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Abstract
Citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics within modem political stmcture in Nepal
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Surrey 
UK
This case study research has examined the resurging poles of belonging that have 
manifested in response to the crisis of citizenship in Nepal. The bourgeoning intensity of 
identity politics and the resulting activism, besides dislocating the post-war consciousness, 
have strengthened the claims to equality and social justice through the narratives of 
recognition, inclusion and power distribution. Through activism, Dalits, indigenous 
peoples, Madhesis and janajatis have attempted to articulate their objection against 
systematic exclusion, monistic state ideology and assimilatory forms of national 
citizenship. I have further raised concerns over the dynamics of identity claims as apparent 
in the narratives of state-resistance vis-à-vis hill nationalities and the Madhesis that depict 
consistent and often conflicting boundaries of interest. Analysing identity politics to be a 
strong insurgency tool, the ‘people’s war’ has advanced its intensity creating an anti-state 
synergy building on the historic wrongdoings by the state on cultural, ethnic, lingual, 
territorial and religious categories. In the process, the traditional ideology sustaining Nepali 
state has collided with the conventional as well as variant forms of identity politics.
I have addressed these complex issues by analysing movements and resistance in the hill 
areas of Nepal and the Terai region and contended that the antagonistic dynamic, appearing 
as a unified and collective front against the Nepali state, inherits complex internal diversity 
and conflicting interests making the traditional concept of national citizenship and national 
identity unattainable. The research takes into account the socio-political developments 
until May 2008, the period during which the 239-year-old Hindu monarchy was abolished 
from the Nepalese political space. ■
Preface
My research on “citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics within modem political 
stmcture in Nepal” aims to study the inherent barriers and constraints to citizenship 
formation within the nation-state model and to identify the roles of social, political and to a 
lesser amount, economic stmctures and institutions along with the associated processes that 
dampen the formation of equal citizenship. The dialectical processes involved underpin the 
milieu for the generation of identity politics in Nepal. It is my argument, therefore, that 
underlying reasons for citizenship crisis bear an intrinsic relationship with the rise of 
identity politics for the analysis of which the theoretical framework must contain the 
principles of political economy without annihilating politics of identity/difference rooted to 
subjective parameters that normally stem from shared culture, religion, membership, 
common experiences, history, symbols etc. of the subject of analysis.
I would like to express my real life experiences that have predominantly determined my 
epistemological position and drawn my world outlook, profoundly shaping my thought 
processes, which I believe are expressed and internalised largely through social 
interactions, praxis and learning processes. Still more, my social class, defined by my 
position within the relations of production and my social status and honour correspond to 
my social identity. It is equally true that my experiences are essentially important in 
making me “think and act strategically in ways which combine intellectual, philosophical, 
technical and practical concerns [...] throughout the systematic and rigorous exercise of 
researching (Manson, 1998:12).
Common language, culture, religion and forms of shared identity are the subjective binding 
units of membership and at the same time, these inclusive elements function to exclude 
non-members from entry; thus creating basic forms of social closure, often expressed in 
forms of varying disjuncture. Rather than through the rigorous calculative alignment of 
interests, the members of the social units are, at all stages, involved in social interaction, 
and in doing so, reinforcing or transforming mutual social behaviours, recreating opinions 
and identities and resisting or enforcing structures. These closures often follow the 
prevalent relationship of production of the material forces, but to comprehend the politics 
of difference or identity politics, the framework of analysis must contain the window of 
political sociology concerned with cultural processes of recognition as well. The analysis of
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the underlying issues of “citizenship crisis and identity politics” requires both the politics 
of production/redistribution and politics of recognition of cultural, religious, lingual and 
other forms of closures to assume the tasks associated with this research.
As a point of departure into the research, I began probing myself on the purpose of this task 
at hand and what formed the social phenomenon or social reality that I thought was worth 
researching. It was initiated with conceptualising elements that formed my ontological 
perspectives. Following this exercise, for a couple of months, I was in position to grapple 
with my epistemological standpoint. “Your epistemology,” opines Mason (1998:2), “is 
literally, your theory of knowledge, and should therefore concern the principles and rules 
by which you decide whether and how social phenomenon can be known and how 
knowledge can be demonstrated.” I made sure that my ontological perspectives and 
epistemological questions were in harmony in the sense that the ontological perspective 
answered the epistemological questions and vice versa. My knowledge and experience in 
the topic of research, literature review and knowledge gained through fieldwork was 
synthesised into a coherent outlook through a reflective process updating and enhancing 
my knowledge at the same time.
Before I advance any further, I would like to briefly mention my experiences and relate my 
position in the context of this research.
i. My location and potentials in the research context
My ontological and epistemological expedition began when I was a child. And in the 
process, alongside my growth and experience, my understanding of the social world has 
also developed and changed. The embedded meanings and their social interpretations have 
substantially grown, all pointing towards my changing epistemological positions. The 
following passages depict the changes and development in the pattern and locale of my 
epistemological position and hence the world outlook.
I was bom in a small and a remote village located in Dang District in the Mid-western 
region of the country. The village, lacking electricity, health, education, transport or any 
other service provisions, was part of my being. I attended a junior school, the only one 
around the area during those days, an hour and a half-walk from my home. The melancholy 
moments during these lonely journeys were my independent learning sessions, while
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wading through flooded rivers or falling over boulders and prickly bushes expressed as 
meagre instants of childhood laughter bore deep meanings remoulding my existence.
During the end of my second year at school, an American volunteer engaged in village 
activities advised my parents that I be sent to a good school since I deserved a better 
education, as I had a full life to live and space for an unlimited growth. My mother being a 
traditional woman could not accept the idea of my departure. She wanted me to be with 
her. On my part, I was ready to accept my parents’ decision.
After three months of discussions, my father finally announced his verdict. I was to be 
taken to Kathmandu and admitted at St. Xavier’s School, which was being run by 
American Jesuit fathers. After the plans were set, we embarked on our journey. Since there 
was no road linking Dang to Kathmandu, we walked for a day and half into the Indian side 
of the border. A jeep ride of flve hours took us to a nearby train station from where we 
began our train journey that lasted the whole night and early hours of the next morning. On 
the third day, we were back into the Nepalese side of the border, at a town called 
Bhairahawa. After travelling over an extremely exhausting distance for two more 
consecutive days and bouncing over intoxicating winding roads through mountainous 
terrains of the Lower Himalayas, we finally arrived in Kathmandu.
I was admitted in class three at St. Xavier’s School, from where I completed my school 
leaving examinations. Needless to say, my father had taken a tremendous risk in admitting 
me there since my family’s financial position was extremely weak. The school provided me 
with the space to grow within Jesuit educational perspectives and practices. It inculcated in 
me the sense of social justice, democracy and moral vision. I realised my confidence 
develop as the education promoted my inner quahties, crushing the associated barriers. The 
education system reinforced democratic culture and social values enabling me to grow into 
a responsible citizen. While at school, I leamt that the spirit of democracy was the 
collective form of efficient and integrated citizens capable of ensuring a self-perpetuating 
free society that avails itself for collective leadership while remaining vigilant over 
democratic rights and freedom. My victory to the presidency of the Student Council, during 
my final year at school was not a concluding achievement; instead, I had discovered in me 
the potentials of competent leadership.
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Thus, the St. Xavier’s system of education was unique in those days, however, the 
internalised democratic values were in conflict with the socio-political settings of the 
country that was under the authoritarian regime of monarch and starkly fragmented into 
class, caste and regional divides. Mid-western region, where I hail from, was the poorest 
region besides being frequently hit by devastating famines and pandemics (this region is 
the seat of Maobadi andolan [Maoist movement] today). Poverty that I had experienced 
during my childhood had inflated nationwide rendering almost everyone poor, exploited, 
and vulnerable. While reading Gandhi, Martin Luther or Robert Frost at school, my 
perception of democracy and freedom, social justice and civil rights began to develop and I 
began to understand that the social world was explainable and that social phenomena were 
indeed comprehensible and thus could be experienced as well as interpreted through ones 
epistemological position.
i i. Further growth
There is no doubt that I was a patriot groomed at school (in that fashion) with daily pledges 
and salute to the national flag during morning assemblies. However, my sense of 
patriotism, which I found out later, was different and often non-congruent with that of the 
rulers’. It was based on democracy and freedom -  more of a utopian category grounded on 
morality devoid of practical politics. My naivety neither fathomed the depth of social or 
political dialectics nor the power relations associated with conflicting or consistent 
interests. As a matter of fact, in those days politics and sociology were not emphasised in 
schools and whatever the content of the syllabus, it was designed to discourage critical 
reflections and argumentative minds. Particularly it was a short visit to the adjourning 
districts of Dang (Rukum, Rolpa, Salyan and Pyuthan)\ after my school graduation, which 
exposed me to the state of acute poverty, exclusion and exploitation -  a social reality that 
existed in those societies. The misery and desolate condition of poverty in some of the 
villages in those districts made me strongly critical over the political superstructure, ruling 
class and elites. I began to experience a shift in my epistemological position believing in 
social structures as the sources to my answers.
After about a month following my tour, I came to Kathmandu and admitted myself for 
further studies. My career in life took a drastic change when some of us like-minded
 ^These were the districts from where the Maobadi andolan began.
colleagues developed a tiny forum for discussing social and political issues and regularly 
debated over various topics of interest. Society, social structures, monarchical 
totalitarianism and his panchayat system of oppression were some of the issues that we 
discussed. We used to conduct these discussions under cover lest the agents of repression 
found us. In this manner, although I was a science student, my interest grew in politics, 
society and social dynamics. It was during these discussion forums that we shared views 
over different political theories and particularly Marxism and Maoism that had attracted 
many youths, partly owing to those revolutionary times marked by worldwide revolutions 
and liberation movements. Asia and Latin America were on fire. Participants in these 
forums continued to grow; while at the same time a country-wide students’ agitation was 
budding, albeit being temporarily latent awaiting a triggering event.
It was in 1979 while I was a student at Trichandra Multiple College that students en-masse 
took into the streets of Kathmandu with a call for general improvement in the education 
system and demand for the freedom to organise. The movement spread like a prairie fire 
engulfing the students’ population throughout the country and extending even into the 
school environments. The government responded in no time, with an unparallel brutal 
force. College and University hostels were ruthlessly attacked. Hundreds were detained, 
while many were injured critically; students were even thrown from the rooftops and 
windows of hostel buildings. However, the barbarous repression fuelled the movement 
even more, promoting a broader solidarity among peasants and workers. Soon the 
countryside woke to the demands of students and thousands of rural peasants, teachers 
alongside the general public marched into district headquarters in support of national 
students’ movement.
In the course of denouncing the first wave of repression, I was detained immediately after 
my speech at Trichandra Multiple College. A, six-month jail sentence was ordered without 
a trial and thus began my jail journeys for apparently demanding nothing more than 
equality and justice, which of course underpinned everything conforming to social political 
theories. Nepal was in turmoil during those years with frequent mass protests and boiling 
students’ movements, and I participated in many of them, as I truly believed in the values 
that I upheld. I was detained and jailed four times during my student life and even tortured 
on one occasion. Starting as a student union Secretary and then President of Trichandra
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Multiple College (through open elections) in subsequent years, I built my way to the central 
level of the most powerful national students’ organisation of that time.
In 1985, owing to ideological conflict and lack of inner-party democracy, I found it 
unconvincing to work within the organisation. My values and ideological attachment 
towards democracy and freedom were stronger than party centralism and iron-fist 
bureaucracy. I opposed Stalinist hegemony, denounced the Cultural Revolution in China 
and questioned the failure of Naxalite movement in India, the communist movements of 
Philippines, Thailand and Burma (which was against the political trend of those times). I 
then left active politics and assumed my higher studies. However, I continued to debate 
over major issues in local newspapers. Thus, these experiences and built-in knowledge base 
provided critical reflection over political events and cross-party leadership that preached 
more than what they practiced.
After completing my Masters degree from Tribhuvan University, I worked at a college as 
an assistant professor of Engineering Geology. During these years, a handful of us created 
a forum by the name of Centre for Nepal Studies for debating political issues. These 
debates were more mature and reasonable than those of my college days. We had 
professional politicians from Communist parties and Democratic parties (all of these parties 
were banned then) participating in secret venues. Finally, in 1990, the monarchical regime 
was challenged by a new level of consciousness and determination, and subsequently, 
within three months of the peoples’ uprising, the monarch had lost his political grip and 
what followed were the disputed years of democracy and Maobadi andolan (Maoist 
movement).
During a brief period in 1997, I had the opportunity to work as an advisor to the deputy 
Prime Minister of Nepal before the government fell from the rising crisis within the ruling 
coalition. During my service, I realised that the sphere of politics, being an ideological and 
practical expression, manifests in association with goals, strategies and policies that 
influence or shape the lives of all including that of general population and those of 
deprived. In this respect, the nature of governance and political settings predominantly 
influence the generated policies and preferences. Even in a congenial political environment, 
inefficiency, corruption and nepotism may carry a state to the brink of failure. It is in 
coordinating the political processes with social and economical paradigms supported by
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efficient policy frameworks that planned outcomes are most likely to be achieved. The 
socio-economic transformation thus becomes stagnant when policies fail to address the 
needs of the people. It is indeed relevant to state here that when these processes do not 
synchronise with social consciousness, conflicts are eminent. When social, political, 
economic and cultural problems are linked to extreme forms of poverty and pegged to 
structures and guided political processes, simple reform packages fail to function. This is 
particularly so when inequality, alienation and oppression are the norms while the core 
issues of social justice, inclusion, identity, multiculturalism and participation never become 
the agenda of the state where the political game is restricted exclusively within a narrow 
band of ruling class and elites possessed in social, cultural and political biasness. State 
neutrality in cultural, religious and lingual affairs along with its proactive role in modelling 
the nature of society is extremely important, as the state is still the central institution 
capable of drafting these changes. The Maobadi andolan thus should be understood as a 
product of dialectical processes that incorporates social problems stemming from the time 
of unification and the state’s role in its efforts to realise the project of a nation-state; 
marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation of a vast proportion of the population from 
social, religious, linguistic, legal and economic perspectives.
Besides visiting many Asian and European countries, I have had the opportunity of 
spending considerable amount of time in the UK. This was during my second Masters 
programme at the University of Reading in 2003-2004. Here, I was exposed to neo- 
Marxism, especially, the comprehension of contesting issues of power, its presence, flow 
paths and its relevance particular to any social organisations being the basics for my 
epistemological stance, prepared me for undertaking this research work.
My experience from the hub of the capitalist economy in Kathmandu to the constituency of 
poverty that deprives the majority of hard-working people of my home district has been 
overwhelming and often emotional. The contrast between the growing culture of 
consumerism in the urban centres and respect for communitarian and republican traditions 
of citizenry in rural livelihoods drew parallels arising from perceived modernism and 
imagined backwardness defining the urban and rural social divides that, to some extent, 
have pervaded social cultures following capitalist globalisation. On the other hand, my 
visits to dozens of foreign countries and especially the European heartlands have exposed
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me to the North-South divides with its imperatives on economic disparity and unfair 
production and distributive systems based on centre -periphery relationships.
Thus, being one of the players in the contemporary politics, I have a genuine firsthand 
experience in the Nepalese social context, as an insider, in the major political events since 
the late 1970s. My active struggles (along side thousands like me) for social transformation 
are in themselves praxis that has transformed my consciousness as well. From another 
angle, the consistent and enduring political struggles for liberty and freedom though time 
and space - more accurately explained as praxis, have been my sources of knowledge 
production that coincide with the process of social transformation.
I have experienced the Maobadi andolan (movement) from proximity in different settings. 
The problems associated with the social, political, economic and regional issues being 
historical in nature involve all of the ethnic categories, faiths, castes and territories in the 
present debate. The nation building process has been questioned whereas the 
‘amalgamating factors’ encouraged as being auspicious during the same process have been 
dragged into the present debate. Forms of movement appear to possess outlines that are 
antagonistic to the ideals of national identity and national citizenship and the historically 
cherished ideology of monarchical nationalism. The politicisation of issues related to ethnic 
closures, cultural differences, regionalism and lingual claims by the Maobadi or the Terai 
andolan have strengthened the rapid undercurrent transforming it to the national level. The 
state, at the moment of completing this thesis was in the process preparing for the 
transformation as anticipated by those claiming for republicanism, democracy, federalism 
and sub-nationalism.
I have had a strong desire for social transformation beginning with me. In addition, I am 
also interested in comprehending the process and evaluate my role as an insider as well as 
an outsider. As part of the process, I have been keen on undertaking the research on 
citizenship crisis and the rise of identity politics in Nepal that shall enable me along with 
others to grasp the knowledge on the topic of research, and more importantly, in bridging 
gap that exists between the rhetoric and reality giving way to major national reforms. As a 
point of departure, I have generated the following main research questions based on my 
experiences, ontological perspectives and epistemological stand.
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i i i. Main research questions
1. What are the underlying reasons behind citizenship crisis and how do they bear with 
the rise of identity politics; how is ethnic politics shaping the nature of citizenship 
being created?
2. What is the nature of ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious, linguistic, and 
regional (geographical) identities in Nepal and how do they communicate, coexist, 
and tolerate the presence of ‘others’ within the modem political environment?
3. How have the political, social and educational policies of the unitary state been 
streamlined to create national citizenship and national identity? How do the 
subjective realities bear dualistic relationships with the official national identity and 
cultural uniformity and what has been the role of the institution of monarchy and 
the Nepalese elite in creating equal citizenship.
4. What are the nature and forms of inherent conflicts between the concept of nation 
state and the practice of citizenship in Nepal, and what are their bearings on the rise 
of identity politics? How have the domestic and global processes contributed to 
these phenomena?
Summary
The concept of citizenship implies certain parameters for defining the relationship between an 
individual and the polity. However, this relationship must transcend its technical boundaries and 
expand into a social category that underpins the values of inclusion, equahty and social justice; the 
notions of which are measured from the degree of human freedoms and choices. In this perspective, 
a free man or women is in essence a true citizen of a polity vis-à-vis the political, civic, social and 
cultural rights that the relationship upholds. Analysis in the Nepalese context demonstrates that the 
crisis of citizenship has been historical, taking into account the existence of caste stmcture, social 
exclusion and inequality cherished by the traditional Hindu orthodoxy. This is where a free man 
needs to emerge from an ‘untouchable’ category as an equal citizen. The Dalits in Nepal are the 
most exploited, vulnerable and socially excluded category.
Citizenship needs to be seen as a momentum concept, unfolding and open-ended, which besides 
confirming the legal status to individuals or groups, seeks to establish the bundle of rights 
associated with equahties and opportunities in all spheres of social and economic life. In this sense, 
citizenship maintains a normative feature that constantly grows as a means of enhancing substantive 
equality on the overall formulations that are bounded by the moral-legal notions of social justice. 
The process must move towards equalising the distribution of power. The participation of Madhesis 
and janajati ehtes in the panchayat politics was based on exploitative compromise and manipulative 
collaboration with the state. Besides faihng to enhance substantive citizenship, the system 
represented a pohtical apparatus, which undermined the social and cultural diversity transfixing to 
the ideals of essentialism. As a historical process, the philosophy and ethos of the Nepali state, the 
role of the institution of monarchy and political tradition of the national parties have contributed to 
the growth of identity pohtics.
Against the backdrop of social exclusion, cultural hegemony and poverty Maobadi andolan spread 
hke a prairie fire. It readily exploited all of the subjective issues through its cultural fronts. The 
issues of self-determination and regional autonomy in the Terai were matched by the call for ethnic 
federations implying the politics of recognition. As a consequence, the Nepali state; institution of 
monarchy; dominant religion, culture, institutionalised traditions and mores; state symbols, official 
national history and experiences have all been brought to the fore in the confUct between the post 
war consciousness and new “identity reawakening”. As the rejection of the product of historically 
acquired social intercourses heightens, reinventing ones identities along ethnic enclaves and tracing 
the imagined communities in their purest forms continues, the pohtical ideological grounds 
sustaining the nation-state and the growing levels of ethnic assertiveness have been revisited.
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Discussion on citizenship, its bearings and historical trajectories
The objective of this research has been to investigate the relationship between the 
underlying reasons of citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics within the modem 
political stmcture of Nepal.
I have located my arguments in; a. the function of elites; b. Maodadi andolan; c. the Terai 
movement; d. the caste hierarchy; e. institution of monarchy and politics; f. the principles 
of nation-state and g. the globalisation process, insisting that these have contributed to the 
‘crisis of citizenship’ more than establishing qualitatively the novel parameters of 
inclusiveness. The genuine environment for equality and social justice is immensely 
lacking. Although this has been the general and gloomy outlook for decades, with the 
emerging politics of identity^ and popular demands for institutional inclusiveness, the 
pressures for equal citizenship are on the rise. In this regard, the politics of identity and 
difference, which I have discussed later in this chapter, and elaborated further in Chapter 2, 
has been the product of these dialectical processes that characterise different social 
formations. As reactions to these ubiquitous experiences and expectations the reinventions 
of social, religious, cultural and lingual boundaries are being explicitly articulated. I have 
further argued that in association with these intercourses, identity and cultural politics have 
contributed to the contemporary social movements and discourses that are shaping the 
nature of citizenship being built on one hand, while on the other, the development of the
 ^ “Identity politics starts from analyses of oppression to recommend, variously, the reclaiming, 
redescription, or transformation of previously stigmatized accounts of group membership. Rather than 
accepting the negative scripts offered by a dominant culture about one's own inferiority, one transforms 
one's own sense of self and community, often through consciousness-raising” (Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy.
Source; http.7/p]ato.stanford.edu/entries/idenl:itv-politics/#i retrieved: 07/01/2007
politics of difference, thereof, has undermined national identity by diluting the 
amalgamating factors perceived vital for national citizenship.
Unlike the roles of the institution of monarchy, the caste system or the principles 
underlying the nation state, the processes such as globalisation or the exercise of 
parliamentary democracy besides others, have provided vital political and social spaces 
necessary for citizenship discourses and identity claims in a context of rising levels of 
social consciousness.
The local trend of identity assertion and ethnic awakening, although accentuated as a global 
phenomenon in later decades, often remains far from being compatible with the liberal 
global discourses and globalisation. Thus, these two trends acting in opposite directions 
also have made a clear and comprehensible appearance in the socio-political lives of 
Nepalese people. This tendency has been to stretch the state and weaken it substantially. In 
this respect, citizenship constitutes an outstanding socio-political issue and through its 
distributive nature, the characteristics of identity have become more articulated and 
sufficiently strengthened in Nepal as a result of citizenship crisis.
My extended engagement in political struggles for liberty and freedom have been my 
sources of knowledge production, and for the same reason much of this research has been 
based on these personal experiences. At the same time, the fieldwork associated with this 
thesis has expanded my knowledge and sharpened my perspectives. I have developed my 
arguments reflecting on my experiences and locating them in relation to existing accounts 
in the literature. Social structures and institutions along with the entailing processes that 
have existed in the planes of perceived and experienced reality have illuminated my 
ontological position.
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will outline the different views and claims over the term ‘citizenship’ and 
present the Nepalese context as part of the general historical process. This section is an 
important part of the general understanding that, in my view, prepares the reader to 
comprehend the present issues with respect to the Nepali state’s historical context enabling 
it to link the socio-political developments that have led to the crisis of citizenship and the 
escalation of the politics of identity. Hence, I have constructed the History of Nepal with
comparative overtones to that of the European nation states and illuminated the historical 
trajectories to locate my arguments. This section commences with a brief discussion on 
citizenship, its comprehensive meaning and use and finally, its implications in the modem 
era.
I have sketched a brief picture of the political connotation of the term ‘citizenship’ tracing 
its historical background. I am concerned here with literature review to bring forth opinions 
and views of various theorists and writers associated with the subject. The term 
‘citizenship’ rather than being just a certain status has been understood to mean identity, an 
expression of one’s membership that transcends the legal and shallow form of citizenship. 
Citizenship in its substantial form is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and 
responsibilities. It is also an identity in a political community based on equal power 
distribution and grounded on moral reasoning. Rather then being tied to classical ideals, the 
argument is to investigate the realities of, and realistic possibilities for, citizenship in the 
political societies of our day.
The notions of nation-state and nationality that have shaped the political argument and 
essence of citizenship in Nepal render it more complicated and problematic. Habermas 
(1995) proposes that although hereditary nationalism gives way into acquired nationalism 
during the nation building processes, the trend, as of today, has been to seek one’s identity 
reaching far into hereditary connections, in spite of the post war national consciousness. 
This evidence is starkly visible in Nepal where ethnic and cultural consciousness has 
unprecedentedly surged as an outstanding socio-political challenge of our day.
The nation-building project that Nepal embarked upon from mid-eighteenth century 
following the unification process requires an analytical explanation. The project built 
around the concept of an empire was by very nature against the elements of democracy and 
citizenship. The political ideology was limited to supporting the project of political 
expansion without the slightest provision of social equality or political and economic 
justice. Following the collision of the Gorkha Empire with the colonial structure of British 
India, the expansionist vision of Nepal came to an abrupt end only to be replaced by feuds 
and battles within the coteries, nobility and ruling elites that characterised the feudal nature 
of the existing political structure.
The culture of domination and oppression charged with xenophobic ideals were inherited 
from the absolutist state and reproduced through political language and action throughout 
the monarchical regime. In later years following the 1970s, the democratic movements 
consolidated as reactions to domestic problems concerned mainly with the political, social 
and economic rights and owe much to the forces of globalisation. Both the positive as well 
as the negative aspects of globalisation have maintained their roles in these socio-political 
processes.
The monarchical regime, being a totalitarian political order offered next to nothing 
concerning equality, social or political freedoms or justice as bundles of citizens’ rights. 
Whatever the limited set of political, social and economic rights (in the form of citizenship 
rights) that were offered by the constitution, these were limited to the ruling class, elites 
and those that reclined in the upper echelons of the social hierarchical orders. The working 
class, exploited and socially excluded, were designated second-class citizens and 
compelled into an underclass status with insignificant, unworthy and undeserving social 
positions.
After the collapse of Soviet Union, many liberation and freedom movements in third world 
countries declined. What Nepal has experienced since then is a gradual rise in the claims 
for identity. Most importantly, the underlying reasons behind the citizenship crises are 
argued to be of historical nature and as a result have continued to furnish the growth of 
identity politics. The history, historical processes and structural arrangements can provide 
meaningful insight to the rise of identity politics in Nepal.
1.2 A brief discussion on citizenship
Most of this section traces the development of citizenship in the European context. 
However, I believe that the notion of citizenship, its applications and practice in different 
historical contexts is also strongly applicable to the political landscape of Nepal. The 
innovative vision underlying the ideals of citizenship possesses the potentials of eroding 
cultural barriers and caste boundaries to diffuse effectively the burgeoning sense of caste 
superiority and ethnocentiism including irredentism and xenophobia. In addition, besides 
the subjective issues centred on the aspects of recognition, the class struggle and class- 
consciousness that underline the theme of distributive justice are in reality the founding 
features of equal citizenship as well.
The discourse on the subject of citizenship has held its currency in modem times as many 
complex problems relating to state-society enclosures and global processes compel us to 
redefine national states. The postcolonial era in general and more specifically the post-cold 
war period has experienced intensification of violence associated with political upheavals, 
growth in xenophobic ideals, and migration-related identity crisis in addition to the increase 
in neo-nationalism and ethnocentiism. This general trend is even visible in societies that 
had adapted to cultural pluralism before. The ascent of Europe into a new political era of 
post nation-state in association with its economic integration has been a complicated affair. 
This stems from the fact that the rise of culture and identity politics bears linkage with the 
failure of social ingeneration in the milieu of unaccountable economic globalisation and 
market imperialism. As a result, the debate over multiculturalism as an indispensable social 
fabric has come in headlong collision with reinforced ethnic and neo-national ideology 
illustrating antagonistic trends that have generated identity conflicts in Europe. Cultural 
politics, being a wide spread phenomenon, has spared no continent and thus the momentum 
has, time and again, called on the context of citizenship to be redefined and political 
theories revisited. It has been amidst this complexity that citizenship forms an outstanding 
issue of contextual debate as a natural outcome. Beiner (1995:1) acknowledges:
The topic of citizenship is of course a large one, and it seems to grow larger day by 
day, as more and more theories are drawn to reflect on many-layered crises that are 
rendering citizenship even more problematical.
However, history reveals that the rights entailing citizenship are conquered rights where 
individuals, groups, nations or cultural identities have acquired, expanded and asserted 
them as Turner (1986:26) emphasises; “The critical factor in the emergence of citizenship 
is violence- that is the over and conscious struggle of social group to achieve social 
participation.”
The word “citizenship” in its classical political sense entails significant historical account, 
traceable to ancient regimes. “Notion of “citizenship” suggests some persuasively 
powerful, though loosely defined, claims about the standing of a person as a member of a 
society or a nation” (Riley, 1992:180). The word being derived from civitas, that originally 
means ‘citizenship’ or a ‘body of citizens’ has its roots extending to the Roman cities, 
where certain rights were allotted to those who were considered to be ‘free’. Ignatieff 
(1995:56) furnishing an account of those times illustrates that “dependent creatures could
not be citizens: slaves, those who worked for wages, women and children who were both 
subject to the authority of the domestic oeconomia were excluded from citizenship”. It was 
apparently an exclusive and ascribed status signifying privilege -  a form of license prized 
by male individuals to be active in the public realm. Aristotle’s image of a citizen was a 
male, a vehement patriarch, fierce warrior and owner of production. He included males 
with landed property, as being capable of performing the duties of a citizen in the public 
realm while private was the concern of the slaves and women. Man, he defined as a 
political animal and citizen the highest order of being. Accordingly, for Aristotle “to 
qualify as a citizen, the individual must be the patriarch of a house hold or oikos, in which 
the labour of slaves and women satisfied his needs and left him free to engage in political 
relationships with his equals” (Pocock, 1995:32); following which, engagement in political 
relationship with his equals was the highest order of being and the central core of public 
good. ‘To rule and to be ruled’ was an expression of a full human being- the highest degree 
of humanity and thus a kata phusin zoon politikon. The Aristotelian model of republican 
tradition and citizenship model offered close to nothing to women and slaves as, “slaves 
would never escape from the material because they were destine to remain instruments, 
things managed by others; women would never escape form the oikos because they were 
destined to remain managers of the slaves and other things” (ibid).
Giving his account of the history of the concept of citizenship Pocock opines:
The advent of jurisprudence moved the concept of the “citizen” form the zoon 
politikon toward the legalis homo, and from the civis or polis towards the bourgeois 
or burger. It further brought about some equation of the “citizen” with the “subject” 
[...] (9195:38).
Citizenship ‘being the quality to rule and be ruled’ idealised by the Greeks for its highest 
form of public good, translated into the relationship between the ‘sovereign’ and the 
‘subject’ in due course of time. As political absolutism within feudal forms of production 
relations developed, the polity and religion were believed inseparable, bringing together the 
public and private into the fore as meaning and essence of citizenship. In early classical 
practice, the ‘the free equals’ participated in political processes and derived laws and tax 
relations that concerned them in the interior. On the exterior, issues related to peace and 
war were formalised through similar decision processes.
“Although the claims of citizenship first articulated in the city-states of the ancient world 
never quite went away, they burst into centre stage in the modem world with the events 
surrounding the French Revolution of 1789” (Pierson, 2004:21) that laid down the 
foundation to the reality of the rights of citizens generating a discourse that later 
crystallised in “the modem theory of citizenship”. The citizenship rights were extended 
exclusively only to the male members of the society. Despite the fact that the Revolution 
expounded the political ideological debate over political rights, it was not until 1944 that 
women won their political rights to take part in democratic elections in France. Built 
around the ideology of republican citizenship, the model derived from the revolution was 
founded on the concept of jus soli. In summation, “The Revolution’s aim, to destroy the 
ancien regime’s privileges and the corporate network defining private interests, was based 
on republican anti-particularism under universalistic principle” (Lefebvre, 2003:3). 
Needless to say, to this day, the republican traditions are in conflict with the liberal view of 
individualism and particularism with respect to the model of citizenship, where vulgarity, 
selfishness, and violence are the norms of the market.
In addition, besides propounding the notion of unitary state, ideas of uniformity and 
homogeneity and expressions of equality and liberty, the revolution established the 
ideology of democracy through popular sovereignty. Civil equality was the metaphor for 
political equality. In the changing political environment, the idea behind citizenship 
underwent substantial changes replacing the traditional ideals with universalist where “the 
revolutionaries set the stage for a vertical relationship between the state and the ‘people’ 
and republican universal principles became the symbols of anti-particularism” (Lefebvre, 
2003:3).
The civil republican tradition of citizenship was premised upon the central core of the 
French revolution. The growth of nationalism and acquirement of nationhood by the 
emerging states redefined the essence of ancient classical citizenship. The necessity of 
individual rights was coterminous to the rise of capitalism and bureaucratisation. Therefore, 
agrees Turner:
Citizenship is a radical and socially disruptive process whereby, though a series of 
expanding processes, social membership becomes increasingly universalistic and 
open-ended (1986:135).
The concept of citizenship has expanded as the emerging social formations and hence it 
continues to do so, unhmited and non-restricted as Hoffman (2004:12) outlining his 
momentum concept asserts, “Static concepts, by way of contrast, are repressively 
hierarchical and divisive. [...] The state, patriarchy and violence are examples of static 
concepts; freedom, autonomy, individuality, citizenship and emancipation are examples of 
momentum concepts” with indefinite expansive scope to represent the unfolding, 
complicated, futuristic societies.
T.H. Marshall presented a simple and an optimistic view regarding the development of 
citizenship in England. He pointed out that with the rise of the modem nation-states during 
the 18‘^  century, civil rights were granted to a small minority that composed the state’s 
landed aristocracy and privileged elites. It was a privilege and form of an unparalleled 
status among the elites. ‘Access to law’ and ‘rights before it’ were categorised as basic 
forms of civil rights that gradually extended during the following centuries. Political rights 
were developed during the 19^  ^ century. Rights such as parliamentary representation, 
councils of local government, growth in party politics, and inclusion of men’s suffrage and 
so on were in Marshall’s view the advancement of political rights. He regarded the 20* 
century as the century of social rights. Thus, in short, citizenship for Marshall was 
represented by law, parliament and the welfare sate, which made three of the most 
important institutions. Furthermore, he saw that with the guarantee of these rights, formal 
equality is achieved that could establish equality in otherwise a class and status divided 
hierarchical social orders in England. Referring to the development of citizenship and 
movements for social rights Turner (1986:26) stresses that the “primary instance of the 
violence is class conflict and we can define the main issue in class relationship an issue 
about genuine participation and control.” Marshall visualised a ‘happy ending and taken 
for granted’ scenario with respect to citizenship rights and entitlements, which in his view 
would dispel social inequality, state of destitution and forms of social evil, especially with 
the establishment of social rights. He empathetically proclaimed as Riley (1992:202) 
outlines:
Class-abatement is still the aim of social rights, but it has acquired a new meaning. It 
is no longer merely an attempt to abate the obvious nuisance of destitution in the 
lowest ranks of society. It has assumed the guise of action modifying the whole 
pattern of social inequality. It is no longer content to raise the floor-level in the 
basement of the social edifice, leaving the superstructure as it was. It has begun to 
remodel the whole building, and it might even end by converting a skyscraper into a 
bungalow.
Marshall’s historical account of citizenship is hard to visualise in the present context of 
eroding sovereignty where nation-states have undergone substantial evolution from the 
pressures of global integration and growing interdependency. His nation-state-centric 
account of the development of citizenship fails to consider the present-day complexity 
involving ‘cultural reawakening’ and identity politics. In addition, the relationship that 
citizenship enjoys with capitalism is not a happy-ending story as Marshall predicts. Giving 
account of the threat posed by capitalism to citizenship Heater (2002:10) emphasis:
We must not forget that the citizenship model presents a state composed of citizens 
of equal status, equally enjoying their rights and relating to the state by virtue of 
those rights and concomitant duties. Capitalism weakens this egalitarian political 
structure by giving primacy to economic relationships.
Universal equality in Marshall’s vision therefore is a debatable issue: “so much so the 
citizenship has itself become in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social 
inequality” (Torres, 1998:106). Emphasising Pateman’s view, Torres (1998:112) further 
stresses that, “He (Marshall) fails to ask whether rights are of equal worth to all citizens, 
[...], whether citizenship means the same for all individuals. [...]. He did not consider 
whether there were other citizens who might be described as second-class.” As a general 
fact, the very nature of capitalism and the desire to maximize profits reproduces inequality 
displacing the moral standing of the conception of equal citizenship.
In spite of the egalitarian promises of today that the modem theory of citizenship upholds 
and democratic participation as the praxis, the reality of political societies, however, have 
demanded that rights and obligations be redefined, being firmly based on practicality and 
possibilities, leaving the classical ideals aside. Rejecting Platonic arguments on moral 
values and objectives of political society, Flathman (1995:109) stresses that these 
arguments “invoke authority and subordination to authority as essential elements on a 
proper moral and political order.” The ideal of high citizenship then may have to be re­
examined “in fight of the relationship between the ideal and political phenomenon [...]” 
(ibid). Following this debate, we can now focus on a fairly accommodative term within the 
modem context, thus as Held (1995:66) insists:
Citizenship is a status, which, in principle, bestows upon individuals equal rights and 
duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities [within] the political 
community.
“The nature of citizenship, like that of the state, is a question which is often disputed: there 
is no general agreement of a single definition: a man who is a citizen in a democracy is 
often not in an oligarchy” (Brubaker, 1994:1) and by the same token, a ‘citizen’ in a 
dictatorial regime is often not a citizen in a democratic polity. Opines Pierson, “yet, 
paradoxically, modem citizenship is a form of status relationship. Citizenship is 
conventionally an ascribed quality [...]” (2004:110).
Including the identity concept resulting from one’s membership, Kymlicka (1995:301) 
expands the concept further stating that.
Citizenship is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities.
It is also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community.
In political discourse, ‘citizenship’ as a set of rights and as a means of equality, has been 
coterminous to the development of class societies and political communities where 
stmggles over ascertaining them have shaped modem societies. Although the classical ideal 
of those early societies, and on which the theory of citizenship was conceptualised, it was 
never translated to practice. “Accordingly, political scientists must resolutely set the 
classical ideal aside and investigate the realities of and realistic possibilities for citizenship 
in the political societies of our day” (Flathman, 1995:106). This is especially so as the 
growing complexity of the world has subjected the contemporary notion of citizenship to a 
tight scmtiny. Hoffman (2004:13) points out that “citizenship is an on-going stmggle with 
no stopping point. It is not that the ends of an inclusive citizenship are not important: it is 
rather that achieving one enables us to move to the next, ad infinitum.” The increased level 
of ethnic or religious consciousness in Nepal should be viewed as an ongoing stmggle for 
realizing a more inclusive and less discriminatory form of citizenship.
1.3. Ethnic and cultural aspects of citizenship
Until a few decades back, ethnic or the cultural aspects of citizenship were rarely discussed 
and likewise the liberal theory or the Marxist traditions assumed these aspects to melt into 
the mainstream culture. Later, the “political theories in the 1970s and 1980s focused 
primarily on what Rawls called the ‘basic structures of society: constitutional rights; 
political decision-making procedures, social institutions” (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000:6). 
The state in liberal traditions may be analysed through the system of political
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representation, participation and accountability, or as a living relationship between state 
and citizenship. And thus the traditions “emphasises the question of state power, 
particularly state actions that relate to class structures, including means, models, and 
institutions of political coercion” (Torres, 1998:26). All these traditions within the liberal 
systems acknowledge that many of the processes described by dominance -  as exclusion, 
inequality, exploitation, oppression etc. are hard facts that are active within societies and 
thus remain so within the jurisdiction of the state. Since the 1990s, traditional view of 
difference-blind citizenship including the idea of the neutral state have been critically 
challenged as the models of traditional citizenship proved incompetent in accommodating 
the real facts of ethnic or cultural diversity. It is now an accepted fact that the rights of 
ethnocultural groups should be respected; treating all individuals equally without taking 
account of their social diversity or cultural backgrounds is to treat them unequally.
In the real world today, ideal citizenship is expected to be “intimately linked to the ideal of 
individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the 
other” (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995:283). It is in this respect, Kymlicka and Norman 
(2000:10) point out:
The functioning of a society depends not only on the justice of its institutions or 
constitution, but also on the virtues, identities, and practices of its citizens including 
their ability to cooperate, deliberate and feel solidarity with those who belong to 
different ethnic and religious groups.
Nepal being rich in cultural diversity is a home to over hundred ethnic groups. The nation- 
building process has disregarded the essence of ethnic diversity and located its national 
pride in the assimilation and subjugation of indigenous and ethnic groups. As the general 
trend “despite three several centuries of systematic homogenization, nation-states have not 
succeeded in suppressing regional, ethnic and cultural diversities (Parekh, 2005:14).” I 
have argued throughout the thesis that since social and cultural diversity enriches societies 
and it is worth cherishing, Nepal needs to institutionalise equal citizenship putting it into 
the contemporary perspectives. Transformation from ‘subjects’ to ‘citizens’ entails 
freedom, however, in absence of the values of equality and social justice, equal citizenship 
is untenable.
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1.4. Nation, nation-state and nationalism
Providing a baseline definition of nation, Kellas (1998:3) states, “A nation is a group of 
people who feel themselves to be commonly bound together by ties of history, culture and 
common ancestry”. The group may reveal their collective forms and sense of belonging 
through common language, religion, descent and culture. Most modem nations are 
multinational states, possessing more than one nation at sub-national level. Smith’s idea 
that nation-state, a political organisation of western origin, imparted dichotomous 
conception during the process of formation, appears appealing. While describing the events 
that followed. Smith (1991:11) suggests “The western conception gave way to the nation­
state and emerged as two different concepts at close conjunction with each other: the new 
kind of polity -  the national state -  and a new kind of community -  the territorial nation”. 
He holds the view that western nations were characteristically cultural communities while 
the non-western nations represented the ethnic groups with ideals of ethnocentrism, 
offering a distinct form of social psychology. “Ethnic groups are generally differentiated 
form nations on several dimensions: they are usually smaller, they are more clearly based 
on common ancestry [...]. Ethnic groups are exclusive or ascriptive” (1998:5). The 
exclusive or ascriptive nature of membership arises from social closures where the 
interfacial boundaries are non-porous. Here, the nation was the community of common 
descent tied to additional properties of common language, customs traditions etc. Although 
this would be the genral case in Nepal, it is equally important to comprehend that not all 
ethnic groups are always based on common ancestry; for exmaple, the Newars. The cultural 
communities of the western model nations were based on legal-political equality of 
members, common civic culture and political ideology. Among the most comprehensive 
definitions of a nation, Stalin’s view that,
A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis 
of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture ^
is the most comprehensive, and includes all of the outstanding subjective features. He 
readily emphasises the features of history, culture, language, economic life, territory
 ^Source: http://w%'%'.marxists.ora/reference/arcbive/stalin/works/l 913/03.htm#s 1 
Retrieved 15/11/2008
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including the instances of psychological make-up for defining a nation. Stalin however 
abstains from locating his argument in real terms. The definition stems from an idealist 
perspective, hard to encounter where all the features are met on a universal account. On the 
other hand, Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that nations are "imagined communities.” 
Referring to his work, Bruner (2005:316) highlights that “all communities larger than 
primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined. Communities are distinguished not 
by their truth or their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.” 
This means that the relations are understood based on imaginations where the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Seeking a 
similar ground. Hall (1992:77) insists:
If we feel we have a unified identity ...it is only because we construct a comforting 
story or ‘narrative of the self about ourselves...The fully unified, completed, secure 
and coherent is a fantasy (in Tariq Modood, 2000:177).
The generic meaning of “nations” in the United Nations’ Charter is coterminous to that of 
“state” and the idea involves the “nations of the world.” It is a matter of empirical fact that 
nations existed as pre-political entities before the advent of modem nation-states and at 
present, many ethnic social organisations have been excluded from national political 
organisations. Non-inclusion of ethnic minorities and sub-cultures within the majority 
composing the nation at national level, to this day, have been rendered the status of ‘second 
class citizens’ - the ominous fact inherent in the principle of ‘the mle of majority. In this 
regard, citizenship based on nations and national identities appears parochialistic and 
exhibits hmited freedom of inclusion at national level. The modem nation-state being 
rooted to the ideals of nationalism, self-determination, sovereignty, independency and 
authority has in one way or the other generated a bottleneck for inclusion and consequently 
devised exclusive measures, which to this day hold significant political implications. Thus, 
the state in this sense is regarded not only as the
centre actor, in preserving (or challenging) class distinctions, but also is crossed by, 
and is the location of, a host of other key social struggles based on race and ethnicity, 
gender, geographical location, and ethical, moral, religious and sexual preferences 
(Torres, 1998:29).
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The ethos of national identity has partly been the fuel supplying the readily needed passion 
for nationalism. The identity may overlap from one that is ethnocentric with ascriptive and 
exclusive boundaries to membership of a wider cultural or political community as the 
nation. The national political status of citizenship would further extend beyond creating 
dual or multiple identities in terms of citizenship at national level. In terms of identity and 
the characteristics of nationalists propounding the ideals of nationalism, political theorists 
and sociologists have made efforts to view through various angles, the most prominent of 
them being the social class approach and the elitist approach. Argues Kellas (1998:31):
Nationalists are clearly idealists since they propound the idea of the nation and the 
ideology of nationalism. They are also people with interests of their own to promote, 
whether it be feudal power relation to a monarchy, or a material of psychic advantage 
as individuals or members of a group. So, nationalist ideology is a justification for 
the pursuit of self-interest.
Max Weber in his effort to define a modem state outlined the logical explanation of the 
monopoly of the legitimacy and use o f force in his effort to establish many of the 
parameters of the modem state embedded in the processes of nationhood. Quoting Weber, 
Pierson (2004:5) writes:
The state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some 
political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has 
always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as 
political ones...Ultimately, one can define the modem state only in terms of the 
specified means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of 
physical force.
Discussing the generic form of the modem state argues Bmbaker (1994:27), it “is not only 
a territorial state, embedded in a system of coordinate territorial states; it is also a nation­
state.” The nature of selective entrance that I have discussed earlier restricts the entry and 
therefore the provision of participation to those defined as ‘aliens’. In addition, the 
participatory space within the territorial state may be restricted through set of mles and 
processes creating social closures. “In this sense, national sovereignty came to be seen as 
the defining principle of political organisation, and the principal vehicle for managing, if 
not resolving, class, ethnic or religious conflict within and between nations” (Camilleri, 
1993:28). However, “nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common 
ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise
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their civil rights” (Habermas, 1995:258). All nation-states draw their legitimate capacity 
from the popular sovereignty that they proclaim and it also represents the “common idiom 
of contemporary political feeling, the natural political sentiment for modem states” 
(Bmbaker, 1994:29).
As an organised space, the modem state developed into a sovereign entity with centralised 
administrative and legal powers, ardently devoted to territorial defence against foreign 
interventions. The state function, being linked to economy and war, created a congenial 
environment for the growth of property relations laying down foundations for the 
industrialisation process and the generation of yet newer forms of social organisations in 
the course of historical development with substantial advancement in citizenship. Giving 
account of the nations-state, Bmbaker (1994:23) outlines:
The nation-state is architect and guarantor of a nurhber of distinctively modem forms 
of closures. These are embodied in such institutions and practices as the territorial 
border, universal suffrage, universal military service, and naturalisation.
The term “nation” and the cluster of associated concepts- nation-state, national community, 
national consciousness, nationality and nationalism, opines James (1996:9), “are vague, 
elusive and historically changing concepts.” Nations are in general defined on the basis of 
national identity; however, the definition is restrictive in the sense of accommodating 
divergent social associations and ethnicities - culturally different, where membership 
definitions include territoriality and nationality.
Drawing from these discussions it would be relevant to consider the term “nation” and the 
cluster of associated concepts as being relatively modem; that made their appearance in 
literature in phase with the advent of modem nation-state. In its distinctive modem sense 
according to Greenfield (1992:7) national identity is “[...] an identity which derives form 
membership in a ‘people’, the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is defined as ‘a 
nation’”.
There is no doubt that the best example in the contemporary world is offered by the nature 
of political organisations that crystallised after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new 
founded states possessed the spirit of identity and nationalism, and the evolving new 
nationhood readily organised itself around the value-laden ideology -  the recipe of
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nationalism. Consequently, the new territorial entities accommodated communities in 
pursuit of identity based on common religion, culture, language that principally provided 
them with the sense of belonging and the sense of common historical destiny -  these being 
the homogenising factors. Discussing the similar issue of German unification (of 1990) 
with respect to the republican usage of term nation-sate, Habermas (1995:256) points out 
“nation-state is stripped of precisely those prepolitical connotations with which the 
expression was laden in modem Europe.” The birth of new nations, stringently points 
towards the ethos of collectivistic assumptions. “Loosing the semantic connections between 
national citizenship and national identity takes into account that the classic form of the 
nation-state is at present disintegrating” (ibid). German unification and formation of new 
states during the 1990s, however, provide characteristics of a converse trend. Although 
hereditary nationalism gave way to acquired nationalism during the nation building 
process, the trend has been to seek one’s identity reaching far into hereditary connection, in 
spite of the post war national consciousness. This multifaceted phenomenon has recently 
grown being rooted into the nationalist ideology buttressing neo-nationalism; 
ethnocentrism and the politics of difference that have appeared as major challenges on 
global scale.
It is specifically in this context, where underlying reasons of citizenship crisis in Nepal 
correlate with and underpin the growth of identity politics, that this research has been 
concemed. With the preceding introduction and a theoretical debate on the concepts, 
assumption and practice of citizenship, I now advance into the next section where I shed 
light on “citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics in Nepal.” By the terms “identity 
politics” I refer to the ideal definition presented by Charles Taylor where he insists that the 
“modem identity is characterized by an emphasis on its inner voice and capacity for 
authenticity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"^ maps out a comprehensive definition 
of identity politics taking into account of Sonia Kmks’s work with respect to the modem 
times, where she suggests:
 ^Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edU/entries/identitv-politics/#l 
 ^http://plato.stanford.edU/entries/identitv-politic.s/#l 
Retrieved: 15/11/2008
16
What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-identarian forms 
of the politics of recognition is its demand for recognition on the basis of the very 
grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women, qua 
blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion 
within the fold of “universal humankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor 
is it for respect “in spite o f’ one's differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for 
oneself as different.
The intensity of identity politics that has surged during the later decades in Nepal has been 
a strong source of empowerment and political mobilization. As I advance further into my 
research, I will discuss this in detail linking it with the crisis of citizenship.
1.5. Citizenship crisis and growth of identity politics in Nepal
In light of the discussions on the attempts of various social and political scientists to 
theorise the term and examine the idea behind the term “citizenship” I have, in this section, 
analysed the subject within the context of Nepal.
Throughout the evolution beginning with the formation of the ancient cities to the 
American and French revolutions and in addition to the political developments during the 
centuries that followed, the ethos embedded in freedom, independence, civility and society 
have shaped the political theory and ideas underlying citizenship. In effect, there has been a 
general evolution of societies towards democratic values, processes and institutions. “[...] 
the disappearance of natural determination, which was once linked to the person of the 
prince or to the existence of a nobility, leads to the emergence of a purely social society in 
which the people, the nation and the state take on the status of universal entities, and in 
which any individual or group can be accorded the same status” (Lefort, 1988:18). The 
transformation of societies from totalitarian organisations and tyrannical ethos to popular 
sovereignty has invigorated the generation of citizenship and the ideology behind citizen 
rights has called for the actualisation of equal citizenship and full participation. This is 
particularly so as “the singular thing about the freedoms proclaimed at the end of the 
eighteenth century is that they are in effect indissociable from the birth of democratic 
debate” (Lefort, 1988:39).
As Nepal moves forward in its democratic process, the forces of liberalism have been 
performing the decisive role in its political discourse in both form and substance 
conforming to its modality. Triumphant liberal democracy has offered Nepal with no
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alternatives; particularly, as it is “the almost sole legitimate form of government [...]” 
(Heater, 2002:33). The April 2006 movement, as the symbol of liberation and political 
freedom, and as a classic movement against the sovereign, possesses the liberal egalitarian 
forms of political conception of citizenship rooted to the traditions of liberal democracy as 
a universal antidote within the Nepalese context as well.
With the advent of democracy in Nepal, the burgeoning ethnic voice as the major element 
of identity politics contains demands for equality and social justice through political 
participation and sharing of state power. The state, ruling class, elites and those in the 
upper echelons of social hierarchy have been challenged by the bourgeoning identity 
politics with the tendency of establishing multiethnic policies and equal citizenship 
replacing the unitary principles that have governed the political life of the state for 
centuries. The exclusive power regimes of the past have been judged as being extremely 
coercive and excessively centralised. The swelling surges of ethnic, cultural, religious and 
gender movements of Nepal have demanded inclusive and democratic conceptions of 
identity unlike those of the past, which were non-negotiable to the extent of being 
absolutist. It would be justifiable to emphasise that this trend has been on the rise since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union where violent conflicts associated with ethnic and cultural 
ingredients are universal, including the most powerful democracies. Underlying reasons for 
what Markus (1998:246) calls “self awakening of these groups of population” while 
describing the escalating identity assertions of the more recent times. He concedes to the 
explanation, “the exclusionary policies exercised by the dominant nation vis-à-vis these 
groups” (ibid) for the resurgence of the politics of recognition. This analysis fits in well 
within the context of Nepal in describing the factors contributing to ethnic consciousness 
and therefore to the rise of identity politics.
The newly founded political structures based on liberal democracy in Nepal have neither 
succeeded in meeting the demands of identity politics nor been able to abate conflicts 
arising from it that have contributed to the crisis of citizenship. It has been a general trend 
elsewhere that the constant challenges and threats arising from social, religious, cultural 
and political backgrounds have undermined the fundamentals of the political theory of 
liberalism within post-colonial democracies. In similar situations, governments, rather than 
moving positively towards the recourse to accommodation of differences, have engaged in 
crisis management thus escalating the conflict situation even further. The one-party
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dictatorial regime in the name of panchayat^ or the policies of assimilation during the 
epochs of nation building have now been outdated. Kymlicka and Norman (2000) stress 
“nineteenth century policies aimed at hegemonic control or assimilation may be out of date 
[...]” and cultural relationships and ethnic diversity need to be viewed under emerging 
political challenges where former methods of eliminating and managing differences are 
devoid of any political scope at present, and for the same token, neither will they in future.
The dispute over individual rights versus collective or group right forms the core substance 
in settling potential conflicts between minority and majority cultures. In a condition where 
Nepali state represents the culture of the dominant that substantially differs from the sub­
national cultures, the emergence of identity politics may be a considered a natural outcome. 
Oppression and internal colonisation of the Terai has also created an acute environment of 
prejudice and discrimination. Thus, these and similar underlying issues express the reality 
behind citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics in Nepal. It therefore becomes 
imperative that we comprehend “how these claims arise from social relations of dominance 
and disadvantage, of oppression and resistance” (Baubock, 1998:37). To comprehend the 
social dialectics it is necessary that we visit the history of Nepal^ for analysis.
It has now been a recognised fact that “modem states are by their very nature not culturally 
neutral but organise the reproduction of dominant national culture” (Baubock, 1998:36). hi 
addition, these states are extremely complicated where culture or any other social constmct 
cannot be isolated from economy and politics. Thus, when viewed from this angle, 
opportunity and participation becomes crucial, as economic wellbeing and political 
participation of citizens form some of the fundamental issues that underline the practice of 
citizenship in real-world practice.
 ^ ‘Panchayat’ was the formal name given to the one-party political system that functioned under the 
directives of the King. The oppressive system for many reflected a predatory state where even the basic 
notions of diversity and difference were not tolerated. The king and the state merged as one, placing the 
monarch above the constitution of a centralised unitary state. The end goal of this system was to ensure 
the king’s position. I will discuss about this mato suhawoone byavasta (system suiting the soil) in later 
chapters.
 ^Please read the history in the annex. I have presented the general history and also included the 
comparison of the Nepali state development with western patterns. This section discusses the formation 
of the state as a historical account including the development of state ideology and nationalism within 
modern political structure of Nepal. The historical process, holding key to the regressive account o f 
citizenship, is imperative as it is argued that these processes and structures have been contributing to 
the rise of identity politics. The content presents an essential interconnectivity between the issues of 
citizenship crisis and the surge of identity politics.
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In the modem political stmcture of Nepal, citizenship has been a form of status by ‘state 
crafted’ legal standards. It is interesting to note that the long drawn debates over the 
validity of equality per se embedded in the term, rarely demonstrate its significance in 
either its theoretical implications or in real practice. Furthermore, citizenship crisis and 
identity politics in Nepal draws most significantly from the fact that the idea of citizenship 
has remained empty and insignificant over the decades as the majority of the population 
has been, in Heater’s (2002:3) words, “deprived as they are of virtually all its attributes”. It 
has been the political, cultural and economic elites enjoying the status of citizenship while 
almost all of the remaining population were oppressed and rendered invisible during the 
king’s dictatorial regime. The social structures and active processes have legitimised the 
status quo furnishing the underlying causes for the rise of identity politics.
Thus, when I discuss such a relevant and complicated issue of citizenship crisis and identity 
politics in Nepal, I accept its uniqueness, adaptability and sustenance with relevance to its 
historical, material, legal, political, social and economic environment of existence. The 
trials, associated with the reinvention of nation-hood through historical journeys beginning 
with the unification, Rana regime, absolute monarchy and the brief democratic period, have 
shaped the nature of identity politics.
1.6. Democratic movements and globalisation
Nepal is at the crossroads of redefining its official nationalism, after the historic movement 
of April 2006. Efforts have been made to shift away from its imperial and expansionist 
version of nationalism and national identity that were centred on the omnipotent and 
omnipresent monarch. The movements, particularly following the sixties, have emphasised 
on the necessity of a democratic state with a clear emphasis on bringing an end to the 
prevailing monarch-subject relationship.
As the political, social, historical and religious explanations offered in support of absolute 
monarchical regime have lost their pohtical justification and the moral grounds to their 
favour, the institution has shrunk without any likelihood of revival. The burgeoning 
identity politics in Nepal has its intrinsic relationship with the institution of monarchy, 
especially as it represents the dominant pohtical, social, religious, cultural, lingual and 
regional aspects of everyday life that define the parameters of identity. The identity claims 
revolving around these issues, therefore, are closely linked with socio-economic inequality.
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exploitation and alienation of broad masses including the process of Hinduization and 
sanskritization of ethnic cultures, religions, traditions and folk way of life. Furthermore, the 
claims to redefine national identity sprouts from lingual perspective as well, where the 
Nepali language has been declared the official national language while the national 
symbols are limited to preserving the culture, geographic meanings, and official history of 
the dominant. The monarchical institution has been identified here as being central to the 
different perspectives discussed and I emphasise that its role cannot be minimised.
The national movements that Nepal has experienced have been immensely influenced by 
international forces, especially India. During the interim period of 1951-1959, Rose and 
Scholz (1980) affirm the relationship to have been inconsistent, troublesome and often 
contentious. The political pressures often derived from its security perspectives have had 
intimidating affects on the sovereignty of Nepal. Since conclusion of the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship with independent India and under its patronage, Nepal has been viewed as 
having lost its sovereign status. I insist that the Treaty that was concluded with the 
collapsing Rana regime, should no longer be binding, and that its abrogation is the way 
forward to restore the sense of trust between the two neighbours. Balanced and mutually 
beneficial agreements need to be worked out with good intentions. In addition to the 
treaties and agreements that Nepalese people perceive as being “unilateral,” the issue of an 
unmanaged and open border between the two countries has been one of the fundamental 
reasons behind the bourgeoning sense of suspicion and mistrust. The recent incidents^ 
related to the encroachment of Nepali soil by Indian settlers along the border have yet to be 
settled. While the projects involving water management, joint-ventures and trade relations
’ Nepal Committee objects to Indian claim KATHMANDU: The parliamentary team, which had visited 
Dang district to inspect the encroachment of Nepali soil by the Indian side, has objected to the 
statement made by the Indian official over the incident. The team has also suggested the government to 
constitute a border security force and depute along the Nepal-India border. Unveiling the report 
prepared by the International Relations and Human Rights Committee (IRHRC) under the Legislature- 
Parliament, IRHRC Chairman Padam Lai Bishwokarma said the statement made by Indian Foreign 
Secretary Shiv Shanker Menon, who recently visited Nepal, was irresponsible and objectionable. 
“Labeling the border encroachment issue of Dang as rumour is condemnable and irresponsible,” he 
said. Menon in his Nepal visit some two weeks ago had denied of border encroachment from the Indian 
side. The committee has concluded that encroachment and excesses from the Indian side is still 
unchecked in the bordering villages of Dang and Bara districts. The 19-point suggestion presented by 
the committee includes constitution of a border security force and use of identity cards for cross-border 
movement, among others.
The parliamentary team was formed to study the encroachment of Nepali territories in Dang district by 
Indian side after incidents of excesses from the Indian SSB along the Nepal-India border.
Source: South Asian News Agency
http://www.sananews.com.pk/english/2009/07/08/nepa]-committe-obiects-to-indian-claiiTi/ 
retrieved: 03/08/2009
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with India have often been subjected to disputes, so too have been India’s involvement in 
Nepalese internal affairs.
In the modem sense of globalisation, Nepal has remained on the periphery. Nonetheless, 
the process as a whole has significantly affected the urban livelihoods. In similar vein, the 
rural sector is not free from the process either. Lives are being shaped through policy 
regimes and government initiatives, if not directly from the international financial capital or 
direct investment schemes of multi-nationals.
The globalisation of politics has been one of the predominant features for the last few 
decades. Globalisation of culture and the globalisation of the market have accompanied and 
shaped the political processes. The 1950 movement was the first of its nature. Being part of 
the pan-Asian anti-imperialist movement, its success was mainly concemed with the issues 
of nationalism and national identity. The years following the seventies saw a gradual and 
steady growth of political activism. The political developments during this time represented 
the growth of the Communist party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) and leftist ideology, the 
resurgence and assertion of political consciousness, urgency of universal suffrage and the 
necessity of a constitutional monarchy. The issues comprising this growth of awareness 
were the product of domestic socio-political processes simultaneously being shaped by the 
globalisation discourses.
In a similar manner, the ethos in support of the essentiality and centrality of the monarchy 
gradually decayed, decreasing the classical and traditional sentiments in religion and 
politics with a gradual shift towards social liberalisation. The all-out effect was a condition 
of social transition. While forms of transition in and around urban centres were strongly 
evident, the vast mral population was left unaffected. This built in a second tier of 
contradiction between the urban thought processes and mral reality, detaching the political 
leadership and urban elites from mral lives. The globalized class and elitists, political 
leaders including intellectuals, represented the global processes and advocated vague ideas 
that bore no meaning to the common people.
Against this backdrop, the anti-panchayat movement of 1990 was no exception in the sense 
that it kicked off with demands for human rights and political freedom as many revolts 
conjure up in post-colonial democracies. Most of the groundwork had been completed by
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forces antagonistic to the monarch, in anticipation of a triggering agent. India, seeking an 
advantageous political opportunity clamped an embargo by choking off its exports to Nepal 
over the cause of disputes in the renegotiation of the Trade and Transit Treaty that had 
failed to materialise with Kathmandu. The shortage of goods and services sparked the 
movement that overthrew the panchayat regime.
Democratic movements of 1950 that followed the anti-imperialist victory in India were 
virtually an inevitable political achievement or a natural outcome based on new level of 
social consciousness and resurgence of nationalism. On the global scale. South Asian and 
African liberations also had their impacts on the Nepalese political processes. In this 
respect, the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy, in addition to Nepal’s domestic reality, was 
the result of global inspiration and the product of the pan-awakening reality. The 
movement of 1990 was part of the third wave of democracy, internally being built on issues 
of human rights, democracy and social justice that promised progress and development 
with the opportunity of equal citizenship that fundamentally failed to materialise.
The anti-colonial movements were charged with sentiments of nationalism and national 
identity associated with the nation building process. As we survey the political nature of the 
movements following the later time frameworks, it is self evident that democracy, freedom 
and equal citizenship have been the inherent characteristics. At the same time, the growth 
of identity politics has also contributed to the weakening of official nationalism as a 
political tool. The local trend of identity assertiveness or ethnic reawakening, and the 
discourse of globalisation, have been acting in opposite directions, stretching the state and 
weakening it substantially. In this respect, citizenship constitutes an outstanding socio­
political issue and through its distributive nature, the characteristics of identity politics have 
been articulated, as Nepal embarks into the 21®^ century.
I have presented a brief account of the Nepali state, including the relevant literature on 
citizenship. I have also included Nepal’s state building process (outlined as history in the 
annex) including the sensitive elements of nationalism, democracy and the institution of 
monarchy within local and global contexts. I shall now proceed to Chapter 2 where I will 
discuss the problem context and advanced my theoretical framework.
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Problem context, research questions and theoretical framework
2.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the major challenges that have evolved from the state’s political 
stand over the issues in which the ethos of citizenship is anchored. The main debate of this 
research, being concemed around the theme of “citizenship crisis and rise of identity 
politics within the modem political structure in Nepal”, this section introduces readers to 
the complexity of social, political, cultural, economic, and lingual challenges among others 
that tend to dampen the possibility of equal citizenship. I have built my arguments around; 
a. the institution of monarchy, b. the stmcture of the state, c. adopted political systems and 
practices, d. hierarchical social stmctures and the caste system, e. the globalisation process, 
for later debates. I have indicated the unitary principles of the nation state and the 
associated project of social, political, cultural, ethnic, religious and lingual homogenisation 
in Nepal’s effort to gain its nationhood. I have also discussed the situation of exclusion, 
active global processes and inherent ideological conflicts.
Many of these challenges possess historic roots despite their being significantly 
pronounced during the sixteen-year tenure of the state’s democratic polity (1990-2006). I 
have tried to trace them presenting a short account of the historical trajectories that are 
visible as complex multi-faceted and multilayered forms. Similarly, the inherent theoretical 
and political incompatibilities between the concept of nation-state and democratic 
citizenship have been raised for further debate. This chapter, being devoted to exploration 
rather than explanations or analysis, is a prelude to the discussions that will follow in 
subsequent chapters.
After identifying the major problems, under the general heading of ‘Profile of Nepal,’ I 
have moved on to elaborate some of the outstanding issues under a separate title of 
“discussion”, highlighting the present socio-political trend and the issue of citizenship in
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general. In the section under the heading of “problem context,” I have identified the 
problem (topic) of investigation. Besides drawing the main questions for researching, I 
have also generated a set of specific questions in this chapter.
In Section B of this chapter I have discussed the framework for my research. The analytical 
framework incorporates the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition. I have 
amalgamated these separate theoretical principles emphasising the point that to 
comprehend the citizenship crisis and the rise of the identity politics in Nepal both of these 
postulations are vital. This union furnishes a comprehensive understanding and a pragmatic 
basis for the interpretation of the social processes, including the boundaries of prevalent 
contradictions on both the objective as well as the subjective issues, their differences and 
salient divides.
Figure 2.1 : Map of Nepal
2.1.1. Profile of Nepal: an introduction
Nepal is a land-locked country situated between China and India. It has an area of 147,181 
sq. km (56,827 sq. miles). The Himalayan region extends along the northern border 
stretching east to west while the hills and the valleys occupy the central region. Fertile 
plain lands occupy the Southern strip. Nepal is divided into five physiographic zones from 
North to South. These are - Higher Himalayas, Midland valleys, Mahabharat range, 
Siwaliks and the Terai.
Source: http://www.worldcountnes.info/Maps/Repion/Asia-450-Nepal.jpc retrieved: 10/11/2008
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Fig 2.2 Map of Nepal with its political divisions (zones)
Of the total land area, only 16% is suitable for cultivation. The total population of Nepal is 
23 million, 50% of whom are living below the poverty line. “Land is the major form of 
asset, and agriculture is the major occupation in which some 80.2 percent of labour force is 
engaged” (GEFONT, 2005: 20). Despite the dismal state, the farm sector is contributing 
40% to the GDP. According to National Living Standard Survey (NLSS, 1996), 4/5 of the 
workforce was under this category, whereas only 21.8% was in wage employment (12.3% 
in agriculture and 9.5% outside agriculture). The absence of even the slightest forms of 
rudimentary social security programmes has bred a vulnerable environment for almost all, 
specifically for the women, Dalits, bhumi putra/adivasi (indigenous peoples) and the 
janajatis (ethnic groups). Defining the terms “ethnic groups” or 'janajatr and “bhumi 
putra/adivasi” (indigenous peoples), is often confusing^®.
 ^Source; http://www.mapsofworld.com/nepal/maps/nepal-poliUcal-map.jpg retrieved: 10/11/2008 
Generally, the words Janajati (nationality) and Adibashi (the indigenous people) are used as synonyms. 
Of course, Janajati is related to social composition and Adibashi has its relation with time period. The 
word Janajati related to social composition and Adibashis are the ancient inhabitants or the indigenous 
people. In the context of Nepal, Janajatis are the groups of people who have their own specific territory, 
language, religious customs and culture, whereas Jat (caste) refers to the people who have division of 
lower or upper social hierarchies, who speak Indo-European language and who believe in and practice 
Hindu religion and culture. Another notable difference is that the majority of Janajatis are the 
Mangol/Kirats whereas all the people of Jat have Caucasian descent.”
Source: Gurung, H. (1999:1)
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The industrial sector remains underdeveloped and scanty national products are unable to 
compete in the international market. Since the last decade, the country has been surviving 
chiefly on remittance capital and foreign aid following the onslaught of Maobadi 
insurgency, while trade and commerce have been paralysed. “The proportion of households 
receiving remittances increased to 32% in FY03/04 from 24 % in FY95/96. In 2004, about 
1 million Nepalese worked abroad, primarily in India, the Gulf and East Asian countries. 
Also, the average real remittance amount has risen by more than 80%” (World Bank, 
2004).
At present, foreign aid covers 70 per cent of the country’s budget. Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita is limited to US$ 150-200. “Nepal is the poorest country in South Asia 
and ranks as the twelfth poorest country in the world” (World Bank, 2004). 45% of the 
people are living in absolute poverty; of these, 95% are rural (CBS 2001). This percentage 
has increased in recent years. Regarding the incidence and correlates of poverty, the 
absolute number of the poor is increasing at a very quick rate and it is relatively higher in 
mountains and hills as compared to that of the plains. Households in the western sectors are 
poorer than the rest, and poverty is more acute among the lower castes and Dalits^^ (CBS 
2001).
The government initiatives and the donor-driven poverty reduction strategy have failed, 
despite the huge amount of money being spent every year amidst the unyielding rhetoric of 
development. The labour market is unorganised; while “there is still prevalence of bonded 
labour and different patterns of force-labour [...] the conflict between labour and capital 
continues to play an essential role” (GEFONT, 2005: 21). The tourism industry, along with 
a few export-oriented goods that had fared relatively well during pre-insurgency periods, 
have collapsed. The resulting breakdown of trade, industry and commerce, added by
" The Sudras, compelled into the lowest echelon of social hierarchy, are to be in service of the whole 
society, primarily the upper layers in the social caste system. This traditional system of social 
stratification has survived despite the confrontational challenges offered by strong forces of 
modernisation and the growing trend of egalitarianism and globalisation.
The Hindu code of Manushmrit, representing the era prior to the expansion o f the Mogul empire in the 
sub-continent sheds light on the definition of the Sudras. It is also likely that this code of social 
hierarchy was well established among the first migrants, entering into the foothills of Nepal during the 
1 century BC. The Aryans could have brought the social stratification of caste system during those 
times.
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market inflations and shortages of goods and services has had adverse consequences, 
exacerbating unbearable hardships for urban and rural livelihoods.
Nepali society became an agrarian economy following the influx of migrants from north 
India during the 12 century. Seddon, Blaikie and Cameron (1981) suggest that the 
movement had a profound impact on the relations of production, whereby the predominant 
pastoral economy was replaced by agrarian forms of production relations as the “rice 
culture” was firmly established and the plough introduced as the major instrument of 
production. Further outlining the migratory episodes in his work entitled Peasants and 
Workers in Nepal, he suggests that large-scale migration of the Indo-Aryan race from India 
to the mid-hills of Nepal continued until the sixteenth century. The migratory movements 
and large-scale resettlements that have occurred since the first century BC in Nepal 
presumably form part of wider mass migrations recorded throughout Asia. As late as two 
centuries down the chronological order, the new settlements substantially changed the 
relative ethnic composition of the hill population, including the growth of new settlements 
exclusively comprised of the new migrants.
“The establishment of the petty Hindu kingdoms meant a significant development in 
technology and in the division of labour in society and the emergence of a class structure 
and a state apparatus” (Blaikie, P. et al., 2001:25). They emphasise that this stage in history 
marked the onset of the preliminary process in the stimulation, production and expansion of 
landlordism. During the later events, the migrated Hindu elites - the emergent landed 
aristocratic class, succeeded in establishing principalities throughout the country, while at 
the same time the non-Hindus and the indigenous and ethnic population were subjected to 
Sanskritization and Hinduization- a systematic invasion of their culture, religion, language, 
tradition and social customs. The process served in preserving and reproducing orthodox 
values and socio-religious structure based on vama-kram; while at the same time, it 
assured dominance over the rest of the populace conforming to the privileges of the rulers.
Prior to the political unification of the territory during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the Himalaya hills were divided into more than 50 principalities (basically 
political units), which were engaged, most of the time, in rivalry and squabbling over 
territorial concerns. It was at this historical juncture that Prithivi Nary an Shah, the king of a 
mid-western principality Gorkha, consolidated and expanded his rule and by 1769,
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Kathmandu valley was under his control. Two decades later, stress Rose and Scholz, “the 
Gorkhas had achieved their basic objectives. An unified kingdom controlling the entire 
central Himalaya from Sikkim in the east to the Kamali region in the west had been 
established” (1980: 17).
Jang Bahadur Rana seized state power in 1846, and the kings thereafter merely represented 
titular forms. The rise of Shah Kings’ absolute control over the national affairs was only 
possible after the collapse of the Rana regime. Being hostile to diversity, recognition, 
multireligious practices and the elements of liberalism, Jung imposed a national civil code, 
which compelled the non-Hindus and non-caste groups to join the Hindu social hierarchy 
that further legitimised the ongoing process of domination, oppression and subjugation. At 
wider level, the consequences were that, while the sub-cultures were compelled to detach 
themselves from their exclusive social formations by being included into a larger 
interdependent system, at the same time they were prescribed inferior social status within 
the vama-kram of Hindu social order. Of course, the repressive political structure did not 
spare the caste groups either. This had far-reaching consequences. The unitary state was 
being modelled though the ideological auspices of national culture, national religion and 
national identity. Although modem Nepal had been created and its territorial boundaries 
fixed following the conquest some two and a half centuries back, the socio-cultural 
dominance and internal colonisation was revitalised during the Rana regime. The term 
citizenship in the modem sense bore no meaning except for the ruling family, the 
aristocratic landed class and military leadership -  the uppermost echelon of the social order 
that constituted the mhng elites. Duties, entitlements and privileges were determined 
though lineages and familial ties to the mling class and included those who possessed 
landed property. Those with power, prestige and status were considered citizens, and 
therefore, possessed the rights to be engaged in public affairs.
The Rana regime ended after 104 years, by means of a popular revolt in 1951. However, 
the envisaged democracy existed only briefly until 1960. King Mahendra dismissed the 
elected government, detained political leaders and imposed his direct rule in the name of 
panchayat, in collusion with the aristocratic feudal forces. Besieged by the ideals of 
symbolic/monarchical nationalism, the product of nationalist movements against the 
colonial forces particularly in India (although Nepal was never a direct colony), the king 
commenced building a nation-state based on one language, one culture and one national
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identity by means of coercive and centralised power. Consequently, the ideology of 
governance and the state apparatus were streamlined to meet this end. This was part of the 
post-war development where the anti-colonial and liberation movements commenced the 
project of nation building through the unitary state models, rather than legitimising 
democracy, individual freedom and equality after their victory. Nepal too, being part and 
parcel of the wider project, denied all forms of diversity including ideas and opinions. The 
monarchy’s role throughout its dictatorship of 30 years was to realise its central role in 
socio-religious and political affairs and build a unitary monarchical state at the expense of 
social, cultural, political and religious freedoms.
With the rise of monarchy (after the Rana regime), Nepali language and Hindu religion 
were officially defined as the pillars of nationalism for attaining nationhood. A civic 
republican model of citizenship was cherished in the early years of post-expansion and a 
later communitarian form of citizenship was groomed under the authorities of subsequent 
monarchs. However, it was extremely exclusive for Dalits, sub-subcultures and the vast 
population not conforming to the state’s official language, religion, and state symbols. 
Although official citizenship was granted, entry was strongly exclusive. Efforts towards 
assimilation and homogenisation were increased through means of political, civic, social, 
cultural, and religious norms. State-sponsored exercises were concerned with promoting 
allegiance of the people towards the state, without reconciling to the principles of liberty, 
equality and justice.
Furthermore, the social condition of women stayed much the same. They made up the 
largest part of the excluded and exploited category. Even basic human rights associated 
with political and civic freedoms were denied. As the third wave of democracy swept 
across Nepal, women, Dalits, Janajatis, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities “awoke” 
to the call with determined enunciation. The fight for social, cultural and religious rights 
under the auspices of human rights began to crystallise in the later phase, particularly 
during the 1980s. Beneath the rise of the rights issues, pervasive forms of poverty 
associated with rural and urban livelihoods contributed to buttressing the ongoing 
movements. I strongly believe that forms of poverty and vulnerability need to be made 
critical issues in citizenship debates. Since poverty permeated almost every household, 
leaving aside only an estimated 30% of the total population, its deep penetrating nature and
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apparent forms demand in-depth research and detailed analysis to dig deeper into the 
caste-class relationship.
The political structure based on king’s direct rule unleashed coercive measures to preserve 
its state-monopoly at home under the banner of nationalism, while it joined the global 
system of nations with the particular slogan of non-alignment and peace. The strategic 
conception proved useful in suppressing the manifest communist movement while the 
latent ethno-nationalist movements were kept at bay. Nepal gained exterior legitimacy 
through the slogan of global peace that it advocated.
Although the vacuum created by the decline of British influence in South Asia during the 
1960s was eventually filled by the United States of America, Indian influence and 
interference in the internal affairs of Nepal have played more significant roles. There have 
been many episodes of general strikes and mass movements organised against the ‘colonial 
attitude’ of the Indian rulers. It is relevant, therefore, to point out that the 40-point agenda 
of Maobadi^^, contains seven points, which redirect us towards Nepal-India relationships. 
However, following the 9/01/2001 incident, the US has revitalised its presence in the 
region, including Nepal, under the pretext of ‘war against terrorism’, and subsequently 
included the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the list of terrorist organisations. 
Although a truce had been reached between the democratic parties and the Maoists in 
March of 2006, and at present (April, 2009) the Maoists hold nine powerful Ministries in 
the coalition government led by the Maoist leader, Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, 
American policy has not been changed. The USA has refused to exclude the party’s name 
from the list of terrorist organisations. The American policy in the region has been “of 
greatest interest to the radical critics: one concerns the use of American power; another, the 
nature of American foreign policy in the post-Cold war; and the third America’s position 
within the larger international system” (Coax, 2002:68). At present, Nepal has been subject 
to the power play of the India-US-European Union nexus. In the EU, the United Kingdom 
has the upper hand in Nepalese political affairs.
Although people’s movement succeeded in establishing parliamentary democracy in 1990, 
the state of affairs hardly changed. The high hopes and aspirations of people soon
See appendix 1
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crumbled. The first democratic constitution resembled a draft compromise among power 
centres rather than an institution honouring the will of the people. Although comparatively 
a better constitution than its predecessor, it was for the first time that Nepal was designated 
a Hindu kingdom. The exclusive state parameter had been set, which proved extremely 
critical for the existence of a multinational state as demonstrated by the 2006 popular 
movement. The ‘new ethnic reawakening’ had strongly objected to this clause, among 
others, and challenged the state for its exclusive tunnel vision. During the formation of the 
constitution in 1990, the growing necessity for receptiveness towards equal citizenship and 
its bearing on democracy and vice versa were never realised. The prevailing caste system 
and the dehumanising circumstances of Dalits remained much the same. Empowerment of 
an imagined ‘Hindu state’ meant the disempowerment of the Dalits including those outside 
the framework of the religious social system. Furthermore, the conjugation of religion with 
the polity obscured the principles of the separation of powers. It was wrong on the part of 
the state to represent the dominant religion, culture, traditions and symbols without 
providing space for those who were different. The marginalisation of the Madhesi^^ 
community and exclusive state policies has inflamed the Terai belt, the territory housing 
41% of the population. The Madhesi population, rather than being of a particular caste or 
ethnic group in its own, is a cultural group with a mixture of different races, castes, 
ethnicity and religion. The grievances have been against the exclusive policies and 
marginalisation of this broad section by the state that has reduced them from second-class 
citizens to being non-citizens. The prospect of a potential movement from the Terai against 
the state is gradually building. In the event of an outbreak, it will prove extremely costly 
not only because the Terai consists of almost one half of the total population of the country 
and that it is the bread-basket, but also due to the fact that it is the outlet zone towards the 
south stretching 1850 kilometres along the international border with India, throughout the 
length of the country. In addition, the social, cultural, religious, economic and emotional
Khas or the Aryans established themselves in Kathmandu valley after the successful offensive 
against the Kirat tribal republic. They had migrated from Lumbini area, south-west of Kathmandu. 
Similarly, in the mid 11 century the advent of a powerful Khas kingdom in the far western region 
of the Kamali basin has been elaborated by Acharya (1997:51) where he affirms that “The Khas 
had their control over a large territory which had its boarder with Nepal (or Kathmandu valley) in 
the east and Gadhwal in the west.” It was the largest and most powerful of the contemporary 
kingdoms in the Himalayan region. The Khas nationality comprises o f Bahun, Chhetri, Thakuri 
and Sanneshi as the custom groups.
The Khasan region mled by the Khas has been the land of the origin of the modem Nepali language. 
The kingdom assimilated many dialects along with its political expansion, strengthening and 
empowering the Nepali language at the expense of minority mother tongues. Finally, it became the 
lingua franca of the hill and the major language of communication among the different cultures.
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proximity that this population shares with the Indian population across the open border 
speaks suggests possible interference from outside. The Madhesi population has aspired to 
democratic citizenship with devolved regional political settings as means of cultivating its 
own identity. However, this population, being predominantly a Hindu society, is not free 
from the stigma of a caste based social structure with strong hierarchical closures. The 
social diversity in the Terai is as prosperous as in hilly regions and power relations are 
often more assertively dominating.
As I have briefly stated before, Nepal is outstandingly a multiethnic, multireligious, 
multicultural society. During the king’s Panchayat the census abstained from revealing the 
data relating to cultural differences and caste/ethnic divides for political reasons. After 
1990, the descriptive and germane data is available. Official statistical data of 1991 has 
recorded 101 caste/ethnic groups that speak 92 different languages or dialects. The 
following table demonstrates the caste and ethnic groups in Nepal and includes the larger 
indigenous groups, ethnic categories and dominant groups, accounting for both the hill as 
well as for the Terai region:
Table 1 Caste and Ethnic Groups
(1) Parbatiyas (40.3%)
Twice bom: Brahmin 12.9%
Thakuri 1.6%
Chetri (formerly Khas) 16.1%
Denouncers: Dashnami Sanyashi and 1.0%
Kanphata Yogi 
Untouchables: Kami (iron-workers) 5.2%
Damai (Tailors) 2.0%
Sarki (cobblers) 1.5%
(2) Newars (5.6%)^ '*
Entitled to full initiation:
Brahman 0.1%
Shrestha 1.0%
Bajracharya/Shakya 0.5%
Uray 0.3%
Other pure castes:
Mahaijan (jyapu) 2.3%
‘Bkthariya’ etc. 0.5 -  0.7%
Impure castes:
Khadgi (Kasai),
Dyahla (Pore) etc. 0.3%
The census 1991 treats Newars as a single group.
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(3) Other hill or mountain ethnic groups (20.1%)
Magar 
Tamang 
Rai
Gurung 
Limbu 
Sherpa 
Chepang 
Sunuwar 
Bhotiya 
Thakali 
Thami
(4) Mahesi (32%)
(a) Castes (16.1%)
Twice borne: Brahmin 
Rajput 
Kaystha 
Rajbhat
Baniya (Vaishya)
Other pure castes: Yadhav/Ahir (herdsmen)
Khushawaha (vegetable growers) 
Kurmi (cultivators)
Mallah (fishermen)
Kewat (fishermen)
Kumhar (potters)
Halwai
Impure but 
Touchable: Kalawar (brewers/merchants)
Dhobi (washer men)
Teli (oil pressures)
Kanu (oil pressures)
Untouchables: Chamar (leather-workers)
Dushadh (basket makers)
Khatawe (labourers)
Musahar
(b) Ethnic groups (9%)
7.2%
5.5%
2.8%
2.4%
1.6%
0.6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.9%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2% 
0.6% 
4.1% 
1.1% 
0.9% 
0.6% 
0.5% 
0.4% 
0.2%
0.9%
0.5% 
1.4% 
0.4% 
1.1%
0.5%
0.4%
0 .8%
Inner Terai: Kumal 0.4%
Majhi 0.3%
Danuwar 0.3%
Darai 0.1%
Terai: Tharu 6.5%
Dhanuk 0.7%
Rajbansi 0.4%
Gangai 0.1%
Dhimal 0.1%
(c) Muslims
(d) Marwaris
(e) Sikhs
(3.5%)
(0.2%)
(0.1%)
Adapted from Whelpton (1997:53) “Political identity in Nepal; State, Nation and 
Community” in Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom
[The table excludes the 4.7% of the population either falling in the census category or ‘others’ or 
belonging to groups accounting for less than 0.1% of the population. For simplicity the figures as 
rounded off. This truly reveals the Nepalese social diversity].
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Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam are the major religions. The others include Kirat, Jainism, 
Lamaism, Christianity, Sikhism, and Bahai. In addition, many of these religions are made 
up of different groups or sects that possess different traditions, worship different deities or 
differ in religious procedures. It is evident that social, cultural and religious diversities that 
Nepal has been a host to, offer challenges as well as opportunities for creating democratic 
citizenship based on moral and legal grounds. The state, in accepting multilayered and 
equal citizenship as a natural outcome, needs to address the growing ethnic, cultural, 
lingual, and religious forms of discontent and put effort on generating institutions build 
around the theme of inclusion, liberty and equality.
The fault lines and parameters of conflict within present social formations in Nepal are 
very complex and often transcend the ethnic boundaries. In the broadest sense, the 
boundary between the Madhesi population (people living in the planes) and parbatya 
(people living in the hill areas); dominant culture, ethnic populations and Dalits 
(untouchables); and between high cast Hindus, ruling class and elites, and janajati (ethnic 
groups) are the major contradictions. Bhattachan (2000:142) emphatically writes, “The 
indigenous ethnic groups are federating themselves to challenge continuing monopoly of 
the ruling class in national, political, social, cultural and economic resources. Similarly, 
Madhesi are raising their voice against the hill people’s domination [...]”. “[...] so called 
“untouchables” against the anachronism of social untouchability and the contradiction of 
women against patriarchal social system” (Neupane, 2000:68). Thus, the genesis of identity 
politics in Nepal is extremely complicated and problematical.
Following the 1990 movement, the subsequent democratic governments failed in their 
efforts to govern a state infested with a multitude of problems, some of which I have briefly 
discussed. Incidents of high-level corruption, nepotism, and financial discrepancies filled 
pages of daily papers. Government contracts were sold on commission; while the function 
of upgrading and relocating government servants was tied to bribery. Executive managers 
and government appointees were often allotted the task of collecting funds for the party -  
as a direct bribe or through the chain of loyalists. There were frequent cases of MPs selling 
their diplomatic passports, and what was more depressing was that no one was brought 
before the court of law. “Democracy or any other system,” opines Dahal, “where 
corruption is protected and honesty penalised, cannot endure for long” (1999:18). By and 
large, the change in the lifestyles of elected leaders was astounding. The law and order
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situation was chaotic; party disputes were poured out into the streets; greed fragmented 
parties. In summary, the leadership along with the state bureaucracy possessed neither the 
honour for accountability and transparency nor the sense of good governance and 
democracy. The political culture and ideological deficit of the multiparty leadership was in 
need of renewal.
As part of the wider scenario, the country had been descending into the vicious cycle of 
poverty and indebtedness, much of which has persisted as the general trend without 
symptoms of recovery. Inflation and unemployment were becoming unbearable, while 
many of the outstanding issues that I have already briefed possessed their own capacity for 
exacerbating social discontent. The privatisation of health facilities, education, and 
government owned industries (as part of Structural Adjustment Programmes launched 
under the patronage of IMF and WB) has had an unbearable impact particularly on the 
vulnerable section of the society. “These programmes have undermined humanity and have 
violated the “right to work, social security, health care, housing, food and education” 
(Dahal, R. 1999:53). A country like Nepal with a weak industrial base and minimal 
produce of its own along with a low degree of diversification and specialisation cannot be 
competitive in the global market. The liberalisation and privatisation policies dictated by 
the WTO, and the reduction of subsidies from service sectors and agriculture has struck the 
lower 50% of the population adversely. Intervention by the IMF in the Nepalese economy 
began in the late 1980s as a prescription to correct the “severe macroeconomic instability in 
the country such as growing fiscal deficits and declining international reserves” (Dahal, 
D.1999:105). The results of these programmes have been negative with the growth of 
wider and deeper poverty, exclusion, inequality and unemployment. After gaining 
legitimate (official) membership of the WTO in 2004, the urban as well as the rural 
scenarios have worsened. The education system is particularised and standardised for rich 
and the poor, where the rich attended boarding schools while the poor attended the 
mismanaged government schools. Government service provisions such as health, transport, 
electricity, telecommunication etc. have been made inaccessible to those who require them 
the most. The prevailing circumstances of social chaos and hopelessness and growing 
apathy towards the political system as a whole cumulated to such a level as to undermine 
the ethos of democracy.
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In short, the push factor towards Maobadi andolan is certainly stronger than the pull factor 
stemming from its own egalitarian principles and violent means it uses to achieve its ends.
This situation, outlined briefly, became the multiplying factor for the Maobadi andolan. By 
2001, the insurgency had grown to such a volume and strength that it controlled more than 
50% of the country, and even more in years to follow. A parallel army paraded the rural 
areas while a parallel people’s courts rendered immediate ‘justice’. Land to the tillers 
became attractive initiatives in areas controlled by the Maobadi. Women’s participation in 
the movement increased to 40%, never realised in any institutional form before. The 
egalitarian equality transcended the social closures, religious divides, cultural differences 
and equated each member into a unified political force of collective will with set 
objectives. In effect, the displaced people flocked in volumes beyond the capacity of the 
government in cities and district headquarters to provide shelter and safety. They were left 
on their own to survive. The local displaced persons (LDP) form a separate challenge in 
rights of their own that requires a separate study. From several army barracks, the Maobadi 
looted huge volume of arms and ammunition and raised itself to that of state security 
apparatus. “Within six years of starting an armed insurgency, the communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) had managed to establish itself as a formidable alternative political force” 
(Sharma, 2003:361). The mass support for the insurgency is quite phenomenal and its rapid 
spread has perplexed sociologists and political scientists trying to comprehend the 
dialectics involved and to figure out whether it is a class-based insurgency or whether its 
characteristics relate to a more loosely understood form of a new social movement.
Marxist ideology, for those involved in the movement, provides an egalitarian ground for 
equality and participation. Furthermore, it also justifies command and control, even though 
it may be through coercive means if necessary. The promise generated by the ideology 
provides a strong political culture based on class loyalty resembling the civic republican 
traditions. “Do or die’ is the common ethos being practiced by the party members. The 
built-in spirit of nationalism expressed in ideological and political conflicts is a powerful 
psychological tool that affirms both victory and vengeance. However, ideological 
membership alone cannot justify one’s rights and duties at state level without attaining 
some forms of legitimacy. In a modem nation-state, the state provides the required 
legitimacy at national level. As for example, there are two ways of attaining that: either 
though revolution or though the ballot. Revolutionary legitimacy and democratic
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legitimacy are thus two contending forms of legitimacy, which underpin different 
conception of citizenship and duties ascribed. As Nepal is a liberal democracy, the criterion 
of revolutionary citizenship is unacceptable to larger sections of society. However, under 
the condition that the Maobadi andolan prevails, the liberal democracy and prevailing 
nature of citizenship will have to forego their present structure, assuming the post­
revolutionary forms of citizenship corresponding to the ethos of the revolutionary 
principles.
The induced social consciousness and “ethnic awareness” cumulating politically into the 
ideology of identity politics, has been geared towards anti-establishment. Concentrating on 
the contemporary issues of caste/ethnic divides, social closures, pervasive poverty and the 
ideals involving the issues justice and equality, the social consciousness has revamped the 
citizenship discourse. Additional structures and processes confirming social dominance and 
monarchy-subject relationships have been strongly confronted. The cumulating 
consciousness has critically raised concern over the comprehensive aspects of wealth and 
power, which form the bedrock on which the institution of citizenship is anchored. Among 
the challenges investigated, I shall focus more on the political and social aspects as I 
proceed through the discussions.
2.1.2. The present context
The political milieu took a drastic and non-reconciliatory course on February 1, 2005. 
Against the background of the flaring Maobadi insurgency and the prospects of Nepal 
being a failed state, the king, through a military-backed coup d'état usurped the state power, 
suspending the elected government and placed the prime minister and major elected figures 
behind bars. This ambitious move proved shortly to be an utterly unwise decision and a 
political disaster for the monarch.
First, the illegitimacy of Maobadi andolan in the international arena and secondly, the 
rapidly eroding faith and growing mistrust of the public towards the political affairs at 
domestic level, are the two principal explanations behind the callous ambition of the 
monarch. The public, viewing these political events as a form of ‘new insurgency’ 
perpetuated by the monarch, staunchly stood against it. The political consciousness 
generated by the Maobadi movement was the prime factor providing the thrust for the anti­
monarch movement. In April 2006, the democratic forces in alliance with the Maobadi
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claimed victory over the absolute ruler, restoring democracy in a more articulate form. The 
dynamics of the chaotic triangular conflict (Maobadi-king- democratic forces) had been 
strategically changed by the alliance of the democratic forces with the Maobadi, which 
brought the united front in direct collision with the monarchy. As of today, the country has 
succeeded in holding the elections to the constituent assembly (the first ever to be held). Its 
first meeting decided the fate of the institution of monarchy by its abolition. A day in 
advance of the historic decision, CNN on May 28, 2008 had this piece of news posted:
Nepal's newly elected leadership changed the country from a monarchy to a republic 
just before midnight Wednesday, a historic move that ended about 240 years of 
autocratic rule in the country. [...] Of the 564 members of the assembly present for 
the vote, only four voted to keep the monarchy
The diminishing charm of the institution of monarchy and the rising popularity of 
republicanism indeed features what the leadership calls ‘the pride of nation’ today. "All the 
privileges enjoyed by the king and royal family will automatically come to an end. May 29 
will henceforth be celebrated as "Republic Day"^^ read out the Republic Declaration, 
putting an end to the existence of the sovereign and the subject. “Maoists on Saturday 
widened their lead in Nepal's constituent assembly elections, defying New Delhi's 
assumptions,” reported The Times of India on 13 April 2008. The media analysed well 
when it conceded the consequences of Maobadi electoral strength:
Certainly, a stronger showing by the Maoists means it’s a goodbye monarchy. What 
remains to be seen is what happens to the army, whether the Maoists insist on a 
national army that absorbs the Maoists' cadres, etc. Certainly, there will be a greater 
affirmative action programme for janjatis and some radical social agenda may be 
expected^^
15 Source: http://edition.cnn.eom/2008AVORLD/asiapcf/05/28/nepal/ retrieved: 29/05/008
"Nepal has turned into a democratic republic, all the existing laws and administrative functions that 
contradict this idea will be invalidated from today," it reads.
"All the privileges enjoyed by the king and royal family will automatically come to an end," it says,
noting that May 29 will henceforth be celebrated as "Republic Day."
"This assembly asks the Government to make the necessary arrangements to vacate the Narayanhiti 
Royal palace," Mr Gurung told the gathering to huge cheers and applause.
"The meeting also directs the Government to take necessary actions to turn the palace into a national
museum."
Source; http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/05/29/2258701.htm retrieved: 29/05/2008 
Source: http://timesofindia.indiatlmes.com/articleshow/2948307.cms retrieved: 12/05/2008
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Apart from the political changes and some reforms in power dynamics, the social context 
remains the same and the outstanding problems that have been discussed pose a greater 
threat in a situation of power imbalance with constant shifts in the state pohcy frameworks. 
A rapidly changing domestic situation coupled by the resurgent tactics of the loyalists 
alongside the Madhesi movement in the Terai, have added to the state’s contemporary 
challenges. At the same time, the security issues are outstanding, especially as the 
domestic scenario is fuelled by ethnic consciousness. Territorial demands for the “right to 
self determination” including the cultural, lingual, and religious issues raised by the Terai 
people will need to be addressed.
The cause of janajati “reawakening” has been inspired from the sense of common descent, 
territoriality, and common subjugation to economic, political and cultural dominance along 
with the suppressive authority of the Khas. In general, the rise of nationalism in Nepal has 
been, as elsewhere, a psychological drive concerned with the variables of economic, 
political and cultural issues and the subsequent build up of animosity in the form of 
response, over the decades. Thus, the mongol and kirat nationality has aspired to identity 
based on common history, common ingredients of culture and practices including common 
racial origin. Although the dialects and languages vary substantially among the janajatis as 
do the customs and traditions, linguistic origins however are inferred to be common. The 
rise of mangolkirat nationalism is, therefore, essentially against the Khas invasion and 
domination.
2.1.3. Discussion
The political and ideological debates in Nepal gained prominence during the third wave of 
democracy. The collapse of the autocratic panchayat regime and the establishment of 
parliamentary democracy in the 1990s provided an open environment facilitating an array 
of debates premised on political ideological grounds, including those on ethnic and cultural 
rights as part of general public rights and citizenship entitlements. The movement that 
ousted the panchayat regime continued at miniscule levels, enhancing political awareness 
where formerly prohibited discussions on ethnic differences and cultural or political rights 
became the state of affairs under the liberal political establishment. Partly as a result of the 
third wave of democracy and partly owing to the pathetic situation at the domestic level, 
the growing, “ethnic, cultural and national consciousnesses have brought either the 
loosening or the actual fragmentation of politics” (Heater, 2002:2). In the process of doing
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so, the very idea of national citizenship based on monism and a unitary state model is being 
challenged. As intrinsic forms of identity politics, spatial movements associated with 
ethnic rights and multiculturalism have, to some extent, influenced the fragmentation of 
nation-state ideology replacing it with the notion of inclusion and equal citizenship. The 
cultural and ethnic grievances against the ruling class, elites and Hindu domination have 
been the major forms of dissent for which minorities hold the state accountable. 
Historically, the effort of the state to assimilate the non-Hindus within its social structure 
secured a way for dominance through the allocation of inferior position within its 
hierarchical formation. Thus, the idea of assimilation was governed by the motive to 
subjugate rather than being founded on the egalitarian concept of equality. The ethnic and 
indigenous population nonconforming to Hindu religion were placed at a relatively lower 
stratum with an identity of matawalis (alcohol consumers). Race superiority, cultural and 
linguistic supremacy, religious ascendancy and territorial pre-eminence were a few of the 
xenophobic ideals, which underpinned the assimilation and subjugation processes.
An important question is yet at large, i.e. is there is continuity between ethnicity and 
nationalism manifesting from loyalty to nationhood? Concerning the relevant discussion 
put forth by both Gellner and Anderson, who stress on essential novelty and modernity of 
nationalism, Kellas (1998:60) insists that “the decline of religion, rise of the centralised and 
bureaucratic state as well as the pressure of the industrial economy propelled the ‘ethnos’ 
to be mobilised and politicised into nations.” Weighing his argument against the historical 
development in the Nepalese context, I strongly argue that despite the formation of a 
centralised bureaucratic state, its recourse to asali hindustan!^ reversed the direction of ‘the 
decline of religion’. The reinforcement of religious values through the instrument of state 
mechanism endorsed religious codes into political processes and amalgamated the religious 
and the political. However, analysing history requires contextualisation and therefore I will 
analyse different situations using this approach while I engage in discussions through this 
work.
In addition to the ‘ethnic reawakening,’ keeping in view the opportunities and challenges 
extended by the new developments in Nepal, the perspectives of a new and affluent
“True land of the Hindus” this terminology appears in Prithivi Narayan Shah’s divya upadesha 
during the times of unification to indicate the essence of freedom from Mogul empire and the British 
colonisers, who in his vision were pollutants.
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democratic state have been the foremost of the aspirations of the Nepalese people. Their 
relentless struggle for freedom and democracy over half a century against the absolute 
monarchs holds true to the initial concept of sovereignty developed out of Rousseau’s 
notion of self-determination. “Initially, “popular sovereignty” had been understood as 
delimitating or as the reversal of royal sovereignty and was judged to rest on a contract 
between a people and its government” (Habermas, 1992: 259). Given that Nepal has joined 
the republic system of states, where accountability lies in the government as opposed to an 
unaccountable sovereign, the sweeping changes, besides presenting a multitude of 
challenges, have also provided equal opportunities for institutionalising citizenship based 
on equality and justice. I argue that the contract must “set the classical ideal aside and 
investigate the realities of and realistic possibilities for citizenship in the political societies 
of our day” (Flathman, 1995:106). “Citizenship, then must be localised” (Beiner, 1995:4); 
it must be inclusive in nature and represent the multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious 
structure of the Nepalese society at large.
As an antidote to the past fifty years of centralised rule, critical elites succeeded in 
generating antithetical public demands for the status of equal citizenship. The popular 
movement of 2006 succeeded in wielding the people’s power against the authoritarian rule 
of the monarch. Following which, there has been a significant change in power dynamics in 
association with the empowerment of the people. Strong and critical civil society 
representing the civic force is required for the creation of active citizenship. For the 
political change to sustain in Nepal and democracy to deliver, new social and economic 
relations should be organised under progressive institutional setups, which appears to be a 
daunting task, at least in the immediate run for a newly democratising state. It is in this 
context that this work has been concentrated, initiating debates on the issues pertaining to 
cultural, social, political and economic membership of the broad masses through the 
institution of equal citizenship -  the factors that have been contributing to the growth of 
identity politics. Citizenship requires to be translated into practice, delivering justice and 
elevating equality rather than being limited to the principles of bureaucratic documentation. 
The equality must underpin real life situations and not the perverse notion of the “equal 
right of the rich and poor to sleep under a bridge” (Ignatieff 1995: 65).
Exclusion is a challenging phenomenon and a problematic concept that possesses 
subjective and well as objective realities, often expressed through the dialects associated
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with the institutional arrangements and instrumental processes in view of the complexity 
and demands created by modernity. The recent movement in Nepal has ushered in the 
demands of modernity embedded in its aspirations for political, social, economic and 
cultural freedoms. Mandanipour et al. while discussing on the issue of social exclusion, 
summarise it to be a
[...] multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are combined: 
the participation in decision making and political processes, access to employment 
and material resources and integration into common cultural processes. When 
combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in 
particular neighbourhoods (in Byrne, 2002: 2).
The discussion raises the issues of exclusion and proceeds into the debate, affirming that it 
is through the process of inclusion and empowerment that the chances of generating 
institution of equal citizenship can be realised. This is specially the case as the newfound 
democracy possesses the capacity to implement strategy and programmes in securing equal 
citizenship and addressing the issues of identity politics. Furthermore, the trends of leftist 
politics in the country in recent decades and the armed struggle of the Maobadi during the 
last twelve years have, in particular, succeeded in empowering the masses. In effect, the 
level of assertion of collective rights or collective identity has risen significantly.
Dealing with the idea of inclusion and exclusion is immensely difficult and problematic, 
especially in the case of Nepal which possesses over one hundred caste/ethnic groups with 
none outstanding as a clear and strong majority within the national demographic structure; 
much of which I have already discussed. However, as a thought for initiating discussions, I 
have borrowed Will Kymlicka’s view from Beiner (1995:6) in response to the concept of 
pluralism and the idea of “the politics of difference” where cultural fragmentation of 
citizenship is considered a positive trait:
On the one hand, many of these groups are insisting that society officially affirm their 
difference, and provide various kinds of institutional support and recognition for their 
difference, e.g., public funding for group-based organisations...On the other hand, if 
society accepts and encourages more and more diversity, in order to promote cultural 
inclusions, it seems that citizens will have less and less in common. If affirming 
differences is required to integrate marginalised groups into the common culture, 
there may cease to be a common culture.
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The above statement, which originated from a liberal point of view, with respect to 
swelling surges of immigrants particularly in the US, Australia and Canada, pleads for a 
collective state that considers nationalism above cultural identities. In addition to this, this 
notion may be applicable in situations of majority where a particular cultural group is 
demographically dominant and smaller groups or minorities demand for “right to self 
determination.” This is a logical outcome in the process of asserting their ethnic rights. 
Alternatively, the demographic composition of Nepal is in itself problematic, in the sense 
that it lacks a dominant cultural group in its objective form. The territorial space may be 
described as being inhabited by many nationalities subjected to ethnic boundaries and 
social closures on their exterior fronts, and at the same time fragmented into series of sub­
hierarchies and structural affronts internally. The problem is more complicated as class 
divides and regional disparities are considered. And above all, the issue of equal citizenship 
and rise of identity politics needs to be considered under the rubrics of the politics of 
redistribution, as well as the politics of recognition. The major problems seemingly 
fragmenting the state today emanate from these realities besides other contributing factors.
The global processes enhancing integration and interdependency have exerted immense 
pressure on the socio-economic, political, cultural and religious fronts as well. Nepal, albeit 
being at the periphery within the global system, has already succumbed to the policies of 
neo-liberalism and the associated ‘grand package’ of adjustments. These programmes along 
with the market forces have exacerbated net poverty and consequently widened the gap 
between the rich and the poor at a level never realised before. This onslaught has been 
creating regional and gender disparity replacing the virtues of social solidarity with 
consumerism and individualism. The dialectics associated with comprehending the barriers 
to citizenship is indeed immensely complicated and problematic. Given that Nepal today 
stands at the cross-roads in defining its citizenship under a new democratic political 
establishment, it is argued here that inclusive parameters being imperative should not be 
neglected; rather citizenship should be considered “as a constituting principle of the 
modem nation-state” (Pierson, 2004:106) and vehicle to promote democracy, equality, and 
social justice.
An equally relevant fact is that Nepal has existed as a multiethnic social organisation 
following the territorial unification, speaks of the actuality that the communities of 
divergent ethnic backgrounds have chosen to share their sense of belonging and have
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adjusted to multiethnic arrangements as a response to social reality. Sufficient degrees of 
incorporation and toleration have been common social factors among different groups. 
Mikesell (1999:194) affirms of the interdependency among the ethnic and caste groups as a 
positive factor and states that the “[...] immense communication and close interdependence 
between peoples of different languages and castes in Nepal” have been the general trend 
that substantially differ from Indian experience where the “[...] caste never enjoyed as 
much recognition or played the same rule in Nepal as it did in colonial and post-colonial 
India [...] (1999:194). In stating this, we cannot swallow the unitary state’s rhetoric of 
Nepal being a “class-less society functioning on the grounds of equality and justice” nor 
risk accepting the concept of Nepal being a char ja t and chhatis bama ko phulbari^ under 
moral-legal judgement In addition, we cannot abstain from arguing against state-centric 
political processes grounded on theocratic ideals that not only undermined principles of 
equal citizenry but also blatantly worked based on exclusion. It follows, therefore, that 
state-citizen relations and relationships among the divergent cultures need to be analysed 
through a dialectical approach with linkage to the state’s attainment of nationhood and 
some form of common denominators otherwise “the idea of a multinational state, on this 
conception, is inherently unsustainable” states Beiner (1995: 7). However, under a 
democratic environment and in the presence of active global forces, the emerging 
institution of citizenship in Nepal needs to be developed on local needs where the exclusive 
unitary model of state structure will no longer serve the purpose if forms of cultural and 
ethnic plurality are to be addressed. My stand in the argument is that I seek an inclusive 
form of citizenship “- of what draws a body of citizens together into a coherent and a stably 
organised political community and keeps that allegiance together” (ibid).
Furthermore, the Hindu caste structure obstructs the modem notion of equal citizenship. 
The vama-kram based on exclusion is rooted in the concept of purity. The Dalit as a social 
category, having made to serve the higher Hindu caste groups, are in fact non-citizens and 
occupy the lowermost position in society. Being dominated through stmctural and 
instmmental processes, this section of the population forms the most vulnerable and 
exploited human category in the country. Dispossessed of social, religious, material or any 
other forms of rights within the formal state apparatus, the Dalits have readily participated 
in the Maobadi andolan. The ‘reawakening’ of the Dalits marks the beginning of a
A quote from Prithivi Narayan Shah, the king who unified the country: he summarises Nepal to be a 
garden of four castes thirty-six vamas. This concept stems from the Hindu scriptures.
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potentially strong movement against the anachronism of the social untouchablity with high 
commitment in its efforts to redefining its identity. And finally, the challenge of the 
Madhesi community in the Terai regions is yet another challenge in the socio-political 
domain of the state that seeks equal citizenship and identity of its own, while the women’s 
movement has been concentrated against the patriarchal social system claiming for quality 
in public spheres with the demolition of public and private divide.
Dalits 
against anachronism 
of social exclusion
Madhesi 
against hill 
domination
Ethnic minorities 
against ruling 
elite, class, and 
upper caste
Women’s movement 
against patriarchal social 
order
Fig. 2.1: Dynamics of social movement and boundaries of contradictions, as apparent in 
general forms adding to the explanations of citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics in 
Nepal
This figure represents the nature and forms of social movements that have been the integral 
parts of Nepalese societies. The women’s movement has been most extensive and 
infringed, prevailing within all of the social categories. Dalits have continued their fight 
against the anachronism of social exclusion, while the Madhesi sub-nationalism is targeted 
against hill domination. At the same time, ethnic consciousness has gradually developed 
against the ruling elites, mainly targeting the Brahmins and the upper social classes. The 
dynamics of these movements and the boundaries of contradictions were fairly well 
comprehended by the Maobadi leadership at the onset of the movement.
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2.1.4. Problem context
This section identifies the problem (topic) of investigation following the preceding sections 
on introduction and general discussion. The remaining section highlights the contextual 
issues under debate within the problem matrix as I generate questions for the research.
Nepal has entered into the global system of liberal states, following the people’s movement 
of 1990. This movement bears historic significance owing to its success in reducing the 
absolute coercive power of the institution of monarchy and its privileged enshrinement. 
The reduction of the monarch within the parameters of the constitution set in a fresh 
adjustment of power relations, not only within vertical political hierarchy, but also equally 
within the social and religious contexts where emerging identity politics collided with the 
principles of nation-state and national identity. The ongoing movements, rather than being 
isolated products of abrupt upheavals, possess deep roots that trail back into history, tracing 
the nation-building processes and beyond, which I have discussed in the annex, titled “the 
history of Nepal.”
Although the movement is credited with the reduction of monarchy, the processes that 
cumulated into building this resistance started more than thirty years back, when the 
monarch was compelled to host a national referendum between multiparty democracy and 
‘improved panchayat system of government’ following a powerful students’ movement of 
1979. Despite the victory of the king’s model of polity in the referendum, the seeds of 
democracy had been planted, and king’s rule as being invincible had been proved a myth. 
Thus, it was from these years onward when the power of monarchy had begun to decline 
that the general public acknowledged the king’s role, more as a shrewd politician rather 
than a legendary benevolent monarch -  despite the pathetic effort of the extreme-right- 
nexus to establish the latter. By locating the last thirty years of history as a period 
representing the cumulative frequency of the growing strength of the anti-monarch politics, 
I do not intend to minimise the roles of national parties, movements and contemporary 
leaders prior to those years. This was the time during which the anti-monarch sentiment of 
the public grew momentously, favouring the communist and the liberal parties. In addition 
to the role of these parties and national state of affairs, the emerging global politics, along 
with major events such as the Cultural Revolution in China, the Vietnam War, South 
African struggle against apartheid, the Middle-East Wars and numerous liberation 
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, had vital roles in the uprising that brought
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the students and the monarch into a headlong collision. This was, no doubt, the first 
incident of its kind in history. Being the first subjects’ encounter with the sovereign, the 
episode set the clock for advanced movements that systematically corroded the effective 
role and power of the institution of monarchy, which in the present context, has dragged the 
institution to the public judgement. (Later, on May 27, 2008 the institution was 
abolished^®).
The logical decay of monarchical power has a direct bearing on the rise of identity politics. 
The state’s exclusion and marginalisation of broad masses of people through political, 
religious, cultural, lingual and administrative practices had set off a self-propelling dynamo 
of resistance against the state and ruling class that are still evident. These movements, more 
or less, have been feeding into the Maobadi andolan as tributary processes. Ethnic 
movements, cultural movements, religious, territorial or similar other movements 
addressed here as forms of identity politics, all bear the idea of equal rights, social dignity 
and identity, although some may appear inconsistent and contradict the political, 
ideological and philosophical outlooks.
During the past, besides governing the dominant culture, religion and language, monarchy 
embodied the state. The legitimate coercive state power infused with the religious 
promoted offensive environment of dominance and subjugation, enabled the creation of a 
unitary state. These were the pillars of nationalism and symbols of national identity during 
the nation building processes. The slogan of nationalism, closely associated with the image 
of the patrimonial monarch and symbols of national identity, were promoted in the public
20 King Gyanendra, whose seven-year reign began in tragedy, floundered in authoritarianism and 
ended in meek surrender, was given 15 days to leave his palace. After that, according to the new 
government, it will be turned into a museum.
An overwhelming majority of an elected assembly, charged with drawing up a new constitution, 
backed the creation of a republic in the Himalayan nation, which endured 10 years of war against 
Maoist rebels, who are now the dominant partners in the new political firmament. The resolution 
passed by 560 votes with only four against states that Nepal will become "an independent, indivisible, 
sovereign, secular and an inclusive democratic republic nation".
It adds: "All the privileges enjoyed by the king and royal family will automatically come to an end." 
King Gyanendra, who inherited the throne after 10 members of the royal family were massacred by 
Crown Prince Dipendra in 2001, was a victim of his own incompetence and historical forces beyond 
his control.
Source: Bell, T., The Telegraph
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/nepal/2044579/Nepal-abolishes-monarchv-as-King-
Gvanendra-given-fortnight-to-vacate-palace.html
Retrieved: 09/11/2008
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and private realms through political, religious and cultural fronts. A one-language policy 
assured acculturation and assimilation into the state’s cultural and religious uniformity, 
consuming social, cultural and religious differences. During the panchayat regime, the 
institution of monarchy prevailed at the cost of democracy and citizenship rights.
Before the establishment of parliamentary democracy, and during the reign of absolute 
monarchy, the state was a functional political entity, despite its being staunchly anti­
democratic, oppressive and monistic. It is quite clear that, with the erosion of the power of 
the institution of monarchy and the growth of democratic society, the fissures along the 
lines of ethnicity, religious faiths, cultures and linguistic subsidiaries are beginning to 
emerge. Social boundaries have been reinforced into asserting the politics of difference. 
Territorial and regional disputes have surfaced at exceedingly quick rates. As a result, the 
country today has been subjected to the seizure of various forms of movements, the most 
powerful among them being the Maobadi insurgency and the movement in the Terai.
On the one hand, consolidation of democracy is not feasible under the hostile environment 
of public uprisings, insurgency and state offensives, but on the other, without 
consolidation, further political disarray and instability are imminent. It is particularly so as 
the sources of unrest are manifest in social constructs, the political and ideological basis of 
the state and in the institutional arrangements and processes circumscribed by the political 
economy. The division of national politics and its subsequent polarisation, for a 
considerable number of years, along the lines of official state policies and the 
contemporary movements, has deconstructed parliamentary politics, weakening it 
sufficiently at domestic level. In the global context, however, the parliamentary polity 
possess a stronger voice. This form of power balance existed while the monarch 
represented the state although with a limited capacity as its head.
With further erosion of the monarchy and its constitutive power, the probability that 
identity politics will grow even stronger and entrench deeper, appears clearly visible. The 
contemporary social movements of emancipation type, or those bearing relatively direct 
characteristics of identity politics as I have discussed, possess inherent bearings on the 
evolution of citizenship formation in Nepal. It was in this regard that political analysts 
visualised the Maobadi movement as an alternative form of citizenship, which claimed 
egalitarian norms vis-à-vis the state-citizen relationship.
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Nepal’s national identity has been based on dominant culture, religion, language, traditions 
and associated symbols. In similar vein, the ethos of nationalism has placed the monarch at 
the centre as the role model of rastrabadi (the icon of nationalism). For the same reason, 
state sovereignty rests with the monarch while the people are subjects to be ruled. The 
fountain of social, religious, political and cultural forms of dominance and power was, for 
most part, the institution of monarchy in association with the culture and religion the state 
represented. In this political equation, the state, as a political entity, was inseparable from 
the monarch. This means that the state and the institution of monarchy represented the 
dominant culture, religion, and language along with the legitimate coercive power and 
means to dominate and rule.
State sovereignty, 
nationalism and 
National identity
Monarchy -  the 
perceived symbol of 
unity and its role
Citizenship crisis
Parliamentary
democracyGlobalisation
IDENTITY POLITICS, 
Maobadi andolan, Terai 
movement, Dalit and 
janajati movements as 
vehicles for change?
EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP
Figure: 2.2: Dialectical representation of social structures, institutions and social processes 
illustrating the crisis of citizenship and rise of identity politics in Nepal.
Later, during the 1980s, political pressure arising from ‘third wave of democracy’ at global 
scale favoured the growing anti-monarchy sentiment and the resulting political processes 
within and without compelled the monarch to yield to the demand of a parliamentary
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democracy in 1990. Global forces and domestic pressures have acted viciously upon the 
state that tends to deconstruct its political and ideological basis. As Turner argues, “The 
state is caught between these global pressures, which challenge its monopoly over the 
emotive commitments of its citizens, and local, regional and ethnic challenges to its 
authority” (1994:157). The nature of citizenship and bundle of rights in practice, are thus 
re-established and remoulded in the course of these conflicts where the “question of 
political sovereignty is of paramount importance for understanding the nature of citizenship 
[...]” (ibid).
Despite the movement of 1990 being settled with a political compromise that forced the 
monarch within the parameters of the constitution, the self-propelled dynamo for social 
change has continued to mobilise the masses, giving rise to a multitude of movements that 
seek individual and collective forms of rights associated with identity and equal citizenship. 
However, attainment of democratic citizenship is not an easy exercise, as Torres (1998- 
100) outlines:
The diverse identities of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual preference, religion, 
regional factionalism, and many other differences in the perceptions, preferences, 
and experiences of social actor cannot be easily be subsumed under a diversity-of- 
interest perspective, thus challenging essentializing notions of citizenship and 
inviting us to analyse social formations and experiences [...].
In the diagram above (Fig. 2.2), ‘democratic citizenship’ is in the act of being created in 
Nepal through the dialectics associated with the principles of nation-state, the institution of 
monarchy, globalisation processes and the theory and practice of parliamentary democracy. 
Identity politics, therefore, has been the product of these dialectical processes and likewise 
has contributed to contemporary social movements and discourses that are shaping the 
nature of citizenship being built. Conversely, the development of the politics of difference 
has also undermined national identity by diluting the amalgamating factors deemed vital 
for national citizenship as common denominators.
2.1.5. Ethnic organisations and political discourse
One of the main features observed during these three decades has been the growth in the 
number of ethnic organisations. The messages that they have been imparting have reflected 
the matters pertaining to ethnic assertiveness and ethnic consciousness. The discourse of
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‘recognition’ has been playing a dominant role despite Nepalese society being under a 
strong influence of leftist politics. Politics of redistribution, as I have argued, can also be 
reconciled with the politics of recognition/identity, as an analytical framework, to observe 
the current socio-political situation in Nepal. It is in this regard that the role of ethnic 
organisations will be extremely important in shaping the future scope of equal citizenship.
David Gellner in the introduction to Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences, raises 
a similar debate where he says “[T]he’ tribal’ groups, especially the Kham Magars in 
whose territory the insurgency has been based have provided many cadres, and a large 
proportion of the victims, but none of the leaders” (2000: 21). This is an exceptionally 
difficult and elusive topic. For a local Maobadi cadre Prakash Pun, “any leadership must be 
capable to lead a movement and at the same time know what is good for all” where he did 
not spontaneously see the aspects of ethnicity. However, Sun Pariyar asserts that it (the 
chemistry of the Maobadi leadership) may have been so because of popularity. He stressed 
that “the present leadership of the Maobadi is extremely capable and people have allotted 
their support including their faith. We should understand that all virtues cannot be expected 
in leadership, it should be discussed in terms of relativity.” The alternative aspect of the 
debate was represented by Bhaskar Gurung a local janajati^^ leader in a similar interview 
in Bijouri village where he opined:
The leadership should include more leaders from ethnic minority groups. It is sad that
the Bahuns are dominating the party leadership.
It is well demonstrated through these interviews that “While ethnicity has certainly played 
a role, it is by no means a simple determining factor (Gellner, 2000:21). In the day-to-day 
debates of this nature, the state, institution of monarchy, civil society, ethnic organisations, 
global discourses and democratic exercises have contributed in delivering critical 
knowledge essential to the growth of identity politics.
The number of janajati (ethnic/indigenous) organisations has flourished within in these 
later decades. “The Janajati category” comments D. Gellner^^ is:
During February 2002, the government recognised 59 ethnic groups and officially included them into 
the “Janajatis.” category
22 David Gellner, http://www.india-seminar.eom/2007/576/576_david_n_gellner.htm
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[...] a mixed bag of historically and culturally diverse ethnies, brought together 
mainly by the common negative traits of not being Bahun-Chetris, not being Indian, 
and not being Muslim -  have ingeniously been divided into five categories: 
endangered, highly marginalized, marginalized, disadvantaged, and advantaged.
“The state has not done enough,” echoed Prakash Pun, “the janajati must be included 
within all of the different levels of participation.” The activism of more than 30 different 
ethnic organisations belonging to Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN)- 
Nepal^^ and similar cultural fronts or political wings of national parties, have also 
influenced the political discourse and the nature of the evolving forms of citizenship^" .^ In 
this respect, the role of the Maobadi andolan has been the most prominent one.
List of NEFIN Member Organizations:
1. Bahragaule Social Welfare Association 2. Bayu Gukhata Kolu Pangdami 3. Bhujel Samaj Sewa
Samiti 4. By ansi Sawka Samaj 5. Danuwar Jagaran Samati 6. Dhanuk Sewa Samaj
7. Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra 8. Dura Sewa Samaj 9. Gorkha Baramo Samaj 10. Jirel Sangh Nepal 11.
Kirat Rai Yayokkha 12. Kirat Yakkha Chhuma 13. Kirat Yakthum Chumlung
14. Kisan Samudaya Club 15. Kuchwadiya Uthan Sangh 16. Larke Samaj Kendra
17. Lochhudhun Lhupa Association 18. Marpha Thakali Sewa Sadan 19. Meche Samaj Sibiyari Afat
20. Mugal Janajati Samaj Kalyan Kendra 21. Nepal Bhote Janjajati Sewa Samiti 22. Nepal Bote Samaj
Sewa 23. Nepal Chepang Sangh 24. Nepal Chhantyal Sangh 25. Nepal Darai Utthan Samaj 26. Nepal
Dolpo Janajati Vikas Kendra 27. Nepal Gangai (Ganesh) Kalyan Parisad 28. Nepal Jhagad (Urau)
Kodrem Sudhara 29. Nepal Kumal Samaj Sudhar Samiti
30. Nepal Magar Sangh
24 “A week long celebration of World Indigenous Day concluded in Kathmandu on Saturday with 
indigenous leaders urging the inclusion of indigenous voice in the new constitution of Federal 
Democratic Republic Nepal. Chief Guest and Speaker of Constituent Assembly (CA) Subash Chandra 
Nembang requested indigenous people from every region to unite together for the making of 
Constitution that equally represents and includes indigenous people.
Speaking in the program, President of Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN)
Pasang Sherpa expressed his hope to come together in World Indigenous Day celebration next year 
with the feeling that the new constitution belongs to indigenous Janajati as well.
Dendoha Jalai Tipura representing indigenous people of Bangladesh declared the solidarity with 
indigenous people of Nepal. He also said that these kinds o f celebration in Nepal inspired, encouraged 
Bangladeshi indigenous people to celebrate and be proud for being indigenous. On the occasion, 
NEFIN presented its 19 points Kathmandu Declaration 2008 mainly focusing in the inclusion and 
participation of indigenous people's issues and voice in new constitution.
NEFIN demanded that the basis of federalism in the country must be ethnicity, language and region 
and guarantee the ethnic autonomous states with Right to Self Determination. UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People and ILO Convention 169 should be written exactly in the new constitution 
as it is in the document and implement them.
Messages sent from United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon and Prime Minister Girija Prasad 
Koirala was read by representative of NEFIN.
Ethnic groups dressed in their traditional attire seemed very excited to have a different indigenous 
communities coming together as one group. An enthusiastic indigenous pride took out a cultural rally 
from Khula Manch, Tudhikhel that went through Ratnapark, Bagbazar, Putalishadak, Sahidget, 
Sundhara and concluded at Dasrath Stadium, Tripureshwor, venue of the main celebration event.
Almost every ethnic communities of Nepal- Tamang, Gurung, Limbu, Magar, Sherpa, Newar, 
Lohurung, Rai, Thakali, Majhi, Tharu, Dhimal, Kumal, Sunuwar, Rajbanshi, Yholmo, Jhagad,
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2.1.6. Issues of investigation
My own experiences since childhood and my personal development to embrace different 
social roles have inspired me to undertake this researeh. Alongside these experiences, 
queries and refleetions, theoretical assumptions and available literature regarding the issue 
of investigation, have positioned me to investigate the underlying reasons for citizenship 
crisis and the rise of identity politics within the modem political stmcture of Nepal. As the 
point of departure, I have generated the following main research questions incorporating 
the elements of intellectual enquiry
2.1.7. Main research questions
1. What are the underlying reasons behind citizenship crisis and how do they bear with 
the rise of identity politics; how is ethnic politics shaping the nature of citizenship 
being created?
2. What is the nature of ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious, linguistic, and 
regional (geographical) identities in Nepal and how do they communicate, coexist, 
and tolerate the presence of ‘others’ within the modem political environment?
3. How have the political, social and educational policies of the unitary state been 
streamlined to create national citizenship and national identity? How do the 
subjective realities bear dualistic relationships with the official national identity and 
cultural uniformity and what has been the role of the institution of monarchy and 
the Nepalese elite in creating equal citizenship.
4. What are the nature and forms of inherent conflicts between the concept of nation 
state and the practice of citizenship in Nepal, and what are their bearings on the rise
Tokpegola and endangered indigenous groups such as Hayu, Lepcha and other groups were there to 
rejoice their unique identity. The event was amplified by various cultural shows, ethnic dances, songs 
and food festivals. Different ethnic groups performed their wonderful dances, served their flavorsome 
dishes along with display of their distinct attires and jewelries.
Gurungs performed Chhyandu, Limbu presented Kelang and Daan Naanch with an unparallel 
enthusiasm. Himali peoples- Sherpa, Tokpegola, Yholmo performed Shaypru dance whereas Magars 
presented their popular Kauda forlk dance. Sunn wars did their Shayadar Sil Dance known as Dhol 
Naanch. Thamis presented their reputed Jhakri Dance and Tamang sang the songs of jubilance and 
celebration with the beats of Damphu, a traditional instrument of Tamangs.”
Source: Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), Sunday, 10 August 2008 00:00 
http://www.nefin.org.np/news—update/news/359-world-indigenous-dav retrieved: 21/08/2008
^ I have elaborated the subject (elements of intellectual enquiry) in Chapter 3
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of identity politics? How have the domestic and global processes contributed to 
these phenomena?
2.1.8. Specific research questions
1. How has citizenship developed as a historical process in Nepal, and how does it trace 
the political trend?
2. How is the nature of social diversity and ethnic composition in the hill areas of 
Nepal, and what are the major causes underlying the crisis of citizenship, that have 
contributed to the growth of identity politics?
3. How do ethnic closures and social boundaries define identities and what is the nature 
of relationship among these groups and the state? Are the global processes influencing 
these relationships, if so how?
4. How is Maobadi andolan relevant to the issues of citizenship crisis in Nepal? And 
how has the movement contributed to, or inhibited the growth of identity politics?
5. How has the Madhesi population been marginalised and excluded from the nation 
building process and what is the nature of identity politics in the Terai?
6. What have been the nature and role of elites in creating equal citizenship? How have 
these roles been contributing or inhibiting the growth of crisis in Nepal?
7. What are the inherent conflicts between the concept of nation state and the practice 
of equal citizenship? What are their bearings on the rise of identity politics in Nepal, 
and how have the national education initiatives been the tools of national uniformity?
8. How is “citizenship” being created in Nepal with respect to domestic needs and at 
the same time how it is being influenced by the global discourses and globalisation 
pressures? What are the socio-political factors that underpin the unfolding processes?
9. How have the political ideologies of parties contributed to the Nepalese political 
tradition? And how do these implications relate to the crisis of citizenship?
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10. How is the process of globalisation relevant in creating opportunities for democratic 
citizenship and at the same time aggravating the crisis? What has been the role of 
education in creating opportunities/barriers to equal citizenry?
11. How has the caste system in Hindu society been a barrier to equal citizenship and 
how is the crisis in Dalits different? Will the caste groups readily grant them entry? 
How can equal citizenship be realised through the state’s initiatives?
2.1.9. Conclusion
This research intends to investigate the relationship between the underlying reasons for the 
crisis of citizenship and the rise of identity politics within the modem political set-up in 
Nepal. The crisis is multilayered and complex. On the one hand, the grand concepts of 
official nationalism as offered by the model of unitary monarchical state is in conflict with 
the emerging forms of identity and citizenship claims, and on the other, the global 
discourse and the forces of globalisation are in conflict with the nation-centric ideology. 
Within the inner and outer forces in operation and as major exponent of the complex 
dialectical processes, identity politics has surfaced in Nepal, building up into a formidable 
challenge to the state including its unitary political ideological conviction.
The discussion that I have just completed forms an intrinsic part of a wider debate derived 
from Chapter 1 in association with my personal experiences, research findings and the 
history of Nepal.
After the general discussion on the social, political and economic profile, and debating over 
a wide range of issues in the problem context, I have also generated a set of specific 
research questions. The main challenge following this section lies in the choice of an 
appropriate theoretical framework, which will enable me to comprehend the social 
dynamics and interpret the social processes.
I now move on to the subsequent section where I will discuss the framework of analysis 
vis-à-vis this research. In this section, I will discuss the reasons underlying my choice.
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Section B
2.2. Theoretical framework
My research has been accomplished while the country was being ravaged by protracted 
war. The analytical framework that I have used has enabled me to comprehend the 
subjective nature and forms of contradictions alongside the objective ones. The framework 
reaches out beyond classical Marxism. Amalgamation of the grand theory (classical 
Marxism) with the politics of recognition has permitted me to comprehend the social 
phenomenon, providing me with a deeper insight, grounded reasoning, reflections and 
explanations revealing why the citizenship crisis has occurred and leading me into holistic 
methods of interpretations behind the rise of identity politics in Nepal.
Political economical structures in combination with subjective parameters present a strong 
analytical framework withdrawing the thrust for economic determinism. Under this 
circumstance, classical Marxism becomes a powerful theoretical framework. The rise of 
identity politics amidst a Maobadi revolution articulates my theoretical framework. In this 
section, I shall detail the framework that I have developed.
Quoting Turner, Ruth Lister (2007:51) outlines:
Identity and recognition figure prominently in the theorization of cultural citizenship: 
a strand of citizenship studies that has emerged to prominence over the past decade, 
reflecting the centrality of cultural identity to contemporary citizenship struggles.
Identity politics stem from the idea of recognition, and it is in this respect that subjective 
issues such as culture, religion or language become contested. In addition, citizenship 
claims are ever expandable; the rights and status they seek to secure can be visualised as 
momentum concept. Ruth Lister (2007:49) quoting Hoffman explains, “Momentum 
concepts unfold so that we must continuously rework them in a way that realises more and 
more of their egalitarian and anti hierarchical potential.” The claims for equal citizenship 
in Nepal are strongly associated with the dynamics of power distribution in societies and 
work against the caste structures, cultural and religious hegemony or the neglect of the 
Terai in the nation building proeess.
While discussing the contingent issues of identity politics, Nancy Fraser (2000:23) argues, 
“[...] a politics of recognition [...] means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by
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deinstitutionalizing patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and 
replacing them with patterns that foster it”. As I have discussed above, the nature and forms 
of identity politics in Nepal cannot be attributed to cultural phenomena alone without 
regard to economic inequality and production/redistribution relationships. According to 
Fraser, stresses Lister (2007:51), “Participatory parity requires a distribution of material 
resources such as to ensure . . . independence and ‘voice’ and institutionalized patterns of 
cultural value [which] express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal 
opportunity for achieving social esteem.” The state of poverty, inequality and injustice 
prevalent in social relations and prejudiced distributive mechanisms present a grim picture 
of the Nepalese socio-economic order. The underlying reasons for inequality, and 
therefore, justification for the politics of difference, cannot be isolated from the economic 
base and neither can economic determinism alone explore the politics of recognition. In 
Nepalese society, where poverty and marginalisation are common denominators and 
deprivation is the norm, class contradictions are eminent. This is an easy explanation 
favouring determinism. However, in a situation where revolutions rarely happen and grand 
theories don’t deliver one need to be cautious. Social structures such as the caste system, 
ethnic affiliations, or the religious attachments have effectively influenced class- 
consciousness because of their overarching subjective in-groupings. More often than not, 
the attachments are powerful enough to negate the acquired knowledge of class struggle.
Marxism provides a firm ground and most reliable framework for analysing the economic, 
political and social structures along with their associated historical processes in explaining 
the present dynamic social contexts. The problems briefly outlined in the preceding 
chapters will therefore be analysed using Marxism as the framework of analysis. At the 
same time, identity politics has been investigated from the window of the politics of 
difference/recognition where issues tied to culture, religion, language, tradition, forms of 
symbols etc. play a significant role in shaping societies. Marxism, in addition, opens 
windows to historical materialism in the analytical process.
The political developments following the 1950 revolt have been considered of extreme 
importance in the soeial, political and economic life of the state. The reversal from 
democracy to absolute monarchy was a political blunder. It has hindered the growth of 
citizenship and prompted the escalation of identity politics. The political developments 
that followed repressed the free development of the capitalist production relations, and
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preserved the vestiges of feudalism in social relations, thought processes, and modem 
political structures.
Thus, political developments have been insufficient in abolishing feudal social relations. 
The state’s failure in differentiating the private from the public and its futile efforts to build 
national unity founded on feudal-oriented ‘official nationalism’ has continued to promote 
relations based on unequal power distribution. These social relationships have promoted 
antagonism on different planes: one, between capital and labour; two, between capitalist 
production relations and the remnant feudal state; three, between egalitarianism and 
traditionalism; four, between ethnocentrism and official nationalism; five, between state 
centralism and democracy, and six, between different cultures, religions and territories.
Within these complexities, multiculturalism and equal citizenship based on balanced power 
relations among social organisations are the imperative political initiatives to enhance 
social cohesion. These will also contribute to the socio-political environment capable of 
abolishing feudal production relations. Foundations for equal citizenship, besides 
generating strong national unity and state allegiance, are capable of promoting newer forms 
of relationship that transcend the feudal forms that is to contribute to a bourgeois 
revolution.
As I embark into the Marxist philosophy and tradition and the historical material 
development of societies it is as important to acknowledge its simplicity and 
straightforwardness. Engels (1977:429) delivering his speech at the graveside of Karl 
Marx, claimed on March 17, 1883:
[...] so Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, 
hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, 
drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion 
etc., that therefore the production of the immediate material means of subsistence 
and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or 
during a given epoch form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal 
conceptions, are, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been 
evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore be explained, instead of vice 
versa as had hitherto been the case (1977:429).
In Marxist tradition, the transformations of social structures have been accomplished by
conflicts resulting from contradictions within societies. These contradictions and conflicts.
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being inherent and inevitable, have created social history and human emancipation through 
different epochs.
Marx emphasised:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production, which correspond 
to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundations, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness (1977:181).
The modem state has been the outcome of contradictions within the former feudal soeial 
organisations. Emergent states evolved as the feudal mode of production was superseded 
by capitalist production relations. Social transition, in this case, can also be analysed as the 
process of transition of economy from one mode of production to a higher form where state 
reinvention has been conjoined with the social consciousness of the productive forces. 
Marx emphasises:
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of the society 
come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -  what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing -  with the property relations within which they have 
been at work hitherto (Marx, 1977:181).
The new social consciousness, marked by the growing capitalist production relations, was 
in disharmony with the feudal relations of production, and thus, capitalism grew from the 
womb of feudalism. It destroyed the latter through simultaneous transformations, on the 
one hand and on the other, ushered in social, economic and political grounds for the rise of 
a modem nation. Engels (1977:429) highlighted, “Marx also discovered the special law of 
motion goveming the present day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society 
that this mode of production has created.” The formation of the bourgeoisie and the 
capitalist class has been the universal social transformation following the demise of feudal 
production relations; and thus the prominence of this class has been the factual and 
characteristic feature dominating the modem nation state. Development of citizenship in 
Europe has also been equated to the growth of capitalism, which I have discussed earlier in 
Chapter 1.
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Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite 
state of development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and 
industrial life of a given stage, and, insofar, transcends the state and the nation, 
though on the one hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as 
nationality and inwardly must organise itself as a state (Marx, On Colonialism).
Within the process of nation building, civil society is a reflection of the state. Since the 
modem state was evolved from the feudal social relations of production, it is a reflection of 
the bourgeoisie and its dominance; the civil society in existence cannot be outside its social 
relations. Civil society, in which case, simply represents the dominant capitalist class 
compatible with its mode of production and not otherwise. Thus Marx would suggest, “The 
modem nation is a historical phenomenon that has to be located at a precise historical 
period; this is the era of the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie as a hegemonic class- the period 
of consolidation of the capitalist mode of production” (Nimni, 1996:60), providing 
significant grounds for debating underlying thematic issues pertaining to the notions of 
civil society, identity politics and the modem nation state.
For human emancipation, the bourgeoisie in its specific historical period had to ascend into 
a hegemonic class, dominating spheres of life. The relationship of production had to be 
transformed into capitalist order. It was in the light of working-class movements, 
characterised by class struggles, that emancipation of humans, as social organisation was 
possible. The historic epoch of labour-capital conflict is shaped by capitalism where 
“bourgeoisie inevitably creates and organises the proletariat” (Lenin, 1968:15). For Marx, 
it was in the creation of the proletariat class that the demise of capitalism became 
inevitable. As the bourgeoisie had transformed the feudal social relations of production at 
the onset of modem state - the bourgeoisie themselves were created within the process 
from the womb of the feudal system. Likewise, for him, the proletariat were essentially the 
product of the capitalist mode of production and correspondingly the liberators of the 
exploited and the exploiters. Furthermore, even in the postmodem societies of our times, 
“the formal and regulatory activity par excellence of the state is to uphold the basis of the 
new social relations which compromise the framework of the civil society” (Bumham, 
2002:121).
Lenin (1968:18) spoke of the aim of the proletariat class, emphasising on their significance 
and way to socialism as:
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The proletariat is not only a suffering class; it is, in fact, the disgraceful economic 
condition of the proletariat that drives it irresistibly forward and compels it to fight for 
it ultimate emancipation and the fighting proletariat will help itself. The political 
movement of the working class will inevitably lead the workers to realise that their 
only salvation lies in socialism (italics in original).
The argument that Marx, Engels and Lenin have constantly made in favour of the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie against feudal relationship of production signifies the fact that 
proletariat class needs to be created and organised with an invincible capability so as to 
destroy the exploitative capitalist system with yet another epoch-building revolution. In this 
sense, the growth of the capitalist system has been approached as a progressive social 
organisation as long as it did not play a regressive role, despite the fact that “capital not 
only extract surplus from labour daily in the production process, but must also ensure 
successful reproduction [...]” (Bumham, in Rupert and Smith, 2002:3). In the private- 
public dichotomy or between the public and private interest, the state seeks to endorse the 
dominant imposition upon those seeking particular interest. “On the other hand, socialism 
will become a force only when it becomes the aim of the political struggle of the working 
class” (Lenin, 1968:18).
The growth of the proletarian class, which was “objectively determined under capitalism 
through the exploitative relationship between the proprietors of the means of production 
and those who owned but their labour-power” (Colas, 2002:196), is a positive political 
process as has been emphasised by Marx:
The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social 
process of production- can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic 
formation of society. The bourgeois relationship of production are the last antagonistic 
not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions 
of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the 
womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that 
antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to 
a close (Marx, 1977:182)
In the capitalist state, for Marx, the bourgeoisie being the dominant class, its all-round 
influence and dominance is legitimised by the existing civil society, which contains the 
entire elements for reproducing the capitalist relationship of production. These 
interrelationships build to create and strengthen the proletariat class or the forces of
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production, that are antagonistic to the mode of capitalist relations of production, that 
provide the “solution” bringing the prehistory of human society to a close.
2.2.1. Constraints and accommodation
If the modem state has such an epoch creating historic responsibility of fulfilling the 
“general requirement” and building an essential setting for revolution as the inevitable 
solution to the class conflict generated by the bourgeois society, then capitalist stmcture of 
state must be assured through every means possible. The state stmcture must be 
strengthened and consolidated for the enhancement of capitalist production relations. It 
must be ensured that at every entrenchment in the social, economic, civic or the political 
realms this supremacy prevails. Therefore,
The central link in civilized society is the state, which in all typical periods is without 
exception the state of the mling class, and in all cases continues to be essentially a 
machine for holding down the oppressed, exploited class (Engels, 1984:169 ).
With the principal idea dominating the proletarian revolution, Marx and Engels clearly 
advocated the end of class-based society, the consolidation of which was extremely 
essential for the demise of the bourgeoisie and its mechanism of capitalist exploitative 
productive relations followed by “the withering of the state.” In light of this argument, the 
politics of identity would also end with the demise of the state. Class politics and identity 
politics, therefore, should cease to exist, once the proletarian class liberates itself. The 
argument that Marx has put forth is central to the political economy without any ground for 
any other form of social contradiction non-conforming to the economic model. However, 
when identity politics is rooted to culture, religion, language or some other sort of symbols, 
which do not have exclusively economic parameters of definition, the Marxist prerogative 
becomes incomplete, on occasions, losing its central theme. The shift in the focus is related 
more to the idea of the extension of economic definition, moving forward and outwards 
into cultural dimensions and religious closures rather than declaring Marxism irrelevant. In 
this regard it is absolutely necessary to be contextual. “Recall Mill’s claim,” confirms 
Kymlicka (1996:70), “that it is better for the Basque to assimilate to the French than to 
‘sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of the past times, revolving in his own little 
mental orbit.” Marx and Mill shared a similar view regarding ethnic problems associated 
with subjective issues. Hobsbawm refutes the debate over Marxism being irreverent by
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insisting that it is “sheer anachronism to criticize Marx or Mill for this view which was 
shared by every impartial mid-nineteenth century observer (ibid).”
Taking sufficient precautions against the possible dangers arising form dogmatism, I have 
intended to employ classical Marxism using at the same time the framework of recognition 
to observe the social whole. Political economical structures in combination with subjective 
parameters present a strong analytical framework withdrawing the thrust for economic 
determinism. Under this circumstance, classical Marxism becomes a powerful theoretical 
framework, as has been the case here.
It is all too clear now that cultural phenomena and ethnic associations along with divergent 
social boundaries are difficult to understand through économie determinants alone where 
politics of recognition claims subjective issues. In most forms similar issues are articulated 
through community values, shared history and experience, common language, etc. within 
the imagined realm that plays a significant role in raising the sense of belonging that 
consequently cumulate the sense of solidarity and psychological foundations within groups. 
Mobilization of members of different ethnic groups in the Nepalese context has 
demonstrated the politics of redistribution and class struggle as well as the politics of
recognition. Thus, the framework of analysis has involved both of these
ideological/practical tendencies while debating the issues of citizenship and identity 
politics in subsequent chapters of this research. The subjectivity shaping the politics of 
difference/identity has been inclusively juxtaposed within the objective reality of economic 
parameters of politics that define the Nepalese socio-political landscape.
I have used the term identity politics in the sense as has been used by Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy^^:
Identity politics starts from analyses of oppression to recommend, variously, the 
reclaiming, redescription, or transformation of previously stigmatized accounts of 
group membership. Rather than accepting the negative scripts offered by a dominant 
culture about one's own inferiority, one transforms one's own sense of self and 
community, often through consciousness-raising.
Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edU/entries/identitv-politics/#l
retrieved: 14/4/2008
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The theoretical framework for citizenship crisis lays out five interrelated structures and 
processes (listed below) that circumscribe the nation-building processes and the 
consolidation of institutions for capitalist accumulation and reproduction. However, while 
evaluating the politics of redistribution, the politics of identity should not be analysed as 
being contradictory as I have discussed above. Rather, the amalgam to these two should be 
made the point of departure. It is within the dialectical relationship of the following broad 
structures and processes that identity politics has surfaced. These are:
1. State sovereignty, nationalism and national identity
2. The institution of monarchy and the totalitarian regime
3. Globalisation processes and global discourses
4. Maobadi andolan (Communist movement/politics of redistribution)
5. Dalit and Ethnic movements (new social movement/ politics of recognition)
6. The Nepali state, elites, politics and resistance
All of these contradictions can be analysed through this framework. The Nepali state 
represents a social organisation that is based on the confluence of feudalism in social, 
cultural and political structures (as the institution of monarchy), and capitalism in its 
economic relations. While the prevailing antagonism between feudal and capitalist 
relationships sets hostility in motion, the class societies within the capitalist mode trigger 
class antagonisms. The mixture of these conflicting social realities, circumscribe the socio­
political processes. Societal resistance expresses the salient features of the crisis, which 
involve both the objective as well as the subjective issues, often compounding the 
complexities involved.
The striving of Nepali society for transformation suggests that it is only through the 
destruction of feudal relationships that modernisation with broad based economic 
development is possible. Moreover, the establishment of capitalist production relations, 
being more progressive than the feudal forms, will provide viable social relations to combat 
deprivation, poverty and backwardness which are, in their broadest sense, the residuals of 
feudal production relations. A significant fact is that the issue of identity politics, a globally 
distributed phenomenon, is problematic if constrained within the parameters of class 
politics alone. The economic base and superstructure in contradiction with the social 
consciousness of the productive forces is reorganised within the egalitarian ethos of socio­
economic justice. However, the problem is neither understood nor solved when identity
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politics rooted to ethnic or cultural phenomenon, rather than (more than) economic order, is 
analysed only within the material production relations and surplus economy. It is 
indispensible therefore that identity politics be analysed from the window of the politics of 
difference/recognition. This is essential because the complex issues tied to culture, religion, 
language etc. have been playing significant roles in shaping the present forms of society.
Along with the Dalits, many ethnic communities and indigenous peoples have been 
exploited, dispossessed and alienated from their own productions. When a collective 
identity is characteristically exploited in a given relationship of production, the sense of 
common belonging, shared history, common destiny etc. swells up in emotion for survival 
or revenge. This strong sentiment amalgamates the individuals into a formidable 
relationship of camaraderie. Despite the high degree of cohesion, inner structures of these 
communities clearly demonstrate class cleavages. Thus, relying exclusively on cultural 
aphorism or on economic determinism would not generate a qualifying research. In 
comparable cases, the politics of identity may fuse with the socio-economic inequalities. 
Marriage between culture and political economy is an obvious product in such cases. In 
the light of the prevalent nature of identity politics in Nepal, this juxtaposed model of 
contradiction overwhelms other forms, and thus generates a more representative theoretical 
approach than any ideologies.
Similar contradictions arise within societal interactions as well. Subjugation and dominance 
of one culture by another promotes identity politics. This is more relevant when the 
dominating and the dominated possess infused interdependent boundaries when both 
belong to a common economic class. For example, a rich Magar and an equally rich 
Chhetri may belong to the same capitalist class and therefore appropriate labour 
irrespective of his identity. However, both may support their own collective ethnic 
identities when they think appropriate. In this case, the identities are overlapping, 
producing complex relationships.
In the Nepalese context, centuries of nation building has been guided by the principles of 
assimilation where the state has always represented the dominant culture. The state, by 
being the guardian angel of one religion, has ensured that one language and one culture has 
substantially marginalised those nonconforming to the codes of dominant identity. Besides 
these historical facts, the advent of democracy since the 1990s has heightened competition
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for survival among individuals, collective identities and contesting social groups. The 
tendeneies of gaining supremacy or claiming recognition, coupled by capitalist 
globalisation have created an acute sense of anxiety, social fragmentation and sense of 
threat on economic imperatives and social existence. Thus, the issue of citizenship rights 
and identity politics in Nepal are founded on both of the valid aspects of the politics of 
redistribution as well as the identity politics.
The poverty factor accumulates from the unjust economic order of both contemporary and 
historic nature. While identity politics has been contributing in reinventing the history, 
symbols, narratives and social status of individuals and collective identities for recognition, 
it is inherently infused with the reality of poverty characterising the political economy.
With a view to analysing the underlying reasons behind citizenship crisis and rise of 
identity politics, I have built my theoretical analytical tool to address the coupled 
phenomenon of political economy and politics of identity or difference. The theoretical 
argument is that the mode of production and social consciousness of material productive 
forces cannot alone explain the contributing phenomenon of identity and recognition that 
stem from cultural perspectives in addition to the nature of political economy. The claims 
to ethnic rights in many ways contradicts Marx as has been explicitly asserted by Kymlicka 
(2006:70) where he emphasises: “indeed, whereas Marx thought that bigger was better, 
many socialists (and environmentalists) now think that small is beautiful.” The 
deterministic view, embedded in communist philosophy, reduces the cultural injustices and 
domination exclusively into the folds of class struggle. Conversely, abandoning political 
economy and inherent exploitative production relations in favour of culturalism that 
demands “recognition” for social justice would be a hollow framework of analysis. Thus, it 
is in the marriage of these two theoretical assertions that I have built my theoretical 
framework for analysing this research.
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Research strategy
3.1. Introduction
This research was conducted in the midst of a Maobadi revolution where people are willing 
to sacrifice their lives for reasons based on their beliefs, principles or ideas that symbolise 
their notions of ‘truth and knowledge’. Thus, the most reliable approach for any researcher 
in similar situations would be to seek a methodology that encompasses emotions and 
sentiments. Considering this unique position, I have used a qualitative methodology^^ 
because I am dealing here with the inner knowledge of human science.
Qualitative methodology is favourable in rural settings within the context of developing countries and 
strongly traditional communities where ethnic loyalty, shared experiences and identities play strong roles 
in driving social discourses. There have been cases (such as the one that I faced during my MSc research), 
where people/respondents were not willing to answer the structured questions because of two main 
reasons; one, because the questions were not understood by the respondents and two, the questions had 
been improperly designed, which I came to realise later. Equally important was the fact that, the 
respondents were very uncomfortable and hesitant over quantifying emotions. The most serious of the 
setbacks that I have experienced is that quantitative methodology cannot be used if the respondents are 
unable to read, write, and transform their emotions into quantitative tabulations.
What I have experienced as well is that, unlike quantitative research, qualitative research is flexible and is 
a particularly suitable methodology of research (in my case), since the majority of respondents are 
uneducated and the literacy rate at the sites of research is extremely low. At the same time, this 
methodology is exploratory and the initial set of questions can be expanded as the research advances 
enabling the researcher to explore the in-depths of the concerned social phenomenon. Being subjective and 
soft, the research process is handy in gaining access to social phenomenon, enabling the researcher to 
study and understand the social trends and incidents of interest in an environment o f partnership and 
sharing. This methodology would enable me to see the ‘other side’ o f the obvious concerning the 
participants of the revolution and the champions of culturalism. Furthermore, the qualitative method is 
favoured for comprehending another culture, and to study the behaviour of the participants and 
respondents as well as to comprehend their social, cultural and religious values, ethics, and perceptions, 
along with their sensitivity towards real world phenomenon. Direct methods such as focus groups, depth 
interviews, and panels of both Delphi and nominal groups are efficient tools and techniques. The indirect 
methods such as association, completion, construction and expression may also be used for generating 
desired data. The quantitative approach on the other hand, being a formal and structured process, cannot 
generate valid results where “emotional” or “affective” information is to be generated. As Thomas 
(1999:3) correctly states, “empirical indicates that the information, knowledge and understanding are 
gathered through experience and direct data collection.” This, o f course, does not incorporate the inner 
aspects of human nature and prevailing emotions.
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For the above-mentioned purpose and to meet the requirement of the nature of research I 
have outlined my methodological choices, epistemological position, research strategy and 
techniques, research design, site of investigation, unit of analysis and methods of data 
collection. I have included the time framework as well. In addition, I have also presented 
the fieldwork details and the precise activities in which I was involved during my research.
3.2. Methodological choice
Having outlined the theoretical and conceptual elements in the former chapter and 
established their links and updates with my research question, I would like briefly to sketch 
my research methodology, highlighting its importance in explaining how the social world 
and social processes are understood and interpreted. This is especially so because it enables 
the researchers “to be able to think and act strategically in ways which combine 
intellectual, philosophical, technical and practical concerns [...] throughout the systematic 
and rigorous exercise of researching (Mason,1998:2).
It is a relity that many, because of their beliefs, principles, or ideas that assist in 
formulating the perception of ‘truth and knowledge’are willing to sacrifice their lives. A 
situation as this strongly suggests that the most reliable approach for a researcher would be 
to seek a methodology that encompasses emotions and sentiments. Considering this unique 
situation, I have used a qualitative methodology because I am dealing here with the inner 
knowledge of human science “[...] which may be explained as life philosophy that 
encompasses the true knowledge of meaningful conduct” (Jayaram, 1989:9). Thomas 
(2002:3), while discussing research methodologies, emphasises that “quantitative research 
is quite good at telling us what is happening and often qualitative studies are better at 
determining why events occur.” Qualitative research is therefore in-depth-seeking and helps 
us to generating data, which involve human emotions and sentiments.
Qualitative research and particularly ethnography, I claim, is a holistic approach, which can 
relate meanings to different cultural contexts in divergent social settings and enhance the 
capability of in-depth studies of social structures and phenomena. As I have mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Nepal, besides being culturally diverse, has been submerged in the politics of 
identity; thus in a powerful way, qualitative methodology, as well as relating meaning to 
cultural contexts, measures the imbued meanings rather than frequencies in many of the 
unfamiliar subjects. This has been extremely meaningful in my context. The behaviours
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and attitudes, partnerships of sharing information and methods which shift the normal 
balance form closed to open, from individual to group, from verbal to visual and from 
measuring to comparing are the critical factors that specify the rationale behind my choice 
of this approach, as has been evaluated by Mason(1998) in Qualitative Researching. With a 
radical departure, confirming qualitative research as means of challenging discursive 
formations, Wainwright (1997) suggests, that these methods offer an important link to 
some of the main concerns of sociological thought, addressing questions of power, 
ideology and subjective meaning.
Since I intend to use the range of tools and techniques offered by this methodology such as 
observation, participation, interrogation, listening and communicating etc., I strongly 
believe that this methodology is of the right choice. By stating so, I further consent that this 
methodology would be extremely useful in generating knowledge to comprehend the social 
reality.
I have chosen qualitative methodology and case study method for this research, which 
alternatively is my strategy as well. These basic elements of intellectual enquiry have been 
founded on four supporting structures: my personal experience, my research findings, 
western literature forming a theoretical package and finally the history of Nepal along with 
the associated literature. I have employed the elements of ethnographic study during my 
research.
Personal
experience
History of 
Nepal
Western
literature
Figure: 3: a. Elements of intellectual enquiry
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My research on “crisis of citizenship and rise of identity politics within modem political 
structure in Nepal” has aimed to study the inherent barriers and constraints to equal 
citizenship formation within the nation-state model. I would like to identify the roles of 
social, political and to a lesser extent, the economic stmctures and institutions along with 
the traditional and global processes that enhance or dampen the formation of equal 
democratic citizenship. It is argued that the dialectical processes involved underpin the 
milieu for the generation of identity politics in Nepal. It is my argument, therefore, that 
underlying reasons for citizenship crisis bear an intrinsic relationship with the rise of 
identity politics.
On the one hand, the institution of monarchy, in its state of absolutism, being antithetical to 
democracy, negates the growth of equal citizenship, while, simultaneously, on the other 
hand, the global political trend and forces of globalisation tend to erode the monarchical 
coercive powers and sphere of its influence. In association with these dialectical processes, 
the research commences to investigate the meaningful relationship existing between 
identity politics and citizenship crisis (as offered by the rise of social, cultural and regional 
politics within the later decades). Within this broad milieu of social dialectics, Maobadi 
andolan has surfaced, encompassing divergent components of contemporary social 
movements where identity politics remains prominent within its fold, although distinct 
movements categorised as ‘politics of difference’ had barely existed in earlier times.
3.3. Methodology
As a point of departure into the research, I began probing myself on the purpose of the task 
in hand and questioned what formed the social phenomenon or social reality that I thought 
was worth researching. It was initiated by conceptualising the elements that formed my 
ontological perspectives as I have already mentioned above. Following this exercise, for a 
couple of months, I was in position to grapple with my epistemological standpoint. “Your 
epistemology,” opines Mason (1998:2), “is literally, your theory of knowledge, and should 
therefore concern the principles and rules by which you decide whether and how social 
phenomenon can be known and how knowledge can be demonstrated.” I made sure that my 
ontological perspectives and epistemological questions were in harmony in the sense that 
the ontological perspective answered the epistemological questions and vice versa. My 
prior knowledge and experience in the topic of research, literature review and knowledge
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gained through fieldwork will be synthesised into a coherent outlook through a reflective 
process updating and enhancing my knowledge at the same time.
Before I advance any further into the topic of research methodology, I would like to briefly 
mention my experiences and relate my position in the context of this research.
3.4. My position and potentials in the research context
My ontological and epistemological expedition began when I was a child. And in the 
process, alongside my growth and experience, my understanding of the social world has 
also changed. The embedded meanings and their social interpretations have substantially 
grown, all pointing towards my changing epistemological positions. The content of the 
preface has outlined my epistemological position with regards to my existence within the 
context of social reality. My childhood experiences in a small poverty-ridden village in 
west Nepal; my education at a Christian missionary school; exposure to the real life 
situations of poverty, hardships, neglect and exploitation; experiences on the social, 
religious, political and cultural forms of dominance and consequent revolts; involvement in 
democratic movements and bureaucratic positions that I experienced from 
University teaching into the offices of the Deputy Prime Minister have shaped my rationale 
of thinking, judgement and induced actions along with my subjective and objective 
arguments in my real life situations and indeed this research.
Being one of the players in contemporary Nepalese politics, I have had a genuine firsthand 
experience of the Nepalese social context as an insider in the major political events 
following the 1980s. My active struggles (along side thousands like me) for social 
transformation are in themselves praxis that has transformed my consciousness as well. 
From another angle, the consistent and enduring political struggles for liberty and freedom 
through time and space - more accurately explained as praxis, have been my sources of 
knowledge production that coincide with the process of social transformation.
I have intended, and with all efforts, to conduct the research systematically and rigorously 
involving active reflectivity. Although I have been objective in my research, elements of 
subjectivity could not be ruled out owing to my position in active politics within my social 
context. However, on the contrary, focussing exclusively on the reality of objectivity 
without any subjective space provides an asymmetrical and lopsided analysis deviating
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form social reality. Thus, my position has oscillated between the two contending poles. 
Wainwright (1997)^^ while discussing Sociological Research emphasises that “this unity 
between the subjective and objective world underlines the political basis of critical social 
research.” In addition, giving account of Bourdieu’s position in the debate on structure and 
agency, as Jenkins (1992:19-20) explains, “[...] the attempt to understand how ‘objective’, 
supra-individual social reality (cultural and institutions social structure) and the internalised 
‘subjective’ mental worlds of individuals as cultural beings and social actors are 
inextricably bound together, each being a contributor to -  and, indeed, as aspect of -  the 
other”. My position in socio-political events thus will be a merit. However, my politico- 
ideological and intellectual bias may be some of the contending factors for future 
researchers.
3.5. Research strategy
As part of my strategy, I embarked on the theme of literature review during 2006. This, of 
course, was an ongoing activity throughout the research work. After reading some of the 
major works related to my interpretivist research, I identified the general topic of my 
interest. However, I was constantly engaged in comprehending various theories in the 
course of generating concepts and designing analytical framework in order for my research 
to be grounded on a philosophical plane; while at the same time, this exercise assisted me 
in comprehending the real problems and theoretical gaps within the research context. This 
has been a deductive approach. However, an inductive approach was also used while 
working in this research project since I am an active player and part of the social process 
within the social context of my enquiry. It is therefore clear that I was neither setting out to 
test my pre-conceived hypotheses, nor that I was naïve in my topic of research; rather the 
end result can now be expressed as being the synthetic form of the elements of intellectual 
enquiry (sources of knowledge) that I have discussed.
I have used (as discussed in Chapter 2),
A) Classical Marxism (as politics of redistribution), and
^ Wainwright, David (1997), Can Sociological Research Be Qualitative, Critical and Valid? “The 
Qualitative Report”, Volume 3, Number 2, July, 1997
http://ww\v. nova. edn/ssss/OR/OR3-2/wam. html 
Retrieved: 08/4.2007
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B) Politics of recognition (a form of new social movement or identity politics or politics of 
difference),
for analysing the social contradictions and confluences in terms of the principles of thesis 
and antithesis during the process of comprehending and interpreting the social realm.
Furthermore, in addition to the theoretical proximity that I share with the above stated 
grand theories, social processes were also analysed within the framework of democratic 
theories, departing from classical Marxism with regards to its strict sense of economic 
determinism. This has allowed me the space to recognise the social, cultural and religious 
courses and forms of fragmentations and growing politics of identity stemming from the 
underlying reasons of citizenship crisis. In light of the growing interstate dependency, 
intensification of science and technology, imperialist economic drive, enhanced social 
interactions, cross-cultural affiliations and growing porosity within social, cultural and 
ethnic boundaries, the globalising process possesses significant bearing on the issue of 
citizenship as a vehicle to social equality, justice and rights. While the most remote 
villages around the world are continuing to be interconnected in the global system, there 
are infinite and diverse likelihoods of possible outcomes ranging through the positive or the 
negative forms of social production.
Identity politics has no precise parameter of existence, as it a loose term indicating no 
specific political characteristics. “Predictably, there is no straightforward criterion that 
makes a political struggle into an example of “identity politics;” rather, the term signifies a 
loose collection of political projects that each articulate a collective with a distinctively 
different social location that has hitherto been neglected, erased, or suppressed” (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The philosophical roots to identity politics have been 
premised for discussions in fairly recent years following the collapse of the communist 
block. The global integration of communities, economic interdependency among states and 
social fragmentation and disintegration of local communities resulting from capitalist 
globalisation have shaped the discourse of identity politics or the politics of difference.
I have also used the terms “politics of recognition” as bearing the same sense and “nature 
of subjectivity and the self’ as in Tyler’s (1989) words. The intermarriage between 
Marxism (politics of redistribution) and identity politics (politics of difference or politics of 
recognition) has been argued to provide reliable explanations and exposure of social reality
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pertaining to the underlying reasons behind citizenship crisis and rise of identity politics in 
Nepal as discussed in Chapter 2.
In addition, I have also used inductive methods while I interviewed different actors, and 
engaged myself in the group/ panel discussions. This method, at the same time, was also 
useful in observing power distribution within the social settings and its exercise through the 
actions and behaviour of different individuals or collectivities under study. Grounded 
theory techniques were also used, especially as I was engaged in the investigation of 
subjective issues beyond those referred to as objective-deterministic. However, all these 
tools and techniques formed the ingredients of my theoretical framework of analysis.
3.6. Case study method of research
I have employed the multi-case study method of research focussing on non-cross-sectional 
organisation principles as to bring forth the interpretations of holistic sequences. Mason 
(1998:129) referring to Yin argues that “the case study allows an investigation to retain the 
holist and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, 
and the maturation of industries”. However, ‘real life events’ also need to be included in 
the exercise to comprehend the social meanings and interactive processes. In the general 
sense I have looked to analyse “the holistic unit [...] to try to produce an explanation of 
processes, practices, or whatever within that unit” (Mason, 1998: 130) for constructing a 
meaningful social reality based on my epistemological position that requires critical 
examinations of discourses and narratives as well.
3.6.1. Selection of case study sites
a. Bijouri village, Dang Valley
b. Dhobighat, Ward No. 3, Lalitpur Kathmandu
a. Bijouri village, Dang Valley
I have selected Bijouri Village of Dang valley for my case study in exploring the issues of 
identity politics and the crisis of citizenship that forms part of the instrumental case in 
contemporary politics. I was engaged here with different political groups, individuals, 
political leaders and cadres of different political parties within divergent hierarchical 
contexts. Various religious, lingual, cultural and ethnic communities and individuals were
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focussed on to investigate socio-political and cultural issues relating to identity politics and 
the politics of difference. First-hand information and understanding of different actors, 
groups, individual and family interests of caste, ethnic and untouchables along with wider 
issues of gender and class, elites and followers was generated in order to explain the social 
structure, process and phenomena under study. The respondents were selected purposely 
and from different positions/status within social, political, religious and economic spectrum 
to ensure the data being generated was as representative as possible.
I have decided to conduct this case study in the specified Village based on the following 
criteria:
It forms a critical case in relation to my research objective: I selected Bijouri Village of 
Dang District for my case study, partly because this is the place of my birth. With relation 
to the research topic, this site was selected with a priority since it represents a classical 
interface between the Terai movement and hill ethnic movement. The hill ethnic groups 
occupying the northern margins of the village have been mobilised by the Maobadi andolan 
within the hill movement category, while the Madhesi population representing the Terai 
movement, also a form of identity politics, has been a major force within the Maobadi 
andolan. At the same time, the Madhesis are opposed to the pahadis (hill people) on the 
grounds that the state has rendered them second class citizens, besides their experience of 
dominance and subjugation stemming from the process of Nepalization that the state has 
been maintaining in its efforts to integrate (rather than assimilate) the Terai population 
within its political domain. The village is multicultural, multireligious, multilingual and 
multiethnic in its demographic composition and resembles many villages in Nepal, 
particularly those that may be viewed as possessing defused regional or demographic 
divides between the hill population and the Terai population. Both of these populations 
possess profound degree of interdependency and dense social transactions while they share 
the common territorial space.
Complexity of contradictions makes it more representative in the present context: The 
population is not homogeneous; the hill category is fragmented along the ethnic divides, 
and each ethnic group practices its own culture, religion and speaks its own mother tongue. 
While the bulk of the population is of Hindu origin, it is also fragmented along the caste- 
divides or the vema kram. Within this category, Dalits, at the lowest rung of the social 
hierarchy, have been uniting against the practice of untouchablity. The Madhesis, being
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predominantly a Hindu category, exhibit similar caste structure, often more repressive than 
that of the hill practice. The poverty factor is an important feature that embraces and 
influences all. While the feature of poverty conjures classical Marxism or the politics of 
redistribution, the other forms of contradictions seek the avenues of subjective reasoning 
along the idea of the politics of recognition.
It is the area of mv interest and fits with mv professional involvement: My professional 
political activities and social work have been partly tied to Dang District. I have watched in 
close proximity the coexistence/ contradictions prevailing within and among caste and non­
caste groups of ethnic, pahade, Madhesi, Dalit or the upper caste populations. The 
significant in-migration of pahades and out-migration of ethnic communities from their 
homelands has been a conunon feature in most of the districts. These migratory trends have 
ushered in significant changes in demographic composition of these territories. Bijouri 
village, in this respect, presents a classical example where the Tharu ethnic population has 
been displaced significantly, within these forty years, by the impact of the in-migratory 
trend. Although the previous trend has not died out, the Maobadi andolan being the main 
cause of displacement at present, is temporarily the main source of migration.
b. Dhobighat, Ward No. 3, Lalitpur, Kathmandu
I have chosen Dhobighat, Kathmandu as another site of investigation. Ward number 3 of 
Dhobighat in Lalitpur clearly encompasses the pressures arising from rapid urbanisation 
and population growth. The area has been swamped by new settlers from different parts of 
the country. This trend has picked momentum following the Maobadi insurgency where 
people fled atrocities perpetuated by the Maobadi and the state security forces alike. In 
terms of the social composition, it is a multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious and 
multilingual urban settlement familiar with the global discourses and global trends and 
likewise, it actively seeks its role in national debates and the political processes that are 
underway. Kathmandu is strongly linked with global markets and networks being a part of 
the capital city, and maintains an active partnership with the global processes. The plethora 
of cultures, opinions and histories, on the one hand, often exhibit complex forms of 
conflicts in the social, political, cultural or economic domains, within the local regimes; 
while on the other, demonstrate convergence or concord as well as sharp and outstanding 
contradictions between the local and the global discourses.
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Dhobighat (ward. No 3)Bijouri Village
Figure: 3: b Area under investigation (research sites)
3.6.2. Method of data generation
I have used documentary analysis; participant observation; individual, group and family 
interviews; focus group discussions and participatory techniques for data generation. Open- 
ended questions for grass-root respondents and similar set of questions for politicians and 
bureaucrats were designed and audio recording arranged where applicable.
Ethnography: The techniques involved with ethnography were rigorously employed to
generate data on cultural aspects of the society at individual or collective levels ranging 
through the family as a unit to clan activities and interactions. Interethnic relations, 
hierarchical social orders and different forms of social closures were analysed through 
ethnographic research. Social, cultural, religious and political organisations and unofficial 
networks were also focussed. Given that, “Ethnography involves the ethnographer 
participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking question -  in fact, collecting 
whatever date are available to throw light on issues what are the focus of the research” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2002:1), it was conducted in a well organised manner to 
provide meaningful explanation of the world being studied. All of the information that was 
contextual was recorded.
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Interviews: Interviews are good techniques for in-depth analysis and valid data generation. 
National level leaders, intermediate and local leaders, cadres and supporters of different 
political and social organisations were interviewed. Similarly, Dalits, members of ethnic 
organisations, and dominant local elites and members of local power groups were also 
interviewed. These sessions were immensely helpful in comprehending the social 
phenomena. The questions used in the interviews were unstructured and open-ended. My 
role as Denscombe (1998:113) points out were to “start the ball rolling by introducing a 
theme or topic and then letting the interviewee develop his or her ideas and pursue his or 
her train of thought”. The interviews were recorded in a tape or notes taken as appropriate.
The interviews were planned, informal, topic-centred with theme, and conducted in a 
narrative approach. Thus, the data generated at one sitting was through close interaction 
involving one to a few participants. It was assured that the data generated bore relevance to 
the topic of research. As there were no set questions, and the interviews were thematic and 
based upon interaction, one question lead to another. However, all the questions and the 
generated answers were add to the bundle of research.
Focus group discussions: Focus group discussions as Patton (2000:9) opines “is a tool 
which is used to explore the ideas, perspectives, and concerns over the issues of the 
participant in a free, open and uncontrolled environment where participants discuss the 
issue on their own terms.” As the research topic being culturally sensitive requiring some 
caution in selecting the participants, I made sure that purposive sampling avoided the 
probable pitfalls. The focus groups consisted of 5-7 participants.
Observation: In this ethnographic method of data generation, I used participant observation, 
as this would allow me to generate information from the natural scene of activities. It is a 
distinct method of data generation as has been mentioned by Denscombe; “It does not relay 
on what people say they do, or what they think. It is more direct than that. Instead, it draws 
on the direct evidence of the eye to witness events first hand.” (1998:139). And further as 
“observations take place over an extended period of time, researchers can develop more 
intimate and informal relationships with those they are observing, generally in more natural 
environments than those in which experiments and surveys are conducted” (Bailey in 
Cohen et al, 2000:187).
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Document analysis: Legal documents, court precedents and the constitution of Nepal were 
examined. Furthermore, policy documents, government instructions, and parliament bills as 
available were studied. All these documents proved valuable in analysing issues pertaining 
to equality, inclusion and social justice on both the legal and normative accounts. In 
addition, this information was helpful in the interpretation of the nature and form of 
citizenship practice in Nepal. Over and above, they provided valuable insight into the 
underlying reasons contributing to the crisis of citizenship and consequently, to the rise of 
identity politics.
Units of analysis: The units of analysis were considered to be at three levels: the national 
level, district level and local level. These levels depict macro-level, meso-level and the 
micro-level. These tiers represent the political players and parties, social organisations and 
networks along with social, ethnic, religious, lingual groups. The state and civil society 
were thus included in the analysis. The economic realm, the market forces and various 
indicators of globalisation were also considered.
Information generation and analysis: The analytical framework of this research has been 
based on the blended concept of Marxism and the idea of recognition as I have explained in 
Chapter 2. Thus, being grounded to these philosophical outlooks, this work has attempted 
to analyse and reconstruct the social reality based on these terms. However, in addition, the 
contemporary movements were also analysed (in terms of new social movements) where 
Marxism alone is incapable of unearthing the existing social reality and the social 
transformation that these contradictions and upheavals have tended to unleash. Being 
based on interpretative approach, the knowledge and evidence gained in this research has 
been build on to my experiences, whereby my analysis contains the social, cultural, lingual, 
religious and national practices within the ethos of nation-state and further embarks on the 
concept of nation-state as being antithetical to the principles of democracy, 
multiculturalism and equal citizenship. A descriptive model with narrative and illustrative 
quotes has been used to clarify my arguments. In the analysis, the global trends, with 
respect to the context of research, have also been analysed. Thus, the work on the whole 
has been devoted towards revealing the meaningful social reality behind identity politics 
and citizenship crisis in Nepal.
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The following two figures (3c & 3d) show the macro, meso and the micro levels of 
information generation.
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Figure: 3 c Location of interaction at national and regional level (at macro and meso-levels)
In figure 3c and figure 3d, the location of interaction has been mapped for the research. The 
former traces the interaction in an urban setting as in Kathmandu city that is strongly 
globalised. The global or the regional discourses and trends strongly shape its outcome. On 
the reverse, the latter, i.e. figure 3d, traces the interactions in rural settings, where the 
forces of globalisation are relatively weak. The traditional forces are strong while global 
discourses are analysed as being deviant and socially impure. Despite my attempt to 
categorise my research areas into these two broad categories, it must be noted that the 
characterisation is based on relative terms.
In Kathmandu, the leadership of all camps, institutions and processes are strongly affected 
by the global forces. Whether we speak of the Maobadi andolan or the ethnic leadership, 
the same is true.
8 1
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Figure: 3 d Location of interaction at local level (micro levels)
This scheme therefore analyses the political and social processes within the matrix of 
strong globalisation networks. Interdependency and problem externalisation can be 
analysed through this model as well. As most of the social movements (categorised as 
national movements) and identity politics draw ideological and political reasonings from 
Kathmandu, the global discourses and processes form intrinsic components of the whole 
In rural settings, as depicted in figure 3d, forces of globalisation are weak. Since 
Kathmandu forms the nerve-centre of the ongoing political processes, rural settings and 
villages such as Bijouri are not entirely free, rather they have been tied to the global via the 
policy regimes and the discourses emanating from this nerve-centre. Although the forces of 
globalisation in operation are weak in the rural areas of Nepal, these processes have been 
influenced though the central policy regimes, discourses and the relationships of 
dependency/interdependency modelled in the urban centres, particularly Kathmandu.
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Field process of data generation: As I have explained and diagrammatically shown above, I 
concentrated on the micro, meso and the macro-levels, throughout my research, for 
generating the data. At macro-level or national level, I interviewed key players and 
stakeholders of political, social, religious and economic organisations. I followed the media 
discussions and programmes organised by various organisations.
This process was also translocated at meso-level or the district level. The field process of 
data generation at the village level (Bijour VDC) comprised of mainly interviews, focus 
group discussions and observations. I interviewed 19 persons, and conducted 2 family 
interviews alongside 2 focus group discussions among 5-7 participants during the first field 
visit (the first field visit was organised during July-August of 2007 while the second was 
during the months of June-July 2008). I reviewed the secondary data at all levels. I also 
arranged brief meetings with the interviewees of my first field trip during my second visit, 
one year later. This provided me with the valuable information regarding the way people 
think and how they link the changed political context with their prior knowledge. During 
the second field visit, I interviewed 12 people and two families. I also conducted two focus 
group discussions. Two workshops (one in Kathmandu and the other in Bijouri village) 
were held during my first field trip (see table 3.1, page 93).
Before conducting the research, critical information was gathered from key informants.
3.6.3. Rigour of the research
Reliability, validity and scope of generalisation: The epistemological position of a 
researcher, his experiences, selection of site and participants, and theoretical framework of 
analysis all point towards some persistent elements of subjectivity that have the tendency 
towards creating some basics of bias as I have partially discussed above. Given that any 
research outcome is far from being neutral, it however is extremely important that the 
outcome is valid. Thus, in my research the possible basis of bias as Swartz (2003:39) 
stresses may be distinguished as “First, related to the social origin of the research, second, 
positional bias that emerges from the positional power and third, intellectual bias.” 
However, these biases were minimised through the process of critical reflexivity to enhance 
the reliability and validity of the research. “Thus,” summarises Wainwright (1997)^^,
Wainwright, David (1997), Can Sociological Research Be Qualitative, Critical and Valid? “The 
Qualitative Report”, Volume 3, Number 2, July, 1997 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-2/wain.html
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“reflexivity is not primarily a means of demonstrating the validity of research to an 
audience, but rather a personal strategy by which the researcher can manage the analytical 
oscillation between observation and theory in a way which is valid to him or herself.” 
Being that reflexivity is more of a management for the researcher, Wainwright stresses, 
“this reflective management of the research in the pursuit of validity applies to each stage 
of the research process [...]”. “Essentially” highlights Mason (1998:21), “validity, 
generalizability and reliability are different kinds of measure of the quality, rigour and 
wider potential of research which are achieved according to certain methodological and 
disciplinary conventions and principles.” Acknowledging ‘thick description’ as being 
essential to boost generalizability, Wainwright goes beyond to say in the same report that 
“generalisability depends not just upon detailed description of a phenomenon, but on 
revealing the social relations that underpin it.” “Validity of method and of interpretation 
therefore must be demonstrated through a careful retracting and reconstruction of the route 
[...]” (Mason, 1998:152), meaning that that the acts of measure, identification and 
observation, as research practices, must all be accountable and answer questions relating to 
the social phenomenon and provide answer to my investigation. The techniques and the 
method of research that I have outlined, in my opinion, have produced enhanced reliability 
adding to the quality of work. In addition, the data generated from different sources and 
settings were integrated and triangulated maintaining the bias-content to be within an 
acceptable measure. Since the condition of generalization is feasible only if we can relate 
the research and consequent analysis to the wider section of the society in a broader 
context, the generalisation was done based on the findings to establish whether the research 
can represent the wider context sharing the same/similar social settings.
This work, being based on case study and the issue of political sociology, represents 
divergent aspects of social reality at different places, particularly those under the influence 
of identity politics and Maobadi andolan. In addition, this research, in my opinion, bears 
the validity for generalisation in the socio-political environments of those places, 
cherishing the state-centric ideology that relentlessly minimises the ethos of democracy, 
inclusion and multiculturalism under the auspices of state-centrism, national identity and 
nationalism.
84
3.6.4. Ethical considerations
All of the issues pertaining to academic ethics and research were seriously thought about. I 
ensured that ethics was held high throughout my research. I reassure with due gravity that 
cultural, religious, lingual and traditional differences were well respected. The process 
concerned with the selection of participants was advanced in a democratic environment, 
respecting the freedom of choice of the individuals. While respecting the dignity of 
individual autonomy, utmost priority was given to maintain confidentiality of participants 
before and after the research. At times, this was extremely complicated as Mason (1998, 
159) highlights “This involves the questions of informed consent and asking yourself 
whether you do actually have informed consent of research subjects to analyse data gained 
form them in the way you have, to make connections and construct explanations in the way 
you have, and to present in some kind of public way data which are sufficiently 
contextualised for judgements about reliability, validity and generalizability to be made”. It 
is in this context that I have decided to hand over a copy of my PhD thesis to Bijouri 
Village Development Committee and the Ward No. 3 Committee of Dhobighat, 
Kathmandu, after completion.
The ethical issues have been cautiously observed. Likewise, similar issues related with 
authorities, organizations, and individuals have been given considerable thought throughout 
the research process.
3.7. Challenges and limitations of the research
This is an attempt to study an outstanding problem within the realm of political sociology 
that encompasses the state from its superstructure to local social units and to analyse the 
processes with respect to translating time and space. The topic being of an enormous width 
and depth, presents a critical challenge by the very nature of its size. However, after my 
first field visit this problem was largely solved as it provided me with the priceless visions 
of approach and the technique of reaching into the depth of enquiry. As I listened to 
different people and their stories, the pictures to be interpreted unfolded in sequential 
patterns.
During my first field visit, the Maobadi andolan was in full swing. While in the field, I had 
to reschedule my programmes frequently owing to constant strikes and road blockages. 
Despite the agreement reached between the democratic parties and the Maobadis, an
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environment of suspicion prevailed, that intimidated or prevented people from speaking out 
openly. This nature of environment Avas more prevalent in the village than in Kathmandu. 
The feeling of intimidation and fear overwhelmed most of the respondents in rural areas; 
however, they did speak out their views even if it meant criticising the Maobadis.
Interviews and family visits were conducted with precise planning. People wanted me to 
visit their homes or were ready to speak to me when they felt more secure -  in the 
environment where no one was watching or hearing them. Many interviews and family 
visits were conducted during the late evening hours. This was the general procedure in the 
village. While in Kathmandu, the environment was more open. I had no problems with 
interviews or family visits being conducted during the daytime.
During my second visit, the country was preparing for its historical constituent assembly 
elections. Politics was in the air and the environment was friendlier. However, the shortage 
of petroleum products caused immense problems to my travel schedule due to the 
disruption of the transport system throughout the country. Moreover, Kathmandu was 
experiencing food shortage as well. The escalating political agitation in the Terai was the 
reason behind the transport blockade that has stifled the rest of the country. The animosity 
between the paharis and the Madhesis was on the rise. The level of trust between the state 
and Madhesis has fallen to a level never realised before.
In similar vein, the janajati andolan was at its peak although these movements existed 
independent of the Terai andolan without any coordination or ideological proximity 
between them. Transportation to the Eastern parts of the country was largely disrupted 
most of the time during both of my visits. People in general expressed their concerns and 
anxiety but also claimed that they were uncertain of the outcomes, as these incidents, in 
their view, had developed unprecedentedly.
Although I had initially planned to interview 36 individuals, conduct 4 workshops and 8 
family interviews, I managed to interview only 31 individuals and 4 families. Likewise, 4 
focus group discussions were held and 2 workshops conducted in total during both of the 
field trips, as shown in table 3.1. I attended most of the workshops, seminars and meetings 
held in Kathmandu by different organisation that possibly came to my notice. Kathmandu 
was vibrant and energetically charged at both the occasions. Elites, intellectuals, students
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and urban bourgeoisie in general were actively involved in all possible events -  
discussions, campaigns, demonstrations and mobilisations that often stifled Kathmandu’s 
urban life.
Note- making was the most useful tool for recording data in the villages. I came to realise 
that using tapes to record interviews or taking photographs were not appreciated. I had to 
abandon the idea in the village when I came to know of the uneasiness this had caused 
among some participants. In Kathmandu, these did not pose any problem. I recorded the 
interviews and relevant data in audio tapes and used notebooks as well. In Bijouri village, 
with the exception of the main points, which I took notes of at the time of interviews, the 
rest of the important and meaningful information was recorded later, on the same day in my 
field note book.
The complex issues that I have addressed are immensely challenging and polimic; the very 
nature of which, as plainly understood and fairly judged, demad further research in each 
topic that I have visited.
3.8. Detailed plan of research
Harmonising my ontological perspectives and epistemological questions and ensuring that 
ontological perspective answered the epistemological questions and vice versa, I finally 
was in a position to assume my field responsibility for generating investigative information. 
My prior knowledge and experience in the topic of research, literature review (both Nepali 
as well as western) and knowledge gained through fieldwork was synthesised into a 
coherent outlook through a reflective process updating and enhancing my knowledge at the 
same time.
The method of data generation involved ethnography, utilising tools such as participant 
observation, panel discussions, group and personal interviews at all of the three levels of 
macro, meso and micro structures.
The first fieldwork was of forty-five days, beginning from July 20 to September 4, 2007. 
During my research, I met key persons and actors in the Nepalese politics through central 
leadership to local activists passing down from macro and meso to the micro-levels of 
activism. The interviews and participatory discussions were conducted across the political
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ideological spectrum. The loyalists, liberal constituency, centre of left to radical left were 
all included within the parameters of active case research.
The central levels of CPN (Maoist), CPN (UML), Nepali Congress (NC), pro-monarchy 
leadership were interviewed from July 20 to July 29. The time of interviews were preset for 
the central leadership of different political parties, before I left for Nepal. Two debate 
sessions were co-planned and conducted in association with the Nepal Human Rights 
Group and Network Nepal, both civil society organisations, on July 29* 2007 and May 31** 
2008 respectively. The participants were among the higher echelons of the previously 
mentioned political parties, civil society organisations and academics. The issues of 
discussion were centred on the theme of prevalent crisis and the rise of identity politics 
within the modem political setup in Nepal. The discussion provided further insight into the 
historic evidences, the socio-political trend, and contemporary practices that have 
contributed to the crisis. The social, political, economic, cultural, religious, lingual, gender 
and regional issues with respect to citizenship rights were tabulated for discussions. The 
debate was guided at times where participants tended to diverge from the theme. I was an 
observer at the first occasion. During the programme organised by Network Nepal, I 
participated as the anchorperson.
During the panel discussions held in Bijouri village, I chose to be a passive participant 
while the discussions were being held. This was necessary because I had the chance to hear 
what the participants had to say. My active participation would have interfered with their 
experiences, stories, and their way they viewed the world and interpreted the local social 
processes.
For the week beginning 1** August, following the high-level table discussion, I was 
involved in interviewing the urban meso-level political constituency compromising of 
district level leadership and local cadres of different parties in Kathmandu. The data 
generated though this exercise represented the elitist visions of the practical and ideological 
debates with relationship to the capitalist globalisation, social processes and the position of 
Nepal within the system of nation-states. In addition, the urban forms of contradictions, 
means of exploitations and alienations induced through the dominating socio-economic 
structures were also investigated through these interviews. Moreover, the historical 
processes together with rapid and unplanned urbanisation that have contributed to the
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exacerbation of urban poverty and shaped the state’s policy of social, political, economic 
and cultural centralism and bureaucratisation, were also investigated. The rights of citizens 
and status insured by legal provisions were of prime concern. The forms of social, political, 
economic, cultural, religious, gender, lingual and regional discriminations were analysed in 
these interviews. The caste hierarchy and social mobility of Dalits (untouchables) within 
the confines of the socio-religious and economic structures were also made the subjects of 
inquiry.
Throughout the fieldwork, any available secondary data pertaining to the research was 
collected from range of sources. Information obtained from government offices as policy 
documents, written directives and public decisions were collected. Reports from NGOs and 
research work of individuals were highly valued.
On the 8* of August, I travelled to Dang Valley that had been chosen as the district of my 
research. The district headquarters is ideally a meso-level research site. At the district 
level, I interviewed government officers on policy levels and on matters of governance. 
The District Administrative Chief, Land Reform officer. Social and Welfare officer were 
interviewed. Local NGOs were visited and their research findings were collected. 
Depending on the involvement of particular NGOs in social, political and economic 
spheres, Jana Sarokar Manch and Janachatana Club were chosen in Bijouri village for 
interviews.
From August 15* to September 4*’ I spent my time researching Bijouri village. At this 
particular phase, the location of my research at village level represented the micro-level 
where I was involved in the interactions with the local leaders, political activists, teachers, 
peasants, Dalits, students and the general public for two consecutive weeks. My interaction 
involved interviews, panel discussion, and group and family interviews.
I used the case study method of research focussing on non-cross-sectional organisation 
principles as to bring forth the interpretations of holistic sequences. Mason (1998:129) 
referring to Yin confirms that “the case study allows an investigation to retain the holist 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, 
and the maturation of industries”. However, ‘real life events’ also need to be included in
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the exercise to comprehend the social meanings and interactive processes. In the general 
sense I have also emphasised on “analysing the holistic unit” or case study, to try to 
produce an explanation of processes, practices, or whatever within that unit” (Mason, 1998: 
130) to construct a meaningful social reality based on my epistemological position which 
requires critical examination of discourses and narratives as well.
At the village level, in order to understand different actors as individuals or as members in 
real or imagined communities, caste as well as non-caste associations along with members 
within divergent social closures and regional identities, were focussed on during data 
generating events. Social processes and socio-economic relationships were studied. Social 
and economic imperatives, along with the political trend furnishing information on the 
process of unjust redistribution of wealth and resources in connection with the relationship 
of production, was made the subject of inquiry while at the same time the politics of 
recognition and idea of difference were analysed. Politics of difference, weighing 
apparently towards cultural phenomenon while the politics of redistribution being an 
economic imperative, were analysed to view the nature of convergence that have been 
shaping the present forms of social unrest, insurgency and civil war in the Nepalese 
context. The respondents represented the natural setting of the society vis-à-vis the social, 
cultural, ethnic, religious, lingual and regional backgrounds and closures.
Secondary data was collected from the VDC office, NGOs, and line agencies along with 
the available individual documentations and also the written accounts of incidents related 
to political, social, economic and cultural phenomena.
The first field study was completed by the 4* of September. I was back in the UK in the 
second week of the same month. Following my return from the field, I began writing my 
thesis with the approval of my supervisors.
As scheduled, I was in Nepal for my second field trip during the months of June and July in 
2008. This trip, besides being helpful in finding the missing links, which gradually had 
developed while I have begun writing my thesis, was of immense aid in verifying range of 
information concerned with the first field visit. As a result, the second field trip functioned 
as a corrective measure, and at the same time was also an opportunity for generating 
additional data for the final work of writing.
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During the second phase of the field trip, similar activities as that of the first were 
undertaken; however, the exact length of interaction (as in interviews) depended on the 
nature of data required and missing links to be sequenced. The interviews also served the 
general purpose of generating specific information as required by the actual writing. For 
example, I called or personally visited the people that I had interviewed in the first 
instance. This exercise provided me with an opportunity to analyse the changing 
perceptions of people. A field visit after a year of interval was immensely helpful as the 
shift in the interviewees’ visions and ideas were clearly noticeable in many instances. In 
similar fashion, the shift in the intensity of identity politics over the period was immense. 
The method of data generation involved were the same as during the first field visit.
The activities and the number of people involved during the investigation have been given 
in tables 3.1 and the general timeframe of the research in table 3.2
Table 3.1
The activities and the number of people involved during the investigation
Activity Site of investigation 1”“ visit 2"“ visit Total involved
Interviews Lalitpur (Kathmandu) 8 5 13
Dang Bijouri 11 7 18
Family visits Lalitpur (Kathmandu) 1 1 2
Dang Bijouri 1 1 2
Focus grups discussions Lalitpur (Kathmandu) 1 1 14
Dang Bijouri 1 1 11
Work shops Lalitpur (Kathmandu) 1 10
Dang Bijouri 7
Total interactions involved more than 85 people
Major forms of interactions:
a. Interviews: with 31 respondents
b. Casual talks/ short interviews: with more than 27 respondents
c. Group discussions and family interviews (visits): 4+4 = 8
d. Work shops: 2
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Table 3.2
The general timeframe of research
S.N Activities Timetable
Mar. 2006 -  
Mar. 2007
Apr. 2007 -  
Apr. 2008
May 2008 -  
May 2009
July. 2009 -  
Jan-2010
1 Literature review, methodology and research design * *
2 Field consultations, rapport building and 
secondary/primary data collection (1)
* *
3 Literature review and preparation for upgrading * *
4 Field research and data collection (2)
5 Data/ information analysis and documentation * *
6 Thesis writing * * * *
7 Thesis submission and final examination/ defence *
After completing this chapter on research strategy, I now proceed to Chapter 4 where I 
have discussed the function of elite in creating the crisis of citizenship.
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The function of elites and evolving forms of identity and citizenship
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the function of Nepali elites in general, and argue that the 
collaboration of the ethnic and indigenous elite with the state has been to undermine the 
ethos of equal citizenship. Broadly speaking, although this relationship has been sustained 
on exploitative grounds, the function of the elite in Nepal has been to inhibit the growth of 
equal citizenship. Identities are social constructs, which are not immune to changes. These 
changes may occur with conflicts or new negotiations relevant to social consciousness. 
States and governments may induce changes in the identity regime through policy 
frameworks, which may readily be ferried by the elites. In this respect, I have insisted that 
the function of elites in Nepal has been to weaken ethnic and indigenous identities for 
national identity through silent negotiations with the institution of monarchy. This shift 
meant pacification of claims; and as a result, it substantially strengthened the state’s 
monistic policies. Its single common agenda to acclaim personal power and prestige 
provided the monarch the political superiority with which to build a strong central state and 
an effective authoritarian regime. I have argued that the ethnic elite, in collaboration with 
the state, monarchy and the Khas ruling class have been crossing boundaries, to a certain 
extent, between the social closures, within the Hindu dominated circumstances. As the elite 
moved up the social ladder, its function, besides being popularised as nationalistic and 
patriotic, became the tool of hegemony.
My argument has insisted that growth of identity politics in Nepal bears a strong link with 
the function of elite circle that compromised their cultural and religious differences for the 
sake of personal gains at the cost of their own ethnic communities that they purported to 
represent. This trend shows remarkable resemblance both in Kathmandu as well as in 
Bijouri village although Kathmandu being the capital city certainly suggests a far more 
meaningful engagement entailing opportunity for national prominence, status, prestige and 
power.
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The term “Hinduism” rather than being limited into a religious category transcends culture 
that builds up into a socio-political philosophy. The debate on Hinduism therefore should 
take account the wider plane of its influence and existence rather than limiting it into the 
religious context alone. Despite the extreme forms of dominance, as in the case of Dalits, 
there have been some signs of mobility. Keeping in view the inferior positions of Dalits, 
the indigenous peoples and the janajatis in the social structure owing to the caste systems 
that I have highlighted in Chapter 2, different strategies have been employed by these 
social groups to scale up the social ladder. Elite cooperation, in my argument has been the 
main avenue for gaining social prestige and maintaining political power. This phenomenon, 
rather than being a recent development can be traced back well into the past, and therefore 
should not be misconceived as a new elite initiative, although it had been more prominent 
during the panchayat regime.
The idea that Antonia Kearton (2005:25) stresses, while dealing with the Scottish 
Nationalist Movement, bears some connection with the nationalist movement in Nepal; 
where she says, “It is the elite who articulate political claims about the nation and put 
forward political demands. It’s in the elite that concepts of the nation are shaped and 
modified.” Despite the revival of ethnic identity, in opposition to the post-war 
consciousness, the function of Dalit, ethnic or indigenous elites till the 1990s had 
exclusively been based on collaboration with the state on issues of nationalism, national 
identity and national citizenship rather than asserting their rights, based on group identities 
or ethnic membership. In doing so, they have neglected to bring to the fore the politics of 
equal citizenship. Broadly speaking, this relationship has been sustained on exploitative 
grounds. Pointing out the underlying reasons for the manipulative relationship, William^* ,^ 
quoting Kokole (1996) stresses that “ethnic consciousness and loyalties lend themselves to 
easy manipulation particularly because other loyalties are either weak or altogether absent” 
(2004:48).
The elusive function of elites has been based on the sentiments of nationalism, perceived 
external threats and personal gains. In this regard, I insist that the state has manipulated the 
ethnic elites in its attempt to create one national identity; and by doing so undermined the 
elements of equal citizenship, social justice and equality. The links between identity
Source: http://www.krepublishers.eom/.Toumals/JSS/.TSS-08-0-000 
Retrieved: 4/5/2009
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politics and citizenship has also been analysed by Taiwo^* (1996), referring to which 
William quotes:
The absence of genuine citizenship is not unconnected with the dominance of ethnic
politics driven by the requirements of rootedness in physical space (ibid).
The elites of the dominant groups compete and contest among one another for a better, and, 
what they perceive to be a more civilised way of thinking and doing things. In such a 
process, which is very complex, the dominant caste groups, although competing with one 
another, have retained their cultures and traditions, including their language as they all 
belong to the same Hindu caste category. What this implies is that they also share the same 
religion, traditions, and customs and possess similar mind-set. On the other hand, the 
indigenous and ethnic elite groups, however, forewent many of their cultural, religious, 
lingual and traditional aspects of their individual as well as collective identities, which 
drew them at a closer proximity to that of the dominant culture and religion. For the ethnic 
elite, the blurring of boundaries affirming momentous transcendental identity provided 
political space and opportunity to rise above the rest of the ethnic members in their effort to 
collaborate with the state. Through this function, newer forms of identity emerged - as new 
members of the ruling class and as elevated personalities within their own ethnic 
communities. Processes similar to these were misinterpreted as being the indicators of 
social inclusion, participation and recognition.
4.2. Nepalese elites
Despite the shortage in the research pertaining to the chemistry, structure and function of 
Nepali elites to date, I have tried to introduce the concept of the term ‘elites’ or ‘elite 
circle’ within the Nepalese context. I argue with no doubt that, this particular section of the 
society has played powerful functions in different episodes of modem history in its effort to 
assert its position within the national arena of power regime by way of socio-political and 
cultural reformation. This particular nature of the elitist function has, on the one hand, 
promoted the blurring of boundaries of identity confinements, which has been one of the 
outstanding and remarkable trends in the creation of changing relationships between the 
state and existing ethnic groups, in effect and on the other hand, this pattern of social
Taiwo, O. (1996) “Of Citizens and Citizenship” in 
Tempo, Lagos, Sep.-Got
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intercourse has created avenues for the generation of newer forms of identities and 
citizenship structures. The transition has also undermined the social needs and cultural 
expressions of these communities. For the liberals, this is a rational compromise and 
perhaps a natural outcome. However, from the viewpoint of multiculturalists or radical 
democrats claiming for identity, recognition and equal citizenship, this portrays the notions 
of deceit and deception.
By employing the term “elites” throughout this work I want to refer to those in relative 
advantaged socio-economic and political positions by the virtue of “advantages affordable 
by wealth, educational background, gender, and accumulation other forms of social capital, 
such as experience in village activities that are political -and/or development related, that 
form major components of what it means to be an ‘elite’” (Harper and Tamowski; 
2002:47). Members of royal palace and extended royal family members, military 
intelligentsia, leadership in political regimes, development workers, educated tatho batho 
manche haru (the clever and educated people) at different levels, form the pool of elites. In 
the post-1950 period, education has played an extremely significant function in the creation 
of this social layer.
4.3. Internalisation of Hindu culture
The chemistry of elites reveals that Chhetries, Brahmins and Newars dominate this pool 
although members of different ethnic identities are not altogether absent despite their 
presence being substantially low in general. The pools of elites within these different ethnic 
groups have played significantly powerful functions in bridging community-state 
relationships. Under the auspices of the ideology of ‘egalitarianism’ and with the aim to 
modernise their communities the leadership has been contextually changed, internalising 
the dominant Hindu culture and its way of life. This is what Rastrabahadur, a farmer 
belonging to the Magar community in Bijouri village had to say:
We are classified as matuwalis by the upper caste groups because of our tradition of 
drinking alcohol. Alcohol consumption is bad; if we could get rid of this ill habit, it 
would be good. In addition, many of us are not educated, without which we cannot 
understand what is being told about us.
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This is not an isolated statement; even my highly educated friends in Nepal or in the UK 
hold similar views where alcohol consumption, anger management or learning culture is 
concerned. The egalitarian and development oriented elites of ethnic communities in the 
research area express similar concepts without the slightest idea behind the rhetoric. The 
ruling Hindu class and elites have justified the necessity of social hierarchy, and the rest of 
the society has internalised those norms as part of their systemic domination. Feeding 
habits such as the consuming alcohol or eating pork was perceived as being impure by the 
upper caste Hindus. Therefore, to assert ones position in the wider political and social 
realm, a shift towards Brahmin culture was deemed necessary by ethnic elite as means of 
scaling the hierarchical order. I will be discussing these issues later in this chapter.
4.4. Nature of elite activism
One of the outstanding features in defining the functions of elites has been that of 
completions and contradictions for national or local leadership. This nature of contest and 
contradiction has had profound impact in shaping the political history, defining the power 
regimes and asserting ones social position, economic standing and prestige at varying 
periods of history. Along with the influential leadership of different political parties, which 
in essence is the aggregate of different sections of elites, the power centres and groups in 
operation within these broad political platforms are constantly engaged in creating newer 
forms of identity and citizenship. I have dealt with the interests of elites and their 
imperatives in setting up the socio-political trend and philosophical foundation of the 
Nepali state^^. In this grand project, the janajati and indigenous peoples were also involved 
via the elite circles that extended into these communities. The members of the elite circles 
functioned as the think tanks and leaders in the local as well the national contexts. On the 
contrary, the rest of the members of these groups were excluded from the socio-political 
processes. In general, the ascendancy to national power entailed a growing distance from 
one’s own community. I shall discuss this issue later in this chapter.
Many of the underground movements, and particularly the Maobadi andolan at present, can 
alternatively be explained as an elitist-driven movement designed to replace the ruling 
national elites from their privileged positions and power. The differing ideological and 
political views are contested forms of contemporary contradictions for mobilising and
32 Please see the Annex
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drafting people into their political projects. In this respect, these political movements carry 
strong messages in the course of their mobilisation, although the core leaderships and the 
elitist groups shape their own agenda based on their self-interest, and what they perceive 
and interpret as being the social reality.
I would like to focus on the ethnic elite and its function in creating new forms of 
relationships with the state, while at the same time converging towards dominant religion 
and culture at the expense of its own in the effort to scale the social ladder for prestige and 
power. This form of function may be viewed more relevantly within multicultural, 
multilingual multi-religious and multiethnic context, where participation meant 
assimilation and Hindu way of life, as the state represented the Hindu culture within its 
fundamental aspects.
In this regard, the elitist movement after the unification has been exclusively driven by two 
major concepts: first, the idea of the preservation, protection and promotion of one’s 
culture, language and traditions and second, with the idea behind securing one’s position 
within broader political setup, where cultural paradox has created congenial political 
background for entry into preferably the central power regime. The reformist idea may 
possess some features of pre-political adjunctive explanation set up by the elite circles; but 
to be more accurate, fusion of functionalism-instmmentalism appears to be the 
representative process in action. In similar vein, in an effort to sum up the ethnic revivalism 
of today, Prayag Sharma (1997:483) emphasises that, “The ethnic politics of Nepal in the 
1990s seems to have elements conforming to both the primordalists and the 
instrumentalists.” With respect to the cultural/ethnic politics or identity recognition 
generally referred to in terms of conflicts. Young (1993) gives a more comprehensive 
account where he suggests that “[...] it is instructive to examine the social psychological 
dimension of the three perspectives most often found in studies of ethnic conflict: the 
primordial, the instrumental and the constructionist” (in Sekulic et al, 2000:798). It is, at 
the same time, as important to recognise that ethnic revivalism needs be observed within 
the premises of legal-moral grounds defined though the principles of equality and justice. 
Social discrimination, marginalisation and exploitation on a broader spectrum have been, in 
the Nepalese context, the major derogating factors promoting the process of revivalism, 
which I perceive as the endogenous factors. In addition to this, particular identities have
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strengthened as a result of the resistance to the globalisation processes. I have discussed 
this in Chapter 11.
Ethnic reawakening on a global plane occupies immediate concerns of social and political 
scientists, today. The underlying reasons that address the nature and form of revivalism on 
a global scale have been conceived as those forming the bulk of, what I have called the 
exogenous factors that I have highlighted in Chapter 2.
Despite the revival of ethnic identity, in opposition to the post-war consciousness, the 
function of ethnic elites till 1990s in Nepal has been based on the ideals of collaboration 
with the state rather than working towards asserting their group identity or ethnicity; and 
therefore, have malignantly neglected to bring to the fore the politics of equal citizenship. 
Krauskopff (2002:200) also stresses this trend when she writes, “I believe that the role of 
elite competition is central in the modem process of ‘ethnicity’. She further stresses this 
point: “I agree with Brass that one key point is to study ‘the relationships established 
between the elites and the state, particularly the role of collaborators and opponents of state 
authority and state intmsion into regions inhabited by distinctive ethnic groups” (ibid). 
However, in the course of attaining its nationhood in the past, Nepal did experience sudden 
and lingering movements of both violent and peaceful natures centralised around identity 
assertions and cultural rights that cannot be neglected. Despite these isolated occurrences 
relating to the politics of culture or those revolving around the identity issues mainly 
articulating through lingual, territorial or religious claims, the rest of the decades have 
undergone silent moments premised within the benign neglect of ethnic elite, which 
energetically was engaged in collaborating with the state. In effect, the convergent cultural 
transformations legitimised the state-centric principles and the outcomes of subjugation. As 
a result, the state’s efforts towards monism were evaluated as ‘participation’ and a tme 
model for national unity.
4.5. Ethnic elite and its function
My intention is not to neglect the ethnic movements prior to 1980s that were central to the 
culture or language issues; but rather, the outstanding feature prior to that period in essence 
can be described as a compromise by the same elite for its own benefit at the expense of the 
rest of the community. The straightforward consequence of the collaboration of these elites 
with the state was that: one, it derailed and mystified the possible movements for identity
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reclamation. And two, what is more important, it strongly reinforced the stature of state- 
subjugation, alienating the ethnic groups further form the possibilities of ascertaining equal 
citizenship. In similar conditions, the functions of elites shape the nature and form of ethnic 
movements being created. Quoting Gurr, Cleary^^ (2000:1129-1130) while discussing the 
issues of democracy and indigenous rebellion in Latin America writes: “most ethnopolitical 
conflicts, including all sustained campaigns of protest and rebellion, are shaped by the 
strategic assessments and tactical decisions of the leaders and activists of communal 
groups.” It is in similar vein that the contemporary ethno-based movements in Nepal 
cannot be isolated from the central function of the ethnic elites.
This is what a local teacher. Binod Chaudhari, from Tharu janajati background had to say 
regarding the objectives of a local NGO in which he was involved:
Our organisation carries a modem concept of preserving and promoting our culture 
while doing away with superstition and social stigma that are carried with practices 
such as child marriage, polygamy etc. We believe that personal cleanliness and self 
discipline go hand in hand, and thus our community has to move ahead utilising every 
opportunity available for its upliftment.
Does the ‘modem concept’ transform/corrode the existing cultures? To what degree should 
the traditional life be maintained and further more, who defines what modemity is all 
about? The trade off between asserting the cultural and lingual aspects of modemity versus 
‘consensus-building’ among ethnic communities for what is perceived as ‘social good’ or 
the ‘more natural norm of living’ within an environment of caste-culture domination in all 
spheres of life has shaped the new emerging identities. The domination of Hindu religion 
and culture being paramount even before the unification, played the most significant 
function in the same process, much of which I have already discussed in my former 
chapters. The mle of dharma in itself was a reflection of religious codes into political 
performance that derives its legitimacy from the religious texts and those that supported the 
codes. The dominant culture intemalised by the dominated as being superior makes it the 
measure for self-assesment and self-evaluation. The intemalisation is even stronger in this 
case because the public and private realms are mutually diffused into one another without a
Source: http://cps.sagepub.eom/cgi/content/abstract/33/9/1123 
Retrieved: 17/05/2008
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trace of distinction; as a consequence, the Hindu way of life is the stronger element of the 
public realm. Binod further added:
We aspire for social, economic and educational achievement among our community 
members, and change our habit of over consuming alcohol. You see, in homes with 
limited grains for feeding the family, rakshi (local alcohol) is being brewed. This is a 
bad practice we have to change our habit.
The concept that Binod cherishes is perfectly understandable; however when we see the 
social process at work we need to keep in mind that Brahmin culture and social values 
abhor the practice of alcohol consumption, and thus the legal codes had classified the 
alcohol consumers as matuwali. Even though the codes were the product of the modem 
state, the intemalisation of the dominant culture by the rest of the divergent ethnic groups, 
have been partly encouraged by the acceptance of the mling culture by the elites of these 
groups. This has, in fact been an ongoing process since the early historic periods as these 
groups socially interacted.
The norms laid down by the egalitarian elitist aspirations within janajati, therefore have 
created sufficient grounds for their cultural erosion; ideas that have resulted in self-hatred 
and self-demonization have been promoting the dominant social and religious values at the 
expense of one’s own identity and the meaningful interpretation of its culture and symbols. 
When one’s own social practices are identified as being derogatory as compared to some 
one else’s, the message in its subtle form becomes extremely dangerous as it would 
encourage members to adopt those, so called the ‘better ideas and values’, of an alien 
culture. This notion is harmful to the basic meaning of membership that binds a 
community together and the very sense of belonging it cherishes.
4.6. Transformed identities
These complex social interactions and evolutionary processes have created new identities; 
those that have been Hinduised with the traits of sufficient hybridity, change or even 
transformation to a certain degree, and others who have not been significantly influenced 
by the dominating culture. During my field visit, I met people belonging to both of these 
categories. Those who are educated or possess a fair economic standing have moved closer 
to Hindu culture as compared to those who do not enjoy these benefits. However, the 
exclusion and exploitation of different forms persisting within the same communities has
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also evolved and transformed identities. Thus, the evolution of ‘civilised and reformed’ 
members and traditional practitioners has created an environment of state-elite relationship, 
promoting the life-styles of exclusionary elements, while pushing the rest of the tribal 
communities further down the hierarchieal social order or into the lower rungs of economic 
standing. This angle of approach helps to analyse the Maobadi andolan as well. A local 
Maobadi and a militia leader, Dinesh, in an interview said:
For us to reform our community education is essential - both formal and 
informal. It is only through mass education that we will be able to reform our 
community. Critical consciousness develops through education and practice.
This view is a strong driver of the Nepalese societies today. However, modem education 
and the traditional knowledge are contending poles. Education, forming the inner substance 
of modem politics, is far from being neutral. Emphasis on modem education signals 
cultural erosion, negotiation, hybridisation and transformation. Although occupational cast 
groups or Dalits have also pursued similar means in their effort to scale the social ladder 
the tendency to abandon ones membership by changing caste-names is quite common. I 
met two Dalits who had changed their family names (also known as caste names), during 
my field visit. Although quite unheard of, one of the interviewees did mention the name of 
a person from Bhote ethnic background, who had changed his family name to Gumng. 
Changing caste/sumames is frequent among Dalits because of their demeaning position in 
the society as defined by the Hindu vama kram, against which they are fighting. The 
practice, behind the alteration of caste/sumames is premised on, and motivated by, social, 
political or economic reasoning.
It was observed in the research area that the Dalits, who were aware, to some degree, of 
their circumstances and possessed at least some characteristics of elites, had more tendency 
of changing their caste names into those of the upper caste groups. This provided testimony 
to submission, and later collaboration with, the state and the dominant culture of the upper 
caste Hindus. The unfolding nature and forms of identities are extremely completed at the 
present state of rapid modemisation that Nepal is experiencing. When I talked to Chaite 
Nepali in Dang he said, “We have to leam from Darjeeling. We hear that people there have 
changed their caste names and therefore are equal.” The decline in the Dalit population
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from 1991 census that recorded 14.5 percent of the total population to 13.6 percent in 2001 
has been observed mainly as the result of this change "^ .^
As I have discussed before, the reformist movements of Tharu or other janajati are not a 
new phenomenon, rather they have been part of the ongoing social processes that have 
blurred boundaries to some extent while creating new forms identities and citizenship 
status within the educated and influential elites. The Sanskritization and Hinduisation 
processes continuing from prehistoric times are still in operation. This began when Indo- 
Arian linguist groups met their counterparts the Tibeto-Burmese group in the Himalayan 
region during century EC. It is all the more relevant to state that within the latent
and overt contradictions, the sense of sharing, understanding, respecting and living together 
have all been part of the inevitable phenomena in the Himalayan social organisations as 
well. If it were not so, the very order and fabric binding the state would never have 
materialised. This state of existence is still relevant at present where Nepalese people exist 
as political entities despite their differences that are rather obvious. As “I prefer to think 
about connection between seeing and social organisation as open, dialogic, formulated in a 
constant flow of life [...]. Racialized and ethnicized difference, and the social categories, is 
also inextricably part of social organisation” (Caroline, 2006:512). However, these 
characteristics are not immutable; on the contrary, they inherently possess the tendency to 
generate new identities and citizenship as these groups gain, exchange or adapt to the 
continuous process of their social existence.
4.7. Comparative analysis
As a comparative analysis, the ethnic elite groups in India appear to have been active since 
the early thirties for the purpose of scaling the social hierarchical order. This phenomenon 
has been stated by Turner (1933) while referring to the census of United Provinces of Agra 
and Oudh, during colonial India, when he wrote:
By tradition, the census has come be regarded as great opportunity for persons low in 
the caste scale to press their claims to higher social status [...]. Since 1921, the sabha 
movement has developed to such an extent that all save the most backward castes and 
tribes now have more or less well-organised societies, who bombarded me until long 
after the tables were printed with request for new caste names” (in Krauskopff, 
2002:201).
See Statistical Year Book of Nepal 2001, His Majesty’s Government, National Planning Commission 
Secretariat, Central Bureau of Statics, Kathmandu, Nepal
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When, for example, the Tharu association, the first of its kind, was established in Nepal 
following the Indian independence movement in 1949, it not only reiterated the reformist 
movement, but also rather went out to associate its tribal attributes with Hindu caste vama 
kram. This must have been the outcome of the Indian reformist movement that has been 
highlighted by Turner. Thus, right from the onset of the reformist movements among 
janajatis in Nepal, the elite has indeed shaped the emerging forms of identity and 
citizenship. While I was speaking to a Tharu leader Prem Chaudhari, a supporter of a 
communist party from Dang district, he confirmed the elitist function as discussed; 
however, he did emphasise on the fact that the identity movement has taken a different turn 
since the recent decade where the Tharus no longer consider themselves within the 
enclaves of Hindu socio-religious order. He asserted:
We have our own culture, language and tradition and therefore are distinct ethic 
groups and our movement is not only for establishing an identity based solely on 
subjective matters, but rather we are engrossed in establishing equality in every 
sphere of life, beginning mainly with economic equality
At an earlier stage, particularly in India, the reformist elitist-driven movements among 
tribal communities were very strong. This is also relevant in the Nepalese side of the border 
at present. The interest of the elites to secure a positive response from the state on the one 
hand and to affirm itself as part of pan-social structure, within the environment of Hindu 
dominance, on the other, appears to be motivated through its utilitarian drive. Similar 
movements not only curtailed any possible chances of mass mobilisation against 
oppression, rather they promoted the euphoric environment for the oppressors escalating 
the actual dependency and exhaustment among its own membership. Subjugation and 
internal colonisation were in fact the very processes in which the elitists from the ethnic 
communities played a significantly important function, while collaborating with the state. 
For, if the collaboration did not exist, the royal seal permitting the use of Brahmin pandit 
(priest) by Gurungs, Magars and Sunuwars in 1825 would not have materialised and further 
we do not see any record of its denouncement in the history. Instead the families of Tharus 
using Brahmin priests perceive themselves as being superior to the rest of their members. 
The movement of the ethnic social organisations towards the premises of the caste groups 
must have been a gradual process. None of the participants interviewed agreed that this 
shift could have been the result of some state sponsored vicious cultural terrorism or from a 
bloody clash of cultures as often seen in the European history.
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A respondent in Bijouri village agreed to the fact that some members of Tharu elites make 
use of Brahmin priests for religious ceremonies. Turner (1933) pointed out a similar, but 
more significant fact where the Tharus in India readily acknowledged the Hindu socio­
religious codes during the thirties and most importantly “were taking the sacred thread and 
alcohol consumption had been highly reduced” (in Krauskopff, 2002:204). Eventually, the 
proselytism, religious conversion and internalisation of dominant Hindu culture were 
celebrated processes within the tribal elites in India opting political positions or perceiving 
the alien culture as being simply the ‘better’ choice. In terms of modem evaluation, it was a 
rational choice stemming from a democratic option. I see a similar scenario and similar 
processes in operation where janajati elite groups in Nepal have been driven by the motive 
of gaining access to power and prestige within the power regime -  a shift aimed at 
elevating one’s social standing from pane chaîne and matawali to someone of importance 
recognised by their own community members as being ‘rich and powerful’ in the company 
of the upper caste groups.
The elite from ethnic backgrounds gained entry into the political order and the power zone 
welded by the caste groups only when the former was included as a member of the mling 
class. And this happened to the degree of cultural convergence or religious congruence that 
defined the level of acceptance. For example, a Tham elite using a Hindu priest, Nepali 
language and practising caste culture would have had a better opportunity of being 
accepted into the dominant culture as compared to an another member who was traditional 
and uncompromising, despite being from the same ethnic background. Inclusion into the 
‘elevated society’ by the ruling elites provided the prospects of a wider participation.
It is therefore relevant to suggest that before 1980s, all the elitist-driven reformist 
movements were caste-based with their traditional discourse rooted to the “cause of 
welfare” of the communities that stressed the necessity to fight against backwardness, 
alcohol consumption, polygamy, child marriage, excessive expenditure and against the 
socially embedded superstitions. During the 1980s many ethnic organisations came into 
active existence -  The Thakali Welfare Organisation, Nepal Tamang Ghedung, Magar 
Sangh, Tamudhi (Gurung Oragnisation), the Tharu Welfare Society etc., although few date 
back to the 1950s as reform associations. In Bijouri, all the interviewees that I interacted 
with supported their ethno-based organisations in general; although, some were sceptical 
over few of the recent demands put forth by their organisations. Dipak Gurung, in a similar
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vein expressed his desire to know if he would have to migrate to the Gandaki, if Dang 
valley were declared a Tharuwan, in an interview.
During the panchayat dictatorial regime of 35 years, political organisations were banned, 
including the ethno-based social and cultural organisations. It was after the referendum 
following the student agitation, which I have elaborated in Chapter 2, that few similar 
organisations made their appearance. However, they had to keep low profiles on political 
and identity related issues. The burning issues of poverty and right to equal citizenship 
were discussed, but in milder tones. With respect to trepresentation - a case where ethnic 
elites were nominated by the kings in public offices, including in the National Assembly, as 
a general tradition of the panchayat regime, Sanjaya Pun, a Maobadi supporter said:
During the Panchayat days we were not allowed to talk about our culture and identity. 
Cultural and ethnic organisations were advocated as being racial, which undermined 
social harmony. We were made to march in our colourful cultural costumes during 
what they called the Democracy Day and during the birthday celebrations of Kings. 
Although we had ministers from our ethnic community in Kathmandu, they were of 
no purpose. The elites of our community were engaged in their own self-interest by 
preserving the broader interest of the dominant culture. We were made to dance by 
our own elites to the tunes of the state crafted by the Khas.
Throughout the panchayat regime, many of the former reformist organisations led by their 
elites and many other independent personalities of elitist nature submitted themselves to 
social and cultural modifications (with or without a choice as discussed above) to suit to the 
needs of the national elite. The very nature of the dictatorial regime compelled the dictators 
to an extremely dense and secure network of loyalists, on whose support the system 
sustained. Many ethnic elites responded to this demand, which tended to increase their 
chances of collaboration with the state all the more. The king during the coup had 
dismissed the elected parliament, detained the democratic leadership mobilising the royal 
army, much of which I have elaborated in my former chapters. The king to some extent had 
to rely on the support of the agitating ethnic elites. The emerging political scenario 
demanded their participation, in selective terms as chosen by the king. This reality partly 
provided space to demonstrate their loyalty towards the monarch (the state). “Although we 
had Limbus as Ministers in powerful portfolios, during the panchayat regime, there were 
many cases where ethnic activists were punished, tortured or jailed because of their 
involvement in ethnic and cultural activities,” said a friend and a colleague of mine living
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in the UK. With a doctoral degree and experience in ethnic movements to his credit, he 
posses some authenticity in this context. During the king’s direct rule, the members of the 
elite circle maintained high profile posts such as ministers or even the Prime Minister but 
they neither bothered to address the socio-cultural deprivation of their own ethnic brethren, 
and nor did they help in pressurising the state for ethnic recognition, identity assertion or 
the cause of equal citizenship. This sentiment has been clearly shared by many of the 
participants of two separate panel discussions in Bijouri village. At this stage (before 
1990), the majority the ethnic elites as panchas^^, had been political instruments of the 
state, managed by the upper caste ruling elites.
The new identity that was being created then was premised on the degree of its acceptance 
by the ruling national elites (or the upper caste elites) in the power regime. In 
demonstrating loyalty, the aspects of social, cultural, lingual and traditional identity (of 
ethnic communities) were traded by their elites for personal power, economic standing and 
social prestige in collaboration with the state. Subsequently, the function of elites put an 
obscured end to the probable agitations that may have surfaced, owing to the pitiful 
conditions of poverty, dominance and social exclusion. The moral, legal and cultural 
grounds for equal democratic citizenship were subsequently demolished for three decades, 
until the third wave of democracy swept the globe, and Nepal was no exception. I have 
highlighted this issue in Chapter 2 and I will discuss the process of globalisation in chapter 
eleven. Sanjaya Pun in the same interview suggested:
During the panchayat regime, we were fooled when the state (synonymous to the 
king) saw that there was some ‘representation’ in the ratriya panchayat (Parliament) 
from the janajati elite. This was a political tactics rather than a genuine step towards 
building foundation to equality and justice. The few members of the elite circle 
played within the power regime circulating in successive governments although their 
presence in no way was a genuine representation. The elite-state collaboration did not 
only deceive us, but rather disarrayed us from generating organised movements for 
democratic citizenship and true representation. Although janajati presence was noted 
during these years (in low degree) the elites took every minute of their moments to 
collaborate with the state, with disregards to our living reality.
It is certainly so that the model of ‘inclusion’ adopted during that time was perhaps the 
classic example of hegemonic inclusion, where the state elites, mainly the king and the 
Brahmin-Chhetry-Newar alliance made the decision over “who to include and in which
Individuals loyal to the king’s autocratic regime
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capacity”, while at the same time this practice excluded the rest. In addition, besides the 
effects of hegemonic inclusion, self-exclusion or passive exclusion (arising from the 
internalisation of dominant discourse) has also reinforced the pure-impure concept among 
Dalits rendering them vulnerable, veiled and excluded from all accounts and moments of 
their social being. The prevailing circumstances are nurtured in a state of low self-esteem. 
The nature and extent of cultural hegemony is extremely complicated and problematical.
Nepal today has been a plethora of various movements and ethnic associations following 
the 1990 political changes. The third wave of democracy expressed as jana andolan 2, 
besides opening up the space for political freedom with universal franchise and periodic 
elections, was a movement entailing mass awareness and ethnic reawakening. The Interem 
Constitution^^, enshrining the vision, concept and the idea that Nepal is a multilingual, 
multireligious, multicultural, and multiethnic state, is an assurance of the popular will to 
drift away from its traditional notion of political centralism. The dawn of democracy thus 
invoked the possibility of multicultural citizenship on legal-rational grounds. The political 
gains were certainly of immense historic significance, especially since the change had 
drafted cultural, religious and ethnic recognition of those excluded in the former regimes. 
S anj ay Pun further added :
Today the janajatis and micro-cultural groups have been aware of who they are and 
thus cannot accept the idea of being classified into Hindu vama kram. Since 1991, 
this approach of asserting our identity has strengthened. As you see, the population 
census prior to 1991 did neither have any provision for ethnic variations nor for 
mother tongues. This was an important aspect of the unitary state which was 
embarked on the project of cultural homogenisation.
The concept of cultural homogenisation has been, at least, replaced by the constitutional 
provision of multiculturalism following the restoration of democracy despite being 
begrudgingly practiced in any meaningful sense by the state. In a democracy keeping in 
view the principles of power circulation, demography and particularly its size, play an 
indispensible function. It is thus quite normal to expect the growth of ethnic, culture, and 
regional based or similar organisations to flourish. In a similar way, the fact behind identity 
assertion is self-evidenced though the comparative study of the demographic census of
Read the Interem Constitution of Nepal 2063 VS [2006]
Source: httD://mvw.unmin.org.np/down]oads/kevdocs/lnterim.Constitution.Bilingual.UNDP.Ddf 
Retrieved: 07/11/2008
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1991 and of 2001. The leaders behind the present identity assertion are the elite groups, in 
full operation, within the constituency of each ethane. It is within this context that the state 
is being confronted by the multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual and multireligious 
foundations seeking legal and moral inclusive environment for equal citizenship.
For the Dalits, the socio-political and religious circumstances have always been 
dehumanising. Being at the bottom in the caste hierarchy, these groups are victimised 
through social discrimination, stigmatisation and untouchablity. The upper Hindu caste 
groups along with janajati have continued to exploit and exclude this section of social 
segment from political, social, economic and religious fronts; the reality that I have already 
elaborated in my former chapters. Perhaps the extreme forms of social exclusion and 
exploitation to the point of complete exhaustion provide sufficient explanations to the 
practice of faith conversion and change of caste names by Dalits, which has predictably 
soured in the present decade. In an interview, a local leader of UML and Dalit elite said.
We have been victimised by the upper section of the Hindus and the janajati alike. 
We have been excluded by all of the dominant cultures. For us, the political, social 
and economic circumstances are very hostile and exclusionary. Dalits have been the 
chronic victims of inherited poverty and landlessness, our situation is far worse than 
that of other caste and non-caste groups. Despite this reality, our voice is never heard. 
We also had our elites as ministers during the panchayat days. However, it is sad to 
recall that they did not represent us. Instead, they were indulged in promoting their 
own well-beings, leaving the rest of us to live in misery.
The situation of Dalits is essentially dismal; the untouchable tag has made them extremely 
vulnerable, marginalised and exploited. The social exclusion against these minorities is 
perpetuated by the socio-religious foundations of Hindu religion. The social and 
institutional structures and the practices of the upper caste and non-caste social groups 
being guided by their biased perception as well as exclusionary behaviour have worked 
against the welfare of this group. Since 1990, political freedom along with some religious 
and cultural rights had been enjoyed (although the constitution 1990 did not specify that 
Nepal was a multireligious country); however for the Dalits the situation had remained 
unchanged. A single fact that points towards this direction has been the amendment of 
muluki ain (civil code) during 1992, years following the attainment of parliamentary 
democracy and universal franchise. For instance, the clause of the same civil code that 
states “’traditional practices’ at religious places shall not be considered discriminatory”- is
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in itself appalling and discriminatory. The attitude of the ruling elites of democratic parties, 
chiefly comprising of the upper caste groups, and few ethnic elites (always in low in 
representation) appears to work in collaboration when addressing socio-religious issues 
discriminating the Dalits. Of course, we know that the state decisions in Nepal fall prey to 
the caste group elites; however, when such stringent and immoral decisions prevail, one 
often would expect the ethnic elite to intervene under the circumstance that it also has been 
victimised by the caste elite group and the state. Thus, under moral normative grounds, the 
voice against the biased and discriminatory decision would have been raised, if 
collaboration against the Dalits did not exist, in the first place.
However, after the third wave of democracy the socio-political state of affairs has changed, 
the oppressed have been organising themselves for the change -  a sustainable change that 
is based on moral and legal grounds. Thus, the forms of perceptive and behavioural racism 
along with the practice of social discrimination were in operation even after the political 
change of 1990. The Dalits at the bottom of socio-religious and economic stratification are 
indeed the most vulnerable, oppressed and exploited segment of the Nepalese society even 
today. Binod Chaudhari in an interview said.
Particularly after the reinstatement of democracy, the people became aware towards 
progressive changes. The political movement itself was an instrument of awareness. 
Democratic values and the sense of justice and human rights were widely debated as 
many realised that the state had been unfair that had been chiefly protecting and 
promoting the interests of the dominant class and culture. The leaders and ministers 
of the ethnic groups that represented the panchayat dictatorial regime were forgotten 
while the people’s movement generated a sense of cohesion among the general ethnic 
members, soon emerging as a new form of ethnic and janajati movement.
The point that Binod makes is quite clear. In the course of the political movement, the level 
of consciousness of the public generally rose to discover their functions as equal citizens of 
a democratic state. The battle consisted of two major agenda: one, under the unfolding 
circumstance of political change to abandon the ethnic elites of the former regime while the 
second one was directed towards mass mobilisation of ethnic regimes towards the direction 
identity politics. The phase following 1990s has been of particular interest; especially so 
because Nepal during the interlude has been characterised with the rise of identity politics 
or reawakening of the ethnic regime. The new emerging elites of the ethnic constituencies 
of today have engaged themselves in generating mass-sensitive programmes of cultural
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politics. The efforts towards the bottom up approach have been the new trend of the post- 
1990 ethnic movement, although elite drivers in Kathmandu are still the decision makers.
It is indeed relevant to state that the crossing of the boundaries between the state-sponsored 
culture on the one hand and ethnic population on the other has been tacitly supported by the 
elite groups as a result of their internalisation of dominant culture, religion and language in 
their effort to gain entry into the wider socio-political realm. Thus, the change in identities 
and emergence of new identities in differing forms of wider citizenship has been 
significantly contributed by some elites who have been playing the function model for their 
respective ethnic communities by the strength of their social prestige and position, mainly 
derived through economic power and political networks. In developing countries like 
Nepal, even a small circle of rich and powerful elite plays substantial function in shaping 
the political culture. In addition to this argument of a national level, the local structures of 
the elite circle operating at different levels within numerous ethnic backgrounds, indeed 
have sufficient potentials for generating newer forms of identity and citizenship. However, 
in these processes, the elitist motive has been to collaborate with the state rather than to 
oppose or change the existing social relationships that otherwise could have influenced and 
induced changes. And further as Prayag Sharma (2006:145) notes, “Wealth and power 
brought social prestige to a member from any ethnic group in the entire village and 
commanded respectful form of address even from the high castes”.
4.8. Conclusion
Starting from these elite groups that function as the fountainheads, the search for new era 
of ethnic assertion has begun. However, the older generation of the elite circle, rejected and 
dejected by the people’s movement of 1990, has made its presence in the new ethnic 
movements during these recent years. The act of felicitation and honouring the old 
‘veterans’ is not altogether a new phenomenon on the one front, while on the other, the 
need for generating stronger movement has initiated the ethnic unification process whereby 
the different ethnic elites have moved closer to build a strong front called the Nepal 
Janajati Mahasang (Nepal Federation of Nationalities) that affiliates 48 ethnic groups. 
According to the Dalits that I spoke to, the Nepal Janajati Mahasang has denied 
membership to Dalit associations although they are the most vulnerable, oppressed and 
exploited section of the social hierarchy since ancient times. The decision prevailed 
because the latter groups are not considered independent of the caste structure.
I l l
As we saw, the two different and often similar or juxtaposed processes that can be 
identified as, (a) the internalisation process and (b) elites’ collaboration with the state have 
greatly influenced the evolving identities. It was within this generally acceptable 
environment, that state symbols were introduced as the state gradually evolved. Hindu 
religion and its way of life, Nepali language {khas bhasa), the institution of monarchy, 
along with state symbols and mythical heroes were created in an effort to generate what 
were then perceived as the binding factors necessary for the subsistence of the nation-state. 
In these complex processes, the elite groups of non-caste entities have facilitated the 
transformation, as the boundaries were constantly being crossed and diffused. By doing so, 
these elite circles were constantly collaborating with the state and the ruling elites as it 
served their instrumentalist purpose. This transformation has contributed to the state’s 
ideology of homogenisation and uniformity despite its multicultural, multilingual, multi­
religious and multiethnic reality. The transformation of these subcultures through 
subjugation, internalisation and power assured compliance for the maintenance of socio­
political order on the one hand and on the other the state’s exclusionist policies and state- 
centric function confirmed the model for the unitary state.
Particularly following the 1990s, what were previously organised as cultural caste-based 
reformist movements shaping the new and evolving forms of identity and citizenship have 
transformed, in phase with the political changes, into constituencies of active mobilisation. 
The mobilisation is based on the politics of difference. The ideological value being based 
on cultural roots also possesses the danger of mystifying and veiling the democratic 
political system on the whole. At the same time, if the ethnic elite circle at the helm 
mobilise the mass with set goals, considering the multicultural aspect of the social structure 
and the question of the existence of the Nepali state, the mobilisation could prove to be the 
progressive way forward for creating a democratic multicultural society and equal 
citizenry. For, it is an established fact that democracy and ethnocentrism are not 
compatible assumptions; therefore, the outcome of the ethnic reawakening since the 1990s 
will have to take into account the restructuring of the nation-state at its very foundation. 
The social, economic and political establishment along with the political-ideological 
standing of the nation-state needs to embrace the ethos of equal citizenship and ideas 
impregnated in the message of democratic participation.
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Maobadi andolan and the politics of supremacy
5.1. Introduction
I have argued in this chapter that the Maobadi andolan bears testimony to the decentred 
account of the traditional nation building process. Associated with this discontinuity are the 
changing identities, assertive culturalisn and identity politics. Although the andolan has 
been claimed to be driven by the Mao-ideology, I have argued that its ideological 
convictions for an egalitarian society are in conflict with its own assumptions of ethno- 
based playground. The dualism present in the Maobadi claims for ethnic assertions and the 
ideology perused invokes comprehensive debates that this chapter has raised.
I have made the case that a dynamic and essentially an egalitarian form of citizenship were 
in its making at the start to the people’s war. Increasingly, as the programmes of the party 
shifted towards the reinforcement of subjective issues within its political framework, the 
egalitarian form of citizenship gradually began as a process to degenerate. This process was 
not limited within the Maobadi constituency; rather it became part of major political event 
within the domains of the other national parties as well. As the andolan gained momentum 
via the frontal organisations of Maobadi, ascriptive forms of allegiances and loyalties 
became more pronounced. I have also contended that, while the ethnic consciousness 
generated by the insurgency, mainly through the politicisation and mobihsation of socio­
culture groups has enhanced the popularity of the people’s war, this has also led to the 
decline of political-ideology, both on theoretical as well as on practical grounds, pushing 
the polity towards the dissociation of national politics. As a natural outcome, the ethnic 
consciousness raised by the andolan has also reinforced identity boundaries that have 
generated stronger motivational factors calling for denser social networks within social 
divides and ethnic closures. In my argument, the nature of identity politics that is unfolding 
clearly demonstrates the phenomena of dissociation and unification i.e. dissolution of 
national identity for ascribed membership. The socio-political processes at work have thus
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created affronts with respect to ‘otherness’ while successfully generating the fervour of 
allegiance and loyalty towards one’s own bounded membership. When these processes are 
viewed, keeping in mind over hundred ethnic groups in existence within the national 
territory, the trend of dissociation from political membership for an ascribed membership 
has been, thus, the common trend. However, while I lay out these facts as research 
findings, it is necessary, at the same time, to take into account the social exclusion, 
exploitation, cultural hegemony and caste structure. The state’s negativity has been to 
accelerate the process of segregation (from the state) while the growing ethnic 
consciousness has contributed towards enhancing affirmation towards ethnic or regional 
memberships.
Ten years of armed conflict that began with Prachanda’s^  ^call for an armed revolution has 
left more than thirteen thousand dead, millions displaced and loss of property in billions of 
dollars. In order to gain the fading state legitimacy, consecutive governments invited 
foreign interventions at different levels in the effort to restore peace and order, and even 
more, to defeat the Maobadi revolution through violence. Although the state held peace 
dialogues twice, the violence escalated at an unprecedented level.
5.2. The regime change
Political citizenship is a hollow concept for most of the Nepalese people including the 
indigenous and ethnic communities. The Dalits, by far the most disadvantaged and 
vulnerable group have been exploited as a rule in all social, political and economic 
relations. During the king’s autocratic rule, the loyalists were the active citizens 
participating in state affairs. After the movement of 1990, many displaced panchas^^ (the 
elite groups of the panchayat regime) gradually shifted their support in favour of the 
Maobadi andolan. This move, rather than being based on their belief in Maoism, was, on 
the contrary, premised on the ill motives of disrupting democracy with the hope that the 
people’s war would damage it sufficiently for them to re-emerge in the political scenario. 
Besides the elite circles of these dominant groups, even those belonging to the janajati 
elite, who had been politically engaged in collaboration with the state for social, political or 
cultural reasons in the past, showed spontaneous support for the ultra leftist activities of the
General Secretary of the Maobadi party; the formal name of the party is The Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist).
Individuals loyal to the king’s autocratic regime
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people’s war. This trend of collaboration with anti-democratic forces widened the playing 
fields of the latter.
At times when ethnic consciousness was on the rise, the shift of former panchas towards 
the people’s war strengthened the movement, as the ideas of nationalism often cut across 
the political, ideological and class boundaries. When the independent culture movements as 
part of pan-Nepal consciousness converged with the people’s war, the politics of identity 
was propelled to a new height.
The Maobadi andolan, after succeeding in politicising the core-sensitive issues with its 
traditional rhetoric of economic objectivism and with the baggage full of base line 
arguments, has generated a self-sustaining social dynamo for change. The andolan, when 
viewed in the present context, i.e. ten years after its commencement (1996-2006), bears 
testimony to the decentred account of the traditional nation building processes. Associated 
with this discontinuity are the changing identities, assertive culturalisn and identity politics. 
To advance my arguments, I would like to discuss Maoism and multiculturalism, and how 
they act or counteract.
5.3. Maoism: cultural diversity, ethnocentrism or uniformity
People in Nepal possess multi-faceted, multilayered and overlapping sense of identity 
where it is just normal to realise a village community as being a mixture of social 
complexities in terms of culture, religion, space, ethnicity and kinship. For approximately 
eight thousand people living in Bijouri village, this is a reality and a common social 
outcome to rejoice. Social diversity offers challenges as well as opportunities for creating 
multicultural and multilayered citizenship and corresponding identities. The Maobadi 
andolan has generated a self-propelled dynamo at societal level, laying claims over the 
necessities for social equality, justice and inclusion. However, in a more subtle form, the 
sense of equality and inclusion in Mao Thought would have been based on assimilation of 
minority ethnic enclaves into the ‘egalitarian’ culture rather than acknowledging the 
inherent differences and judge them as equals. I argue over this case because the Nepali 
state is unique in social diversity; since its existence it has been a home to more that 101 
ethnic communities and as a state it lacks any form of majority in ethnic demography. For 
example, the largest population is that of the Chhetris which consists of only 18% of the 
total population. The rest of the other groups share between 13 - 0.00%. In such a unique
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situation, a strong multicultural polity would certainly be the way forward rather than to 
seek solution through assimilation, which the history has disproved. And further, 
federalism does not promise the prospects of multiculturalism or inclusion either. Present 
schemes from different sources have presented 6-12 federal units; however, when it comes 
to including all (i.e., more than 101 ethnic categories, which are well dispersed), the federal 
units would have to endorse strong multicultural policies to ensure that the individual as 
well as group rights of all are recognised and protected bearing in mind the normative 
features of equality and social justice. Population breakdown by ethnicity has been 
presented below:
Table 5.1
Population Breakdown by Ethnicity*
1 Parbatiyas ( ‘hill people’) Hill
minorities
(Janajatis)
Language loss 
among minorities :
Tarai ans ( ‘plains 
people’)
Others
: Bahun 13% Magar
7.2%
68% Tharu 6.7% Muslims 4.2%
J Chetri 18% Ne war 
5.5%
34% Yadav 4%
1 Dalit 9% Tamang
5.6%
11% (+ many small 
castes inch Dalits 
and Janajatis)
Rai 3% 16%
Gurung
2.4%
50%
Limbu
1.6%
14.5% j
Totals 40% 25% 30% 5% = 100%
2001 Nepal census; total: 23.15 million, with figures for hill minority language loss.
Notes: Dalit = former Untouchables; Janajatis, underlined, are mainly those who were formerly called 
hill tribes; 59 groups were officially designated as Janajatis in February 2002, not all of which had been 
included in the 2001 census. The term Madhesi/Madheshi is contested: some Tarai dwellers, notably the 
Tharus and the Muslims, reject the label. Estimated figures for language loss are taken from Whelpton 
(1997:59).4 All figures are likely to be disputed.Source:
David Gellner, http://www.indiaseminar.com/2007/576/576 david n gellner.htm 
Retrieved: 11/09/2008
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The dualism present in the Maobadi claims for ethnic assertions and the ideology perused 
invokes comprehensive debates that this chapter has raised. A well-respected primary 
teacher at a local school in Bijouri village said:
We are multiethnic nation right from the beginning (since unification), I do not 
understand why this issue is being raised by the leaders as though they have found 
something new and further, I don’t know why the Maobadi launched the revolution in 
the first place if it was only for a handful of elites to enjoy the state facility.
Apart from questioning the role of the leadership in the current debate of cultural politics, 
the focus should be to link the present debates as a continuum of the past. Unresolved 
problems have surfaced, encompassing new vigour, better logic and stronger strategies. 
And at the same time, new developments and changes that have continued to influence 
societies cannot be minimised. The history of the Nepali state beginning from its 
expansionist vision, centralised authoritarian course to cultural monism, represent the 
major historic trends that need due attention. On socio-economic fronts, the failure of the 
state in transforming traditional agriculture to mechanised forms has indeed reproduced 
poverty and backwardness without an immediate remedy. I will discuss the impact of 
structural adjustment programmes in Chapter 11.
Therefore, the social, religious, lingual, political, or ethnic issues in debate are in most part 
premised on old issues but have been presented in their newer forms as the boundaries of 
identity have shifted towards fluidity or rigidity. This provides space for the growth of new 
associations, identities and citizenship opportunities through social networks and dialogue 
that seek new agencies for expression. It is within this argument that the Maobadi andolan 
has been analysed in this chapter. In addition, the globalisation process with its 
compounding complexities should be accepted as a vital phenomenon and as one of the 
chief forces influencing the politics of identity. Bijay a Pradhan, a teacher in Kathmandu 
opined “the ethnic complexity and the present state of ethnocentrism bears evidence to 
domestic situations as well as global trend on wide range of issues that make the domestic 
debate paramount.”
The agencies of expression have been politically, ideologically, philosophically, religiously 
or ethno-culturally oriented in Nepal. I have stated in Chapter 2 that owing to a low degree 
of participation chiefly arising from the exclusionary policies and practices of the state
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during the course of the nation building, the old problems have surfaced in newer forms 
and with increased intensity. The swell in the ethnic discourse has had the tendency of 
devouring most of the state’s legitimacy as the major and delicate interfaces of the social 
organisations have been politicised. Contemporarily, the most effective avenues or the 
agencies of expression, the Maobadi mobilisation, calling for an end to the rule of selected 
reactionary elites and their class, has challenged the very foundations sustaining the 
political ideological basis of the state. As I proceed into the issue of the Maobadi andolan, I 
would like to present a short historical account of the movement.
Dynamic and essentially an egalitarian form of citizenship were in its making at the start to 
the people’s war. Increasingly, as the programmes of the party shifted towards the 
reinforcement of subjective issues within its political framework, the egalitarian form of 
citizenship gradually began as a process to degenerate. This process was not limited within 
the Maobadi constituency; rather it became part of major political event within the domains 
of the other national parties as well. As the andolan gained momentum via the frontal 
organisations of Maobadi, ascriptive forms of allegiances and loyalties became more 
pronounced.
Following the inception of the ethnic frontal organisations, the peoples’ war rose to a new 
level; however, in doing so, the egalitarian form of citizenship based on class struggle 
gradually weakened. The very insurgency that apparently had grown with the vision of 
amalgamating social fragments that, in reflective measure, had transcended ethnic, cultural, 
lingual, religious and regional closures at the onset, subsumed into a political paradox of 
subjectivity. The ascendency of identity politics in Nepal, besides being a natural outcome 
of social exclusion, exploitation, and hegemony is also an analytical category resulting 
from the paradoxical and complex consequence of an envisaged Marxist revolution.
This debate apparently challenges my theoretical framework, and as such, I believe that it 
requires further explanation. I have stated that identity politics alone is incapable of 
asserting profound socio-political changes, whereas the situation in Nepal is quite the 
opposite. As Nepal today is a mass of contradictions, with diverse class/group interests, 
these have constantly grown over the years of insurgency. It is rather that a strongly 
growing ultra-leftist party seized the right moment to include the essence of Nepalese 
identity politics into its political framework. Besides the economic variables that
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underlined the politics of redistribution, politics of recognition were paradoxically 
incorporated into its folds. The reinforced ethnic and territorial mobilisation in a condition 
of weak indoctrination has contributed to the growth of identity politics. It has been a 
matter of fact that political activism draws political and civil deals that can bring about 
sweeping changes including revolutions. David Gellner analysing the growth of Maobadi 
andolan suggests that it has exploited the ethnic issues. He insists:
For their part, the Maoists have cleverly exploited the ethnic issue, by standing up for 
ethnic rights and holding out the prospect of autonomous regions. Many ethnic 
activists, disillusioned by the largely symbolic gains made since 1990, have been 
tempted to throw in their slot with the Maoists (Gellner 2002: 21).
5.4. Nature and genesis of the movement
The Maobadi andolan, despite being interpreted as the politics of class struggle, has been in 
fact a diverse collection of social struggles encompassing complicated social processes, 
perhaps not dominated by any one of the reasons critiqued by the political scientists. As a 
testimony, a true picture is obtained from those that are involved.
A farmer in Bijouri village said:
Maobadi andolan addresses everything, promises everything to me, I would be happy 
if I get gaas, baas and kapaas^^ and be a satisfied person. This is my personal belief 
that makes me support the movement.
In this statement, two important facts need to be considered: one, the objective, and 
quantifiable assumptions and second, the subjective and ethno-cultural concepts, which are 
perceived as strongly by those involved in the andolan. Identifying these facts contributing 
to the movement becomes imperative, as these along with their trajectories have been 
politicised to induce mobilisation. However, the first and the foremost work would be to 
see (a) how the politics of distribution or class struggle differs from or converges with the 
ideals of identity politics that is limited within the boundaries of subjectivity; and (b) what 
are the prospects of multiculturalism within the Maobadi ideology, and how has this issue 
been addressed and dealt by different communist movements in the past? Finally, (c) what 
markers can be determined in explaining the Maobadi support for identity and ethnic 
movements? In the interview presented above, the narratives of the response and the use of 
phrases such as “addresses everything, promises everything” and “be a satisfied person” are
Metaphorical term used in the Nepalese leftist literature for basic needs such as food, shelter and 
clothes.
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value-laden opinions. They possess bundles of objective as well as subjective 
considerations, which are immensely hard to define and quantify.
Gopi Maharjan, in an interview in Lalitpur said,
I believe that the Maobadi will liberate us from the shackles of oppression and 
exploitation. We will be equal citizens and demonstrate our full potentials. There will 
not be any kind of social chuwa-chut (untouchabliity) and neither will there be 
economic disparity.
This belief is in general the driving force behind the movement. The ethos of social 
equality and justice are being interpreted in absolute terms and stereotyped in common, 
interactions, which have imparted the sense of crafting almost an altruistic political system. 
The economic factor, of course, is an objective parameter that can be quantified and spoken 
in terms of the theory of redistribution. In a country such as Nepal, where more than 40% 
of the population falls below the absolute poverty line and half of the total population is 
plagued by hunger, want and disease, the obvious factor for political mobilisation would be 
the economic.
However, it is not just the objective causative factors that determine a movement. 
Sufficient subjective sources may also exist within societies, but this is by no means a 
conclusion to establish a cause-effect theory. Similar factors, as anthropologists and social 
scientists have unravelled, certainly exist in other geographical locations around the world 
as well. “At the moment it is the Nepali state that has succumbed to the Maobadi violence. 
In India, insurgencies have been a continuous phenomenon, since the suppression of the 
Naxalite movement during the seventies,” said Gopal Maharjan. Thus, if poverty, economic 
hardships, and material dispossessions were always adequate reasons for an immediate 
civil war, it is difficult to imagine what would be the next course of action in many of the 
LDCs. In addition, mobilisation needs an agency or sets of multiple agencies operating at 
different echelons including the grass root levels. This means that the nature of 
mobilisation and the genesis of the movement would change according to the politics of 
that agency, and how it perceives and interprets the social phenomenon as being the social 
reality. It is in within this context that Maobadi andolan needs to be analysed. Thus, the 
strategy adopted and policies and the tactics implemented by the party provide additional 
evidence concerning its mobilisation. To analyse the growth of identity politics within its
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regime of influence, it is essential to understand the composition and the nature of the 
people’s war.
It is reasonable for the Maobadi andolan to bear strong aspects of proletarianism by virtue 
of its being led by a communist party, and increasingly the economic factors have been 
emphasised as being the underlying reasons. On the converse, when this movement is 
analysed with respect to the other proletarian revolutions of the past, the Maobadi andolan 
is immensely short of being a class-based movement, although it is certainly being guided 
by the agency that interprets it as a perfect example of class struggle, in the twenty-first 
century. The movement is extremely complicated in terms of the issues addressed and the 
nature of mobilisation. The andolan has succeeded in politicising all of the vertical and 
horizontal social interfaces. At the same time, it has also succeeded in exposing and 
generating debates on bundles of subjective issues such as nation, nationalism, ethnicity 
and cultures. “Our agenda is not limited to a reformist movement,” proclaimed Sushma a 
Maobadi leader in Bijouri village, “it rather is geared towards reconstruction of the state 
from its very base.”
The andolan cuts across the religious, ethnic, lingual, caste, gender and most prominently 
even the economic barriers. The participants are both rich and the poor, led by middle class 
intellectuals and the elite circle. The reality is far more different than simply defined 
through the lens of class struggle and political economy. The andolan has attempted to 
address significant issues, categorically from family violence, ethnic grievances, lingual 
inequality, territorial and gender issues to economic inequality, including the official 
history. The Maobadi andolan, to my understanding, has been loaded with sensitive 
elements that define the vertical and horizontal relationship between the state and sub 
groups (nations): inter and intra ethnic boundaries; ethnic, religious and lingual closures; 
the territorial, historical and symbolic divides; including the issues encompassing the 
philosophical realms of equality and social justice.
“In the present context, after the April movement, the Maobadi have concentrated only in 
the immediate issues rather than seeking for the long-term goals”, replied Vikash Thapa, a 
peasant, in an interaction. The idea behind the long-term issues that he outlined were, (in 
addition to the above that I discussed) related to the bourgeois revolution that would 
reposition Nepal in the international system of nations besides bringing an end to the
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‘feudal production relations’. Vikas also mentioned that he was concerned with the eroding 
course of nationalism and Nepali national identity -  the issues that had been circulating in 
the Maobadi discourse since their demands'^® were presented to the Prime Minister in 1996. 
Furthermore, the issue of federalism and the federal units designed on the ethnic 
categorisation have also been part of the debate, since the April movement.
The andolan, being extremely responsive to popular demands has readily politicised them, 
with the belief that the class struggle will soar to a new height. The tactical inclusion of 
popular demands has engendered a sense of anti-state unity materialising in the form of a 
people’s war. The whole issue of Maoist revolution has deviated in the absence of a 
paramount class presence and further, the tactical issues have often over- ridden the 
economic issues and distributive politics enmeshing itself into the questions of ethnicity, 
culture, religion and race; more obvious as political-civic-ethnic conundrum.
One of the communist leaders of the seven-party alliance (not a Maobadi) in an interview 
said:
We have failed to balance the issue of class struggle and ethnic cause; sometimes we 
overplay our tunes to cultural (ethnic) issues rather than focussing on the working 
class and its unity.
This dilemma portrayed itself when the Madhesi population in Terai region took to the 
streets during January-April of 2007, following the killing of Mr. Mahato by Maobadi 
cadres. As the movement took on momentum, a major demand was put forth by the 
Madhesi movement that called for an ‘end to the political and cultural subjugation of the 
Terai region by the centralised Nepali state’. The movement was a political and an identity- 
related one, seeking regional autonomy that had been previously raised by the people’s war 
as well. As can be argued now, the Maobadi were ready to suppress the movement by use 
of state-sponsored terror whilst part of the coalition government. I will be engaged in the 
issue of Madhesi movement in the Terai region in Chapter 6. In some cases, popular 
demands are not consistent with the state-ideology and often may not coincide with 
national interests. Revolutionary tactics based on identity claims and national politics may
See appendix 1 for details
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differ in their rationale, and reconciliation of these may be extremely difficult as has been 
the case with the Maoist leadership.
5.5. Questions at large
Within these ten years of insurgency and civil war, since all of the major social interfaces 
have been politicised by the movement, the politics of difference has reached new heights, 
culminating in a newer form of citizenship assertion. Will the political outcome strengthen 
national identity and national citizenship or fragment national identity even further, eroding 
the existing common factors that bind the society into a cohesive national citizenship? Or, 
is national identity a myth never to be achieved in a multinational or a multiethnic state? It 
is debated that multiculturalism is in contradiction with the notion of cultural uniformity 
and that national identity and national citizenship are guided by the nationalist idea of 
assimilation rather than multiculturalism. It is not a hidden fact that the Mao Thought is a 
tremendously strong and a powerful ideology overloaded with the notions of class struggle 
and determinism, which arguably has no space for a multiethnic state, as I have stated 
before. From this angle, the analysis of Maobadi andolan calls for a fresh research. Just as 
one of the Maobadi personalities in Kathmandu proclaimed, “The main reason for identity 
assertion in the Terai is a reaction to the state’s atrocities against them, and if we want to 
move ahead it is only through unity.” However, the idea behind the term “unity” should 
encompass the conditions of equal power distribution. Shallow desires to seek a national 
unity through state centralism or through other forms of dictatorships do not provide the 
basis for true participation. In similar vein, to seek unity between the perpetuator of 
atrocities (the state) and the victims of the state is an exceedingly weak explanation. When 
the party was at war with the state on all fronts, it had called for its end; whereas, when the 
party ascended power, it justified “unity” which in my opinion was derived from 
disoriented concepts and dislocated ideas. In either of the cases, two questions need to be 
answered: One, will the identity politics serve to strengthen the unity between the members 
of the working class? And two, what are the likely chances that the strengthening of ethnic 
or territorial boundaries will be supportive of class boundaries and class struggle?
5.6. Present state of Maobadi andolan and the inception of the party
When Gyanendra’s repressive rule was terminated in the April of 2006, the Maobadi 
entered into a dialogue with the national parties. A historic peace deal was agreed in 
November and in early 2007 the Maoists joined an interim government. In September, they
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withdrew from the government, demanding abolition of the monarchy. Parliament agreed 
to this condition in December, and the Maobadi rejoined the government. The Maoists 
emerged as the largest party in parliament following elections in April 2008, and the 
monarchy was abolished a month later from the first meeting of the constituent assembly.
The state reacted with violence as the Peoples’ war gradually picked momentum. However, 
in the later years following 2001, the state’s position had weakened significantly to the 
point of losing its legitimacy. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which once was 
determined for nothing less than the establishment new democracy under the banner of 
Maoism has at present been participating in the parliament. As one respondent from the 
Nepali Congress in Kathmandu said, “the parliamentary politics that was vehemently 
denounced as being only a club of the bourgeoisies by the Maoists has today 
accommodated them.” It was this alliance that brought an end to the monarchical regime in 
the April of 2006, although king Gyanandra still awaited his institution’s future to be 
decided, during my first field visit.
The transfer of politics of the Maobadi andolan from jungle revolutionary warfare to urban 
parliamentary politics began with the understanding reached with the agitating democratic 
parties that formed a broad-based coalition determined to terminate the institution of 
monarchy - a project on which the parliamentary parties prior to 2006 had never been keen. 
The comprehensive peace agreement (CAP)'^  ^ between the government and the Maobadi 
ended the devastating warfare unleashed ten years ago. I have elaborated the process 
leading to the signing of the peace agreement between the rebels and the government in 
Chapter 2. The involvement of the United Nations into the peace deal so far has been 
appreciated however. International Crisis Group Asia Report (2006:9) cautions with the 
statement “The UN has very high credibility but it will not last indefinitely, especially if 
there are delays. International support for its monitoring of both the two armies and the 
elections will be crucial”. All the respondents in Kathmandu as well as in Bijouri village 
agreed that the state of peace process was extremely fragile, although there was a sense of 
relief, and more so, a definite feeling of soaring hope among them. The commoners and the 
ordinary people in general expressed more relief and trusted that the peace process would 
lead to permanent solution.
See Appendix 5
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The political process now hangs in a delicate balance of political games of internal as well 
external genesis. Considering the delicacy of the process, it is noted that the government 
has been slow in its response to speed up the peace process while at the same time, the 
CPN (Maoist) appears resolved to press its political agenda through extra-democratic 
processes rather than seeking public dialogue and democratic engagement more favourable 
to the democratic practices. Suresh Sharma of CPN (UML) shared a similar view when he 
said, “The Maobadi are in the government and they challenge the same structure whenever 
there is a difference of opinion. How can democracy flourish in an environment of hostility 
among the parties in coalition?” These types of political errors, in the long run, possess the 
negative tendency to overstretch the party alliance in addition to devaluating the values of 
democracy and the ethos involved. The alliance needs to further its agenda of a republican 
setup. The Maobadis, emerging as the largest party, have the biggest share in the 
government. Puspa Kamal Dahal, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist/Maobadi) is Prime Minister and Baburam Bhattarai, the second in command of the 
same party is the Finance Minister.
Onesto, in 1998 presented the detailed study on the Maobadi andolan when she wrote “On 
February 13, 1996 a new Peoples’ War was launched in Nepal, led by the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist), aimed at sweeping away imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic 
capitalism” (1999:8). On that particular day (13‘^  Feb. 1998), “thousands of men and 
women participated in coordinated raids and attacks throughout the country” (ibid). 
Against the backdrop of the problems that have plagued the state as detailed in Chapter 2, 
Maobadi andolan grew quickly like a prairie fire. The constant military and militia 
offensives mounted on state-owned institutions and the security apparatus propelled the 
people’s war to become gradually the symbol of revolution, triumph and terror.
During the past, the government had been eager to contain the Maobadi andoaln by means 
of police/military operations. In this respect, various efforts with code names such as 
"Operation Romeo," "Kilo Shera Two," "Jungle Search Operation," "Search and Destroy" 
etc. were undertaken; however, they failed to hold back the insurgency. Not only did these 
repressive measures fail in containing the Maobadi andolan, rather, the grotesque incidents 
of group executions, murders, rapes, tortures and intimidation during these operations
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alienated the public from the state, and rewarded the Maobadi. According to Dr. Chitra 
Tiwari "^ o^f the South Asia Analysis Group:
The insurgency that began from 3 mid-western mountain districts of Rolpa, Rukum, 
and Jajarkot, western district of Gorkha and an eastern district of Sindhuli has now 
spread to 68 of Nepal’s 75 districts. According to government’s own admission, 32 
districts are believed to be the hardest hit where guerrillas roam freely and organize 
open mass meetings. By mid-January 2001, the Maoists have declared the formation 
of provisional revolutionary district governments in Rukum, Jajarkot, Sally an and 
Rolpa districts.
“It was a very brief period in the national history - something even hard to imagine, where 
in such a short span, a very powerful movement was generated to challenge the very 
founding principles of the sate,” stressed Sanjay Pun, in an interview.
In 1971, the Central Nucleus was formed with the view to mainstream the communist 
movement among the remaining factions, which ultimately proved to be a futile attempt. 
Finally, this group held its Fourth Convention in 1974. “However the newly formed 
communist group was not itself exempt form the traditional disease of division and 
fragmentation. The General Secretary [...] of the group was ousted in 1978 over sex 
scandal [...]” (Gurung et al., 2001:18). During October of 1979, this further underwent 
division"^  ^ into CPN (Mashal) and Fourth Convention. This point in the organisational 
history may be marked as the incubation period, consisting of splits and reunions' '^  ^ of the 
extremist ideology that has appeared in the form of the ‘people’s war’.
Dr. Chatra Tiwari (an independent consultant on international affairs in Washington, D.C) in “Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Internal Dimensions” 
httD://www.southasiaanalvsis.org/DaDers2/DaDer187.htm 
Retrieved: 11/08/2008 
See appendix 2 for details
Mashal underwent division again in 1986, to form Masai led by Mohan Bikram Singh, and Mashal led by 
Kiran Baidaya. Two years later, the approval of the political line presented by Puspa Kamal Dahal 
(Prachanda) to “succeed the New Democratic Revolution through protracted armed struggle” oriented the 
organisation to concentrate on ‘people’s war’. He became the General Secretary of CPN (Mashal) the same 
year. CPN (Mashal), CPN (Masai), CPN (Fourth Convention), Proletarian Workers’ Organisation and CPN 
(Janamukhi) merged to form Unity Centre in 1991, where Prachanda continued to be the General Secretary.
On March 1991, the party announced its decision to participate in the forthcoming election under 
the banner of United People’s Front (UPF). According to Dhami Commission (1997:9-10), the participation 
of UPF in the general election was strongly objected to by RIM (International Revolutionary Movement), 
which demanded reconsideration of its election policy. Following which, CPN (Maoist) called for the 
boycott of the 1991 general elections, and it has maintained a marked consistency regarding this policy. 
Unity Centre underwent formal division in 1994. “The Second Convention of CPN(Maoist) Party held in
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Dhami report further details that through the conference of its organisations in 1993, 
adopted Maoism as its guiding principle of the New Democratic Revolution. It was at this 
stage (after the formal split of the Unity Centre) that the stronger splinter group was named 
Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), as per the decision of RIM.
5.7. Debates over federalism
The CPN (Maoist) demand for “constituent assembly” correlates with one of the political 
resolutions of the first general convention of the Communist Party in 1954, where it states, 
“We want complete political democracy; without the authority of the constituent assembly 
complete political democracy cannot be imagined.” (Gurung et al., 2001:12). The party 
thus has staunchly stood by this demand. In addition, the post-April government has 
decided on a federal system, giving way to the Maobadi demand, although the specifics of 
envisaged political system has not been debated in its detailed form in the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, all the national political parties including the CPN (Maoist) have proposed 
their arguments regarding the federal units. The models presented by these organisations 
have in general traced ethnic-territorial boundaries as the solution to the federal structure in 
Nepal. “We must have Tharuwan as one of the federal units” proclaimed an activist of
February 2001 in Dang abolished the post of General Secretary and elected Prachanda as its 
Chairman” (Dahal, 2003:3).
45 “Today, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, together with other Maoist forces, are the 
inheritors of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, and they must firmly base themselves on this heritage 
[...] Upholding Mao Tsetung's qualitative development of the science of Marxism-Leninism represents a 
particularly important and pressing question in the international movement and among the class conscious 
workers and other revolutionary minded people in the world today. The principle involved is nothing less 
than whether or not to uphold and build upon the decisive contributions to the proletarian revolution and 
the science of Marxism-Leninism made by Mao Tsetung. It is therefore nothing less than a question of 
whether or not to uphold Marxism-Leninism itself. Thus the Marxist-Leninist movement is confronted with 
the exceptionally serious responsibility to further unify and prepare its ranks for the tremendous challenges 
and momentous battles shaping up ahead [...] The historic mission of the proletariat calls ever more 
urgently for an all-out preparation for sudden changes and leaps in developments, particularly at this 
current conjuncture where national developments are more profoundly affected by developments on a 
world scale, and where unprecedented prospects for revolution are in the making. We must sharpen our 
revolutionary vigilance and increase our political, ideological, organisational and military readiness in 
order to wield these opportunities in the best possible manner for the,interests of our class and to conquer 
the most advanced positions possible for the world proletarian revolution.”
Source: Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 
http://www.csrp.org/ri m/rimdec.htm 
Retrieved: 11/07/2007
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Tharu origin, while a teacher from Chhetri background added “it would be a better idea if 
we chose political framework for the proposed federal divisions rather than inclining 
towards the ones proposed by janajati or the Maobadi that have traced historic ethnic 
boundaries.” All of the seven participants debated with similar arguments on either side of 
the spectrum during the interaction organised in the course of this research work in Bijouri 
village. Currently, similar debates are in the open, while the political experts are divided 
in one way or the other, each side pressing for their own agenda. “Equally pressing are the 
issues of equality and social justice, without which participation is difficult to achieve,” 
said Santosh in Bijouri village. It is precisely as Santosh mentioned, i.e., participation in an 
environment of equal opportunity strengthens the institution of citizenship. He also pointed 
out that since most of the districts in the country do not have the majority of any one ethnic 
group, and therefore, the division of federal units along ethnic boundaries would not be a 
sound decision. Since, Nepal is a true representation of diversity; (home to more than 101 
ethnic communities) other factors besides ethnic divides need to be considered as a political 
solution to the present crisis.
5.8. Nationalism, sovereignty and communist movements: Nepalese experience
The ethos of nationalism has particularly been in favour of the communist movements as 1 
have already elaborated. Similar movements inspired by the ethos nationalism often 
annihilate the essentials of cultural diversity with the emphasis on state centralism and 
monism. It is in this respect, communist movements in Nepal are difficult to be viewed as 
those honouring diversity or cultural recognition. Nepal-lndia relations provide some 
aspects of Nepali nationalism. The Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and Britain has been one 
of the major factors behind the growth of Nepali nationalism. As documents point out, 
“many articles (in the treaty) providing for terms and conditions of commerce with and 
through India for the procurement of arms and ammunition by Nepal, represent some of the 
foreign policy issues that continue to surface periodically up to the present times” (Panday, 
2000:303). On December 21, 1923, the Treaty of Sugauli was confirmed between Britain 
and Rana rulers (see K.C., 2001 for details). This view, being popularly shared by Nepalese 
people, is often demonstrated by rallying around communist parties, as the agenda of 
nationalism has been upheld with vigour.
Similarly, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Rana regime and independent India 
in 1950 amidst the soaring anti-Rana mass movement, has remained a controversial and
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sensitive issue in Nepal’s international relations. “This treaty remains a bone of contention 
to this day and is considered by a wide section of Nepali community an affront to Nepal’s 
sovereignty and national dignity. The Nepali people find many provisions in the treaty 
more offensive than the 1923 treaty signed with Great Britain” (Pandey 2000:303). “Our 
resources have been exploited by other countries, we have lost our bargaining power due to 
Mahakali Treaty with India; and this is all because the politicians who are in power are no 
longer nationalists”, commented Ghanashyam, a university youth in an interview.
Furthermore, India and its international relations vis-à-vis those chiefly associated with the 
annexation of Sikkim in 1974, the neo-colonisation of Bhutan on regional fronts, and the 
imposition of discriminatory treaties of Gandak, Koshi^^ and Mahakali integrated projects 
with Nepal, have promoted diverse reactions at home; the most prominent being the 
enthusiastic integration of pro-nationalist forces. In this respect, nationalist movements in 
the country have been integral parts of communist uprisings while the threat from global 
imperialism and its unity with the national ruling elites have been further reasons for the 
growth of nationalism among the middle class. “It is important to realise that Nepali 
nationalism has been weakened by the political situation at present and Nepal has lost its 
national pride and it is therefore more relevant for the CPN (Maoist) to grow,” commented 
Prem Nepali, a Maobadi sympathiser, in an interaction programme in Bijouri village. It is 
also relevant to note that among the forty demands of the Maoists, majority of them speak 
of domestic issues; seven of which address the issues related to Nepal-lndia relations.
5.9. The alternative analysis
Underlying reasons such as poverty, social exclusion, economic disparity, bad governance 
etc. have been explained by political scientists and sociologist alike as being the 
determining factors for the Maobadi andolan. However, when one comes to such a 
conclusion, an assumption would be to find similar massive Maoist-movements in every 
country in which similar environments, as described, prevail. Indeed, this is not the case. 
This is the reason why 1 have stressed that the situation here is not as simple as it appears to 
be. Although the arguments for a movement are well placed, they do not substantially 
explain the particularity involved, which in my opinion are short of being holistic
^  Tens of thousands of hectares including many villages were inundated in recent floods in Koshi 
River. The multi-hydro, high-dam project built in this river basin at the border between the two 
countries has been a serious concern for Nepalese public owing to its devastating consequences 
upstream. The project is opposed as it forms one of the many unequal treaties with India.
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approaches. It was rather though the politicisation of delicate social boundaries, political 
interfaces, ethnic, religious and territorial overtones, that the Maobadi andolan has 
succeeded in attaining its massive stature, as we see today. The nature and the means of 
mobilisation, therefore, differ from former communist revolts. It is my argument that to 
comprehend the social reality particularistic approaches must be taken, rather than 
overemphasising the baseline arguments, which tend to abandon the former. Otherwise, as I 
have stated before, we should have been experiencing as powerful communist movements 
in those countries where similar economic situations exist - but the facts are different. In 
his recent intereiw with the Britain-based World People’s Resistance Movement, Baburam 
Bhattari has reiterated his stand over the need for ethno-politics. “Clearly alluding to the 
decision of the party to divide the country into various ethnic provinces after establishing 
ethnic fronts, he said the Maoists are "cutting up" the state part by part," in fact we are 
devouring it part by part"^ "^.
5.10. Objective reasons underlying the Maobadi andolan
In Chapter 2, I have discussed the problems that have been responsible for the current 
crisis. The Maobadi andolan bears direct links with those problems. The cause of the civil 
war can broadly be categorised into two qualified opinions: (a) that possesses economic 
objectivism and (b) that are subjective in nature. “In general,” argued Vijay Kama in an 
interview, “social discrimination, poverty, stmctural inequality along with the 
contemporary issues related to the nature of governance and political repression are the
Dr Bhattarai says Maoists' ultimate aim is state capture
Clearly alluding to the decision of the party to divide the country into various ethnic provinces after 
establishing ethnic fronts. Dr Bhattarai said the Maoists are "cutting up" the state part by part, "in fact 
we are devouring it part by part. Ultimately we will be able to smash it and then replace it with a new 
state."
"What we need to practice now is the idea that the revolution never stops until all the classes are 
abolished, the state is abolished, the property system is abolished and we enter a classless and stateless 
society, or a commune of the masses of people is created," he said in the interview.
"Until that stage is reached revolution never stops. This idea of Cultural Revolution needs to be firmly 
grasped and we are very serious on this issue" (link of interview).
Source: nepalnews.com
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/2183-dr-bhattarai-savs-maoists-
ultimate-aim-is-state-capture.html
accessed: 01/11/2009
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underlying reasons for the Maobadi andolan”, during my first visit in Kathmandu. I will 
discuss the subjective issues later in this chapter.
To begin with, Nepal has been plagued with poverty and it is no surprise that the leftist 
ideology has shown a strong presence in both the urban and the rural settings since the end 
of the Rana oligarchy. “The reason for my joining the Maobadi,” said Maya a Maobadi 
cadre in Bijouri Village, “is because my family is poor. I believe that once we are liberated, 
our hunger and poverty will disappear.” The utopian concept of equality and justice is a 
prime driving force and this reasoning (reasoning for justice and equality) is inevitably 
present in all forms of discussions and interviews. Poverty has been an ever-challenging 
issue for Nepal despite receiving foreign aid for more than half a century. Economic 
liberalisation initiated since the late eighties has ruined the agriculture and cottage industry 
sectors. The high rate of inflation coupled with the incidents of currency devaluations, 
withdrawal of subsidies, removal or trade barriers, deregulation and privatization in 
compliance with WTO and WB, since the last three decades has shattered any remaining 
chances of decent life for ordinary people.
Secondly, the 1980s, as the institution of monarchy gradually began losing its corrosive 
powers, the state subsequently weakened. In addition to this trend, the growth of the 
people’s war significantly eroded the legitimacy and control of the state. The fall of the 
monarchy and the process of démocratisation, although appearing quite direct, are 
complicated in the sense that the democratic institutions failed to shoulder the newly 
transferred responsibilities. This created a power deficit pitching the political parties, 
groups and individuals into acute and unhealthy competitions, unholy alliances and 
undemocratic exercises for the control of state resources and undue rewards.
An unlimited appetite of the political class for power, corruption and the perpetuation 
of a culture of impunity and human rights abuses contributed to the criminalization of 
politics and politicization of the bureaucracy, the police, educational institutions and 
public corporations (Dahal, 2005:6).
^ Dahal, D.R. (2005) Nepal Supporting Peace Process through a Systemic Approach, Berghof 
Foundation for Peace Support, study prepared for the Berghof foundation for peace support, 
Kathmandu
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Thirdly, while analysing the history of political parties, it is important to note that 
revolutionary doctrines and revolts have been the de facto general blueprint for any new 
party aspiring to enter into the Nepalese polity. Beginning from the Nepali Congress in the 
fifties to the Jhapa andolan of the CPM (ML)*^  ^ during the seventies, the common 
denominations have been violence, dogmatism and adventurism. Although the Maobadi 
andolan traces a similar path, its emergence as the largest national party marks a strict 
departure from the rest in terms of its short interval of activities and the optimum level of 
violence. Many interviewees responded by saying that they admired the sense of 
martyrdom and sacrifice involved in the movement.
5.11. Politicisation of vertical and horizontal hierarchy
As I have stated before, tactics involved with the politicisation of the delicate social 
boundaries, political interfaces, ethnic, religious and territorial divides have favoured the 
Maobadi andolan. The mobilisation tactics in this sense have been different from the 
conventional methods employed by the similar communist movements of the past, which 
stressed only on class conflicts. For example, during the 1970s the Jhapa revolt relied 
exclusively on Maoism and class struggle and identified economic objectivism as the sole 
justification for a revolution. It is my opinion, therefore, that to comprehend the social 
reality we should take into account the particularistic approaches also, rather than 
overemphasising the baseline arguments. The Maobadi movement, to my understanding, 
has been loaded with all of the sensitive elements that define the vertical and horizontal 
relationships between the state and citizens: inter and intra ethnic boundaries; religious and 
lingual closures; territorial and regional divides, along with the strong commitment to 
deconstruct social and religious practices of ‘traditional’ categories.
5.12. The politicisation of inter-ethnic houndaries
“The Maobadi andolan has been true to our cause as it has raised the issue of ethnicity and 
streamlined its politics so that our rights are recognised by the state” said a fellow 
passenger sitting next to me on the journey to Bijouri village during my research in June 
2007. He was an NGO employee and a supporter of Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, also known 
as Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN). Since the eighties, fissures were
Prior to 1990, CPN(UML) was called CPN(ML). It was after the unity with another communist party 
that its name had been altered, with an addition of ‘U ’ signifying a ‘Unified Communist Party’.
132
manifesting in the political system as the public began to show signs of discontent with the 
panchayat regime. The decline of monarchy was first observed in the years following the 
popular students’ uprising. In the mean time, the implosion of the Soviet Union presented 
the possibility of a new political order on a global scale. This dramatic scenario was 
compelling despotic leaderships throughout the world to employ alternative strategies as 
one of the two global powers faded out.
These political developments of global scale had their own implications for Nepal. The 
third wave of democracy eventually hit hard when the king, in due course, had only one 
global power to look up to while at the same time, the education in Nepal had reached a 
critical level whereby the people no longer accepted the idea of being the ‘subject’ of the 
sovereign. The characteristic feature of this movement was that it was popularly 
participated in by caste as well as by non-caste groups. The broad-based solidarity 
succeeded in limiting the monarch within the constitutional framework. The people from 
ethnic background soon became disenchanted as the panchayat politics failed to represent 
them and what they stood for.
The revival of ethnic assertiveness can also be seen as a regional characteristic feature 
within these decades. Secular India has now been entangled with a wide spectrum of non­
secular ideals testing the foundations of the nation-state. Nepalese are aware of Naga, 
Jharkhand, Assamese, Khalistan, Gorkhaland and other similar movements of ethnic origin 
in the Indian soil. In similar vein, the rise of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh have all been too expensive and regretful aspects in the nation-building 
projects for either side partaking in the conflict. However, this dismal scenario does not 
have to be applicable in our discussion, as I believe that the ethnic reawakening in the 
Nepalese context is based on constructive and purposeful principles with the view to 
rectifying the past mistakes committed by the state.
“I support the Maobadi andolan as it has accommodated our cause related to our ethnic 
identity. Further the leaders have also said that we will get our own territory” replied an 
elderly lady, mother of a Maobadi activist in an interview in Dang district. The social 
exclusion faced by the ethnic groups and their aspirations for equal citizenship has 
presented the essential torque for social mobilisation.
133
As I have explained previously, the class-based participation is in reality very poor in the 
Maobadi andolan. For the movement to grow, the necessity of a sister organisation based 
on ethnic sentiments was deemed necessary as this was a sure way of involving the ethnic 
grievances into the movement. Furthermore, the sentimentalism associated with 
nationalism becomes a formidable amalgamating factor during mobilisations. Following a 
careful study, the All Nepal Nationalities’ Organisation {Akhil Nepal Janajati Sangha) was 
founded in 1998 by the Maobadi party at the central level. Apart from the claims to ethnic 
rights that formed the general category, those “including the right of secession for all 
nationalities in Nepal” (Shrestha, B. 2003) were promoted with refreshed arguments. The 
decision, being sentimental and popular, was overwhelmingly supported by the people 
from different nationalities, as no group in Nepal forms a demographic majority. The 
political movement, powered by the sentiments of nationalism has indeed been successful 
in mobilising the masses for the liberation that it assures. The pivotal tilt from economic 
determinism and class struggle to cultural politics has shifted the centrality of the political 
debate from objective reality to subjective reasoning and value-laden narratives.
The Maobadi leadership, being the vanguard of this discourse, needed to be vigilant and to 
demonstrate wisdom while situations on the ground changed that demanded more 
flexibility and caution. This is implicit to all political parties in general; however, the 
Maobadis have demonstrated the ability for political shifts and swings with high degree of 
perfection. The pattern of this swing has been monitored by the Crisis Group, where in 
2005 it reports:
Maoists are revising their methods and reconsidering their goals” and in 2007 “the 
most significant political shift has been a conditional acceptance of multiparty 
democracy -  a fundamental ideological concession [...].
It is precisely the perceptive nature and adaptive as well as the inclusive capacity of the 
movement that has produced a snow-ball effect, while at the same time, overarching the 
ideological basis as reasons for accommodating the subjective issues.
“The communist movement, most prominently the CPN (Maoist), in recent times has been 
inclined towards addressing cultural and ethnic issues,” opined Shyam Thapa, university 
student in Kathmandu during a group discussion. “The idea behind the Maoist movement 
in my opinion was to create a broad-based proletarian power of the working class,” he said.
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adding, “somehow the sentimental aspect of culture has succeeded in grasping the central 
attention instead of class struggle.” Although, the ethnic and cultural aspect of the 
movement has manifested in a major form of debate today, it however could be contested 
that the communist party rather than cherishing multiculturalism and the rhetoric of identity 
and recognition, is in reality seeking to strengthen the revolution by exploiting the 
subjective challenges.
“Following the dissolution of the United Front, the Ethnic and Regional Front 
Coordinating Committee (ERFCC) was formed on May 2001, including eleven different 
ethnic groups” (Gautam: 2004). Favouring the view to strengthen the ‘people war’ from 
ethnic organisations, about a dozen of ethnic and regional fronts were created by the 
Maobadi leadership to propel the people’s war to a new height. These organisations 
functioned as the frontal organisation playing significant roles in organising party 
activities, serving as recruiting centres and assisting in the political and the military wings 
of the party. The Maoist-created ethnic organisations^^ are as follows:
1. Magarat National Liberation Front,
2. Tamuwan National Liberation Front,
3. Tharuwan National Liberation Front,
4. Tamang National Liberation Front,
5. Thami National Liberation Front,
6. Majhi National Liberation Front,
7. Madhesi National Liberation Front,
8. Newa Khala
9. Limbuwan National Liberation Front
10. The Nepal Dalit Liberation Front and
11. Kamali Regional Liberation Front
The ethnic and regional front’s coordination committee coordinates the operations and 
activities of these frontal organisations of the CPN (Maoist).
^  Please see CPN-Maoist (UCPN-M) publications 
Source: httD://mvw.ucpnm.org/
Retri eved :9/2/2006
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Although the organisations have been named as regional fronts as they also represent 
various regions of the country geographically, more strongly they represent the ethnic 
composition as the content of liberation, irrespective of class outlook. Thus, these 
organisations do not implicitly represent the political economy. “We have been oppressed 
by the upper-caste Hindus, namely the Bahun-Chhetry groups that have ruled the country 
for more than 230 years,” outlined a Maoist ethnic activist in Kathmadu. The argument 
possesses the historical elements within it; however, the basis for mobilisation in these 
particular cases does not involve class-based interpretations. Therefore, the issues rebound 
to confirm that all Bahuns and Chetries should therefore belong to a feudal class or all 
similar categories from part of a larger feudal network that the Maobadi intends to abolish. 
This is where the bulk of the problem persists in their ideological stand. The facts are 
different; there are rich and poor like from all caste and non-caste groups and more over, 
the mechanism of exploitation cut across ethnic or other forms of closures. The ‘feudal 
exploiters’ by class exist within all sub-national groups irrespective of their cultural/ethnic 
origin. Therefore the revolutionary idea would be to unite all the exploited people, as a 
class, and mount the revolutionary assault on the feudal class irrespective of their 
cultural/ethnic origin; in which case, it would be more compatible with the Marxist vision 
of class struggle. It is commonly agreed that culture, religion, tradition or any other forms 
of identity are not immutable, transfixed and frozen.
The argument here is not to state that the Maobadi are not well versed in Marxism, 
Leninisn or Mao thought; nor has been to undermine the party or its leadership. However, 
“the crux of the matter lies in its failure to analyse the political implication that these 
organisation would involve in serving their strategy” added a leader from CPN (UML) in 
Kathmandu. The major questions arising in this circumstance are; one, are the Maobadis 
truly multiculturalists or was it an ideological deviation that prompted them to undertake 
this decision; and two, was it just a tactical effort to promote the ‘people’s war’ via these 
organisations, without the foresight to analyse the possible outcome? The opinion of 
Sangeeta Thapliyal (2006:57) subscribes to a belief that “The Maoist attempt to increase 
their support base by including the concerns of the janajatis has paid dividends,” that may 
be compared to an ethnic movement. However, she goes further to emphasise that “the 
Maoist image of being representative of janajatis is a political ploy to gain more cadres” 
(ibid).
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After eleven years into the insurgency, outcomes are becoming visible. As one might 
expect form the debate above that the objective sense of economic equality and liberation 
of labour from the bondages of feudalism have been overridden by the agenda of ethnicity 
and sub-nationalism. The recipe of sub-nationalism has created multi-nuclear communities 
(Nepal has 101 ethnic communities) in pursuit of identity primarily based on their 
differences. Equally convincing is Habermas (1995:256) when he points out that “loosing 
the semantic connections between national citizenship and national identity takes into 
account that the classic form of nation-state is at present disintegrating.” Moreover, in the 
context of Nepal, this disintegration process is being fuelled by a Marxist movement. The 
Maobadi andolan has indeed created a self sustaining dynamo of ethnic consciousness 
retracting these social organisations into non-porous bounded units in horizontal directions 
while the political superstructure has been battered with the classical Maobadi strategy of 
liberating the state from the “clutches of domestic feudal exploitation and the forces of 
imperialism that have co-opted to continue with their evils” (Maobadi pamphlets: 2001).
With the ongoing andolan everywhere, we truly cannot see the direction that Nepal 
would be taking in future; however, we believe that everyone that is involved is as 
patriotic as the next one. This gives us the hope that all will end well.
This was the general reaction of the participants in a participatory discussion held in 
Bijouri village during the course of this research. However, the term patriotism is slippery 
concept and politically problematic. Patriotism at national level would often conflict with 
ethnic or sub-national category if we were to argue taking into account the ethos of the 
post-war consciousness or the foundations of Marxism.
5.13. The politicisation of caste and non-caste boundaries
“The people today appear different arguing for themselves and the groups they represent. 
The common sense of Nepalipan (Nepaliness) as a collective identity does not seem to 
please people any more” replied an interviewee in Bijouri village. Years after the formation 
of these organisations, ethnic boundaries have been reinforced, that ironically should have 
been weakened in the wake of an egalitarian socialist revolution. “It is only by forging 
unity among the productive forces that a strong and formidable revolutionary force is 
created” said a retired politician and a Marxist in Kathmandu. And what is more, the issues 
of revolution is in itself a complex social process where the old relationships are replaced
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by new ones mainly concerned around the national identity, built around the egalitarian 
concept of uniformity and allegiance towards the state and what it stands for.
The 40-point demand of the Maobadi clearly pointed towards a nation-state that would be 
independent and centred around the pillar of nationalism. These demands clearly range 
from agenda premised around people’s livelihoods, democracy and nationalism. The 
nationalism, thus, would represent the national identity or Nepaliness. Karl Marx while 
dealing with the issues of state and civil society in his chapter On Colonialism (1972:58) 
wrote “[...] it [the state] must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and 
inwardly must organise itself as a state”. The Marxist interpretation of state and 
nationalism has been specifically premised within this perspective; while at the same time, 
the new democracies have also conceded to his idea and implemented within their realms 
as well. The post-colonial independence has specifically accepted the unitary form of 
nationalism while at the same time gained its nationhood through mainly assimilatory 
politics. Thus, this idea has not only captured the Marxists but rather has been the guiding 
principles of post-war consciousness, although communicated centuries ago. I have 
elaborated this linkage in my former chapter. “The issues raised by the ethnic movement 
are extremely complex. Although the leaders have all the moral and legal rights to put forth 
their demands, the problem lies in finding an amicable solution acceptable to all,” said a 
schoolteacher from Dalit background. “We as a caste group are in the most disadvantaged 
position; however, we are least heard by the upper caste groups including the janajatisC he 
added. The reinforcing of the ethnic boundaries and categorization of “we” versus “they” 
has been common base line on which the social dissociation at one point has 
accommodated social solidarity on the other. It has been a concern that buttressing social 
boundaries even at the margins among differential groups has reversed the process of social 
diffusion offsetting the ethnic/linguistic identities into multi-nuclear ‘different groupings’. 
Thus, the challenge offered by the ethnic consciousness has equally caught the capitalists 
as well as the socialists off balance in the later decades as the rising tides of ethnicity 
captivated different political locations, and Maobadi are no exceptions.
In this respect, the Maobadi andolan has been flexible in terms of accepting problems and 
grievances; however, the solution is elusive, as the ideology itself becomes a paradox while 
it struggles to seek solutions to subjective issues as ethnicity, culture, religion etc. Thus, 
the present dislocation of Maobadi andolan with respect to these issues arises out of the fact
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that the theoretical arguments, premised on the mode of production and social 
consciousness of material productive forces, are short of explaining the phenomenon of 
surging ethnic consciousness that I have elaborated in my theoretical framework. 
“Politicising sensitive issues may be helpful to produce social unrest; however, when 
political decisions on such matters are endorsed with short-sighted vision, the country and 
the people suffer in the long run” opined Vashu, a Madhesi leader in Bijouri village while 
he shared his experience on the growth of ‘hate language’ and how Madhesi have been 
made the victims.
5.14. Politicisation of language and religion
Nepali language was declared the national language during the 1960s. Since then, it has 
been the only official national language. Prior to this, Nepali language was never declared 
the official medium of communication although it had been the lingua franca, primarily 
within the hill population. I have elaborated the fact that the Nepalese language had played 
an indispensible role during the unification process in Chapter 2 and in the annex.
For the Maobadi andolan to grow, politicisation of language was a strategic matter, which 
the leadership understood very well. The Terai has history of frequent political agitations 
concerning the language issue as I have outlined. The sure means of pitching the Madhesis 
against the state depended on the manipulation of this issue as well. “Well... we support 
the ethnic languages of the country, both that of the hills and the Terai... but... I don’t 
think the Hindi language would be a good option,” replied a central leader of Maobadi in 
Kathmandu during my second field trip. This was the time when the country was geared 
towards its historical Constituent Assembly elections. The overlapping identity of the 
Madhesis with the Indian population has been undermined and thus, the crisis of identity is 
as acute as before. With respect to the other indigenous languages of the country, it is still 
too early to say what the policy of the Maobadi would be. However, since they had 
included the autonomy of the languages as tactical slogans in their movement, a very strong 
sentiment exists among the different indigenous and ethnic groups. However, the modality 
of the project still remains to materialise. With scores of languages in existence and only 
limited federal units, the politics surrounding the issue of language will doubtlessly be a 
contested one in the days to come.
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5.15. Conclusion
The debates in this chapter are concerned with the possibilities and constraints that the 
Maobadi andolan offers regarding the generation of equal citizenship. The factor to 
consider was the premise of the strategic swing or the theoretical derailment vis-à-vis the 
andolan’s deterministic ideology. The nature of Marxist orthodoxy does not supply grounds 
for cultural issues, especially where in a relatively limited territory, more than a hundred 
ethnic communities reside. The effort of the state since the unification was to assimilate 
these groups into a single national identity through the project of national citizenship. The 
communist movement in Nepal has been supportive of this state-centric engineering 
through its passionate rhetoric of nationalism, sovereignty, efficiency and self-reliance (see 
Chapter 9). However, it is essential that cultural diversity be recognised for assuring equal 
citizenship.
Since the former model has been proved a failure in Nepal, the most likely model of 
citizenship could be premised on a multicultural scheme. With respect to this project, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, as has been practised in Nepal, bears a strong tendency of 
creating affronts when power sharing is concerned. The issues pertaining to the Hindi 
language or the extension of citizenship in the Terai are no exceptions.
From the ideological point of view, the party is under extreme pressure. Since it 
successfully politicised these sensitive issues during the decade-long andolan, it has been 
equally difficult for the leadership to review these issues. The pressures derived from the 
ethnic assertiveness and cultural claims have surfaced from three avenues: First, from the 
public, that was involved in the revolution project, and second, from those who were 
theoretically away from Mao Thought, but have claimed that the demand is legally and 
morally right and third, from the ethnic consciousness generated in the party leadership. At 
all accounts, the ethnic assertiveness and class interests are in conflict. In this regard, the 
Maobadi party is undergoing transformation in trying to adapt to the emerging 
unpredictable circumstances. Thus, if the party truly becomes democratic in character, the 
subjective issues still need to be settled. On the contrary, if the leadership recognises these 
subjective issues as being only tactical (as I have argued to be so), then, the party and its 
guiding philosophy will be a strong barrier to multicultural citizenship.
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It is equally important to recognise that Nepal has never experienced a movement as strong 
as the one commenced by the Maobadi. All of the outstanding issues, since the unification, 
have surfaced within very a short period of democratic life of the state. David Gellner 
(2005) in “Ethnic Rights and Politics in Nepal” assets:
Compared to India, Nepal has had to come in terms with the problems of caste and 
ethnicity in a modem democratic context far more quickly, and with less time for 
democratic procedures to embed themselves and become part to the political culture 
at all levels^ \
Thus, the problems underlying the citizenship crisis, that I have discussed so far, require 
efficient corrective measures for the historical wrongs. It is only through a phenomenal 
effort, strong and dedicated leadership with clear vision that similar changes happen. And 
most importantly, the public must be supportive of the state-led project. State engineering 
or state restmcturing is an immensely complex process and it can only be achieved if the 
principles of redistribution are simultaneously applied with a clear vision and a strong will 
to address the issues pertaining to the politics of recognition. The intermarriage of these 
ideologies is, in my research findings, the most viable theoretical alternative and practical 
model for Nepal in delivering equal citizenship. This, evidently not only transcends the 
model produced by Mao, rather it is in conflict with the national citizenship model that the 
orthodox communists in Nepal truly believe in.
This quote is also available in the internet 
http://www.isca.ox.ac.Uk/fileadmin/ISCA/ACADEMlC/D Gellner publication files/EthnicrightsinNe 
pal.pdf (page 1) 
accessed: 11/10/2009
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Nepal Terai, Madhesi population and hill-centric state
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I have dealt with the salient features behind the rise of identity politics in 
the Nepal Terai arguing that its unique nature of diversity, location and the sense of 
belonging need to be recognised as being different from that of the hill population. I have 
insisted that the failure of the hill-centric state in recognising Terai’s uniqueness in: a. the 
national context, b. social diversity, c. culture d. social stratification, and e. migration has 
exacerbated the citizenship crisis. As a result, the Terai consciousness is against the hill- 
centric state ideology and its policies. To be more specific, identity politics in the Terai is 
premised on two distinct levels. At the grassroots, the indigenous and ethnic consciousness 
is at work while at the national level, Madhesi consciousness is paramount. The indigenous 
and ethnic consciousness claims for ethnic assertion, identity and recognition, while 
Madhesi consciousness aspires for regional or territorial autonomy as its ultimate form of 
identity. I have argued that within these two levels of identity claims, the ethnic category is 
in conflict with the Madhesi consciousness. However, although the pan-Madhesi 
movement at present has surfaced as a strong force negating the state-centric ideology, the 
‘ethnic reawakening’ will continue to furnish the identity politics at the grassroots unless 
equal citizenship is realised. I have discussed this issue further in Chapter 7.
I have further argued that since the caste structures are stronger with strict moral codes for 
adherence, claiming for egalitarian values become a risky affair in the Terai. And secondly, 
since the caste and ethnic based exploitation and oppressions are more acute, more 
dependent and vulnerable, ethnic consciousness lags behind considerably so as to challenge 
the norms of the social organization in an structured form. As a result, radical ideologies 
are less welcomed. Although I have introduced the idea of Madhesi consciousness and 
ethnic conscious earlier and also said that these are contradictory processes, the trend of the 
Terai movement, however, has been established by the elites and upper caste groups. By its
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very nature, the Madhesi consciousness has been an elite driven expression of the anti-state 
politics that has claimed for its ‘right to self-determination’.
Since the 1990s, after the restoration of democracy, the Terai has been particularly 
affirmative in claiming self-determination and regional autonomy. This took a violent turn 
following the people’s movement of April 2005. The popular agenda of federalism 
succeeded in mobilising the Madhesi population as the state was engrossed in the nascent 
peace process. During this interval, the UN had been playing a major role. Despite 
government’s lack of sensitivity over the issue and the rising tempo of the movement, the 
former tried to explain the state of affairs through alternative approaches although 
invariably it stood against the idea of sharing the state power with local bodies as indicated 
by the proposed federal autonomy. More than an assumption, it can be accepted as a 
conclusion that nation states inevitably posses what Kampelman in his Forward to 
Autonomy: Flexible Solution to Ethnic Conflicts writes “the erroneous assumption that the 
right of self-determination of peoples includes within it the right to secession serves to 
confuse the dialogue and interfere with the process of accommodation” (Lapidoth, 1997: 
ix). Going even a step further and beyond the principles of nation state, one can also 
suggest that the idea of cession does not violate the moral and political code of freedom 
and liberty if people develop a common will for independency from a draconian rule of 
some kind.
The Maobadi anodolan was successful in politicising the sensitive issues involving 
language, religion, culture, ethnicity and regionalism that were largely structural and 
historical in nature. The demise of the institution of monarchy has signified a condition of 
disequilibrium and rapidly reorienting power equations in the Terai. As a result, various 
ideologies including ethnocentrism, regionalism to secession have also accrued. In an 
extremely delicate and exceptionally fluid political milieu, lobbying, networking, 
dialoguing and rallying have been the common features in the Nepalese socio-political 
space. The social structures, institutions and processes of different nature have been 
contributing to the citizenship crisis, escalating the identity politics even further.
6.2. Nepal Terai in the national context
The Terai region is a narrow strip of low-lying fertile land ranging from 26 to 32 
kilometres in width that stretches full length along the southern border of Nepal from North
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to South. The fertile soil, dense tropical forests, and abundant flora and fauna are a few of 
the outstanding features of this area. Outstanding ecological assets and significant 
biodiversity comprise the common bundle of reasons behind the establishment of five wild 
life reserves in different locations within this strip. The highly fertile and productive land 
covers 17 percent of the total area of the country. Besides contributing economically in 
areas of primary production, the Terai region is also the central locus of small, medium and 
large sized industries due to its proximity with the Indian market and the natural 
endowment in the ease of transportation and communication in comparison to the rugged 
topography of the hill areas. This narrow strip of land therefore maintains its supremacy in 
its economical, political and social contributions, besides being home to the 48.44% of the 
country’s 32 million people. According to 2001 census, the people of hill origin compose 
one third of the total population of the Terai.
Frederick Gaige (1975:2) argues that, “the Terai population is predominantly of Indian 
origin, its economic and cultural ties are primarily with India [...]”. The social and cultural 
roots of this population, including its proximity and connection with respect to its 
economic interests drive the overall interest in this population in its effort to assert its 
identity in the Nepalese national context. At present, the Terai is under an immense 
pressure owing to migration phenomena of two distinct types: One, from the hilly regions 
of Nepal and two, from the southern plains of north India. In the first instance, the 
migration of hill population to the lower fertile lands of the Terai has been perceived as a 
potential threat to their vision of identity. The migration of hill people in different episodes 
of recent Nepalese history underline issues related to the nation building efforts and its 
policy regime. During the monarchical era, the initiatives involved in integration of Terai 
have partly been driven with the assumption that Gaige (1975:2) suggested:
Nepal has always regarded India as a greater threat to its independence than China,
because of Nepal’s proximity to and economic dependence upon India.
The clash of interests and needs between what this population perceives as its cultural 
identity, symbols and rootedness with the political ideology of the territorial state, more 
visibly observed in the latest episodes of violence in various districts of the Terai, has 
claimed dozens of lives. Following the withdrawal of the imperialist forces from the region, 
the conventional nation state model and its assimilatory policy for attaining nationhood
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may have temporarily favoured the ruling classes in their project. However, with 
democratic changes in Nepal, the old questions are being paraphrased into newer forms. 
The claims are concerned with the regional and collective rights categorically beyond the 
state-centric model.
The pan-Terai consciousness, although stimulated during the 1950 movement, did not 
achieve any noteworthy political gains. However, in the last decade, the consciousness has 
developed into a momentous stage via the agency of the people’s war. I will analyse the 
Terai andolan in connection to the present crisis, in a situation where the Maobadis have 
succeeded in politicising the region. However, owing to the recent developments (which I 
will elaborate later), the Maobadi party in the present context is no longer the sole actor in 
the region. Dozens of new regional/local parties have sprouted following the unrest of 
2007. The major agendas of the emerging organisations and alliances in the Terai are 
similar to the ones politicised by the Maobadi andolan. However, the Terai movement has 
taken a new turn where many groups have withdrawn from the Maobadi activism and 
function as independent organisations. Despite these new developments, the Maobadi is 
still the strongest party in the region.
I will analyse these developments in subsequent sections of this chapter arguing that the 
political developments in the Terai have, in fact, been made possible though the agency of 
Maobadi andolan. In the present democratic environment, debates over the ideals of social 
justice, human rights, equality and freedom formed part of the national discourse. The 
Maobadi andolan, having succeeded in politicising the sensitive issues of culture, 
regionalism including the hierarchical forms of religious, social or economic stratifications, 
has tactically succeeded in providing significant impetus in generating the pan-Terai 
consciousness in addition to providing the agency of that expression.
6.3. Social diversity and the Terai population
Cultural groups within the Terai can be classified as Mongol-kirats, Dravidians, or Arayans 
by race and as Hindu, Buddhist, Kirat or Musmils by religion. Among the Madhesi cultural 
groups (native and linguistic), Tharu, Maithali, Bhojpuri and Avadhi are the chief 
languages while Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Marwari are also spoken. Giving account of the 
custom groups within the Terai belt, Neupane (2000:51-51) specified that:
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The custom groups include Yadhav or Ahir, Kayastha, Kumhar, Baniya, Dhobi, 
Sudhi or Kalwar, Kumi, Bhramin (Madehsi), Rajput, Teli, Kuahmar, Muslim, 
Halwai, Mallah, Rajbanshi, Dhimal, Gangai, Marwary, Bengali, Dhanuk, Dikh, 
Dushadh, Chamar, Khatwe, Masahar, Kewat, Rajbahar and Kanu.
Among these custom groups, the Tharus and Dhimals have Mongoloid origin. Tharu, 
Rajbansi, Danuwar, Bantar and Satar are the indigenous people. The Madhesi population 
exhibits cultural differences and religious variations according to their descent and 
profound attachment with respect to culture, religion, language and territory with the 
people of North India. The Hindu custom in the Terai plains possesses a stronger 
hierarchical social order and caste system, more pervasive than the hill practices. Hajam, 
Lohar, Badhai, Mehata, Tatama, Dhobi, Mallaha, Doli, Chamar and Dom constitute the 
impure caste and therefore are the ‘untouchables’ within the social classification and caste 
characteristics. The majority of the Terai population are ardent believers of Hinduism and 
therefore its influence can also be observed in other social structures beyond the strict 
Hindu socio-religious closures.
Cultural groups within the Terai can be classified as Mongol-kirats, Dravidians, or Aryans 
by race and as Hindu, Buddhist, Kirat or Muslim by religion. The “indigenous groups, 
communities which have cross-border cultural, linguistic and kinship links; and a large 
number of migrants from the hills who have moved into the area as it opened for 
development in the latter half of the twentieth century” (Crisis Group, Nepal’s Troubled 
Terai Region, 9 July 2007:2). All these groups are not homogeneous units; rather, they are 
deeply divided by caste, class and clan hierarchies. The caste groups are the dominant 
identities as plain people. Hill migrants compose the second largest group that is divided 
into caste and sub-caste groups. The third category is the indigenous peoples of Terai 
origin, with their own culture, language, traditions and way of life as compared to the rest 
of the population. These indigenous groups are also subdivided into different subgroups. 
The identity mosaic of the Terai is extremely diverse and socially remarkable and likewise, 
the relationships among/between these groups are as complex.
The democratic polity allocates sufficient theoretical space for democracy and liberalism; 
however, to accommodate the rising sense of identity assertion, the state has gingerly 
drafted some legal basis for group rights. Ethnic nationalities and oppressed groups such as 
Dalits have been recognised and reservations have been worked out in different sectors
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such as education and employment. The Maobadi movement in most part has created 
sufficient pressure in bringing about the recent changes in the socio-political sector 
beginning with the promotion of identity politics. The fervour of promoting cultural 
distinctiveness in the Terai has flared up astoundingly heating the political environment. 
The Terai region has been extremely active in its effort to maintain its cultural difference 
from that of the hills. The gross effect of the political processes has been to raise the level 
cultural consciousness while at the same time, imparting the urgent message for inclusion, 
human dignity and equal citizenship.
On the larger scale, hill migrants from different lingual categories are either Caucasoid or 
Mongoloid in origin. These groups speak their own language and follow Hinduism, 
Buddhism or both of these religions. The picture in the Terai is more complex as compared 
to the organisational structure of hill migrants. The lingual groups of the Terai are 
categorised into Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan, Austro-Asiatic and Dravidian whereas the 
cultural groups along the religious-lingual divides are the Muslims, Sheikhs, Jains and 
Bengalis.
The Terai consciousness possesses a two tiered identity assertion operating at different 
levels: first, it seeks an independent identity liberated from the subsidiary and oppressed 
position at national/regional level and second, the emancipation of low caste, tribal and 
poor from the exploitations of the ruling elite, feudal forces and traditional mindset. While 
the agenda in favour of independent Terai identity has been pursued by the regional elites 
and national leaders of the plains, the emancipatory movements operating at the lower 
rungs of the society have been in the interest of local activists and oppressed identities. 
Regardless of the differences in the nature and chemistry of these movements, the 
foundation to both of these categories has been the peoples’ war.
As I have stated in Chapter 2, the state’s scheme of classification has been controversial 
and this is also applicable to the Terai region. Jayaprakash Gupta (2004) strongly argues 
that there has been a flow in the scheme of classification employed by the state. Giving 
account of the Indian system of classification, he emphasises that Yadhavs, instead of being 
placed in the caste category, need to be grouped into custom category. Gupta (2004:21), 
arguing that “in India, Bengalis have been identified in terms of their linguistic
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characteristics instead of seeking out their caste position”, supports the idea that the 
deprived/backward class should be added in the categorisation.
Analysed through an alternative approach, his proposal does not sound unrealistic in the 
sense that if census and other formal classification schemes take advantages of economy 
alongside other variables, the tendency to see social organisations exclusively based on 
Hindu elements would surely diffuse the centralisation of caste structure as the sole 
analytical tool. When caste is emphasised in every event, it also has the tendency of 
reinforcement with stronger exclusive potentials that otherwise could be restructured or 
reoriented through years of social interactions and interdependent environments. Similarly, 
if analysts and social scientists overemphasise the caste-ethnic or hill-Terai dichotomy 
seeing it as an immutable construct, the caste structure or geographic identities likewise 
would possess the tendency of fortifying themselves as the in-group response. The 
consequence would be to identify the ‘other’ across an impermeable and permanent divide. 
The overall by-product of this separation has also contributed to the growth of identity 
politics including the elements of ethnocentrism.
Furthermore, the caste constructs of organised societies of the Terai do not contradict with 
that of the hills. Rather it is mainly in the body politic based on the cultural, lingual and 
territorial way of life of the plains people vis-à-vis the states’ policy of multifaceted 
discrimination, that the potentials for conflict lie. The disempowered groups under 
disproportional power relations had very minimal opportunity to demonstrate their apathy 
under the absolute power regime of the monarch. The democratic polity, however, offering 
a congenial environment for dissension has been the background in which the Maobadi 
andolan operated and extended its activities into the Terai. The insurgency constantly dug 
into the structures of power relations and exposed the role of the state as being predatory 
and immoral with regard to the power distribution among different cultural/ethnic groups 
including the geographic/lingual parameters of the Terai-hill divide.
6.4. Cultures and Hindu umbrella: state’s politics of uniformity
As we have seen, the population of the plains does not represent a homogenous group; 
rather, the diversity that exists in the Terai is more conspicuous than that of the hills. The 
cultural characteristics, religious practices and languages spoken by the caste Terai people 
resemble that of northern Indian states. The food, festivals, religious practices, rituals.
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clothes, choice of colours, nature of ornaments and the general personality of Nepalese 
Terai people are remarkably similar to that of the people living on the other side of the 
border. It cannot be disputed that the Madhesi population clearly shows an overlapping 
identity.
Terai is overwhelmingly a Hindu settlement where about 70 percent of the population 
represents this faith. Although Hinduism is also the dominating religion in the hills, its 
practice in both of these geographic locations within the same political territory is similar 
in some aspects although the prevailing differences are often more striking. Despite the 
state’s continuous efforts to difine its official national identity, it has by pursuing the 
concept of religion and faith as intrinsic indicators, created a divide rather than the 
amalgam and common denominator for cohesiveness between the Madhesis and the hill 
people. Within the same dominating religious group, the cross-chure (hills that separate the 
Terai from the hills) social density is relatively sparse when people belonging to these two 
broad ecological and geographical regions are considered. This is contrary to the advocacy 
that tends to categorise the Nepalese population under one heavy bundle of Hinduism.
Worship of the same gods is a common feature, although in the hills Shaivite tradition is 
observed, whereas in the plains, Hinduism has more elements of Vaishnavite tradition. The 
diversity in the deities such as those representing or guarding jungles, rivers, homes, 
farmlands, grasslands etc. often differ. In a similar vein, rituals and religious practices 
across these two geographical and ecological divides are also quite different. Religious 
texts inscribed in Sanskrit languages are similar and Brahmin priests preside over religious 
functions on both occasions; however, the denominations are often different. The priest 
must be a Brahmin, a strict follower of books and a vegetarian for the legitimate acts of 
presiding in the Terai whereas in the hills, the standards have been compromised and the 
religious practices are rather moderate. In the hills the dietary practice may not be strictly 
upheld. In Terai, festivals like the Chhat are popularly celebrated, while in the hills these 
are unknown even though the lunar calendars have mentioned the dates and days or of 
similar festivals. Between Dashian and Tihar (Deepawali), festivals marking national 
holidays, Dashain is emphasised and more popularly celebrated in the hills while Deewali 
(Terai version of Tihar) is more enjoyed in the Terai. Festivals such as Holi is celebrated in 
the Terai with ritualistic preparations where the whole community participates irrespective 
of age, while in the hills it is approached differently; usually the youth engage in the
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festival and it is an occasion of enjoyment rather than a festival reflecting religious stories 
and shared myths.
The form of Hinduism that has evolved in the hills basically reflects an active interaction 
with Buddhism that is more liberal and accommodative. In addition to Buddhism, Bon, 
animism, shamanism and other ethnic religions and faiths have greatly shaped the nature of 
Hinduism practised in the hills. However, the reverse is true in the case of Terai. To 
safeguard the religion from Islam during the Mogul empire, the tendency of the Hindu 
society had been geared towards generating a protective strategy. This meant that a very 
strong faith along with more orthodox practices was deemed vital. Simultaneously the 
religious boundaries needed to be more rigid to minimise social intercourse whereby the 
social organisation could preserve its religious spirit in what it was perceived to be the 
purest form of the religion. Insular practices further reproduced religious orthodoxy. 
Imposed on this plane of religious conformity was the ascent of the colonialism in the 
Indian subcontinent. As cultural and religious consciousness formed part of the resistance 
to the colonial rule, the reinforcement of identities accelerated in different forms. The 
inclusive “Hindustani” identity embedded other identities, one of which was based on faith. 
Thus Hinduism was one of the religious platforms to provide the spiritual and physical 
energy guiding the common behaviour patterns of resistance. Thus the sense of faith and 
allegiance to religion created a form of celestial centre demanding unquestionable loyalty. 
Homeland then had been defined as Janani Janmabhoomischa swargadapi gariyasee 
(place of birth is divine and is equivalent to heaven). Religious affirmations, cultural 
assertiveness and orthodoxy of various forms were complementary to the larger package of 
political resistance during the anti-colonial uprisings as part of the pan-Indian 
consciousness.
Despite the Terai and hill population’s dominance over other forms of religion, the 
common sense of belonging, religious allegiance, shared values of Hinduism seems lacking 
among those living across the hills-Terai divide despite practising the same religion. 
However, Nepal had Malla kings introducing a caste system in Kathmandu valley and 
priests from India had been summoned to look after Pashupati Temple. This also links up 
to the Mogul umpire in India, from the influence of which the kings of Kathmandu Valley 
did not want their citizens to be ‘contaminated’ and this was achieved by way of 
orthodoxy. However, hill societies have gradually changed with the passage of time. The
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social intercourse, interdependency and social exchanges have had profound impacts on 
existing cultures, religions, languages and traditions. In their interactions, some languages 
have been made hybrids, broadening a few, while many have become extinct as part of the 
socio-cultural processes. What is more disputable is the idea behind nationalism. The hill 
demands separate and distinct identity from that of India while the Terai experiences 
stronger overlapping identity and culture affinity with the south. The overlapping and 
overarching forms of identity in terms of common boundaries and expected political 
loyalty are at odds with the hill nationality - a position, which the state of Nepal often has 
failed to comprehend.
In practical terms, inter-caste marriages are more frequently observed among the 
population in the hills while this is not the case in the Terai where the caste hierarchy 
dominates the existing forms of social or customary practices. Most importantly, cross­
marriages between people of Terai and that of the hills (among any caste-non-caste divide) 
would normally be extremely rare. As far as the religious loyalty is concerned, it has not 
been playing a vital role in the integration process with the exception of providing vitality 
to the interpretations of those that see the Hindus as being the rulers of Nepal, although 
Terai has never had that opportunity.
Dor Bahadur Bista (1967), suggested not more than twelve castes in the hill region while 
Gaige (1975) claims to have encountered 59 caste groups in the Terai. This sets a picture of 
the complex social structure of the Terai where, besides the major hierarchical caste 
groups, a keen competition of dynamic order has been active within the lower rungs of the 
social structure for ascertaining social superiority over other groups with similar social 
standing. Thus, it is common to hear of a blacksmith as being superior (more pure) than a 
goldsmith, although these and similar occupational groups have been categorised as being 
‘untouchables’ by the broader Hindu socio-religious codes. On the contrary, blacksmiths 
are regarded to be inferior to the goldsmiths in the hills (in the areas of my research).
The slow process of assimilation that was imbued through social interactions has stratified 
the non-caste groups into social hierarchies principally depending on the degree of 
Hinduization. More the degree of assimilation, higher would be the position of the 
individual(s) within the social ladder. This of course has been the case both in the Terai and 
well as in the hills. The original social status of indigenous peoples in the hills is above the
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untouchables and they are described as pani chaîne jat. However, in the Terai, the tribal or 
ethnic groups have been placed below the untouchables, and thus their social mobility is 
extremely low irrespective of the active processes of démocratisation and modernisation.
It is worth noting that cultural or ethnic consciousnesses possess egalitarian as well as 
conservative consequences. In Bijouri village as well as in Kathmandu, the outcome of 
ethnic and Medhesi consciousness possess long-term implications.
On the regional front, new developments appeared in their most visible forms during the 
historic elections to the constituent assembly of April 2008. The regional parties of the 
Terai have succeeded in presenting their issue to the voters in different fashions. With an 
attractive agenda of state structuring clustered around the concepts of self autonomy, 
proportional representation, reservations, recognition of regional languages and equal 
opportunity, the regional parties (local to the Terai) contested the elections. Unlike the 
1959 elections when none of the candidates from the Terai Congress had been elected, the 
2008 elections have been observed as a landmark victory for the cause of the Terai. Viewed 
from this standpoint, we can see the growth of identity consciousness and affirmation as a 
general trend after the 1990s. This trend also describes the level of ethnic consciousness as 
well, which are congruent with the rising level of education, communication and growth in 
the concept of modernisation. However, the rise of regionalism in Nepalese political 
practice has raised concerns among the nationalist forces that validate the trend as a 
damaging process that weakens national identity and national cohesion. Thus national 
unity, they argue, should be made the focus of the political processes at work. Seeking 
allegiance to the processes based on ethnicity, language, culture or religion, in the 
nationalist view, will in fact destroy the sense of being part of or belonging to a territorial 
state. The state nationalism versus the regional/ethnic nationalism have collided headlong 
where the position adopted by the Maobadi andolan has maintained its ambiguity at its 
best, shifting positions on similar contexts with regards to hill constituencies versus the 
Terai.
It is relevant to point out that the tendency of including the hill as well as the Terai 
population under one bundle based on either faith as Hindus, Buddhists or into even a 
broader category, as Aryans or Dravidians etc. bears no significant political validation as 
opined by the people interviewed. Janak Lai in Bijouri even went on to say:
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The government categories us as Hindus in its census just to show majority. 
However, we are neither treated as equal Hindus by the state nor the hill people. The 
hill people do not even know our festivals. Thus, there is no reason why we should be 
grouped together with the hill people.
These two broad categories of populations in either side of the Siwalik Hills actually 
possess the potential to share political allegations and constitutional loyalty. However, on 
the contrary, playing with the idea of faith and religion is to favour the state’s role of 
assuming dominance and its effort to legitimise its nationalist agenda. The idea of placing 
the Terai and hill populations under a Hindu banner stems from the perspectives of creating 
a majoritarian rule and distinguishing the others as minorities. This would establish a 
scenario where the non-Hindus would have to accept the social and political leadership of 
the majority. Despite the political aim, the tendency to group the plains people together 
with the hill population under a single Hindu umbrella has bred suspicion, animosity and 
sense of alienation among the Terai people regarding the state’s policy of uniformity. In 
their efforts to realise their true identity and with the state’s failure to include plains people 
in the national processes, Madhesis have united against exclusion and dominance. 
Likewise, the hill-centric policies have been viewed as biased, oppressive tools. The 
people’s war has played the most important role in shaping the Terai consciousness against 
the hill-centric state while at the same time, the Terai ethnic consciousness generated by the 
same movement has the tendency to reinforce the ethnic boundaries and weaken political 
affiliations that have been generated through the Terai consciousness. I insist that the Terai 
consciousness is a political category quite unlike the hills, where the consciousness is of the 
ethnic category.
6.5. Social stratification and caste system: Terai differs from hills
During the Rana regime, the state enforced the caste system as the basic organisational 
principle, freezing all possible avenues for mobility. The caste system was the most 
effective tool of governance, which also provided the effective traditional method of 
dominance and surveillance. The Terai, rather than being directly ruled by the central 
authority, was in fact just a recreational area with abundant land and forest recourses at the 
wanton disposal of the Rana rulers. Terai for them was distant colony for extortion and 
exploitation for personal gains.
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The national codes promulgated by Jung Bahadur Rana did not incorporate the caste 
structures of the Terai. Therefore the mechanisms of social, political and economic control 
were based on the traditional caste hierarchy, even stronger that that of the hills. This meant 
that the society remained closed where moral codes were more vigorously upheld. 
Although during the panchayat regime, ‘untouchablity’ was banned though legislation, its 
affect was minimal in terms of citizenship practice. The state apparatus and its rule failed to 
entrench themselves in the enclaves of the Terai, and the legislation at large was grossly 
ineffective in granting legal protection. In light of the failure to execute state legislations 
against the backdrop of caste rigidity, the state of affairs rather became a prelude to social 
inertia serving to protect its closed character. On the other hand, closed societies were in 
themselves barriers to legal codes or any new ideas that tended to disturb the traditionally 
maintained value systems.
It is obvious to a student of caste structure that the organising principle of society is based 
on a hierarchical social order underlying the notions of purity and pollution, applicable in 
either solitary confinement or during social roles of individuals. Thus, the strength of the 
caste boundaries and the rigidity of social hierarchy in the Terai are to a large degree a 
reflection of the social order operating in the adjourning states of India during the colonial 
occupation. Strong socio-religious codes and rigid forms of social organisations 
characterise the plains population. This characteristic in general drives the social attitude, 
behaviour and institutional forms that is clearly distinguished from the hill orientation. 
However, my intentions are not to say that hill is exempt from these traits; rather, my 
emphasis lies in the fact that there is a relatively weaker affiliation in the socio-religious 
codes and value systems in the hills as compared to that of the Terai, owing to the 
interaction of Hinduism with non-Hindu practices since the ancient times.
The constitution of 1990, rather than being a hindrance was a fair draft incorporating 
elements of democracy. For the first time in history, it had recognised the cultural, lingual 
and ethnic variations and had taken into account the differences in its classification scheme. 
For example, articles 11, 18, 26 and many others give impression of states’ assertive role in 
the protection of individual rights while recognising cultural diversity^^. The clauses also
Visit: http://www.asianlii.org/np/legis/const/199Q/index.html for details on the constitution of  
Nepal, 1990, retrieved: 11/08/2008
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stress the issues of national integration. However, the failure was in the state’s reluctance to 
execute these rights. The customary practices overshadowed the legal obligations and the 
state’s declarations such as “having common aspirations and united by allegiance to 
national independence and integrity of Nepal, the Nepalese people irrespective of religion, 
race, caste or tribe collectively constitute the nation” (article 2. constitution of Nepal 1990). 
Consequently, no headway was made where social exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, faith 
and religion operated grossly on societal levels. The Maobadi did not fall behind in 
tactically making these attributes the common features of their political agenda, striking the 
state and its acclaimed democratic exercises. “Shredded cloak of an old rudimentary 
regime,” announced by a pamphlet of the party during July of 2001, clearly politicised the 
efforts of the state as being treacherous and reactionary. The caste relationships were 
strongly rejected and what Nepal observed then was the rise of Dalit consciousness. The 
media reported many incidents of Dalits trying to enter temples forcefully as signs of 
dissent against social exclusion. The cultural and religious revolt, founded on the political 
platform of the Maodadi proved to be a powerful agency for demanding equality and 
justice.
Despite possessing similar caste characteristics, the caste-associated traditions and customs 
in the Terai and hills are different. The birth and death rituals are also practised differently 
according to the ascribed caste conduct or dharma. The ethnic groups choose their brides or 
grooms from their own groupings either within their own village or some other village. The 
distance could vary considerably. The plains people also follow similar practice. The 
groom or the bride in this case could be located in Nepal or in India, but of the same culture 
group. Thus, travelling far to establish family ties though marriage would involve limited 
rich and powerful families with considerably wide connections. The same scenario is 
prevalent among the hill migrants in the Terai. Marriage is within one’s own caste of hill 
category. Among more affluent individuals and families of considerable social standing, 
the tendency of seeking brides or grooms from cities or far off hills is a common practice. 
The cultural divide maintains its valour signifying a classic example that clearly defies the 
melting pot theory. International Crisis Group^^ points out “caste divisions govern social 
relations, play a significant role in forming political choices [...]” (July 9, 2007).
"In the most troubled corners of the world, Crisis Group has been the eyes, the ears, and the 
conscience of the global community. Its mix of field-based analysis, well-reasoned policy
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Along with the caste structure that influences specific cultural patterns particular to making 
choices, the society in the Terai also bears testimony to the evolving political trend as well. 
Plains people had demonstrated a democratic tilt even during the panchayat era while in the 
hills it had been roughly divided between the monarchical, liberal and leftist ideologies. 
The strength and rigidity in the caste structure in the Terai was in itself one of the forces 
that tended to reject the Marxist ideology and egalitarianism, as the messages derived from 
these concepts were antithetical to the caste based hierarchy. Crisis Group agrees to this 
fact stating that the “caste has an important role in Terai politics. The failure of radical left 
movements is attributed to the entrenched caste structure that makes it difficult it to 
mobilise lower castes in significant numbers” (July 2007:5).
The situation as it stands is that the hill and the Terai populations often consider themselves 
different peoples with distinct identities, separate experiences, and with dissimilar 
heritages. The idea and motivation behind hill supremacy although evident during the Rana 
oligarchy, was designed and reoriented into a modem political concept during the 
monarchical regime. The national symbols that created the essential psychological settings 
for nurturing the sense of nationalism represented the hill scenarios rather then being 
inclusive to accommodate the Terai settings. The nationalist agenda even addressed the 
provision for a national dress that was alien to the plains people. The ideals of hill 
supremacy were justified on myths of bravery and civic virtue that buttressed the fervour of 
nationalism and placed the hill population above and ahead of the plains people. The small 
nation psychology or the nationalist desire to claim a superior national identity pushed the 
regime into monism and uniformity
The cultural, ethnic, lingual and territorial barriers among different social categories in the 
Terai still remain rigid. As a result, distinct division and clear separation is apparent despite 
the liberal political environment. The shift in the political trend in Terai towards the radical 
left following the 1990s is associated with the Maobadi andolan that has provided the 
necessary avenue for the articulation of Madhesi grievances. In an interview with a weekly
recommendations, and high-level advocacy is a winning combination." William J. Clinton, former 
President o f the United States, 5 March 2007
Visit: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1205&l=l for details about the International 
Crisis Group, retrieved: 11/01/2008
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portal, Nepali Sandesh, Mr. Prachanda, the General Secretary of Nepal Communist Parry 
(Maoist) said^ "^ :
People have faith in us because they believe that we alone can bring positive changes. 
When we put forth the demand for constituent assembly, the parties in parliament 
opposed us; as we demanded for a republic setup they called us terrorists; when we 
called for federalism they were busy putting price tags on our heads.
Although Prachanda is quite eloquent in this regard, there are reasons why the Terai has 
been less eager to adopt a radical ideology. Effect of the social stratification and the caste 
system has been to promote dependency in vertical as well as in the horizontal 
relationships. Since the caste structures are stronger with strict moral codes for adherence, 
claiming for egalitarian values become a risky affair in the Terai. And secondly, since the 
caste and ethnic based exploitation and oppressions are more acute, more dependant and 
vulnerable, ethnic consciousness lags behind considerably as to challenge the norms of the 
social organization in an organised form. As a result, radical ideologies are less welcomed. 
Although I have introduced the idea of Madhesi consciousness and ethnic conscious earlier 
and also said that these are contradictory processes, the trend of the Terai movement, 
however, has been established by the elites and upper caste groups. By its very nature, the 
Madhesi consciousness has been expressed as an anti-state forum claiming for its ‘right to 
self-determination’. I have discussed this issue further in Chapter 7.
6.6 Migration: opportunity and apprehension
During his extensive research report of 1975, Gaige elaborates: “ if, we assume that the five 
districts of the survey represent the entire Terai with fair accuracy, majority of the migrant 
are, in fact, of plains origin: 59 percent of plains origin, 35 percent of hill origin and the 
remaining 6 percent tribal indigenous to the Terai” (Gaige, 1975:73). As of 2001, the 
demographic canvas has changed quite significantly. The population of plains people (the 
Terai castes) stands at 40.9 percent while hill migrants compose 33 percent; janajati, 
indigenous to the Terai at 18.2 percent while the Dalits exhibit a fair proportion of 7.9 
percent of the total Terai population.
The process of migration in the course of nationhood has had social, political and economic 
impacts wherever these movements have occurred significantly. According to William
^ Source: Europe Ko Nepali Patra, April 8 2008
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Kirkpatrik and Francis Hamilton, providing perhaps the earliest account of the Terai have 
written that “a majority of the inhabitants of the eastern Terai were plain tribal, Tharus 
throughout and Rajbamsi, Mechis, and Gangais in the far eastern Terai” (Gaige, 1975:56). 
The past records are sufficient to explain that, besides the populations indigenous to the 
Terai, the rest and larger proportion is relatively new. The two tier migration beginning 
from the north Indian states was followed later by the migration from the hills that have 
dynamically changed the demographic composition of the inhabitants besides bringing 
about readjustments and transformations in those cultures during these decades if not 
centuries. The growth of identity politics has also been the means to separation and 
exclusion establishing differences which in some instances was not fought over in the past.
With the northwardly migration of plains Hindus and Muslims from the Indo-Gangetic 
plains of the south, the indigenous population moved northwards deeper into the forest. The 
displacement was not a straightforward and immediate event; rather the general movement 
was very gradual. The Tharus, once the dwellers of the Terai had steadily been pushed all 
the way to the North of the Siwalik Hills in western Nepal. In places such as Dang Valley 
or Chitwan, there is a large proportion of this population. Mahesh Chaudhari argues, “The 
owners of the vast plains of Terai, the Tharus, became enslaved by migrants” (2004:109). 
Gaige (1975:63) explains the general pattern of migration in the Himalayan foothills:
The balance between population and available resources must have narrowed quickly 
for the settlers in the dry and inhospitable western Himalayas, pushing them eastward 
into less densely populated and less dry hill region. This process -  migration, 
settlement, gradual overpopulation, agriculture deterioration, famine, migration -  
produced an kind of Malthusian peristalsis, pushing people farther and farther east 
along the hill ranges.
The migration in the Terai from the hills can be categorised into three forms ranging from 
permanent, semi-permanent to seasonal migration. The permanent migrations were in 
general self-motivated based on the difficulties associated with the hill livelihoods. The 
pull factors principally included, among others, the availability of resources (fertile land) 
and dreams for better lives. The semi-permanent migration to the Terai has been a common 
phenomenon even to the present. The hill people migrate into the Terai in the hope of being 
engaged in some sort of an employment, while many travel all the way to India as either 
agricultural workers or workers in industries, mines and urban dwellings. The period of 
seasonal migration could range from couple of months to a period of few years. Seasonal
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migration is usually significant during plantation and harvest seasons and the male or the 
female migrant would normally work in the Terai for a couple of months to a year.
During the panchayat regime, the government encouraged settlement in the Terai, with a 
view to intermix the pahade population with that of the Terai. The policy was 
implemented after the eradication of malaria through a joint programme launched by the 
World Health Organisation and the US government during the 1960s. In Dang Valley, 
particularly in the Bijouri VDC, many Chhetri, Bahun and Magar families have migrated 
on permanent basis from the adjourning hills, chiefly from Salyan, Pyuthan, Rukum and 
Rolpa. Migration from the hills to Dang valley has been a common affair in these recent 
years owing to the Maobadi andolan, although it had been an ongoing phenomenon since 
the earlier times. Among the other push factors, declining food and social security, loss of 
productivity, depleting order of energy resources such as fire wood and fodder, natural 
disasters such as land-slides, earthquakes and possibility of unknown natural calamities of 
other sorts have been the most common reasons promoting outmigration from the hills.
The state crafted resettlement programmes that have been criticised heavily by the Terai 
intellectuals have not been successful projects either. The encroachment of the hill migrants 
into the jungles and forested area of the Terai has been retaliated against viciously by the 
state on number of instances. However, the state elite, rather than from the concerns of 
social or cultural chemistry of the plains, was keener on upholding its centralised authority 
irrespective of the pros and cons associated with the migration programmes. During the 
Jhoda incident of 1972, dozens of lives were lost when the state responded with heavy 
handedness towards thousands of hill settlers who were clearing forest in Jhapa district. 
The military was mobilised to control the unrest, and readily resorted to the use of 
excessive force. The Jhoda andolan has been understood today as a “wave of forest 
occupation for settlement by landless people in eastern Terai (Karki, 2002:212). “As the 
landless people cleared considerable area for forceful settlement, the government retaliated 
with extreme violence (Gautam, 2004:33).
It is difficult to establish a clear divide between the hill migrants and plain migrants as 
evidently as Gaige states: “the majority of migrants from the hills are high-caste people, 
whereas the majority of plains migrants are of low caste” (1975:74). This certainly was the 
case during the mid-seventies; however, at present the situation is quite different. The
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migrants from the hills are poor as well as rich. Among the rich there are those with 
considerable resources, including the social capital and political attachments, whereas 
many are just ordinary folks drained out from the difficulties associated with the hill 
livelihoods.
Similarly, the more recent migrants from India also show variations with respect to their 
social status and economic standing. The poor make up the bulk of the migrants. Rich 
people with investment capacity and also those with cross border business have tended to 
settle in the Nepal Terai. Doing business from either side of the border does not pose any 
constraint. David Gellner^^ suggests that “the border with India is therefore a border that is, 
for many purposes, merely notional.”
Moreover, as the links of these businessmen based on cultural, educational, political, 
lingual, kin or familial ties with the Indian populations across the border are secure, it 
hardly matters from which side of the border business is conducted. In connections to 
business, smuggling along the border has been an outstanding issue unresolved by both 
governments, which frequently appear during disputes. At times, India has gone to the 
extent of mounting allegations on Nepal on grounds of Nepal having given sanctuary to 
terrorist elements.
With the rapid change in the demographic composition of the population, the social, 
cultural, political and economic equations are being redrawn. “The large-scale migration 
from the hills resulted in massive deforestation” (Jaghrit Nepal, 2007:5). In the same report 
submitted to the World Bank the authors’ argument that “The greatest losers have been the 
ethnic nationalities of the Madesh who lost their endemic rights on the national trinity of 
their sacrosanct jal, jangal and jamin (water, forest and land), heritage [...]” (ibid), is an 
important claim. The mass migration besides the changing cultural equations has had a 
severe impact on forest livelihoods, especially on the more vulnerable section of the Terai 
communities. The usual scenario is that education, experience, caste category, and 
available resources normally determine the status of an individual emigrant and the 
possible role that any migrant would play. Businessmen, rich families and men
Source: http://www.epw.org.in/epw/up1oads/articles/10625.pdf). 
Retrieved: 11/08/2008
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representing the affluent class dominate the rest of the society as elsewhere and capital 
does neither distinguish between social hierarchies nor the caste/non-caste divides. 
However, after the rise of identity politics, the separation between “pahade” and “Madhesi” 
has become a more common feature in daily discourses. Salient social divide created along 
the identity boundaries has strengthened significantly and clashes have occurred between 
these identities in recent times. Crisis Group (2007:12) reports a similar case:
The first flash point was in Nepalgunj, where the NFS had called a strike. The 
administration tried to block the march; at the same time, pahadis attacked MAdhesi- 
owned shops in the heart of the town. There were reports of retaliation by Madhesis 
but pahadi violence and police complicity were captured on camera (9 July).
The problem derives from the state’s position of neutrality with respect to the Madhesi 
population. It is comprehensible in its day-to-day affairs that the state is driven with hill 
psychology and national mindset prejudiced against the Madhesis. Consequently, it 
appeared during the event in Nepagunj that Crisis Group had reported. The spree of 
violence took its toll as transport blockades choked off Kathmandu valley from supplies, 
causing shortage and scarcity of even the most essential goods including the petroleum 
products, and medicine. Then only did the rulers in Kathmandu realise the urgency of the 
crisis.
The situation of hill migrants in the Terai is not a happy scenario either. The poor are the 
ones to suffer the most. The hill migrants face disadvantage in Terai, which should be 
accepted as a general rule. However, being that Kathmandu identifies with the hill migrants 
rather than treating the plains people as equal citizens, the impact is seen in the strained 
relationship between these populations. The atmosphere of mistrust embedded into the 
sense of ‘otherness’ is not an uncommon event. However, the Madhesi societies during the 
later sequence of trouble have demonstrated a mature stance by carefully avoiding the 
possibility of a blown up communal violence or ethnic cleansing by directing their 
movements against the state. Although few incidents relating to vandalism, deaths and 
intimidation have been reported, on the whole, the Madhesi leadership has demonstrated an 
efficient politics. The armed ultra-right extremist factions operating under of the pretext of 
Terai liberation have been a serious concern to the paharis as well as the Madhesis.
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Being disadvantaged is an intrinsic feature to minority positions and operates on every 
society around the globe, and Nepal Terai is no exception. Language barriers, cultural 
differences and conditions associated with adaptability are examples of difficulties, just to 
name a few. The migrant hill Dalits face additional forms of disadvantages due to their 
inferior social positions and end up with an outright social exclusion by both the hill and 
Madhesi caste categories.
Land confiscated during the ‘land reforms and development programmes’ of the sixties and 
seventies were mainly distributed among the landless of the hills. This general policy was 
pursed for the Terai. The idea of distributing land in the Terai, exclusively among the 
landless people of the hill origin, was embedded in the concept of hill nationalism. Rather 
than with the sole aim of creating hill majority that most Madhesis criticise, the 
resettlement programmes were drawn from the perspectives of internal security with the 
objectives of building national identity through what Gaige (1975) calls as ‘Nepalisation’ -  
a vehicle and process to national integration. Jargit Nepal, for instance, asserts, “In 
Kapilvastu and Jhapa districts, the excess land of Tharu landholders were appropriated by 
the government and distributed among the fresh arrivals from the hills [...]”. The bias 
persisting in this policy has not been sufficiently criticised by national academics although 
the issue has been raised by the Terai elite and the regional leadership constantly, despite 
them using waxing and waning tones to suit the differing political scenarios.
Similarly, small-scale resettlement projects were justified on the grounds of relieving 
population pressure in the severely overcrowded hill region while on the political fronts the 
state successfully used these arguments as vehicles to spread the message of national unity 
and integration. The security threat was expected to be minimised with the resettlement of 
the ex-army personal and people of hill origin in different regions of the Terai bordering 
the Mahendra Highway, the only highway that connects Nepal from the east to the west. 
Despite the fact that Nepal has always been cautions over its state of sovereignty and 
independence, the open border remains far from being an issue of unilateral jurisdiction. 
The state’s political and ideological standpoint has always been wary of the 1800 km-long 
open border and equally frustrating is the prospect of economic dependency as they 
compromise the concepts of sovereignty and nationalism for Nepal.
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Furthermore, Nepal has always been sensitive to the problems of Nepalese emigrants 
elsewhere and has readily accepted them in case of crisis when they had to return to their 
land of origin. In many of these instances as when the Nepali speaking populations have 
fled from Meghalaya, Manipur, Burma or Bhutan, Nepal has always welcomed the 
Diasporas and the following resettlement programmes have been work out in different 
regions of the Terai. The fact that Nepal has been sensitive towards its nations is well 
detailed by Michael Hutt (1990:140) who writes:
Curiously, although they may never have resided in Nepal themselves, it is usually to 
that country that Nepali-speaking refugees come to seek sanctuary, whether they have 
come from Meghalaya, Manipur or Bhutan, and Nepal has usually accepted them. 
Ultimately, being Nepali without Nepal has often proved impossible, and the 
diaspora’s bond with the motherland, however tenuous it may be, is often renewed in 
time of crisis.
The act of extending sympathy and indentifying with the refugees has promoted the moral 
standing of the state; however, in contrast, the state has neglected the legal and moral right 
of the Terai citizens to be treated as equals. Michael Hutt’s argument is concerned with the 
Nepalese people of pahari background. On the reverse, the state has refused to issue 
citizenship certificates to a vast number of Madhesi people living in the Terai. Unjust, 
partial and exclusionary practices of the state have created the congenial environment 
furnishing identity politics at the state-Terai level.
Having discussed the issues underlying citizenship crisis in the Terai, I will move on to 
Chaper 7 where I have raised the debate on Terai resistance and local politics vis-à-vis the 
hill-centric state and its unitary policies.
6.7. Conclusion
The salient features behind the rise of identity politics in the Nepal Terai are indeed 
complex and problematical. The unique nature of diversity, geopolitical location, social 
stratification and culture alongside the inconveniences associated with migration need to 
be taken into account by the Nepali state. The anti-state Terai consciousness is against the 
hill-centric ideology that has strengthened at the moment when the state is at its weakest. 
The Terai andolan and the inherent politics of identity are premised on two distinct 
levels. At the micro levels the indigenous and ethnic consciousness is at work while at the
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national level, Madhesi consciousness is overriding. The indigenous and ethnic 
consciousness claims for ethnic assertion, identity and recognition, whilst the Madhesi 
consciousness aspires for regional or territorial autonomy as its ultimate form of identity. 
Within these two levels of identity claims, the ethnic category is in conflict with the 
Madhesi consciousness. However, although the pan-Madhesi movement at present has 
surfaced as a strong force negating the state-centric ideology, the ‘ethnic reawakening’ 
will continue to furnish the identity politics at the grassroots unless equal citizenship is 
realised at the local level. At the national level the problem derives from the state’s 
position of neutrality with respect to the Madhesi population. It is comprehensible in its 
day-to-day affairs that the state is driven with hill psychology and national mindset 
prejudiced against the Madhesis.
Democratic polity has allotted space for democracy and liberalism, however to 
accommodate some of the outstanding issues of identity claims, the state has gingerly 
drafted some legal basis for group rights. The cultural, ethnic, lingual and territorial 
barriers among different social categories in the Terai still remain rigid. As a result, 
distinct division and clear separation is apparent despite the liberal political environment. 
With the rapid change in the demographic composition of the population, the social, 
cultural, political and economic equations are rapidly being redrawn.
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Terai resistance and local politics: a complicated affair
7.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, I have argued that the identity politics in the Terai characteristically is a 
two-tier phenomenon as mentioned in Chapter 6: One, premised on the elite driven anti- 
state pan-Madhesi citizenship claims and two, the indigenous and ethnic assertiveness and 
demand for recognition in the local and national contexts. I have further insisted that the 
complexity surrounding the Terai andolan is compounded by the cleavages present in local 
identities, indigenous and ethnic constructs. I have raised some of the outstanding issues 
that complicate the formation of equal citizenship. Although the elite and higher caste 
Madhesis, as part of the pan-Madesi consciousness have, claimed for eak madesh, eak 
pradesh (one Madesh, one territory) and succeeded in their demand for preferential 
treatment on issues such as reservations, the growing ethnic assertiveness and the 
burgeoning politics of recognition at the grass roots is more concerned with the issues of 
equality and justice at the micro levels. The Terai autonomy in a real sense would not 
amount to significant political liberty and freedoms for Dalits, indigenous and ethic 
communities when prejudice, dominance, and social exclusion continue. In this situation, 
the essence of equal citizenship would be completely lacking.
In this chapter, I have focused on the local issues debating that the identity politics at the 
grassroots has a different orientation and different meaning from those of the Madhesi 
elites.
After the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Terai region gradually woke up to the 
revolutionary calls from the people’s war, which was commenced in 1996. Long standing 
problems in association with the influence of the Maobadi andolan became a powerful 
contrivance in creating a strong alliance for resistance. The historical grievances held 
against the hill-centric politics were openly addressed by the contending groups and as a 
consequence, the Maobadis’ influence widened and deepened to be experienced even in the
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remotest parts of the rural Terai. The levels of mass mobilisation and the degree of 
militancy had grown unprecedentedly by 2006. The democratic era, more symbolised by 
the Maobadi movement, proved to be the congenial environment necessary in delivering 
the thrust that reached its peak during 2007. Against the backdrop of political strife and 
volatility, including the failure of the national leadership to manage the state, the Terai 
movement made its headway into the national scenario. As the precondition for the dissent 
had piled up since the 1950s, the agitation required only a spark to set it off. The April 
people’s movement provided the opportunity when the state was at its weakest. Moreover, 
the Maoists agenda carefully included these grievances which in the short run appeared 
extremely beneficial to the movement, enabling the party to gain its firm hold in the region 
which otherwise had been unresponsive to the leftist politics in the past. As the events 
unfolded, politicisation of Terai demands favoured Maobadis’ position and the andolan 
succeeded in reaching out to the Madhesi population.
Besides the demands over the right to self-determination, autonomy, including the language 
issues, the claims to citizenship certificates by the Madhesis has created renewed and 
strong in-group solidarity against the state. Despite gaining national prominence, the Terai 
andolan is not devoid of its own internal conflicts and complications. The indigenous 
peoples of the Terai have claimed for their own cultural identities and expressed their non­
willingness to accept the Madhesi identity; and further have declined to accept the one 
Pradesh one Madesh slogan of the Madhesis. On the other front, besides the claims for 
self-determination, politics over the use of the Hindi languages has remained controversial, 
which the state is reluctant to grant. Madhesi elites claim Hindi language as means to their 
identity, difference and recognition. However, the indigenous peoples like Binod 
Choudhari that I had interviewed in Dang are not willing to recognise Hindi as the bridging 
language. He insists:
Local languages such as Tharu, Maithali, Bhojpuri or Awadi besides other indigenous 
language should be granted preference. This would reflect diversity. Hindi language 
is not any of our language and in addition, the Terai population can communicate in 
Maithali, Bhojpuri, Awadi, Tharu and other languages very well just as we have been 
doing. We are multilingual as well. I don’t think the idea of introducing Hindi 
language would be a wise decision.”
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The avenues of resistance and local politics in the Terai are extremely complicated. It is 
largely because of the implausible diversity in language, culture, history, ethnicity, heritage 
and experiences that the population possesses, and partly because of the differing interests 
and needs. These interests often collide with one another, creating the sense of insecurity 
and apprehension. It is clear that this population is not homogeneous either. Indigenous 
populations along with the hill migrants do not identify themselves with the term ‘Madhesi’ 
and consider themselves as being different. The indigenous populations, having 
considerable demographic size, insist for their own federations outside of the ‘Madesh’ 
terminology and view the Madhesis as well as the hill migrants as encroachers of their 
territory. The hill migrants with relatively better livelihoods have been regarded as 
intruders by the Madhesis. All of these different interest groups possess their own agenda 
of resistance vis-à-vis the state.
7.2. Citizenship in the plains
My debate over the issue of citizenship involves the issues of rights and participation, more 
than the limited matters involving the ownership of certificates or the legal provisions that 
define citizenship under the conditions of unequal power distribution. This being the case, 
the standoff between the Madhesis and the Nepali state regarding the citizenship 
certificates is another complicated affair. From the point of view of the state, “distribution 
of citizenship certificates is no a problem among the hill populations as all the residents of 
hill origin are easily recognised; on the contrary, with the Terai population it is difficult” 
said a local development officer in Dang. The overlapping identities and cultural closeness 
including physical appearance with respect to the south has made it extremely difficult for 
the state to differentiate between Nepalese citizens and non-citizens. This argument is 
based on the facts associated with the free movement of populations across the 1800km- 
long Nepal-India border. Nepalese citizenship model founded on the principles of jus 
sanguinis bears overarching shortcomings when the issues of migration are concerned.
Describing the citizenship model of Nepal during the early phases of the Panchayat era, 
Gaige (1975:88) asserts, “Hill people were given preference over plains people settled in 
Terai, so that the plains people were relegated to a second class status.” The condition 
described by Deepa Gupta, a history student and an interviewee in Dang reflects a similar 
tone that Gaige observed in the early sixties. In an interview, she said:
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The paharis think that they are Nepalese and we are not. We are seen as Indians 
although we have been living in this country for centuries. The hill centric ideology 
has been harmful for the unity of the country. We should all be regarded as equals 
and the citizenship should truly represent this sentiment.
The hill-centric ideology that Deepa has mentioned is valid, much of which I have 
discussed throughout this research. The situation of an open border and the lack of data on, 
and management of, the border and immigration has contributed to the state’s psychology 
of suspicion when Madhesi population is concerned. When I began this research, more than 
two hundred thousand Madhesis had openly claimed for Nepalese citizenship, whereas 
Kathmandu viewed their claims as being invalid. However, after the 2006 movement, the 
state declares to have extended citizenship certificates to all. This decision did not prevail 
without a strong criticism either. Concerning this initiative, a central member of the 
Maobadi party reacted strongly by arguing that, [It] is “a matter of shear madness to extend 
Nepali citizenship to more than two hundred thousand Madhesis without any investigation 
and study. Moreover, the process was not planned out categorically.”
The historic account of the Terai has been raised by some researchers to explain the hill- 
centric nation building process. “This is understandable when one remembers that the Terai 
was viewed before 1951 more as a colony than an integrated part of a modem nation-state 
(Gaige, 1975:88). Although the view over the Terai has changed, especially as it has 
proved to be the economic backbone of the state, the sentiment of seeing the Madhesis as 
second-class citizens has been claimed to be the same. This sentiment persists even after 
the 1990s and much of what Gaige saw is eventually tme even today. He writes, 
“Culturally different from the hill people and geographically isolated from Kathmandu, 
plains people living in the Terai were considered to be at least quasi-foreigners” (ibid).
7.3. Conflict in the terminology and discourse
The people living in the Terai are called Terai basi (those living in the Terai) in the formal 
sense. This population was also referred to as ‘Madhise’ or ‘Marshya’ in a derogatory 
manner by the hill people while the plains people refer to the latter as 'pahade', which was 
as disparaging in its use. The term Madhesi (note the difference in the spelling) has been 
chosen by this population to refer to themselves. This term implies to those people living in 
Madesh, meaning madhya desh (mid-land or middle country in Sanskrit). It follows; 
therefore, that Madhesi is a common term denoting the residents of Madhesh. Today,
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Madhesh signifies the southern plains (Terai) of Nepal. Furthermore, Madhesi rather than 
being an ethnic group or a particular race is a generic term referring to the cultural groups 
living in the Terai or the southern plains. However, the hill migrants in the Terai exclude 
themselves from being identified as Madhesi or are excluded from the membership and 
thus are ranked with the pahade or pahari. The culture of non-recognition of the paharis in 
Madhesh is similar to the situation of non-recognition by the paharis to the Madhesis in the 
hills. However, the hills have an extremely low Madhesi population as compared to that of 
the Terai, which is clearly observed through the pattern and the size of migration that I 
have discussed.
The contradiction that prevails between these two sets of population is extremely complex. 
The terms, pahade(s) or pahari(s) apply to all the migrants of hill origin irrespective of 
their caste, class or gender or to the non-caste migrants such as the hill ethnic nationalities. 
The story is similar in the hills, the paharis see all people from the Terai as Madhesis (with 
the exception of those of hill origin), irrespective of the social diversity and non­
homogeneity that this population upholds. On both the accounts, the problem stemming 
from non-recognition has had immense impact by creating social deficit on the possible 
political motivation for building cross-cultural civic societies. The hill caste as well as the 
non-caste groups including the ethnic population that have migrated to the Terai express 
their experience of being alienated by the caste and non-caste plains people of the Terai 
region. The contradiction within the caste hierarchy and the challenge that this complex 
Hindu socio-religious structure imposes on non-caste cultural groups and the indigenous 
communities, features the overall intricacy of existing societies in the Teria. The fact of hill 
migration to the Terai exceeds the complexity that is otherwise observed in the hills where 
northbound migration from the plains is minimal.
In the later political events commencing from 2005 (as the Terai movement gained 
momentum), the Madhesi intellectuals have tried to define the term more elaborately. 
Although previously the term ‘Madhesi’ would have referred only to the non-paharis that 
spoke the local languages, at present this term has been redefined to include all people 
living in the Terai. Thus, Hindus, Muslims, Jains, and the rest of the faiths and tribal groups 
are argued by the Madhesi elites to be included within the terminology. However, the 
indigenous communities of the Terai such as the Tharus, Rajbanshies, Danawars have 
strongly rejected the Madhesi identity and have claimed for their own indigenous identity
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stating that they are the indigenous populations and thus are distinct from Madhesis who in 
fact are the emigrants that have partly uprooted them from their own natural environments. 
The contradictions among different interest groups appear to have grown since the 
demands for the Terai autonomy were put forth by the Madhesi elites. The demand for 
autonomy also entails the idea of eak Madesh eak predesh (one Madesh one territory). 
Madhesi elites claim that the demand is unanimous verdict of the Terai. However, the 
indigenous populations do not agree to eak Madesh eak predesh and insist that they should 
have the rights to their own federation by the name of ‘Tharuwan’.
In the post-conflict scenario, where proportional representation and reservations of the 
Madhesis has been endorsed by the democratic government, the share of ethnic 
nationalities, that form 17% of the population, remains uncertain. Further to this, the policy 
of representation and reservation should essentially entail power relations with regard to 
other communities to enhance their cultural security. It is often the case that when such 
provisions do not incorporate all the sections of the society, cultural disempowerment is 
consequential, offsetting the power relations even further with the tendency of 
strengthening the forces of hegemony and control. At the current standing, the indigenous 
peoples of Terai and Dalits demonstrate a general fear that the ruling elite and upper caste 
Madhesis will inevitably be more privileged through these policies disempowering them 
even further.
7.4. Conflict in the state initiatives
The migration from north to south has been phenomenal, following the eradication of 
malaria as I have stated in Chapter 2. Besides voluntary migrations, state planned 
settlements have also been the cause of grievance and therefore, the sources of conflicts. 
For Janak Lai in Bijouri:
The state sponsored resettlement programmes in the Terai have been criticised by the 
local leadership, as a conspiracy to destroy their culture; however, the migration from 
the Indian side of the border, as the state sees it, is more harmful to the efforts of 
integration. This is a true analysis; however, both the hill people as well as the 
Madhesis have encroached upon our land. We are the indigenous peoples and we 
have lost everything. Our plight also needs to be stressed.
The indigenous peoples have been affected the most by the migrations and state-sponsored 
programmes of resettlement. The impact can broadly be categorised into three categories:
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one, the impact from the mass migrations from the northern states of India; two, from the 
migration of hill people without state’s direct involvement, and three, from the state 
sponsored resettlement programmes. With rising claims for recognition of the Madhesh and 
the Madhesis, the indigenous populations have also indicated their concerns. They have 
stood for their own federation. The heightened levels of cultural and political consciousness 
among the Madhesis, has imbued strong in-groups solidarity among the indigenous peoples 
of the Terai. Hari Yadhav, a resident of Kathmandu said in an interview:
“The state has been unjust. It has sponsored programmes of resettlement and favoured 
the paharis. Although many Madhesis are landless peasants, it always has been the 
hill people that benefit from these programmes to resettle in the Terai.”
The resentment is quite strong among the Madhesi elites who see their space being given 
to the hill migrants. Since Madhesi is the largest cultural category, its voice is strong. On 
the contrary, the indigenous peoples seeing Madhesis as the intruders express similar 
bitterness when politics is discussed. The strengthening of group boundaries between 
divergent ethnic groups, if centred on the theme of negation, would mean subsequent 
erosion of recognition and respect that is vital for divergent societies to coexist.
7.5. Question of indigenous peoples
The question of the indigenous peoples in the Terai, forms another parcel of complication 
in the politics of Terai. While the Madhesis have demanded regional autonomy, federalism, 
Hindi language, proportional representation from the state, “the indigenous people of the 
same region have regarded them in general as the colonisers of indigenous communities 
that since the past have displaced them of their land, water, and ancestral territories” 
(Chaudhari, 2007:287). As a general case in the Terai where multicultural/multiethnic 
societies exist, the hegemony of Hindu culture and social way of life can be clearly 
observed, although the degree of Hinduization is different in different settings. In Dang 
valley, the process of acculturation among indigenous peoples is quite significant 
depending on the variables such as education, social and political awareness, access to 
resources and proximity with the elites. The traits of cultural hegemony are self-evident.
The Maobadi, after their ascendency to power (when they joined the government) saw a 
gradual decline in their support from different groups of the Terai region. It was viewed 
that they were being let down by the Terai movement as it gradually developed into a form
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of independent movement where many Terai groups had emerged. The Maobadi faced a 
political dilemma while they joined the seven-party alliance. At the initial phase of the 
Terai outburst, the party tried its level best to suppress the movement through the 
government security apparatus. “The Maobadi feared that their agenda of self 
determination, federalism, proportional representation etc. were being seized by the 
sprouting Terai organisations,” commented a Madhesi activist in the UK. The Maobadis 
analysed these later developments as a nuisance to their achievement and tried to brush 
them away.
Along these political developments that were mostly outside the Maobadi control, the 
seven party alliance, (with Maobadi as one of the member parties), resorted to different 
tactics regarding the Terai moment. For example, they ignored the demands on the one 
hand and on the other, labelled the Terai factions as “puppets of external forces and 
supporters of regression” (Maobadi pamphlet of December 2007). The tactic was to gain 
support through the nationalist stand.
The term “Madesh” is, in a colloquial reference to the Nepal Terai. However, the 
indigenous peoples of the Terai such as the Tharus and Dhimals see a folly in the use of the 
word Madhesh. Asserting that they are the indigenous peoples of Terai, they have argued 
that to refer to the Terai region as “Madesh” would mean to accept the prehistoric city 
located in the proximity of Narbada River that neither coincides with the modem history 
nor the geography of Nepal. A university lecturer and a leader, Mahesh Chaudhary 
(2004:278), writes:
Those that claim Terai region to be formally recognized as Madesh (mid-land) are 
either Indians or migrants of Indian origin. No Nepali nationalist will agree to permit 
the Terai of Nepal be relocated (through the use of the terminology) in the Indian 
soils of prehistoric Madhya-desha.
The arguments that the indigenous peoples of the Terai have raised are driven from 
nationalist viewpoint. “There are Madhesis in Nepal, but there is no Madhesh (madhya- 
desha) and the effort of Madhesi elite to base their arguments on some Puranic myths may 
possess some hidden agenda” (ibid). The opposition of the indigenous peoples to the claims 
of Madhesis to carve out the complete Terai belt into one Madesh autonomous region is a 
reflection of the experience of being oppressed and exploited by the Madhesis. Autonomy
172
in any real sense would not amount to much political liberty and freedom when the same 
prejudice, dominance, and exclusion continue. In this situation, the essence of equal 
citizenship would be completely lacking.
7.5.1. On reservation policy
Since the endorsement of the reservation policy, the oppressed and indigenous 
communities have been expressing their dissent arguing that the policy is flawed. 
Madhesis have been granted reservation in different areas such as education and 
employment. The message that the indigenous and oppressed peoples in the Terai are 
trying to get across is that “these rights in the form of reservations have minimal chances of 
trickling down as most of the Madhesi elites would have all the opportunity”, said Binod 
Choudhari in an interview. What this implies is that the oppressed, Dalits, the indigenous 
populations or those in the lower rungs in the social stratification would never have the 
opportunity of enjoying them. Binod Chaudhari further emphasized:
With the current policies of reservation in the name of Madhesis, we have been 
systematically marginalized. We do not believe that populations excluded by the 
Madhesis so far possess any possibility of benefiting from such a policy. We have 
been minimized.
Thus, under unequal power distribution, the paradigm of social equality does not function. 
Besides, the term Madhesi denotes collectivities rather than an organic whole with different 
lingual groups, principally the Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadi speakers etc. followed by the 
Dalits and indigenous peoples of the Terai. All these groups have their stratified positions. 
The prevalent prejudice, exclusion and situation of non-recognition among these divergent 
groups has sustained despite the pan-Madhesi consciousness. This means that the higher 
caste groups and elites possess the necessary status and access to resources including the 
provisions of reservations. On the reverse, the position of Dalits and indigenous peoples of 
the Terai speaks of deprival, exclusion and exploitation. The idea of positive discrimination 
is welcoming; however, when the target group is of an enormously divergent category, 
such as the Madhesi, the arguments put by people like Binod is indeed valid.
7.5.2. Growing consciousness among the people of the Terai
There has been a renewed sense of identity assertion among the Tharus in Bijouri village 
following the 1990s. They readily discuss their history, culture and language during festive
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seasons or in community mass meetings. The general story is repeated when they 
empathetically assert themselves as being the descendents of Buddha. The general folk 
dances have been interpreted in similar vein. Tharus assert that they were the dominant 
residents of the Terai, long before the advent of modem societies. Furthermore, as evidence 
to this claim, there is a strong belief among ethnographers that Buddha was a Tham. 
Presenting her extensive ethnographic research Krauskopff (2002:235) stresses that “the 
demonstration rests first on the Majumdar’s 1940 study of blood group which purports to 
show that Tham are of Mongoloid origin.” Quoting Ramanada Prasad Singh, a prominent 
ethnographer, she writes, “Sociologists of India agree ... that theories of their being 
Australoids are nothing but fiction [...]. They originated in Nepal and are the remnant of 
the Sakyas and Kolyas” (ibid).
Along with the pan-Madhesi consciousness, various other ethnic groups of the region have 
also developed heightened level of assertiveness. The relatively liberal environment has 
provided the political space while the growth in education, development of transport and 
communication systems and availability of free-floating global ideas have had their impacts 
as well. The daily chores of people in the urban centres like that of Kathmandu are not 
excessively associated with the ethnic discourses. However, ethnic communities 
wholeheartedly take part in their cultural activities, rituals and folk dances during festivals. 
Theoretical debates are generally more associated with activists and political communities. 
However, the likelihood of societies being changed through the actions of actors, 
discourses, and opinions are high as these invariably employ local tools and symbols of 
communication. In view of what I have discussed in Chapter 4, the role of elites has been 
quite significant in the political history of Nepal.
Growing consciousness among the indigenous peoples coincides with that of the 
Madhesis’. These aspects are relative and interconnected. Cultural claims among the 
Madhesis have signalled for similar assertiveness from other groups. Identity claims have 
precluded detachment and fixation, generating boundaries anchored in the perceived sense 
of increasing insecurity. The degenerating aspects of out-group affiliations are clearly 
visible through the interviews conducted in Kathmandu as well as in Bijouri village.
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7.6. Language barrier
The distribution of language appears structured as well. None of the languages spoken in 
the Terai is used in the hills; in similar vein, all of the languages used in the hills are as 
alien to the local Madhesi population (with the exception of the Nepali language). 
However, even the Nepali language is rarely spoken in the in-group communications. The 
languages of indigenous communities have adopted many words from other languages. The 
Tharu language in Dang has enriched itself from Nepali, Awadi and Bhojpuri languages. 
Besides the recent migrant populations (from hill to the Terai or vice versa) those who 
speak to one another in their own mother tongues, hill languages are still as alien to plains 
people as latter’s languages are to the paharis (hill people).
Although language is problematic, the interdependency is nonetheless strong. Domestic 
economy and the state of poverty have led to interdependency and dependency alike, often 
difficult to categorise. The existing relationship of production in the society offers an easy 
explanation when viewing the dependency -  interdependency conundrum. This is because 
the politics of redistribution and the idea of recognition do not always operate in the same 
phase. The growth of the hill population and hill culture (although not homogenous) in the 
plains following the recent decades of migration, has created a sense of fear and anxiety 
among the Madhesis who see their culture and resources at stake. The response to this 
perceived cultural crisis has valorised the multifaceted boundaries in the act of intensifying 
identity politics. The indigenous peoples perceive it even more strongly when they speak of 
their ancient homelands or being victimised resulting from cultural hegemony. The 
interviewees insisted that they have been impacted by both the Madhesis as well by the 
paharis regarding their territorial displacement and culture crisis.
Although the plains people are multilingual, communicating with one another in different 
dialects when out-groups relationship are concerned, the barriers between the hill 
languages and the languages spoken in Madhesh are as strong as they had been decades 
ago. In this respect, the ethnic languages of the hills hardly make any sense to the peoples 
of the planes. Even the Nepali language falls short of being truly the bridging language in 
the Terai among the Madhesi population. However, the verbal communication between a 
pahari and a Madhesi would usually involve Nepali language to some degree. As the 
situation presents itself, the politics of language that has preoccupied both the Madhesi 
elites and the Nepali state is indeed a complicated affair.
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7.7. A brief history of Terai politics
In order to comprehend the complexities surrounding the issues of identity politics in the 
Terai, I want to present a brief history of Terai politics.
The party operating at regional level in the Terai was founded from Nepal Sadbhavana 
Parishad of the 1980s that was compelled to minimise its activities within its cultural 
boundaries. The issues of language, religion along with other outstanding themes of 
dissents were banned as they were regarded to undermine the spirit of social harmony. By 
and all, assimilatory and homogenising policies and cultural subjugation operated that 
stemmed from the state-centric ideology, which I have detailed earlier. However, the 
antipathy towards the monarchical regime was rising constantly from the early 1980s and 
as a result, the growing unrest that had remained latent so far made its first appearance in 
1979. All the while, the trends of political and social changes were beginning to be shaped 
that would ultimately change the political setting of Nepal in twenty-eight years.
Thus, it was within this political milieu that the second wave of démocratisation provided 
impetus to the UN declarations focussing more on right-based issues. Elevated levels of 
awareness, growth in education and communication, followed by the concept of 
modernisation helped to generate the essential mindset necessary for political activism. As 
a result, the Nepal Sadbhavana Parishad was reorganised into Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(NSP) at the aftermath of the 1990 people’s movement.
Records Jagrit Nepal (2007:19):
The party objectives and programmes resembled that of the Terai Congress and 
included reformed citizenship laws, official recognition for Hindi, a federal system on 
Nepal, and greater Madhesi representation in the civil service and security forces.
The leadership of NSP had emerged from the elite circle, mostly from the upper caste 
groups and landlords. During the general elections of 1991, the party succeeded in 3 
constituencies while in the second and third successive elections it witnessed a substantial 
fall in its popularity. The results were in favour of national parties and the people’s verdict 
demonstrated a significant shift rather than being pinned to the regional issues alone. 
Furthermore, the national parties also advocated the regional issues raised by the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party that considerably succeeded in diffusing the Terai support for NSP 
although the issues were never raised in the parliament to effect a change. The voters’
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psychology and group behaviours in the Terai has been claimed to be extremely elusive by 
some leading analysts. For example, Jaghrit Nepal states:
Quite another irony is that the very party formed for the rights of the Madhesis have 
always favoured the monarchical system in Nepal by which the Madhesis have been 
victimised and made prey to internal colonisation in the first place (2007:16).
I have opposed this particular view throughout my argument, and insisted that this analysis 
is unsustainable and devoid of any supportive evidence. The Terai population at large has 
been the victim of power abuse but its behaviour has always been to align with democratic 
forces. This was clearly visible during 1950, 1990 and 2006 movements. For this reason, 
the Terai has a fair share in shaping the democratic trend. Moreover, the Terai had also 
been staunchly advocating for the constituent assembly elections since 1951, in addition to 
seeking autonomy from the monarchical control. ‘Seeking autonomy from’ and ‘showing 
allegiance towards’ are antithetical and contradictory and neither is it a case of false 
consciousness. However, the Indian Hindu fundamentalists, in association with like- 
minded individuals and groups in the Nepal Terai, have favoured the statist politics in 
Nepal based on their symbolic and religious reasoning. Besides this, the socio-religious 
euphoria among a limited size of high caste Hindus for ensuring the political role of the 
absolute monarch, the Madhesis in general have favoured democracy. Thus, it is no less 
than being illogical to refer to the Madhesi category as those ‘having favoured the 
monarchical system’.
The decline in the influence of this party is connected with the Maobadi politics. The 
Nepali state, most of the time in the past, had been strong enough to control dissenting 
views from being expressed publicly. The Madhesis being systematically dominated were 
treated as second-class citizens rather than seen as being of equal worth. Exposed and 
vulnerable at the hands of the state, all their efforts calling for change never materialised. 
As the extreme leftist politics of Maobadi callously gained grounds over time, other parties 
including The Nepal Sadbhavana Party lost its charm and further, it had also failed to 
deliver what it had promised to the voters.
The major event in the shift of Madhesi loyalty towards the Maobadi andolan was the 
inception of Madhesi Rastriya Mukti Morcha (Madhesi Liberation Front, MRMM). The 
loyalty, rather than being an overnight achievement, was a gradual political process. The
177
Moabadi strategically penetrated the Madhesi communities through this organisation that, 
besides being more acceptable than the central leadership, represented the true spirit of the 
people, as they were Madhesis themselves. The initial point of entry was at the grassroots. 
However, this had a multiplier effect, in the sense that as the movement grew stronger the 
upper echelons of social and economic structures simply surrendered or gave in their 
passive support for the movement considering their own safety and survival. This served to 
be a very powerful message for the revolutionaries. It also provided logical argument for 
joining the party. The mentality of “winners take all,” that had besieged the society, proved 
extremely beneficial for the Maobadi andolan in sweeping the Terai region, with very little 
local resistance at village levels. The dynamics of class struggle was also encouraged to 
eliminate people when terror was felt necessary for regaining control.
Reports Jaghrit Nepal:
The MRMM demands proportional Madhesi inclusion in state institutions, full 
distribution of citizenship certificates, use of Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi as local 
official languages, and protection of other cultural rights, reinvestment of Madhesh 
tax revenues in the region itself, revolutionary land reform, and an end to dowry 
practices, women’s exploitation, untouchability, and other forms of social 
discrimination” (2007:19).
Thus, the demands and sentiments of the Terai were well grasped by the Maobadis, and 
with local leaders at the helm of the MRMM and a revolutionary ideology as guidance, the 
momentum of the movement picked up as all the sensitive issues had been politicised. In 
the bundle of issues, agenda of language and the right to self-determination were at the 
core.
Seeing the danger that this movement inherited, the national parties opened up their own 
fronts in the Terai, following suit. However, since all these organisations were revolved 
around the Madhesi issues and engrossed in regional politics, the scenario changed 
drastically as the political demands were gradually overshadowed by cultural and identity 
claims as a matter of keen competition among these organisations. The overall impact led 
to a surge in the level and tempo of identity politics where differences tended to be 
celebrated. In the present situation, the boundaries between the two populations remain 
semi-fluid in terms of recognition, respect and tolerance.
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7.8. Question of identity and equal citizenship
With the exception of the indigenous peoples, the Terai population comprises relatively 
new immigrants. It has therefore been classified as being ‘Indian origin’ by some 
sociologists and prominent writers such as Tony Hagen (1980) and Gaige (1975). The hill 
people often question their national loyalty on this ground. “They see us as Indians and 
tend not to trust us even though we have been living in this country for centuries,” 
commented Bansi Yadhav in Kathmandu during my second field visit.
The dense forests of the Terai had been the sources of revenue to the Rana rulers. When the 
demand for timber rose during the construction of the Indian railroads during the First 
World War, Indian companies were called in for timber logging. Gaige (1975:25) confirms 
“to increase the land revenue, the Rana government also encouraged the settling of Terai 
lands” to the Indian settlers. In similar vein, he added, “because the hill people found the 
Terai climate hot and living conditions strange, Ranas could not persuade hill people to 
settle in the Terai” (ibid).
The active social intercourse of the Madhesis with the Indian population across the border, 
albeit a normal phenomenon, is observed by Kathmandu intellectuals as a consequence of a 
disarrayed and failed process of integration. The social, cultural, religious and lingual 
similarity with the south, rather than with their own compatriots to the north, has made the 
population more interactive and socially interdependent with those across the border. The 
bond between common identity and shared sentiments among overlapping identities is 
often complex. While analysing “Overlapping Identities” Luchezar Boyadjiev (1998)^^ 
indicates it to be: “[...] something rather more complex, something that is a potential 
source of conflict as well as of understanding.” However, although the established 
argument based on the state’s failure in integrating the Madhesi population is valid, the 
analysis lacks the implications of overlapping identities and fails to support the ideology of 
multilayered citizenship.
It is often that the pahade including the janajatis do not acknowledge the Madhesi pledge 
to national patriotism and thus treat them as second-class citizens. The absence of this
Overlapping Identities (1998)
Source: http://www.cfront.org/cfOObook/en/luchezar-overlapping-en.html 
Retrieved: 03/03/2009
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population in the unification process is an additional claim of the paharis to regard them 
with suspicion. Bishal Gorkhali, a student, who I talked to while travelling in a bus to the 
Kathmandu University, said:
Madhesis are one of us, but the problem has been the open border. When people are 
coming every day from India, we think that every Madhesi is a new immigrant and an 
Indian.
Nepalese political trend shows limited evidence to suggest that faith or religion have had 
any significant impacts in the modem political process, especially after the 1980s. The 
political parties participating in the democratic processes have often felt it convenient for a 
candidate to file in his candidacy in a constituency of his choice. This would depend on his 
popularity, familial extensions and ties, clan relationships, faithful followings etc. The 
former four election results explicitly demonstrate the vote pattern in accordance with the 
party lines, rather than indicating strong links to faith or religion.
However, this does not signify integration. The Madhesis were excluded from serving in 
the armed forces until the last decade, and even at present, the participation of this 
population is insignificant as compared to that of the hills. This is also tme in other sectors 
of government services including the bureaucracy. Vijaya Kant in an interview said:
Madhesis have been excluded from the nation building process since the beginning.
We had to get permission to travel to Kathmandu. Although this is not the case today,
we still are excluded from job opportunities. You may see the statistics, it is all too
clear. Our population has been victimised.
Equal opportunity and respect are essential to impart the sense of belonging that transcend 
into the integration process. However, prior to all, the state as well as the hill population 
should recognise that Madhesis are tmly Nepalese and that they too have equal rights as 
that of the rest. It is in this regard that they have claimed for their rights to equal 
opportunity and employment. The aspects of mutual recognition, respect, inclusion and 
fraternity should be premised on the grounds of equal power distribution among different 
members and groups. The identity politics in the Terai differs from that of the hills in the 
sense that the agenda of Terai is political as it is related to self-determination of Madhesis 
of all categories whereas, in the hills it is based on ethno-centric agenda along ethnic 
divides and closures.
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7.9. Politics of language
I have discussed the advent of the Khas kura/bhasa (Khas or the modem Nepalese 
language) in Chapter 1 as the speakers entered into the Himalayan region during 2-1 
century BC. It therefore follows that the language gradually grew together with the 
mobility of this population within the present day expanse of the hill regions of Nepal. 
With the establishment Khasan kingdom in the west that later broke up into twenty 
confederations, that is, prior to the unification of these states call baise, Nepali language 
had been well established as the lingua franca of the region. Similarly, the chaubise 
confederation also had experienced that Nepali language had become the principal 
language of communication among different social groups- either as a bridge-language, or 
as a commonly spoken medium. Thus, Nepali language was one of the key components in 
the unification process. Prithivi Narayan Shah being himself a speaker of Nepali language 
readily took advantage of this reality while embarking on his conquests.
During those times, rather than looking into the particularistic nature of the conquered 
population, the main goal of the conquerors was to extend power and dominance over alien 
territories. Cultural variations and identity differences were undermined under the ideals 
that the country was morally above individuals or collective entities. Brave heroes and 
fierce fighters under the leadership of good war-managers have carved out territorial states 
through blood bath and terror. Nepal’s unification was no exception. The ethos of Nepalese 
sovereignty was compromised in the peace treaty with British raj and more severely in the 
peace and friendship treaty with democratic India. Later, Nepal caved in to redefine its 
nationalism on alternative footings -  politically monarchical, internally anti-Indian, 
culturally -  Hindu and linguistically Nepali. These were calculated to be the defining 
characteristics of Nepali nationalism -  perceived as being unique to Nepal.
Although Nepali language was the medium of unification of the hill principalities, it never 
was the same in the Terai. The forces of Terai nationalism first made their entrances in 
modem politics, as an open agenda, during the 50s following the anti-Rana uprising. The 
democratic environment, particularly the transition phase served to be an ideal milieu for 
the growth of elite activism in Nepal Terai. At its core, the Terai nationalism has always 
consisted of the language issue. Formulation of Nepal Terai Congress was in fact the first 
elitist driven agenda asserting its rights language and autonomy. “The Madhesi movement 
is misunderstood when it is regarded as being new,” confirmed Vijay in the same
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interview, "we have been fighting with the state since the 1950s and yet been denied of our 
language rights and identity claims.” Discussing over the history of the Terai movement, 
Vijay further added.
The parties have understood our plight and the state needs to understand that our 
identity is dear to us. We cannot compromise on a subservient category. It is the 
Maobadi andolan in the present context, that has politicised the Terai needs and since 
they have emerged as the largest party, I am hopeful that we will receive justice. 
People in power need to understand that all languages including Bhojipuii, Maithali, 
and Awadi spoken in the Terai should be recognised.
There is a strong saying in Kathmandu that ‘history repeats itself. The Madhesis are keen 
to see the new constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly. As Vijaya opined, the 
Madhesis are hopeful but not without being suspicious over the idea that history will not 
repeat itself. When I was in Nepal during my second visit, the Terai movement was at its 
apex.
7.10. Conclusion
To deliver social justice and assert equality and equal opportunity for all on universal 
grounds is no doubt a challenging task. In a diverse society as that of the Terai, the task is 
even graver and more demanding. Since federalism, proportional representation and 
reservation have been agreed upon by the state, the Terai at present possess the opportunity 
of creating multilayered equal citizenship. Rather than retaining its ethnic nationalist 
discourse, Madhesi activism should seek inclusive federation where overlapping identities 
coexist. Instead of symbolizing a cultural group, mainly the Madhesi, in naming the 
federation, the right choice could be the ‘‘Terai Federal Republic” denoting regional 
boundaries rather than being confined into a narrower confinement. However, for the Terai 
to exist as one single federal unit, much needs to be done to create an atmosphere of unity, 
respect and mutual recognition in order to promote the indispensible common feeling of 
loyalty, allegiance and cohesion, if indeed it turns out to be so.
The Maobadi party fully supported regional, ethnic and nationalist demands with little care, 
without realising that they themselves could be at the helm of power some day. This policy 
certainly furnished the insurgency, however became extremely challenging to the political 
process.
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Nepal is indeed at the cross roads while the constitution is being drafted. With Pandora’s 
Box wide open, the issues raised although being valid could be expensive to the emerging 
republican state. Possessing a strong correlation with the citizenship crisis, the escalating 
nature of identity politics in Nepal does inherit the possibility of derailment especially if 
the uncompromising and resistant elements of ethnocentrism make sustainable entry.
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Dalits and society: the beginning of citizenship crisis
8.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I have discussed the general situation of the Dalits and debated that the 
caste-based social structure has been the beginning of citizenship crisis in Nepal. I have 
argued that the solution to citizenship crisis in Nepal lies in the comprehensive state policy 
of meaningful inclusion especially aimed at those that have been excluded by the former 
regimes. I have further insisted that the Dalit consciousness and the supremacy of Hindu 
orthodoxy are in direct conflict, as empowerment from below signifies disempowerment of 
the higher castes. Therefore, anxiety has been expressed by the upper caste groups with the 
idea of the ‘the erosion of national culture’. Emphasising that equal citizenship is possible 
only when the state and the society act together towards achieving that goal, I have argued 
that it is only through in the liberation of the Dalits that the liberation of the rest of the 
Nepalese societies will be assured.
Nepal has been thrust into a vortex of multidimensional conflict, with varying intensity and 
nature, explicitly for over the period of last ten years where ‘‘its impact is different in 
different places” (Gellner, 2002:18). The manifest forms of conflict may politically be 
classified into those that are functional within the constitutional parameters, while others 
represent a set of non-constitutional conflicts accompanied by violent means of protest and 
protracted guerrilla warfare. The boundaries of the conflict outline three major contending 
political forces chiefly categorised as the orthodox right wing, headed by the king, the 
Maobadi-led ultra-left and the democratic forces that represent the elected parliament. 
Among the later episodes of the upheavals, the movement of April 2006, which overthrew 
the absolute monarch in favour of parliamentary democracy, is indeed historic. Following 
the 12-point memorandum of understanding reached between the political parties and the 
Maobadi, the movement was the turning point of the decade-long protracted war. 
Notwithstanding the present kaleidoscopic political changes in terms of power dynamics, 
public rights and social adjustments, it is necessary that the ousted ultra-right forces
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concede to the emerging democratic institutions, rather than indulging into plotting 
strategies of counter-revolution for undue power reclamations.
Hindu social structure and the paradigms of hierarchy that it embraces, has been 
extensively debated. The messages emanating from these debates, is that exclusion, 
injustice and dehumanisation override the principles of equal power distribution in a Hindu 
society. It is naïve to imagine that the ideals of equality and social justice have any 
meaningful space within such relations. The caste-based divisions are thus the barriers to 
equal citizenship. Since the caste structures have been shaped traditionally, the birth of the 
Nepali state and the ideals of democracy and citizenship that gained prominence later have 
been observed to function within these astringent relationships, legitimising the social 
hierarchy to a considerable degree. Social processes are complex, far from being linear 
progressions. Despite this fact, a series of progressive processes involving education, 
political activism, social or ethnic consciousness or the global discourses have tended to 
render pressures on the classic practices of purity and pollution.
8.2. Nature of 2006 movement and comparative history
It was for the first time, during this movement, that spontaneous powerful surges of mass 
protests were reported in all of the 75 districts of the country. “The movement of 2006 that 
Nepal experienced was rather different than the previous ones on two grounds, said Vijay 
in an interview. “ First it contained a very strong sense of republicanism and second, the 
level of participation was enormous.” Rather than being urban-centred, as had been the 
cases with popular movements in the past, the movement of 2006 was distributed even to 
the remotest of human settlements encompassing all of the physiographic divisions of the 
country within its purview. Given the fact that the popular mass participation transcended 
salient forms of social closures, vertical and horizontal hierarchies and the prevailing socio­
economic boundaries that were characterised as being non-porous or rigid, it provides 
sufficient ground for working out the common denominator. The mammoth participation 
blatantly transcended the pervasive caste/ethnic divide, economic disparity and regional 
imbalance. The movement in essence symbolised the aspirations of the public both urban 
and rural, with a new vision for national reconstruction based on democratic reality; a 
democracy that delivers and promotes the ideals of equal citizenship.
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As I have discussed earlier, Nepal had aspired to a democratic polity since the early 
nineteenth century when the state was constantly challenged by sporadic social movements 
in different regions of the country. Given that the political vision of the ruling class and 
political elites while shaping {derailing in fact) the political trend in Nepal had been against 
popular aspiration of the masses, it was only through the mass agitation of 1950, driven by 
the new foreign-educated elites, that the 104-year Rana oligarchy finally had came to its 
end.
“Although the horizontal dispersal of power was already chartered in the constitution of 
Nepal 1948” (Dahal, 1999:21), following the political changes at regional level that was 
chiefly marked by the Indian independence and the resulting growth of political pressure on 
the political processes in Nepal, “it was eventually nullified [...] by the insincerity and 
duplicity of the dominant wing of the Rana family” (Joshi and Rose, 2004: 62). The 
nullification of the constitution politically proved to be a positive outcome as it consisted of 
nothing that could be labelled as being progressive or inclusive. This is because it had 
principally aspired to ‘legitimatising’ the centralised control of the oligarchy over the state- 
machinery, reinforcing the “right of succession of the Ranas to the prime ministership as 
‘for all time inalienable and unalterable’” (ibid). The overall substance and the spirit of the 
constitution was concentrated in the effort to legitimatise personal welfares of the ruling 
family and lineage through constitutional provisions of absoluteness.
Following the shift in the power balance at the aftermath of 1950 popular uprising, “Interim 
Constitution of Nepal Act 1951” (Dahal, 1999:21) was promulgated only to be disbanded 
through the Special Circumstances Power Act on September 9, 1952 -  clearly an act of 
political retrogression. The Act that bore significantly far reaching implications “[...] not 
only provided the legal foundation of the Royal Councillor’s regime, but also marked the 
introduction of the king’s absolute authority in political affairs” (Joshi and Rose, 
2004:104). The king’s position thus was unilaterally enforced to be above the constitution 
and the absolute state authority and executive powers were unalienable from the sovereign. 
What the political process implied was that the king was portrayed to be the symbol of 
unity and nuclear icon of Nepali nationalism. The inclusion of religion into the political 
sphere through the provisions of the constitution provided congenial space for the creation 
of a legitimate theocratic state. The emerging institutions at national and local levels
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functioned under the provisions of exclusion and undermined even the slightest aspects of 
equal citizenship.
Thus, in totality stress Joshi and Rose (2004:153):
[...] supreme executive, judicial and legislative powers of the of the Shah sovereign, 
which had been “revoked” in 1951, and that supreme authority in all these spheres 
was once again vested in the monarch. This was, thus, the first unequivocal 
affirmation of the king’s inherent powers as supreme executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority in Nepal since the end of Rana rule.
The Act promulgated by the king and his socio-political outlook grossly represented a 
strong retrogressive socio-political philosophy in the modem age of nations and recourse 
reverse and antithetic to the democratic polity and processes. The decision to seek such a 
role generated two-fold contradictory situations within and without. The state, the emerging 
institutions and the processes blatantly created an offensive affront with regards to the 
domestic consciousness, while at regional and global front it alienated itself from the 
process of democracy and emerging forms of modernity. The centralisation of power 
reached its peak during the Panchayat political order (1960-1990) that was characterised 
by the state of totalitarianism. Similar monarchical orders existed in Europe through many 
centuries, however; in Nepal, this was the present state of affairs - in the twenty first 
century, where sovereign-subjects relationship depicted hard facts, rather difficult to digest. 
The elite circles and the state representing the interests of higher caste group have always 
exploited and dehumanised this group of people in the name of upholding religious values 
and hollow expressions of salvation.
Thus, it would be relevant to debate that the path through which the country has traversed 
for the last half the century bears direct consequences of the remorse political trend, 
especially with regard to the attitudinal role of the monarch, institutional arrangements and 
processes in line with the socio-political centralism, religious hegemony and economic 
alienation of Dalit masses. The Dalits and the upper castes possess very little, if at all, any 
aspects of common bonds and interests, a situation where no sense of citizenship ever 
existed.
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8.3. Deeper problems
In the present circumstances of newly formed democracy, the predicament of actualising 
equal citizenship with assertion of collective and personal wellbeing, in true sense, requires 
transformation and praxis at all levels. Both within the public and private spheres the 
resulting transformations need to be expressed not only in terms of outcome, which may 
represent a short-lived social by-product. Rather, in addition to the outcome, and more 
importantly, the pedagogy must involve and be involved in the process that sustains the 
self-propelling dynamo of interaction and praxis as a continuum within masses in 
generating empowerment. In this regard, therefore argues Byrne in his book Social 
Exclusion (2002:41), “Freire’s notion of empowerment is a specification both of a means to 
social pedagogy [...], and of an end, an outcome in which civil republican citizenship is 
expressed through communities of action.” It is precisely through the process of social 
pedagogy and empowerment that the culture and practice of social exclusion is confronted.
To further the discussion on empowerment, I borrow the following from Heaney that is 
contextual to the socio-political situations in Nepal:
Empowerment -  For poor and disposed people, strength is numbers and social 
change is accompanied in unity. Power is shared, not the power of a few who 
improve themselves at the expense of others, but the power of the many who find 
strength and purpose in a common vision. Liberation achieved by individuals at the 
expense of others is an act of oppression. Personal freedom and the development of 
individuals can only occur in mutuality with others (in Byrne, 2002:40).
The politics of the assimilatory state, having extended its clutches to power through 
systematically orchestrated policies of divide and rule, has generated animosity vis-à-vis 
state-public relationship translating into cultural exclusion and alienation.
To ensure the establishment of the institution discussed, the solution to citizenship crisis in 
Nepal lies in the comprehensive state policy of meaningful inclusion, especially aimed at 
those that have been excluded by the former regimes. The formulation and execution of 
such policies demand a strong political will. In addition, to change the social and religious 
outlook towards the Dalits is an immense task; and what we know about religious 
institution is that they are extremely resistant and unwilling to compromise or forego the 
value systems they uphold. “We cannot bear further humiliation, deprivation and poverty 
because of our birth that bars us from participation in all aspects of social lives. The higher
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castes and the state should end the practice of prejudice,” said Gyan Nepali in an interview 
in Dang.
8.4. Conflicting stands
In the case of Dalits, unlike the janajatis, political will from above appears truly 
insufficient for a meaningful change, even in situations where the ruling elite circles may 
be willing to make the concession. This is because the empowerment of Dalits would 
demand the disempowerment of the Hindu upper caste groups along with all those 
practicing untouchablity or partaking in any form of social activity that contributes to the 
theory and practice of dehumanisation. When I was talking to a Sanskrit language teacher 
Bharat Sharma in Bijouii village, he said:
We need to protect our culture and religion. As Nepal is modernising, the signs are 
not good. Many people have forgone their traditions and picked up unhealthy habits 
and ways to guide their lives. Sense of faith has collapsed.
The sense of erosion of Hindu culture and religion has been equated with the loss of 
national identity by the ruling elites that I have discussed previously. This makes perfect 
sense when it comes to the issue of empowerment of the Dalits, including others that have 
been veiled in their social lives. The demand for equality from the lower social hierarchies 
has been perceived as threat by those dominating the social structures.
Therefore, the Dalit consciousness and the supremacy of Hindu orthodox appear to be in 
direct conflict in the research areas as empowerment from below signifies disempowerment 
of the higher castes. This perceived anxiety as been expressed by the upper caste groups 
with the phrase of “the erosion of national culture.” It is correct to argue that globalisation 
and modernity has tended to produce desirable as well as undesirable outcomes; however, 
to premise one’s argument in favour of caste system is highly unreasonable. Above all, to 
use the phrase ‘erosion of national culture’ in this case is immensely dangerous in that it 
denies others who are different. And above all, in a multicultural, multiethnic and 
multireligious society, the idea of national culture is unsustainable. More than this, when 
the Dalits and upper caste groups possess nothing in common, simple judgement tells me 
that there is absolutely nothing to share. In this situation, defending national identity and 
claiming for shared values is difficult to explain.
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The Maobadi andolan has politically empowered the Dalits. Besides, the global forces 
including the UN have also supplemented the moral and legal grounds for their cause of 
mobilisation in pursuit of self-dignity, recognition and social equality. Most importantly, 
being critical over these practices, a growing number of people from upper caste groups 
have begun revaluating their own culture. Among 31 respondents that I interviewed 9 of 
them were from higher caste groups. Of this population, 7 respondents clearly stated that 
the practice of purity and pollution was immoral and incorrect.
Social consciousness works both ways. Just as the dominant national identity is debated as 
being in a state of continuous erosion from both the internal as well as external pressures, 
the sub-cultures and ethnic traditions are not free from similar forces compelling rapid 
transformations either. As each group insists on preserving its own culture, the frantic 
condition of ethnic revivalism has gripped the state. As for Dalits, it has been the cause of 
social emancipation -  freedom from caste stigma. On the contrary, it is in the act of 
preserving their ‘culture’ that the upper caste sees a true meaning of life. Although caste 
structure is seen by many higher caste groups as being part of their culture, its overt 
practice has decreased in urban settings. The rising level of cultural consciousness has built 
in in-group pride among all communities to the extent that in some cases the euphoria has 
demanded stricter norms, stringent moral codes or revitalised and rigorous cultural beliefs. 
Hence, I would like to stress that the socio-religious and ethnic consciousness has taken a 
sharp upturn, that has put enormous pressures on groups to redefine their culture, reorient 
the history or revisit the saga of what they believe to the their heritage.
8.5 The quagmire
Constitution amendments and free lectures are not uncommon, and do not compose of the 
exercises that Dalits are unfamiliar with. Although Dalits have been sympathised with, the 
will of the state to guarantee their protection from social injustices and exclusion has been 
lacking. Devoid of institutional arrangements and absence of serious interventions designed 
to date, the Nepali state must to be regarded as having failed on both legal and moral 
grounds as the protector of the rights of Dalit people.
Baumeister (2003:393) argues that the state as well as society has their obligations in a 
multicultural society. Equal citizenship is possible when the state and the society act 
together towards achieving that goal.
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Although a commitment to equal citizenship implies that the state should 
acknowledge the different histories, needs and goals of the various communities that 
constitute it, a multicultural society must at the same time develop a genuinely 
shared culture.
The practice of untouchablity and opinion of ‘shared culture’ are hard to blend. “Individual 
citizens are presumed to have equal status, equal rights and duties, etc. so that principles of 
inequality deriving from gender, ethnic, class or contexts are not supported to be of 
relevance to the status of citizenship” mentions Devis^^. However, in the case of Dalits, 
gaining status of citizenship appears only through the deconstruction of existing social 
relationships. Transforming their relations with higher castes for Dalits should not mean 
socio-religious and cultural erosion for the upper caste Hindus. Thus, in a true sense the 
higher castes need to visualise their own liberation in the liberation of Dalits.
The aspects of distributive justice as well the new and transformed relationship could be 
assured through the institution of equal citizenship and vice versa, and the social consent 
and dialogue would help Dalits in their politics of recognition and equality. Despite the 
logic that I have just mentioned, there is no indication that the elites and upper caste groups 
will readily disempower themselves at the cost of empowering some other group and loose 
what they believe to be their ideals of ‘socio-cultural identity’. As discussed below, the 
situation of Dalits is more pervasive than that of the indigenous peoples or the janajatis. 
The efforts of all needs to be focused on the cultural and religious inertia that must be 
overcome for creating equal citizenry. Such a transformation cannot be achieved by 
political movements alone. I will continue this debate later.
8.6. Dalits revisited
The Sudras, compelled into the lowest echelon of social hierarchy, are in service of the 
whole society, primarily the upper layers in the social caste system. This unique and 
traditional system of social stratification has successfully survived despite the 
confrontational challenges offered by strong forces of modernisation and the growing trend 
in the prevalent intangible fields of egalitarianism and globalisation, especially after the 
seventies.
Source: Yuval-Davis, N., Feminist Review, No. 57, Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries, (Autumn, 
1997), pp. 4- 27
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The Hindu code of Manushmri represents the era prior to the expansion of the Mogul 
Empire and sheds light on the definition of the Sudras as well. It is also likely that this code 
of social hierarchy was well established among the first migrants, entering into the foothills 
of Nepal during the century BC. The Aryans could have brought the social stratification 
of caste system during those times. Yakharai (2053 VS: 124) quoting from the text of 
Manushmriti shows the following conditions under which individuals were classified as 
Sudras:
- Prisoners of war
- Slaves who have accepted slavery as means of survival
- Sons of a slave women servant
- Purchased individuals
- Individuals received as part of a religious gift
- Children of a slave father, and
- Those who are declared as Sudras as a punishment by the king
The social code interwoven within the Hindu value system resembled the social structures 
and norms of the long gone Greek or Roman times. Much of the social despondency 
stemming from socio-religious hierarchical orders continued in Europe extending much 
into the era of Enlightenment. Thus, the religious codes that have been mentioned in 
Manushmriti (a medieval Hindu script) are similar to that of European socio-religious 
codes, but with distinctive charectaristics. In any event, because of the stigma that the 
classification carries, we are currently involved in the discussion over its continuity not so 
much as in its moral content as we concede that it is immoral, unethical, and inhumane to 
preach and practice such codes.
In our study, Dalits are defined as people who have been the victims of Hindu vama kram 
and called ‘untouchables’ based on the practice of purity and pollution. These ‘impure’ 
clusters of people are at the bottom of the caste hierarchy and include Kami, Damai, 
Sharki, Pode, Chyame, Kasai, Gaine, Badi, Musahar, Chamar, Dushad etc. These are 
occupational groups engaged in activities such as: Kami is a black smith, Dainai is a tailor, 
Sharki is a shoemaker, Chyame is a cleaner, Kasai is a butcher. Gaine is a instrumentalist, 
singer and dancer, Badi is a fisharman etc. This category of people mostly being the 
descendents of the prisoners of war and slaves, rather than possessing a separate racial
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identity, are “not only the descendants of Khas-Aryans but also have Mongolkirat blood 
too” (Neupane, 1999:13) as would have been the case when the Aryans defeated the Kirats 
in the struggle over the control of Kathmandu valley during the beginning of the 3”^^  century 
AD. The prisoners of those times faced similar dehumanising circumstances in the rest of 
the world as well.
The custom/occupational groups of Dalits such as Dushad, Chamar and Mushar belong to 
the terai area while Kami, Damai, Sharki are from hills. The groups such as Pode and 
Chyame are from Newar community in Kathmandu valley. The custom groups are skilled 
and have special areas of specialisation as defined by their occupation. Their skills range 
from creation of fine pottery to musical instruments; from music composition to the 
designing of beautiful dresses. It is indeed extremely disheartening to realise that although 
their creations are valued social goods, they themselves are rendered ‘untouchables’ and 
barred from observing Hindu rituals. The Dalits compose 9% of the total population of 
Nepal. The Dalit consciousness rather than being a new phenomenon is a newer expression 
of the experiences of optimum dominance, exploitation and inhumane circumstances of 
economical, social and moral survival. The direction of dominance is vertical and by all 
nationalities - caste or non-caste variants.
Besides the Khas, the Janajatis also treat them as untouchables. Furthermore, there is yet 
another hierarchical order within the Dalits where, each occupational group is set up in 
specific location of the order, signifying one being superior to the other. Perhaps it is this 
multilayered check, balances, and interdependency within social orders that have been 
culturally laid down and practiced for centuries that provides the inertia against social 
change. The democratic political environment of recent times, following 1990, has been 
extremely fruitful in championing their cause of nationalism. With the growth of support of 
the wider section of the society, Dalit nationalism has marked a new height in the socio­
political spectrum.
The Dalit nationality has been based on a common history of dominance and 
dehumanisation and the resulting psychological phenomenon has ever since been 
antagonistic to the existing social order at differing times.
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In Bijouri, the Dalits are situated in the outskirts of the village and at a distance from where 
the upper caste groups live. They are not allowed to enter into the homes of upper caste 
groups or that of janajatis, and in case they touch them, water is sprinkled as a ritual for 
purification. The practice of untouchablity that the janajatis consent to has resulted from 
the Hindunization process active for centuries. However, the Tharus do not practice 
untouchablity. Dalits and Tharus get along well without the elements of purity or pollution 
in their social intercourses.
“We stitch clothes for them (upper caste groups), and while taking measurements we have 
to touch them. Someone from their family, member of their own caste or any one from 
pane chaîne jat (pure caste) sprinkles them with water, after which, they are say that they 
are free from pollution” said Prem Nepali, a local tailor by trade. In the village, manly four 
groups of Dalits reside. The damai (Tailor), kami (black smith) and sarki (leather 
craftsmen), dhobi (washer man) reside at the fringes, keeping their distance from higher 
caste groups although living within the village territory.
While I visited Prem’s home during my first field trip, there was a case reported, where 
Dalits in the eastern area of Nepal had forcefully entered into temples for worship. 
Although this incident was not of its first kind, the meaning it conveyed was quite powerful 
for both of the groups: Dalits as well as the others. For Gyan Nepali, an activist, this move 
signalled emancipation. He explained:
Entering temples is our right. But more than that, this act has been a way of showing 
our dislike towards the stigma of the caste system. We did not make this rule to 
which we are prescribed. This is not our choice, and thus we want to be liberated 
from the dehumanising situation.
Prior to the 1990s, the level of consciousness was extremely low. This is not to say that the 
situation has changed remarkably as of now. However, due to the political movements, and 
especially the Maobadi andolan, following the 90s, the political consciousness has been 
raised to a new level where the facts related to social exclusion have been enthusiastically 
circulating among the elite members of the community.
During the second field visit, I had a chance to be at a mass gathering in Ghorai, the 
commercial headquarters of the district. The leaders spoke about the social stigma and their
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position regarding the Hindu caste structure. Later that evening Gyan pointed out:
We are the most disadvantaged section of the Nepalese society. We occupy the
lowest position in terms of education and awareness. Incidence of poverty is the
greatest among us. Our children are uneducated and we are not regarded as equals.
We are deprived socially, economically, politically and culturally.
The Dalits have also shared the same sections of the village occupied by the Tharus. Tharus 
do not practice the caste system and are classified by the Hindus as panic chaîne jat 
(group/category that does not pollute water). However, with the Dalits their relationship is 
based on equal terms. “Water sprinkling” is not required after a physical contact. This 
being quite unlike the hill ethnic groups, where water sprinkling may not be strictly 
practiced, although untouchablity is the common ground for defining group superiority. In 
this sense, the Dalits have been made the objects to represent inferior beings by all, 
irrespective of the caste/non-caste divide. Although the sense of superiority derived from 
the aspects of purity (as claimed by the upper caste groups) is significantly practiced, the 
upper caste youths that I interviewed strongly opposed this practice and said that they did 
not believe in the caste system.
8.7. Dalits and the problems of citizenship
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Nepal possesses a new opportunity for radical 
transformation following the democratic political changes. Prior to the recent political 
changes, the state had pursued a strong nationalist ideology (see Chapter 2), it will have to 
orient itself towards a national democratic structure and generate institutions with visions 
towards meeting the needs of a multiethnic and class divided society, enjoying equal 
citizenship rights. Within the multiethnic platform, I have also included the position of the 
Dalits as being equal and at the same time being bounded by common aspirations and a 
sense of dignity to live together as equal citizens.
Often it is the case that the ideology of nationalism becomes antithetical to the principles of 
democracy and thus, as has been observed in many cases, the democratic system of polity 
becomes the alternative form of a political system rather than being supportive to the 
ideology of nationalism. The case of Dalits is different from the situation of the janajatis, 
who are also being mobilised for asserting their equal share in and opportunity of 
participation in the state structure. For Dalits, equality and social justice entails liberation
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from the socio-religious stigmatisation in addition to the issues of equal opportunities and 
fair grounds for participation. “Although we are Hindus, we are not allowed to enter into 
our own Hindu temples for prayers” (ibid). It is different in the sense that it was only 
during Jung Bahadur’s reign that the janajatis were unilaterally included within the broad 
category of Hindu structure, namely the caste-based system of social hierarchy, through the 
national code. For many, however, this rarely made any sense as they continued to live the 
way as they had been doing -  particularly the Limbus, in whose settlement, Hinduism 
offered relatively a small influence (as a product of active and passive resistance besides 
the low rate of inward cultural flows). However, in the case of Dalits, they form the 
integral part of the Hindu structure since the prehistoric times. The choice that Nepal will 
have to make, therefore, will form the crux of the emerging form of citizenship and related 
issues of social exclusion. It is time to see these two ideologies in action and is equally 
necessary that the ideology of nationalism be balanced with the emerging form of 
democracy where the two forms of ideologies interact with one another in reproducing 
public good by way of institutionalising the institution of citizenship. This reality not only 
becomes the indicator of democracy, rather, the active citizens generated thereafter become 
the vanguards of democracy and freedoms. The caste system being the strongest barrier to 
inclusion and equality presents the most serious thereat to equal citizenship and 
participation. Citizenship, often highlighted by social scientists, is a political term. 
However, when the issues here are more of a social category than the political, the situation 
is more challenging and at the same time, it demands intensive scholarly work.
Political decisions require the will of the state or rather the will of the ruling class that 
represents the dominating class-culture assortment. In light of this view, the ruling class 
and elites are from the dominating culture and thus the state, rather than seeking to deliver 
justice, is mainly engrossed in legitimising cultural hegemony. In a situation where the 
cultural hegemony becomes a powerful tool that has been internalised at large, and 
although the elite has been dethroned and removed, then political change becomes nothing 
more than a farce unless it is followed by a strong cultural movement or a cultural 
revolution.
Thus, it is only when sweeping political changes are accompanied by strong social reforms 
and broad-based economic initiatives that social transformation is possible. Social caste 
systems and the vama kram have so far been resistant to change and prone to enduring
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challenges of progressive transformation toward emancipation, inclusion, mutual respect 
and equality. This view was expressed by Prem Nepali, where he said.
It was during the panchayat days, following the 1960s, that untouchablity was made 
illegal, and at the same time the constitution had promised equality on all respects. 
However, on the contrary, the exclusion and exploitation of the Dalits never 
decreased. Since then, we have had many movements with similar promises but the 
situation of Dalits is the same.
In this regard, the will of the state towards transformation, and the empowerment of the 
masses from below should generate the congenial environment required for the 
establishment of equal citizenship. Inclusion, recognition and emancipation need to go 
hand in hand. Thus, during the process encompassing the progressive change, it is in the 
creation of the institution of citizenship that political, social, economic and cultural 
relationships are strengthened on the grounds of justice and equality, either in the state- 
citizen relationship or among the diverse cultures.
As we have seen, Nepal’s socio-political structure in the past has been unitary and the 
Dalits were victimised the most. They were excluded from the nation building process and 
delinked from in the spheres of political, civil and social rights. “After all, historically 
assimilation was seen as a precursor to and prerequisite for citizenship” (Cairns, 203:504). 
The general fact about any unitary state, including Nepal, is that it was rather a tool for 
assimilation than a protector of civil liberty and social justice. This being the trend of 
nation-states, the cause of nationalism was in itself a parasite on citizenship and acted as 
the sentimental and impulsive form of social behaviour, partly as a response to the slogans 
of ruling elites and class, at the expense of political, civic and social rights of the rest of the 
Nepalese people. Thus, the major political trend of the country was towards “a single 
centre of power ruling over an undivided social order” (Pierson, 2004:8), as a result of 
which, the escalating measure of exclusion unleashed by the state formed much of the 
ingredients of a legitimate Hindu society during the process of attaining its statehood. With 
this trend of the argument, it is therefore quite clear now that, it is the instrument of ‘state 
religion’ that has been pivotal source in depriving the Dalits of their fundamental rights on 
the one hand. On the other hand, the Hindu orthodoxies, traditional knowledge systems, 
and internalisation of dominant culture and historical processes concerned with 
Hinduisation and Sanskritisation have all, to some degrees, influenced the social values.
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These values have resisted the progressive changes although powerful political movements 
have swept the state, with enough strength to deliver new constitutions.
Although the population is multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious and multilingual, the 
underlying social dynamics is unexpressed by these terms. It is equally worth analysing the 
situation where the Terai and hill populations consist of Dalit category in their social 
constructs (while even the Newars in Kathmandu valley are not free from such a 
dehumanising hierarchy) the institution of equal citizenship becomes an imperative theme. 
Thus in an all-pervasive caste system, Dalits are dehumanised and exploited. In addition, 
these occupational societies, such as tailors, goldsmiths, blacksmiths, cleaners, butchers 
etc. are indispensable to the society, whose service cannot be undervalued. In this respect, 
they have been alienated from their own production. The recruitment of Dalits in the 
Maobadi andolan clearly speaks of the prejudices and exploitation of his category by the 
state and the upper caste elites. It was with the hope of emancipation that Dalits readily 
supported the people’s war.
In view of the present political processes, I have outlined the constraints to the 
establishment of the institution of citizenship in Nepal where much of the outcome 
following the aftermath of the recent political changes shall be the product of opportunity 
utilised. Despite the multitude of problems, enveloping the state at present, the issue of 
exclusion is considered the principal challenge undermining the institution of democratic 
citizenship in Nepal.
The institution of citizenship is a social construct that brings to the fore the debates on 
rights, duties and obligations of the members of the political or cultural entity, through the 
interactive processes. True relationships between the state and citizens are founded on and 
streamlined though public opinions derived from socialisation; sometimes referred to as 
civilising processes by social scientists and political theorists. Thus, fresh debates in the 
present political unfolding in Nepal will assist in directing the course of citizenship 
formation through inclusive processes replacing the assimilatory exercises and 
exclusionary practices as distant forms of internal colonisation and domination.
For a newly founded democracy, citizenship is essentially an unalienable principle. Much 
to the definition follows the idea behind rights and duties as members of the state. The
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relations expressed through citizenship are multidimensional, broadly categorised as the 
relation of the members extending towards the state as well as the relations between people 
at individual or collective levels. These relationships profoundly affect the strategies, 
policy and programmes visualised by the state in terms of outcome, whether or not a broad- 
based participation of the public is achieved. The concept of citizenship is important as the 
degree of participation amounts to volume outcome especially with respect to social, 
political and economic goals during the comprehensive development phases in which 
Nepal would inevitably engage. This notion has been shared by Cairns (2003:501) as well:
Citizenship is possibly the most important of the central institutions of the modem 
democratic state. It is an instrument to socialise individuals into a supportive 
relationship to that state. It encourages them to develop positive attitudes to 
membership in the political community and to review the legally constituted political 
authorities as legitimate, in short, to see the state as their state, in whose development 
they actively participate.
The idea of citizenship in a modem sense, expressed either in the form of membership and 
social status as a person in possession of rights defined by reciprocal duties, or as an 
expression of equality and social justice should be tested on practical grounds. Dalits 
stigmatised as being impure, dirty or sinners will never be able to gain equality unless the 
stigma is withdrawn and an inclusive, environment promoted. Participation becomes 
impossible between hierarchies defined by status and power. The above discussion has 
been very illustratively explained by Gyan Nepali in Dang:
We find it intimidating to share space with a high caste Hindus. When we are taught 
not to touch them or share food with them, because we are polluted, our human 
dignity is lost. What does participation mean when I am so inferior? Although all 
citizens are said to be equal in the constitution, this has never been applied to the 
Dalits. This is why I supported the Maobadi andolan -  to bring abut a change in the 
real social relations.
The above statement is extremely helpful in digging into the parameters constituting the 
bundles of pull factors and by analogy, the push factors, with respect to the people’s war. 
Dalits have been attracted towards the Maobadi andolan for various reasons; however, the 
underlying cause has involved social relations, perhaps more explicitly than economic 
objectivism. Irrespective of wealth, honour and prestige is never achieved within the social 
organisation for them. “Wealth can be made in a life time, but we have been subjugated to 
this subhuman relationship since ancient times,” said Kanchho Damai, in Bijouri. The need
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for social justice has been the consequence of Dalit consciousness. The bond that ties them 
to the Hindu socio-religious structure needs to be terminated, rather than being ended on a 
compromise.
For example: will Dalits be allowed into temples; or will they be regarded as being pure; or 
will they be welcomed into the homes of upper caste groups; or will they be compelled to 
their traditional chores; or will they be allowed to use local wells and springs for water; or 
will they have to bow down, as always, in front of all, in all places at all times; or do they 
deserve to be treated as sub-humans? The answer to a rational mind is, of course, negative! 
Then, what is the probability of a compromise? -  there is none. Compromise seeks some 
level of equality among the participating groups. Thus, the option for compromise does not 
exist. Rules can be made on legal grounds, but the moral issues that differentiate faiths and 
values are immensely non-compromising. As for janajatis, the matter is different. It is 
more associated with the needs for federalism, role in state machinery and opportunity for 
participation. These are the underlying reasons for which they have contributed to the 
Maobadi andolan as individual or as collective entities. Here again is a strong sense of 
emotion that drove the people’s war.
The history of political processes and development of the institution of citizenship bear a 
significant relation in their intrinsic or extrinsic forms. In countries where inclusion of the 
general masses has been practised through incorporating the ideals of social equality into 
constitutional parameters and legislation, the institution of citizenship has evolved as a 
natural outcome increasing the individual and collective power of the people. However, in 
stating so we should not discount the fact that many of these states maintained unitary 
democracies in the past that enforced social uniformity at the cost of social diversity and 
pluralism. Furthermore, democratic evolution in these countries cannot be isolated from 
working-class movements that constantly increased and broadened the parameters of 
democracy through greater degree of inclusion, participation and further movement. In a 
sense opines Heater (2002:9) “we have a picture of a movement from a hierarchical to an 
increasingly egalitarian society as the rights of citizenship became democratised”. 
However, even with the advent of liberal democracies and postmodernism in capitalist 
societies, the movements for citizenship entitlements rather than fading away have 
continued to surface with wider degree of complexity and reinforcing social consciousness. 
The inherent animosity between capitalism and citizenship throughout the process of the
200
growth of modernity is visibly attributed by the “inequalities as a consequence of naked 
market forces” (ibid), more visible in urban centres of Nepal. Srijana Nepali in an interview 
shared:
Although Nepalese as “subjects” have been changed into “citizens” with the 
inception of the republic, the social condition of the Dalits has not changed. Our 
condition is worse than that of janajatis.
Srijana’s response indicates dominance and humiliation within a system that functions on 
caste hierarchy. For Dalits, freedoms are possible only by transforming the caste 
relationship, which is beyond their control. The dependency and bondage - the creation of 
age-long caste relationship does not apply to janajatis. Although the national code 
promulgated by Jung Bahadur Rana had placed the janajatis into Baishya category, the 
state remained short of attaining its aims. Janajatis with their own heritage, language, 
history and culture were partially independent as inherent traditionalism provided them 
with a sense of identity. However, the situation of Dalits has been different. Their identity 
has been tied to the upper castes. In absence of Brahmins, Chetris or Baishya there would 
be no Sudras/Dalits. Thus, the coexistence, based on dominance and humiliation, is 
extremely complicated and problemetical that offers Dalits with more challenges as 
compared to that of the janajatis.
Despite the contradictions within citizenship and modernity, I pursue my line of argument. 
Nepal would have appeared different today had it accepted the cultural plurality and 
divergent social formations and devised an incorporating and inclusive policy mechanisms 
enhancing the process of citizenship formation. Both the formal and informal social and 
political processes in failing to extend rights to the Dalits speak much on part of the state’s 
failure in initiating policies for equal citizenship. As a consequence, the operating political 
processes engendering extreme forms of social exclusion became unsustainable. The 
movement of 2006 has thus aspired for inclusive political society and institution of 
citizenship based on equality and social justice. It was essentially against the exclusionary 
socio-political processes that the recent movement seemed to be focussed. In this respect, 
we now can view the nascent democratic political process in Nepal as an opportunity for 
equal citizenship; norms for which have been demanded from below -  through popular 
struggle and collective will of the people. With the fall of monarchy, the Nepalese people 
have been transformed from ‘subjects’ to sovereign entities as an umbrella reference;
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however, for the Dalits, emancipation from the shackles of caste domination, prejudice and 
exploitation still appears a distant dream without a stronger state-societal involvement. 
Both the objective as well as normative issues needs to be recognised in a constructive 
harmony with the global discourses and the process of globalisation. Alongside claiming 
for their rights, the janajatis and indigenous peoples have developed stronger appeals 
towards their faith, culture, language and issues of ‘differences’ in disharmony with the 
model of national citizenship. However, for the Dalits it is in the rejection of the 
exploitative social bonds, disclamation of religious hierarchy and abandoning their 
derogatory conditions that social recognition is possible. In true sense, this category of 
people will eventually be equal citizens only when the upper castes free themselves. I 
believe that it is only in the freedom of Dalits that the freedom of all is secure.
Foregoing caste-based practices does not imply the erosion of religious or faith. Rather 
Hinduism like other salvation religion seeks universal happiness through devotion. It 
believes in atman resident in every being and views humans and animals alike. Simple 
argument would be that when atman resides in all humans equality would follow. 
Furthermore, I believe that the concept of the caste system must have derived from the 
exclusion-inclusion practice that underlined the principles of citizenship during those times. 
Thus, just as any distant exclusionary form of citizenship of the past, the caste system 
needs to be deconstructed to suit the changing times. Acceptance of the fact that caste 
system represented the model of citizenship during the medieval or ancient times in Hindu 
societies will surely make it much easier to transform the caste hierarchy. The tools of 
sanctions, operating through dominance, dehumanisation and exclusion, were employed to 
appropriate economic productions and enforce social order by the rulers, religious leaders 
and the elites. The upper castes need to comprehend that logics supporting the caste system 
are not only invalid; rather the practices such as untouchablity are illegal, unjust and 
immoral, thus need to be dispelled. In either case, both are winners: If Dalits liberate 
themselves, the upper castes will be liberated and when the upper castes liberate 
themselves, the lower caste groups will experience emancipation.
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8.8. Conclusion
It is evident that the caste-based social structure and the inherent discrimination it entails 
has been the foundation of citizenship crisis in Nepal. The multidimensional conflicts 
alongside the Maobadi andolan have been to a considerable degree associated with these 
structures and prejudiced practices. With the rising cadence of consciousness, the Dalits 
have also increased their levels of activism for identity assertion and social justice, partly 
being influenced by the nation-wide ethnic awareness. Although the ethnic assertion has 
geared towards culture and political self-determination, Dalits aspiration is against 
untouchablity, injustice and social hegemony. As a result, it is in the rejection of the 
exploitative social bonds, disclamation of religious hierarchy and abandoning their 
derogatory conditions that social recognition is possible
The movement of 2006 has thus aspired for inclusive political society and institution of 
citizenship based on equality and social justice. It was essentially against the 
exclusionary socio-political processes that the movement seemed to be focussed. In this 
respect, we now can view the nascent democratic political process in Nepal as an 
opportunity for equal citizenship; norms for which have been demanded from below -  
through popular struggle and collective will of the people.
Thus, just as any distant exclusionary form of citizenship of the past, the caste system 
needs to be deconstructed to suit the changing times. Acceptance of the fact that caste 
system represented the model of citizenship during the medieval or ancient times in 
Hindu societies will surely make it much easier to transform the caste hierarchy.
203
Crisis of Citizenship: myopic vision and dogmatic contention
9.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I have argued that the ideological grounds prior to the period of change 
during the 1990s were premised on three competing notions. First was the state-centric 
ideology with the king as the guardian of the state while the second represented a liberal 
view based on liberal democracy. The third comprised the leftist ideology centred on the 
notions of a vibrant national identity and a strong state that emphasised the features of 
nationalism as the basis of national unity. Within this ideological setup, I have further 
argued that the liberal view of individual rights and liberties and the Marxist tradition 
although different from that of the monarchical, compromised with the state regarding the 
issues of nationalism and national identity as paramount over other forms of social 
expressions, symbols or cultures. The monarchical state ideology rooted in the orthodoxies 
of nationalism, besides caste supremacy, was in essence counterproductive to the 
possibilities of equal citizenship. I have argued that the coupling of the ideologies of 
monarchical nationalism with that of the multiparty forces (assuming the similar stance 
although criticising the monarchy) during the democratic era has maintained a unified 
affront underplaying the issue of equal citizenship. For democracy to sustain, the idea of 
citizenship must be embedded into the state ideology as “[...] the concept of ‘equality’ 
arising from this status has very real implications for the politics of identity, since 
citizenship has traditionally claimed priority over other identities” (Purvis and Hunt, 
1999:457)
Despite the other contradictions between the political parties and the centralised state, there 
was not only a tacit theoretical compromise on the issue of nationalism, rather each group 
tried its level best to portray its nationalist fervour, disregarding the other groups’ political 
stand as being weaker. In effect, the monarchical nationalism grew stronger. The chapters 
of politics in Nepalese history including the overall process have been driven along the
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parallels of the national question, which have so far been unquestioned in any form of 
political discourse. The imbued impulse of nationalism in all of the political forces has 
helped to shape the mindset creating synergy among the elite and the educated people. The 
political exercise has rendered the ethos of nationalism indispensible in defining identity. 
The birth of a state does not conclude its national identity, especially in a country like 
Nepal where the national and territorial boundaries do not converge; otherwise, being 
transfixed and non-evolving, the general process of nationhood would simply be stifled -  
terminating its active existence. Creating the binding elements with some degree of loyalty 
among the population is the craft associated with nation building processes. This provides 
productive grounds necessary for shared projects and common aspirations, facilitating the 
process of evolution that generates newer forms of identities, bringing forth more 
diversification. The synergy required for this would have to be based on common and 
shared projects and goals as opposed to the subjugation of weak ethnic categories by 
dominant ones. In Nepal, the scenario of dominant nation (by majority population) does not 
exist, much of which I have elaborated in Chapter 2. Thus, the challenge of attaining 
nationhood for Nepal on the foundations of social justice and equality has been palpable as 
never before. The state, which characteristically disregarded the public desire for social 
justice in the past, needs to comprehend the message of identity politics and move forward 
towards asserting equal citizenship.
In addition to the three forces passionate for the uniform national identity, I assert that the 
emergence of the Maoists has contributed significantly to strengthen the same agenda of 
symbolic nationalism. This fervour encouraged by all of the three representative ideologies 
has historically represented the Nepalese political space, and arguably underpins the crisis 
of citizenship in Nepal. The sentiments upholding the state during the king’s direct rule can 
be reorganised into three main categories beginning with role of external threats in the 
milieu of Nepal’s geopolitical, ideological, and cultural vulnerabilities, followed by the 
imagined passion of development and finally, the monarchical nationalism. These precise 
bundles of sentiment on categorical basis have been the founding ideology of the political 
parties across the spectrum although they seemingly were against the authoritarian rule of 
the monarch. It is evident following this discussion that the political parties cannot be 
given clean chits since they have been collaborating with the state, in its commitment to 
essentialism and monism through subjugation and assimilation. The forms of national 
citizenship and national identity created within the last half a century have been of prime
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political concerns while evaluating the Maobadi andolan. This neglect or the denial of 
social diversity by the state and the democratic parties alike has manifested itself in the 
form of ‘citizenship crisis’ contributing to the growth of identity politics in Nepal.
The issue of citizenship is an extremely challenging political expression, and at times 
enormously elusive claiming its links to the entity of a nation. When citizenship is debated 
while being contextualised in the Nepalese political space, it is seen that the issue has 
rarely been the agenda although the crisis had been emerging as a formidable challenge to 
the very ideology sustaining the nation-state. The political tradition of the state prior to the 
1990s had been driven with the centralist and assimilatory ideals that I have detailed in 
Chapter 2. It was during the 1980s and particularly following the people’s movement of 
1990 that the essentialist perspectives of the state were openly debated, although not 
whole-heartedly by the national parties. Intellectuals, Madhesi and indigenous peoples 
along with the civil societies have assumed the task of invigorating the tradition of critical 
analysis of national affairs following the advent of democracy. Since then, the ideas and 
opinions involving exclusion, exploitation, oppression, neo-colonialism, marginalisation, 
caste hierarchy etc. that have been prominently raised, underline the salient features of the 
crisis in citizenship. Even in the present context, political implications of the term 
‘citizenship’ have rarely been uncovered and debated, as it needs to be.
9.2. The Nepali Congress
For most of the time in the political history of the Nepali Congress (NC), the party had not 
only accepted the institution of monarchy but rather had cherished it as the symbol of 
national unity and cultural custodian. Moreover, it had expressed support for the institution 
since 1948, when it was founded. Its national politics during the political exile of the NC 
was guided by the notion that if the monarch provided the party with a compromising space 
in the national polity, it should cooperate through active participation. After the demise of 
its leader, Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala (BP) in 1981, the party had literally cast off its 
ideological base. For most of his followers, BP was a visionary leader; however, for the 
king his personality and vision emanated a sense of threat. Viewing him as a democrat and 
therefore a political rival, the king took no chances when he commanded a coup that 
overthrew the elected government and imprisoned the cabinet members, along with 
hundreds of leaders from other political parties non-supportive of his political ideology.
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The king, as an ambitious and callous leader, had relied on political allegations such as the 
issues of corruption, nepotism, law and order and anti-national elements for justifying his 
undertaking. He clearly demonstrated his antithetic stand with the process of democracy as 
he talked to BP Koirala a few months before his move, when he said: “Look, it appears 
both of us cannot be contained in the same place... Either permit me to fade out and you 
run the show as you like. Or you get out and let me rule as I think best. Both of us cannot 
be at the same place together” (Hoftun et al. 1999: 69-70). Stressing the belief that 
monarchical regimes needed to be antithetical to democratic ethos, the king clandestinely 
had read out his verdict. With the political developments heading towards minimal 
democracy and freedom, an exclusive form of citizenship was designed to serve the state- 
centric ideology where every resident of the territorial state was expected to demonstrate 
his allegiance as a duty without enquiry into other intrinsic forms of identity or their 
variables. However, on the national question, the king as well as the democratic leaders 
was inspired by the concept of assimilation en route to uniformity for promoting a strong 
sense of nationalism, national unity and national citizenship. The NC observed the role of 
large neighbours as a national threat while at the same time strengthened the state ideology 
by cherishing the cause of nationalism. Further to this, the party was supportive of the 
monarchy from its apparent class perspective in addition to the mounting fear from the 
rising popularity of left politics. Nepal observed over the years a triangular form of 
relationship where the communists regarded the NC with distrust while the latter supported 
the monarch as a way out for keeping the communists from power. However, on all 
occasions both the left and the right strengthened the institution of monarchy from the 
nationalist point of view.
B.P. had envisioned the future Nepal as an economically strong entity governed by laws 
and democracy, and was consequently steadfast on the overdue issues of landownership. 
He advanced the land reform strategy as the realistic struggle against the prevalent state 
feudalism. Here we can view the arena of citizenship emerging where economy and 
commerce could narrow the wealth gap between individuals participating in production 
relations. At the same time, the issues such as education, health, security etc. were also to 
be tackled. However, his leadership in the government suddenly ended with a coup and 
likewise, the chances of citizenship formation never occurred. During the years of political 
excursion, the king centralised his focus on building national identity premised around the 
idea of state supremacy sans individual liberty and freedom.
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On the central stage, the monarch represented the state and oversaw the institution’s 
supremacy over all political, economical, social, religious and constitutional matters. 
Monarchs being above the constitution meant that extra-constitutionalism governed the 
country while the constitution simply became defunct as and when the king wished. The 
institution of citizenship on social fronts was hollow while in the political arena the 
supporters of the king’s direct rule were included as privileged citizens. The vast majority 
with differing ideologies or views was classified as ‘antinational elements’ and ‘betrayers’. 
These terms in general indicated the activists affiliated to either the Nepali Congress or the 
Communist Party. Both of these parties were driven underground during the monarchical 
regime.
The outlook of the Nepali Congress represents the liberal trend while its membership 
chemistry reflects a mixture of the bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie and to a fair extent the 
working class such as peasants and factory workers, as well. It is neither a class-based 
party, nor possesses an ideological uniformity. Oscillating between social democracy in 
rhetoric and liberalism in fact, the party has seemingly lost its theoretical position including 
the political lustre that it upheld. Rather, the leadership has been plagued by the unhealthy 
practices of patron-client relationship and familial hegemony. The concept of equal 
membership appears to be replaced by a moderately revised form of ‘a few as more 
equals’. This relationship extends beyond the party lines and well onto the public sphere 
subtly influencing the state-citizen relations on both the vertical and horizontal accounts. A 
postgraduate youth supporting the party and a political activist who is a Dalit in an 
interview said, “It is not that the idea of equal citizenship that is not good, it’s rather that 
the problem lies with the leadership. When they (leaders) do not judge us (Dalits among the 
party members) as being of equal worth, how could one believe they favour equality and 
justice?” The idea of equal citizenship is a political matter but more strongly, it also is the 
measure of any organisation’s collective belief in equality and social justice. On failing to 
streamline the party towards maximising inclusiveness, the exclusivity has produced 
institutional bias restricting the organisational capability for institutionalising equal 
citizenship. On similar grounds, the attitude and behaviour of the leadership has been non- 
inclusive as well. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that most of the members of 
leadership from the district to the central level are from Chhetri, Bahun (Brahmin) and 
Newar ethnic backgrounds. Thus^ the coupling of institutional orientation on the one hand.
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and the exclusive behaviour of the ruling elite on the other, has undermined the growth of 
equal citizenship within the party.
In an interview, Mohan Sharma, a youth leader from the NC party presented his opinion on 
democracy and citizenship where he relied on the reductionist vision in his attempt to 
refute this non-inclusionary trait. He stressed, “All members of the party are equal as they 
have the right to vote for the leader of their choice. Isn’t this what democracy is all about”? 
This was in fact the representative view of the loyal party workers -  an opinion providing 
linkage to how democracy is viewed. Reducing democracy to a symbolic one-act repeated 
every four years has curtailed not only the free flow of knowledge but rather has minimised 
the theory and practice of democracy into a robotic act, without upholding the necessity of 
viewing the needs and aspiration of the voters. Citizenship involves more than just the right 
to vote, it also involves the extended cultural and economic rights and most significantly, it 
implies every person being recognised as an equal social member in a political entity. This 
dynamic relationship is represented by the institutional agency of citizenship.
Traditionalism has also played a profound role in shaping the model of democracy in 
Nepal. The factors of clan relationship, familial and communal systems were in many ways 
conflicting with the demands of democracy. The traditions of the patrimonial and 
patriarchal societies served as bottlenecks in the decision-making processes, very crucial to 
the widening and deepening of democracy. The units such as families and clans along with 
their traditional way of managing daily lives, hardly serves to promote the modem sense of 
democracy. The problem is further exacerbated when the party rather than taking a 
relatively egalitarian stand on issues pertaining to social practices, resorts to continuing 
with the traditional processes that deeply limit the growth of ideology and vision associated 
with democracy in real living conditions. Political freedoms are less visible in conditions 
where the political trend dominantly represents the traditional ways. For instance, Hoftun et 
al (1999:218) point out that “democracy in a sense of political pluralism, rather than 
economic egalitarianism, is perhaps less easy to see as a natural development of some 
aspects of traditionalism.” Despite the much-celebrated political changes in Nepal since 
1950, little has been achieved in social and economical contexts without mentioning the 
more subtle issues of language, ethnicity and religion that have been neglected. The neglect 
bears evident roots that link to the rise of identity politics.
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More correctly, the Nepali Congress is a political party, which is a conglomerate of 
different classes in the economic terms and a collection of different cultures (caste, non­
caste and indigenous peoples) across the social structures and regional divides. These 
collectivities possess their own interests and often the leadership is under the influence of 
the dominant members, associations or groups that are traditional and more powerful 
within the party. The Nepali Congress claims its legitimacy over the ideals of democracy, 
but many critics have different opinions. Sunil Poudel, lecturer of Political Science at 
Trubhuvan University in an interview explained:
Democracy is rather a way of living” and added, “It is simply meaningless when 
people’s daily lives are rooted to the chauvinist, sexist and patriarchal practices and it 
is even more disturbing when leaders of political organisations and ruling elite have 
similar mindsets often in more traditional forms.
The emerging form of the institution of citizenship and the long-practiced traditionalism 
are in conflict in Nepal.
Despite the strength of traditionalism within the party, it is not free from the powerful 
message of equal citizenship. The outburst of identity politics in the background of 
Maobadi andolan has continuously influenced the party and its ideological regime. As a 
result, the pressures for inclusive democracy, multiculturalism and equality have continued 
to build within the party. The later developments involving the party organisations and the 
recent election manifesto for the constituent assembly elections all point towards similar 
direction. “Nepali Congress has to change with time; the fresh CA elections show that the 
party has been, at least momentarily, kept away from power. This should be a strong 
message to the leaders,” replied a local NC leader in Bijouii village. “The leaders must 
change their attitude for an inclusive stance,” he added.
Dipak Jha, schoolteacher at a primary school in Bijouii and a supporter of the Nepali 
Congress said in our casual talk “You see, I am a teacher by profession and we don’t have 
the problem of exclusion in schools. However, when it comes to having the opportunity of 
learning in one’s own mother tongue, there is surely a situation of exclusion. Here, it is not 
the teachers that have the ill intention; rather it is the state policies that govern the 
decision.” Later in the same interview he said, “It’s quite true that the Nepali Congress had 
been in the government for about ten years within the 12 years of democratic life of the
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country, (prior to the royal coup of 2003). However, it could not introduce programmes for 
cultural or social reforms.” The social and cultural reform programs indeed would scale 
down the differences among caste and non-caste groups while at the same time promote the 
inclusive practices streamlining the socio-political processes towards creating equal 
citizenship.
The Nepali state, having accepted the idea of national citizenship, viewed assimilation as 
the most effective means of achieving the end, which of course must be accepted in the 
historical context rather than approached at face value. The political parties in the last half 
of the century have pursued this state ideology without any investigation of its possible 
links to the rise of identity politics. The Nepali Congress is no exception as I have already 
mentioned. It also affirmed national citizenship as the only model for a strong state that 
basically would be self-reliant and enable the convergence of the human potentials into an 
efficient productive relation. This was thought to be a progressive as well as a scientific 
way out for a multicultural, multilingual, multi-religious and multi-ethnic state. The state 
was portrayed above the individual existence; and the synergy derived from national 
citizenship was equated with economic progress. The overall state initiatives during the 
panchayat era converged to create a national monoculture around dominant identities 
through explicit and implicit forms of assimilatory policy regimes.
Nootens (2006:37) emphasises:
Since most contemporary liberals remain trapped in the ideal of the territorialised 
sovereign state, their normative stance towards national minorities either puts national 
minorities at a disadvantage in issues of self-determination, or conveys a dissociation 
of culture and politics that contradicts the very essence of the modem idea of the 
nation.
Particularities concerning religion, ethnicity, language and culture were regarded as 
hindrance to national cohesion and the king called for national unity during different 
episodes of uprisings. Emphasis maintained that the state should function as the powerful 
centre while the rest of the population accepted the obligations for an unconditional service 
towards the state. The Nepali Congress Party was an active agency for the monarchy’s 
policies on assimilation, social subjugation and hegemony, refuting any voice that claimed 
for identity assertions in any way. The effects of exclusion were invisible for the party that 
believed in essentialism and monism for attaining national identity.
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The ideals of state centric ideology, national citizenship, assimilation, uniformity and 
hegemony that besieged the Nepali Congress were effective tools to reinforce the 
monarchical state ideology. Thus, it is for a considerable part that national political parties 
such as the Nepali Congress have had their ample share in generating citizenship crisis. 
And as we see, the crisis has eventually advanced into social movements, characteristically, 
the politics of identity and recognition.
9.3. Confluence of ideology confirming the modality of citizenship
As discussed above, the ideology of national citizenship had been the guiding belief of the 
state effectively during the panchayat era. The idea behind national citizenship has been 
part of the post-war consciousness that I have detailed in my former chapters. The ideology 
gained its legitimacy as nation-states advocated sovereignty, indivisibility, territorial 
integrity and non-interference as their defining principles. The eagerness of the states 
towards this goal was imbued in the emerging political setup of the 1960s that were visible 
in all of their expressions. The nationalist movements generated by the elites and anti­
colonial movements from below served as agencies of coordination for creating the basis 
for the emergence of the national citizenship. By promoting this agenda, the ruling elite 
secured its own positions at the helm of the states while the civic society and political 
parties, possessing no significant alternative means against colonisers, viewed the state- 
centric ideology, as an inevitable political strategy for overcoming colonialism or neo­
colonialism. This strategy was also employed for building new states liberated from 
colonial powers. These initiatives were ultimately described and valued as the continuums 
leading into the nation-building processes that followed liberations or the movements of 
independence. I have highlighted anti-colonial liberation movements, and later the 
implosion of Soviet model of socialism, as additional causes contributing to the rise of 
identity politics in Chapter 2.
Pritihivi Narayan Shah, during the unification, declared Nepal as “garden of flowers.” His 
analogy appears to be based on the concept of national identity with the intention for a 
viable state with a strong capability of resistance externally and a unified population devout 
to the monarchical regime internally. However, the feudalist state simply signified a model 
possessing exclusionary characteristics, which identified itself with the high caste and 
feudal identities while the occupational groups and minority cultures were expected to 
assimilate. All groups, however, were expected to acknowledge allegiance towards the
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State. The Hindu model of exclusion provided space to the indigenous and ethnic groups 
but not without subjugation. These groups were placed at the lower rungs of the social 
hierarchy. The chosen state culture was the dominant Hindu culture as practised by the king 
of the Gorkha Empire. The prominence of Hindu religion and culture along with Nepali, 
the language of communication (with the most extensive usage in the foothills), were in 
themselves the raison d ’être for unification. The act of politicising the “imagined 
communities” (Anderson, 1991) that enduringly needed to battle the expansionist colonial 
rule of the south, succeeded in legitimising the possible threat. This resulted in galvanising 
the monarch’s forces for the unification project to a certain degree. However, also the 
feudal ideology (embedded in social structure of that time) may have inspired him for an 
extensive kingdom and the power that would substantially differ in form and intensity from 
that of the small principality that he enjoyed. Despite the arguments that tend to stick 
different tags to his name, PN Shah was a conformist in his cultural standing. I accept the 
fact that he is indeed a historical figure and the creator of the Nepali state, despite many 
controversies surrounding his state policies.
National culture was being shaped by the state since the unification. Quotes from religious 
texts were extensively used as inspiring messages. Symbols were tied to political goals to 
forge alliance with the commoners. During the panchayat era, elites from different cultural 
backgrounds were nominated as political representatives. The foremost message of the 
state was concerned with the promotion of a state-centric monarchist ideology, where 
individual liberty and freedoms were neglected for national goals. The citizenship model 
was communitarian, muddled in the republican thought processes. Although a national 
culture never existed, efforts were exerted to channelize national consciousness as the key 
political feature of modernity and nationalism. Despite the prescriptive loyalty of 
individuals towards the state, individual as well as collective rights and freedoms were left 
out even from the attributes of national citizenship. This form of divorce between the 
individual and collective rights from political entity legitimised unequal identities rather 
than creating equal members and citizens. The neglect of cultural, ethnic, religious and 
territorial identities along with the language question was expected to transcend the ideals 
of individual rights and freedoms in favour of nationalism and national citizenship. Behind 
this motive was the desire for creating a homogenised community around the dominant 
culture. Moreover, the emphasis on the idea of a ‘classless society’ during the panchayat 
regime proved to be an unfounded slogan especially as class, caste along with other forms
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of social hierarchies existed in their real and objective forms. The idea, rather than 
providing insight into addressing these problems was a tool for legitimising these 
differences. Viewing the axioms, ‘classlessness’ ‘equality’ and ‘social justice‘, to be the 
pedigree of the regime, the king’s direct rule did not refrain from mocking the sensitivity 
that that these value laden terms may have possessed.
In summation, the ideology of citizenship in the Nepalese context has been premised on an 
imagined homogenous national state. The rise of identity politics following the 1990s 
provides sufficient insight into the phenomenon of cultural politics that has tended to shape 
the structure of the state with the intention of redefining the status of citizens within the 
political entity.
The Nepali state in its effort to create one national identity ventured to hybridise and 
translate the politico-theoretical basis of the neighbouring states. Its invention of 
‘classlessness’ and ‘panchayat democracy’ were in effect the response to the political 
systems of the neighbouring countries. The former tried on theoretical grounds to defend 
the Nepali state from ‘class-based’ insurgencies at home, and partly to dismiss the 
influence of the Chinese revolution and the cold war. The latter (panchayat democracy) 
was lauded for its mato suhaundo (indigenous/innovative) characteristics as compared to 
the Indian model of democracy. Post-war psychology, anti-colonial movements and the 
centrality of monarchy in state affairs were imbued into the national consciousness that 
have significantly influenced the political processes including the political parties across 
the spectrum. Even with the advent of democracy in Nepal, both the the Nepali Congress 
as well as the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) has continued to cherish the monarch-led 
nationalism despite the changed political context.
Thus, the marriage between the political parties and the state is not a new phenomenon; it 
rather has been inherited since the inception of the Nepali state, albeit in different contexts. 
The Communist Party of Nepal has been no exception.
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9.4. The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) and the communists
The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPM(UML) in short] has been 
no exception in building the state-centric ideology that has promoted assimilation, cultural 
uniformity and social homogenisation with the aim to create universal national citizenship. 
Marxists in their theoretical interpretations have accepted the state to represent the 
reactionary domestic forces in collaboration with global imperialism. The state ideology is 
simply the reflection of the ideology of the ruling class. However, in developing their 
thesis, the Nepalese communists have not only failed to reinterpret Nepali nationalism, 
disentangling and dislocating it from monarchical perspectives, but have also generated a 
conflicting scenario concerning the emerging forms of identities and citizenship claims.
“Our party comprehends the indispensability of the concept of nationalism, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity,” proclaimed a leader of the Communist Party (UML) in an interview 
adding, “Nationalism has always been at stake for a small country like Nepal.” The 
psychology of smallness coupled by the sense of foreign threat and the internalised logic of 
vulnerability failed to invigorate the searches for alternative forms of identity for Nepal. 
The marriage between the Marxists and the ‘reactionary state’ concerning the ethos of 
nationalism has been truly remarkable. The monarchical state-centric ideology appears 
appealing to the leftists and communists although the political changes have demanded the 
ideology to be revisited. The supremacy of Hindu religion, culture and Nepali language, 
against the multiethnic, multi-religious and multilingual nature of state has had no impact 
and neither seems to alert the communists, who emphasise on revolution underpinning only 
the economic aspects of social contradictions. The founder General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Nepal, Pushpa Lai had described compositely the plight of the people; 
however, he abstained from emphasising the complications that a fragmented society, as 
that of Nepal, would pose for a revolution when the underlying reasons were reduced to 
economic reality alone. “The Maobadi were politically clear,” said a university teacher in 
an interview following the constituent assembly elections, “while they may have not known 
the implications of their declarations concerning ethnic and regional contradictions, it is 
clear now that they have been rewarded.”
In my opinion, it is not that the Nepalese Marxists have not understood the complexity 
associated with Nepali national state and ideas associated with nationalism, national
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identity, sovereignty and freedoms, rather the problem lies with the Marxist literature that 
often appears ambiguous.
For instance, Ephraim Nimni (1994:8) writes:
The second parameter configuring the Marxist theory of the national question is the 
theory of the economic determination of the forces of production. This theory is a 
form of economic reductionism, because it declares that all meaningful changes 
within the social arena take place in the sphere of economic (class) relations.
If this view of state is to be reconsidered, then the communists should not have supported 
the features and the theoretical explanations of nationalism offered by the reactionary state. 
Although Lenin pointed out that, “Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it 
even of the ‘most just’, ‘purest’, most refined and civilised brand” (in Nimni, 1994:87), the 
Nepali communists have associated their programme of revolution with nationalism and the 
associated ideology. The political-ideological basis of the state had then been defined by 
the leftist leaders as being ‘reactionary, semi-feudal and semi-colonial’, which was the part 
of the project of the ‘feudal state’. Further to this, the communists believe that the state 
ideology is the reflection of the ruling class ideology. If this was the case, the matter is 
quite simple. Since the ideology that defined Nepali nationalism during the king’s direct 
rule was founded on feudalism and essentially monarchy-centred, the immediate task 
would be to redefine and relocate it in the changed political context.
Bamdev Gautam, a central leader of the CPN (UML) said in an interview during my first 
field visit:
For the revolutionary achievement, the reactionary state that has been based on semi- 
feudal and semi-colonial characteristics must be destroyed. Uniformity in every 
respect is essential for national upliftment.
However, on the question of Nepali nationalism, all the forces, irrespective of ideological 
differences, have co-opted with the state that not only saw social diversity as a demerit for 
the cause of national unity, rather the impetus was streamlined towards attaining national 
uniformity and national citizenship centred around the notions of symbolic nationalism. 
External and foreign threats, the rhetoric of development, self-reliant models of existence 
and various other ideas promoting national citizenship were used to create the atmosphere 
of urgency for the elitist project. This was the main feature of the panchayat autocracy;
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however, even the communists configured with the state ideology that they comprehended 
as being reactionary.
During the panchayat autocracy, the ideas supporting the concept of the homogenous 
national state were passionately discussed. When the king overthrew the elected 
government during 1960s, The Communist Party underwent a split, one faction supporting 
the role of the monarch while the other advocated a new democratic revolution. Even 
though the squabbles within the communist party were frequent, the split, in this case, 
became extremely helpful for the king to promote the ideology of a homogenous national 
state and its strong attachment to nationalism. The ideology was sufficiently well 
supported to keep the monarchical regime intact and kicking. Although the reactionary role 
of India in semi-colonising Nepal had been theorised by the communists, it was the 
monarchical regime that benefitted the most. Despite what theoretically appears to be a 
paradox, in reality it reinforced the marriage between the communists and the royalists. The 
tacit agreement between them on issues of nationalism, sovereignty, national self- 
determination and cultural uniformity have all contributed to the crisis of citizenship while 
the tactics employed by communist parties, such as the Maobadi, underpin the narratives 
behind the rise of identity politics in Nepal.
The question of language with respect to national integration was also approached by the 
communists very cautiously. The multi-lingual characteristic of the state was not 
approached with the positive view of recognition and respect. Rather the aspect of social 
diversity was examined through the lens of class struggle, which entailed the notions of 
fragmentism among the working class, if left unassimilated.
Nimni (1994:47) points out:
The universal language will result from the mutual assimilation of the most important 
contemporary languages as the process of economic development brings into a single 
system the different national economies.
The fact that the cultural, religious and lingual issues have been approached by Marxists as 
being secondary to the economic conditions signifies their belief that these differences 
create antagonism between cultures and the state alike. Besides, this argument casts 
sufficient doubt over whether Marxists like the Maobadis could be dedicated 
multiculturalists. “Kautsky ascribes no importance or meaning to cultural diversity, the
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shattering of the cultural existence and values of more backward national communities in 
the quest for universal human progress is always a acceptable and very often desired” 
(Nimni 1994:49). This interpretation has rendered minimal space for subjective issues of 
culture, religion, language and ethnicity. It is because of this that these issues are avoided 
from discussions within the leftist traditions. The communists as well as the monarchical 
regime were for the most part operating under a similar reductionist vision. However, in 
summation, the institution of monarchy that had survived until the recent times drew from 
the synergy generated by the congruence of left and the right. In similar vein, the 
monocultural paradigm of the assimilatory state was revamped by the Marxists who 
assisted in diluting the existing forms of identities and helped to streamline the state 
policies towards monism, although they claimed to be anti-feudal and revolutionary.
9.5. On the question of self-determination
The recent debate concerning the issue of self-determination has surfaced with a new 
vigour and under a changed context -  from when the Maobadi were in the jungles to the 
present context when they are in the central government. This issue needs to be considered 
on both the theoretical as well as the practical grounds. The theoretical aspect of the debate 
is limited within the elite circles of Kathmandu, whereas, on the practical side, the issue of 
self-determination has been more politicised by the Madhesi movement. It, however, was 
the Maobadi that made “the right to self determination” their political agenda with the aim 
to expand their revolution in the Terai. The ethnic nationalist forces have also claimed for 
their rights to self-rule. Thus, the present debate has been introduced under the context that 
Nepal today stands as a federal, republic democratic, state within the global systems of 
nation-states.
On the ideological front, Marxists has been ambiguous on the issue of self-determination. 
In the absence of an impartial and universal definition of the terminology, it is even more 
problematical to justify ones stance regarding the sensitive and politically charged issue. 
However, the debate has not permeated into the grassroots and the ordinary people are 
untouched by the debate.
Santosh Shah, a primary teacher in Bijouii village, said:
... W ell... I just hope that the leaders will decide on what is good. This is a matter to 
be debated above, and ordinary people like us don’t know what it all implies.
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This was the general response at the village level from many respondents such as peasants 
and local students identifying themselves as ‘ordinary people’. However, it is important to 
note that even the grass-root leaders representing different parties were unclear about the 
idea and tried to provide what little they knew of the expression. It would be perfectly 
normal to say that they had their own interpretations and it meant different things to 
different people.
The Maobadi’s theoretical provision of the right of the people to “self-determination to the 
point of cession” has reversed the ideology that that state had upheld since the unification. 
This slogan has served them well while mounting assaults on the state. As cultural, ethnic, 
religious, lingual issues had been politicised, the idea of self-determination was the pivotal 
message that turned the Terai movement in their favour.
A small businessperson from the Madhesi background (wanting to remain anonymus), said:
We had difficulty in supporting the Maobadi for a long time. When they raised the 
issue of language and said that we could use our own mother tongue for all purposes 
including the official ones, I supported them and so did the rest of my family 
members.
However, the supporters of the people’s war who were on the fringes most of the time had 
an important message in common -  they all were unsupportive of the violence. “Despite 
being attracted by the overall political demands of the Maobadis, including the cultural 
ones, people like I abhorred the violent means employed.” The important aspect of this 
behaviour stems from the fact that majority of the people perceive that the issues of 
language, culture, religion or the ideas of self-determination do not necessarily make 
essential packages in their strategy for survival. “It is good to have it but not over a blood 
bath”, commented an elderly women in a family interview in Bijouii village. This indicates 
the common desire for a constructive state with vibrant, strong democracy where the 
immediate chapters of discussion would involve the right based issues, but in no case the 
resurgence of the civil war.
The Nepali communists have since their organisational inception included Leninist 
framework of democratic centralism as their organising principle and philosophical guide 
to the new democratic revolution. The notion embedded in this interpretation suggests
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centralism more than democracy in true practice. On the organisational aspect of the state, 
Lenin wrote:
Marxists are, of course, opposed to federation and decentralisation, for the simple 
reason that capitalism requires for its development the largest and most centralised 
possible states, other conditions being equal, the class conscious proletariat will 
always stand for the larger state” (in Nimni, 1994:88).
Lenin’s view, regarding the idea of federalism, decentralisation, or distribution of state 
power, was accepted at face value by Nepali communists. The pluralistic nature of the 
social structure was perceived as political problem for the creation of a centralised state and 
central economy. Thus, it was in their interest, besides that of the monarchical state, to 
insure the path of cultural and lingual assimilation, which they believed in the long haul, 
would unify the ‘fragmented’ social structure, the working class, and the proletarian 
movement as well. It was a matter of immediate concern of the communists to exclude any 
political agenda that counteracted the strategy of a new democratic revolution. The overall 
impact of this interpretation, besides strengthening the monarchy, down played the 
pluralistic vision of citizenship exacerbating the crisis, throughout the thirty years of the 
panchayat regime. Further to this, the problems that arose relating to the non-economic 
issues were brushed aside under the assumption that ‘revolution would be the solution’ as 
means of bringing about changes in all directions while reducing the gross social 
intercourse into a rigid parameter of class struggle. It has been the mantra of the 
communists to view every prevalent form of discrimination, racism or sexism prevalent in 
the Nepalese societies as the product of ‘feudal social structure’. Thus, in the course of 
interpretation, the reductionist vision of class struggle being implied on even the cultural, 
ethnic, religious, and lingual issues, failed to provide space for comprehending the cultural 
content, which drastically differed from objective parameters of economic determinism. In 
the quest to explain the subjective issues, the Nepali communists referred to the revolution, 
explaining it as though it were to be the magic wand for solving every sort of grievance, 
including the subjective issues, the content of which, they have had difficulty even in 
theorising. It was definitely challenging for the communists to analyse identity politics 
associated with subjective issues, which often manifest without objective economic 
interests and transcend the class divisions.
Debating on the idea of federation, autonomy and self-determination, Lenin pointed out:
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The right to federation is meaningless; since federation implies a bilateral contract... 
Marxists cannot include the defence of Federalism in general in their programme. As 
far as autonomy is concerned, Marxists defend not the ‘right’ to autonomy, but 
autonomy itself, as the general democratic principles of a democratic state with mixed 
national composition... Consequently, the recognition of ‘the right of nations to 
autonomy’ is as absurd as the ‘right of nations to federation” (in Nimni 1994:76).
The inspiration of Lenin’s political analysis had been the guideline that formally forbade 
any communist to adhere to analogies corresponding to pluralism. When the state brutally 
cracked down on the Terai Congress during the late 1950s for their demands on ‘the right 
to their local languages and right to autonomy’, both the communists and the NC paid little 
attention. I have discussed this in Chapter 2 and 7. The struggle for language in the Terai 
was eventually analysed by the communists as one that had the potentials of developing 
into a separatist movement, despite the fact that the movement was the outcome of the 
identity crisis and the forgotten chapters of overlapping citizenship. This, the political 
leadership had failed to comprehend. The caution that the communists held fast to was the 
possibility of foreign intervention in the integrity and indivisibility of the Nepalese state. 
The attitude of India has exceptionally preoccupied the Kathmandu leadership across the 
political spectrum when assertive voices are heard in the Terai.
The politics of assimilation, uniformity and national citizenship under the banner of 
national identity converged into the mantra of salient category for all the political forces on 
both sides of the left - right divide. For the same reasons Lenin emphasised, “Wg are 
opposed to federation in principle [emphasis added], it loosens economic ties and is 
unstable for a single state” (in Nimni 1994:76), the communists failed to see or undermined 
the national prospective based on diversity and subjective issues of ethnicity, religion, 
culture and language. The political imperatives otherwise could have driven the polity 
towards inclusiveness and recognition. Politics of recognition was ultimately abated for the 
more spontaneous agenda of the politics of distribution, which suited their political and 
philosophical basis of state reconstruction.
Besides these arguments, the additional dogmatism that was observed in trying to analyse 
the ethnic, cultural, religious and lingual grievances with regard to the Marxist literature 
needs some consideration. This involves the transportation of the idea of nations, and the 
arguments for categorising some as ‘historical nations’. The definition that Stalin has 
worked out for nations is perhaps the most expressive one where he stated:
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A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis 
of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make up 
manifested in a common culture, (in Nimni 1994:91).
In the Marxist debate of historical nations, only those capable of forming states of their 
own were included while the rest were nonhistorical and thus were needed to transcend to 
their higher levels. What this implied was that those nations incapable of separate states 
had to be assimilated into larger ones in order to create a strong and a powerful centralised 
state. The economic parameters and the capitalist mode of production would bring 
profound changes with one language and centralised economy. Ethnic or subcultural 
movements in this regards were observed as being counterrevolutionary because they were 
perceived to fragment the working class and the proletariat.
As discussed above, with more that 100 ethnic communities in Nepal, the sub-national 
nationalism was not accepted into the political framework of the Nepali Congress party or 
the communists. As communists argued, the liberals also upheld the notion that the ethnic 
differences and the politics of identity were unhealthy for the state. The monarchy along 
with the political parties, in line with my argument, helped to strengthen the state’s vision 
of culture assimilation with the hope of ‘transcending’ the ethnic subcultures into higher 
forms through the institution of national citizenship and national identity. This was 
particularly the message that Stalin (ibid) gave out: “The national question in the 
Caucasus,” he said, “can be solved only by drawing bleated nations and nationalities into 
the common stream of higher culture (emphasis added). Stalin’s idea of higher culture fits 
well into the Nepalese context. With so many ethnic sub cultures in existence, the dominant 
Khasa culture has been expected to be of higher form that needed to be adapted by all. 
Rather than force being applied for this purpose, the state took up the issue as a political 
agenda and delivered the message of Khasa supremacy through the legal, social, cultural 
and educational tools. Cultural hegemony and social supremacy were complex processes 
that promoted the process of internalisation in a more subtle, slow and non-violent way, 
absorbing the time span of centuries for changes that are visible now.
During the political period of the past half a century, the Nepali state survived amidst a 
series of political and social contradictions. The prominent ones were concentrated around 
the agenda of state power claims, which were led by elite circles and shaped by a range of 
ideological standings. The major contradiction was premised around the agenda of
222
democracy as opposed to the monarchical regime. The underlying reasons for any given 
conflict were analysed through the economic parameters. The aspects of distributive 
politics were profoundly advanced by the leftists while the rightists illustrated the benefits 
of wealth and economy. The idea of the politics of recognition was neglected by all of the 
three forces that dominated the space in the national politics. Neither the state’s policy 
regime nor the political agenda of the opposing parties (the leftist and the rightist forces) 
appeared to realise that subjective issues were important aspects of citizenship and needed 
to be addressed to promote the sense of inclusion for the survival of the Nepali state. The 
gross neglect of social justice and the legal-moral aspect of equality conflated the ethnic, 
religious, and the social into the level of a civil war, which not necessarily represent the 
ideological and practical aspects of the Maobadi andolan.
9.6. Conclusion
What follows then, is that in the Nepalese context, the programmes of national culture, 
national identity and national citizenship are not only limited within the visions of the state, 
rather the assimilatory ideology and cultural uniformity suits the communist philosophy as 
well. In addition to these forces sharing common aspirations, the Nepali Congress, a liberal 
party, possess no alternative political agenda. Rather, it has spent most of its political life in 
collaboration with the state in its effort to thwart the growing leftist influence in the 
country. However, as I have discussed at length, all these forces in the political spectrum 
(i.e. the king, communists and the liberals) shared the same principles. The consistent 
effort and failure of the state’s projects in creating national citizenship, national identity 
and national culture and the ideology that sustained these value-laden ideals, have been 
important factors behind the citizenship crisis. It is thus fair to conclude that the political 
parties, on both sides of the left-right divide have been the barriers to the creation of equal 
citizenship in Nepal and thus should accept their common accountability for the rise of 
identity politics.
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Institution of monarchy, Nepali state and autocracy: the prelude to the demise of 
social diversity
10.1. Introduction
The nexus of the institution of monarchy, the state and the autocratic political regime 
formed an outstanding political front that survived all forms of state resistance for thirty 
odd years building up the “citizenship crisis.” During this interval, the role that the national 
parties played is as important, much of which I have already discussed in Chapter 9. The 
monarchical ideology, I have argued, along with its political creation - the panchayat 
regime, succeeded in fashioning Nepal into a centralised unitary state and accomplished the 
task of generating a “provision of symbolic nationalism” that to this day has influenced the 
state’s national policies. It was within the parameters of this nationalist assimilatory vision 
that national identity and national citizenship were thought to be indispensible, even at the 
expense of the multiethnic, multilingual, multi-religious genesis of the state, for creating a 
homogenised political entity.
I have argued that the growth of ideology/ethos or the sentiment of nationalism, national 
identity and national citizenship, was the product derived primarily from the panchayat 
political discourse during the former regime. The overall impacts of these political and 
institutional processes that basically neglected the social, cultural and regional diversities 
were visible in various forms of social exclusions, working in reverse to the ethos of equal, 
democratic citizenship. As a point of departure, the institution of monarchy, the state, and 
later, the panchayat autocratic regime (1960-1990), which had infused into the Nepali state, 
in my argument, form the central locus of barriers in the creation of equal citizenship and 
thus, the reasons underlining the identity politics. I have argued that the nexus that existed 
between the monarchy, the state and the regime continued to reinforce one another; and in 
doing so, the institution of monarchy was ensured into the central theme as both the creator 
and ruler of modem Nepal (See Chapter 2 and Annex).
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10.2. Legitimacy of monarch: genuine feelings or false consciousness
The current debate over the institution of monarchy, its symbolic standing along with its 
political, social and cultural significance has been premised on the grounds of false 
consciousness versus the genuine feelings in differing perspectives. In this section, I have 
discussed how the institution of monarchy has been perceived at the grassroots following 
the April movement from whence the institution has lost its political space. Although the 
final tremor that ousted it was during 2006, its systemic decay was visible since the 1980s. 
For a poor and non-political village blacksmith, Rakam Kami, the monarchy is essential. 
“King having created Nepal, possesses the divine right to rule” he stresses emphatically. 
His beliefs on the monarch are as high as his doubts on the party leaders. He clearly says 
“the king is a king; don’t compare any selfish leader to him.” This is not an isolated view 
either; rather, the Nepali monarch still possesses the social and religious space, although 
whatever remained of the political legitimacy on external fronts has rapidly eroded away. 
For political elites and party workers, the king has been a symbol of feudalism, exploitation 
and a political evil. Almost all the interviewees that were educated and had some 
connections with political parties or were independent democrats expressed similar views 
regarding the institution of monarchy. During my fieldwork of 2007, the constituent 
elections were still due and the monarch continued to reside in his palace, the Narayanhiti 
Darbar, although he had been ousted from politics since the movement of April 2006.
Even during my 2008 field visit (immediately after the king’s political demise), the 
monarchy was still highly regarded by the hardworking rural people that I met. I had time 
to talk to some farmers and some Dalits in Dang district where they told me that they did 
not believe in the latest happenings. “The king is a symbol of unity, and our respect for him 
is high; at least higher than that of any leaders,” Rakam stressed in our conversation. For 
people like Rakam Kami, who have been excluded from social life and barred from the 
ideals of social justice, equality and citizenship, the lingering hopes on and appeals for the 
king and the monarchical regime still appear strong. The fading trickle of hope coupled 
with frustration as the king left his palace for the government’s planned provision for his 
temporary residency, was evident in the interview and open discussions in the days to 
follow. On the reverse, “the idea behind the symbol of unity is all inflated tale and a myth 
coined in during the panchayat autocracy,” continued Prakash Pun, a Maobadi cadre. “The 
king represents the residue of the old regime, namely feudalism, and nothing less.” The 
ideas imbedded in these interviews, represent not only the opinions of fragmented people -
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based on ideology, class, caste/ethnic, religion or language; rather constitute the underlying 
opinions - some predictable, and acceptable. They are also the indicators of the 
opportunities of emerging identities and citizenship formations. These voices also 
represent the contemporary contradictions between the traditional Nepaliness versus the 
egalitarian modernism. Despite the argument of traditionalism versus the modem versions 
of democracy, the role of the monarch as a symbol of unity is a question that will demand 
more justification rather than limiting the argument to assumptions. “The thirty years of the 
panchayat era,” say leaders like Bamadev of the CPN (UML) “have succeeded in 
stereotyping four fundamental myths regarding the monarchy -  symbol of unity, symbol of 
religion, symbol of power and symbol of territory.” The validity of these myths although 
claimed, disclaimed or opposed, possess a strong influence in the minds of public 
especially at the time when the invincible monarchy has more than lost its utility.
The state being observed, even on practical grounds, as the material creation of the 
monarch, placed the latter above the state and its institutions. Besides the altruistic respect, 
the reverence and admirations of many commoners towards the institution of monarchy is 
not uncommon as stated before. While I was in Rakam Kami’s home in Bijouii, talking to 
him, his wife casually entered into the conversation -  a very rare scene in traditional 
Nepalese families - women rarely have interactive space in the parochial and patriarchal 
systems to participate in discussions where males are engaged. However, the participation 
in this case tells of the urgency that she must have felt to let her voice be heard. She joined 
in when we were talking about the recent changes that the country had experienced in 
connection with the monarch. She empathetically said, “the king was the taken as god- 
incamate and religious symbol. I always was convinced that he was above the rest. I did 
not imagine him to step down.” The traditional views regarding the monarch and his 
sovereign prerogative to rule still have strength.
It would take a while for the egalitarian, democratic and republican views to trickle down 
to the excluded masses, who have always been the exploited recruits of elitist projects. The 
question in this case is no different either. However, the jana adolan two, as the movement 
that ousted the monarch is called, had permeated deep within the masses to the level never 
attained in the past. Many possible causes have tended to accredit the ruling national 
parties; however for Rakam Kami’s wife, “the Maobadi andolan is the main reason for the 
present changes including the ones associated with the king; it is hard to even imagine that
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the parties (national parties) could have achieved it without the involvement of the Maoists. 
However, I feel sorry for the king.” The appalling state of the ousted king the in social 
arena is countered by the bold and assertive anti-monarch approaches of the political 
parties. Sweeping changes in the national power regime alongside the political disarray 
that have followed the downfall of the monarchy have caused the general public to question 
themselves on these fundamental changes although the answers will never be the same.
While I was in Kathmandu visiting ward no. 4 of Lalitpur, a group of women that I met 
expressed their surprise at the announcement that the former king would be granted the 
permission to reside at Nagarjun palace as per the decision of the Nepal government. Binita 
Maharjan expressed in utter surprise “I thought, the king owned the territory and that all 
belonged to him (meaning the territory of Nepal), it’s so difficult to comprehend these 
changes, and I still wonder if these changes would be permanent.” The changes that 
Nepalese people are experiencing now have indeed been of historical magnitude, and as 
much as people like Binita are concerned, the monarchy still appears invincible although it 
has been washed from the Nepalese landscape. To many hardworking Nepalese people, the 
demise of the power of the monarch is in itself an important chapter in education, 
constantly shaping and upgrading the social consciousness form the traditional, divine 
logics to the system of modernity, norms of democracy and the rule of law. These changing 
relations with time needless to say, will gradually recline in the principles of state-citizen 
relationship rather than the one that had been traditionally accepted through the divine 
affiliations of the monarch-subject interpretations.
During my second visit, the matter relating to the king was readily discussed by both males 
as well as females. Among the female respondents, most of them appeared weary and 
confused at the prospects of a republican setup. As Bhuau Maharjan, a peasant in 
Jawalakhel said, “it is difficult to sink in the idea of Nepali state without a king. Whenever 
I think of Nepal, the idea of a king automatically creeps in.” The fact that the monarchy 
also signified a social and religious space besides the political is an important aspect of the 
Hinduism. Although the institution has been washed away from the political canvas, the 
monarchy’s social and religious relevance in some aspects of religious norms and values, 
traditions or rituals will certainly persist for some time to come. Its political nonexistence 
does not necessarily terminate its social or religious significance. “See, when my children 
play, they constantly use the symbol “king” to denote the leader that is superior, all-
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knowing and powerful” said Raknm Kami. Among the lower echelons of the Nepalese 
society that are relatively free from the influence of the indoctrination processes, the idea of 
‘Nepal without a monarch’ has been hard to digest. However, this argument is strongly 
criticised as being the result of false consciousness, more persistent among the rural and 
uneducated urban masses. Dinesh, a Maobadi cadre in Bijouri village asserted, “The people 
who sympathise with the monarch and feudal forces are not political; their level of social 
consciousness is extremely low. In this situation, it is their false consciousness that is being 
echoed.” The monarchy-state-panchayat infusion was at large successful in establishing the 
ideology of the monarch-centric regime, where most of the effort was spent in establishing 
the institution as the guardian of the kingdom on all aspects including the religious, social, 
cultural and the political. Despite the present quandary between what some of the people 
say and why they say so, the idea of false consciousness raised by few respondents above, 
requires further academic research.
I will now advance and explore reasons why the ‘residue of false consciousness’ or the 
mythical belief on the king continues to linger despite its termination.
10.3. The monarchy, state and the autocratic regime
After the royal coup of 1960, the king’s ambition was to establish his own system of 
government to suit his will in stark opposition to the domestic reality. The domestic 
scenario, then, was inclined towards democracy and popular will. In the mean time, China 
and India were moving ahead to establish their own identities in the international system of 
nation states. Although, they both had different roots -  one emerging from the shackles of 
colonialism, while the other from the feudal and imperial exploitations, for the Nepali 
monarch and the landed elites the messages emanating from these countries were 
confusing, in the sense that they were both inspiring and fearful at the same time. “Neither 
the type of revolution that occurred in China would have been tolerated by the rulers in 
Nepal, nor a democratic polity resembling India,” said Amirt Sijapati, a local Nepali 
Congress activist in ward number three of Dhobighat, Kathmandu in an interview. 
However, since Nepal also had undergone political changes, freeing itself from the Rana 
oligarchy, the changes in India and China were accepted in similar fashion, but caution 
always ruled over political logic.
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The education system and the flow of information chiefly from radio and print media 
served pretty well to maintain the integrated strength of the monarchy, the state and the 
panchayat autocratic regime. The education system in the name of New Education System 
Plan (NESP) was designed to control the flow of knowledge that was generated and 
reproduced within this trinity structure. According to Binod Chaudhari, the New Education 
System Plan, introduced in 1971, was identified with the partyless panchayat system. The 
objectives of NESP, he added, were “to produce citizens, who, with full faith in the country 
and the crown, would conduct themselves in accordance with the panchayat system; and to 
meet the manpower requirements of development through the spread of scientific and 
technical education.” The basic idea behind the new education system plan was to revamp 
the political and philosophical existence of the state and to reproduce the legitimacy of the 
trinity (monarchy-state-politics) under the constant changing and challenging 
circumstances. The education system was engineered to meet the political needs of creating 
pro-monarch nationalists cherishing national identity based on loyalty and subjecthood in 
contrast to democracy, liberty and equal citizenship. However, this costly and unscientific 
adventure in education was abandoned owing to the series of protests from students, 
teachers and intellectuals, besides from those within the power regime that saw no future in 
the system.
Giving account of the education initiatives following the Rana regime. Save the Children 
points out:
The National Educational Planning Commission (1955) recommended universal 
literacy in Nepal within twenty-five years. The first elected government opened 1,600 
primary schools in a single year, 1959, and an additional 600 primary schools in 
1960. Altogether, 2,200 primary schools were established, matching the number of 
polling booths in the first ever elections in 1959^ .^
Although relatively a late starter in education provision, Nepal had an inspiring beginning. 
The kings’ royal coup brought these initiatives to an end and later, crafted the state-centric, 
nationalist education system that saw nothing beyond the monarchy-state-panchayat effigy. 
“The education was a sham” said Vijay, a university lecturer, “sociology and social 
education had no place in the system, while political science was looked upon with
Source: http://www.savethechi1dren.net/neDa1/kev issues/edupolicies.htm l 
Retrieved: 07 /07 /2008
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mistrust. Science and technology was overstressed in the name of vikas (development)”. 
Despite its broad based unpopularity, there were no alternative except to participate in the 
education system. The system although was a disaster in the end, it however was an 
efficient tool to streamline the state policies: One leader -  the king; one language -  the 
Nepali; one religion- Hindu; one culture - Hindu-based; one dress- the national dress; one 
territory - pahad (hill) and one political system -  panchayat. “The education, being founded 
on the elements antithesis to democracy not only curtailed the notions of universal 
citizenship, but rather provided the ruling elites with intellectual synergy to keep the 
system working” commented Vijay in the same interview. Moreover, the language of 
instruction being Nepali meant that it carried with it the package of culture that belonged to 
the ruling classes and Hindus of the hill Origin. I have discussed the issue of education in 
Chapter 11 as well.
Linguistic standardisation, which was a common phenomenon worldwide during the past 
episodes of the nation building processes, underlined the nature of nationalism that was 
being created. The dominant language, Nepali in this case, came with the baggage of 
culture. Language as such has proved to be an immensely powerful tool in orienting the 
nation-building course towards monism and cultural uniformity. For instance, Stergios 
(2006: 15), presenting similar argument, stresses:
Language is a central gauge of a culture’s desire for and ability to articulate a 
common cultural and political, identity. As such, historical figures, as well as 
theorists and historians, often view linguistic standardisation as a critical step on the 
road to forging a nation.
Keeping the monocultural model in the perspective, the New Education Plan was 
developed. The rulers then endorsed a national curriculum based on what they described as 
‘the needs of the nation’ (as stated in the royal address). The education system along with 
the state-owned radio and print media endorsed strong messages for legitimatizing the 
state’s beliefs. Among the most prominent ones were: rationale behind the classless
society in respect of class conflict, monarchial regime rather than democracy, assimilation 
rather than diversity, monoculturalism rather than multiculturalism, and mono lingualism in 
contrast to multilingualism, etc. Nirmala, during an interview stressed that “despite the 
political interpretation of the rulers, then, the educational administration, like political 
power, was centralized so that the new education policy could be implemented firmly that
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essentially was streamlined to serve and strengthen the monarchial feudal state”. Presenting 
his similar account, former minister Dr. Mahat goes to the extent where he writes, “Besides 
the national integrity and monarchical system reclining in the feelings of nationalism, 
national language and dress were also included”. Please read Chapter 9 for details.
10.4. Education system
As I have just stated, the education system provided the academic as well as a sense of 
meaningful existence to the monarchy-state-panchayat relationship. At the same time, by 
using the Nepali language in schools on compulsory accounts, the state became the 
machinery of hegemony and control. The nation building process during those thirty years 
of the monarchial dictatorial regime drove the country towards a centralized polity with 
very strong sentiments of monarchial nationalism. The democratic as well as the leftist 
forces were also the collaborators in this grand design. I have detailed their involvement in 
Chapter 9. Among many similar incidents, a case that had gripped Kathmandu valley for 
about a week, in a traditional nationalist passion has been illustrated. “If the incident had 
occurred during the king’s pamchayat regime, one may find explanations within that same 
system that constantly invigorated the sense of nationalist culture based on the 
presumptions of uniformity” replied Shyam Thapa, a college student. However, this being 
the incident of 2000, after the restoration of democracy, I stress that it needs further 
academic attention.
I would like to cite an incident where an Indian cinema actor sent the Kathmanduites into 
frenzy. The public poured out into the streets in protest at what they called “nepali lai 
hepeko” (undermining Nepalese people). It ended up being an anti-Indian showdown. 
“Surprisingly, top leaders from CPN (ML) were leading these processions during the 
disturbed days” commented Dinesh Sharma, a youth activist of the Nepali Congress 
currently living in Dhobighat, Lalitpur. The reason behind the political riot was based on 
an incident involving an Indian actor who allegedly was said to have passed derogatory 
comments in an interview regarding Nepalese people. “Kathmandu besides being melted 
down into complete disorder for a couple of days, experienced the bitter incidents of 
harassment of Indians in Kathmandu” said Shyan Thapa in the same interview in 
Kathmandu. On 20**^  Dec. 2000, the BBC had this piece of information to report:
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Four people have died as a result of the violence, and the protesters have now 
demanded that the country's deputy prime minister resign [...]. The Indian 
Government has reacted strongly against the violence and said the protests were 
carefully orchestrated "by elements inimical to Indo-Nepalese friendship to create an 
atmosphere of hatred and distrust" [...]. And Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee has spoken to his Nepalese counterpart, Girija Prasad Koirala, over the 
matter^^.
The showdown of self defence has frequently appeared in Kathmandu streets, if not on a 
regular basis This in my opinion requires a considerable thought and most importantly the 
ingredients of nationalism, leading to such incidents, need to be discussed in a academic 
level, without which, the modality of the state and therefore the nature of citizenship, 
schemes of inclusion and fields of participation cannot be worked out. This must be made 
the central theme especially to ensure that the Madhesis (Terai people) are neither harassed 
nor their properties vandalised by hill nationalists, on the one hand and on the other, that 
the people of hill origin are not terrorised and intimidated by various groups in the Terai 
that are charged no less with the fervour of sub-nationalism and ethnocentiism.
Former Minister of Finance Dr. Mahat argues that the “king used anti-Indian nationalists to 
justify the takeover and rally support in his favour. For this, the new system was in the need 
of an ideological clarity. [...] The feelings of nationalism were heightened by the use of 
media tools such as radio, news publications, pamphlets and posters” (2006:71). However, 
was the nature of nationalism released in the streets of Kathmandu during 2000 similar to 
those that were seen during the monarchy-state-panchayat era, and if so, why is the content 
of the fervour remaining the same? Under the democratic regime that prevailed since 1990, 
and with the monarchy restricted to the constitution, it would have been normal to see the 
contents of identity, self-image or the meaning of Nepaliness reinvented in the changed 
context.
For the monarchy, from 1960 to 1990, both the interior as well as the exterior political 
scenarios were threatening. Thus, the only way available was to take over the country and 
run his own government, controlling and directing everything from education, media to 
politics that were deemed influential and thus envisioned as being detrimental to the 
interests of the monarch if left uncontrolled. The nations emerging from the colonial era
Source: http://nevvs.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/world/south asia/1090264.stm 
Retrieved: 07/07/2008
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possessed the sentiment of national unity, where the dominant and the most powerful 
engineered the flow of knowledge as well as processed the national project towards 
attainment of the envisaged and desired goals of national citizenship. In this respect, Nepali 
nationhood also premised the ideology of state centralism and streamlined the political 
processes to generate a common form of national identity. Nick Stevenson (2001:7) giving 
similar account of the nation building process highlights:
Cultural homogeneity was accepted as a principle of communal solidarity with the 
nation-state, and ethnic homogeneity was imposed by the state through political 
methods ranging from language policies and compulsory membership in the national 
church to ethnic cleansing; it was political membership within the national 
community which, often by default, defined cultural membership, primarily as the 
possession of a dominant language.
As such, the Nepali state was made intensely monarch-centred and this fact was reflected in 
the daily lives of the people. For example, the more celebrated slogans during the king’s 
rule as - hamro raja hamro desk pran bhanda pyaro chha (our king and country is dearer 
than our lives), demonstrate the political philosophy of monarch-state fusion. “The grand 
objective here was,” says Santosh Shah, a teacher in a primary school in Dang, “to impart 
the message that the Nepali state’s existence was dependent on the fate of monarchy. One 
could not exist without the other.” It is interesting to see the use of language in the slogan 
above. The singular verb denotes the king and country to be understood as a single 
subject/entity. Thus, the idea behind this powerful mantra of the panchayat era establishes 
the monarch and state as synonyms where the sense of nationalism is anchored. One who 
loves the monarch is a patriot and a nationalist of highest honour, by doing so he loved his 
country and the political system as well. By default, to be a citizen one was expected to be 
a nationalist i.e. King-loving, panchayat-adoiing, democracy-hating, Nepali-speaking male. 
The rest of the population was excluded from the status of citizenship.
During the king’s direct rule, highlights Save the Childen:
NESP also had a policy of universal primary education. Primary school enrolment 
rose dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. New textbooks were produced. There was a 
strong emphasis on Nepali as a medium of education. To bring uniformity in 
education, the educational administration was centralized completely (Save the 
Children)™.
^  Source: http://\vww.savethechildren.net/neDal/kev issues/edupolicies.h tm l 
Reitieved: 07/07/2008
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The language controversy arose when the state linked the monarch, state and Nepali 
language as personification for the spirit of nationalism. The non-Nepali speakers in the 
state were disadvantaged. This policy favoured the dominant groups as the Bahuns and the 
Chhetris. One language policy and one education system being the epitome of the state-led 
education plan, the multicultural and multilingual aspects of reality were sidelined for the 
attainment of a national identity and national citizenship imbued within the folds of Nepali 
nationalism.
Thus, Save the Children further outlines:
The policy of universal literacy in twenty-five years was abandoned and a lower 
target was established, then the disgruntled political groups started using 
schoolteachers as activists to keep their political ideologies alive (ibid).
Politics entered into the field of education. These developments clearly marked the 
beginning era of identity politics related with the issue of language policy, cultural rights in 
schools and equal opportunity in education including the right to ones own language. And 
as such, argues Hoffman citing Poggi:
[...] to impose a dominant national identity at home, and the single national language 
that generally characterizes the nation state has usually been imposed with a good 
deal of violence upon those who would rather speak a different tongue, or who prefer 
local dialects eradicated by public education policies (2004:51).
After the 1990s, following the people’s movement, there has been no initiative on political 
fronts to redefine the king-centric nationalism although the constitution had undergone 
significant progressive changes. In an interview, the last Prime Minister of the panchayat 
regime, Mr. Singh said:
I wonder why the democrats or the communists have not shown any signs in 
redefining the contents of nationalism. They say the king needs to go. However, even 
when the king is constitutional, the fervour of nationalism has not changed. This is 
because the people are as nationalist as the king is. Since nationalism was defined by 
the monarchy and upheld by the people, it will be difficult for anyone to change it. 
When India had its embargo clamped down during 1990s, we imported petroleum 
from Singapore. It was during those bitter times with India that the movement of 
1990 was initiated.
The political scenario had undergone a basic change - from the monarchical regime to 
parliamentary democracy. However, many crucial questions on nationalism had not been
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addressed. The former monarch-state-panchayat nationalism had neither been officially 
repelled nor reformed although a democratic constitution had been promulgated that 
granted the general features of parliamentary democracy within the framework of 
constitutional monarchy. Pfaff-Czamecka (1997:123) puts forth his view with respect to 
the movement of 1990 and the subsequent process of démocratisation that followed. He 
stresses, “The question of national identity and the process of its redefinition is an intrinsic 
element (and cannot be avoided) in the quest for participation in policy-making and in the 
distributing of national welfare resources.” In the Same article, quoting Giesen, Pfaff- 
Czamecka (1997:121) states, “different kinds of national identity have been propagated by 
successive leaders, who attempt to orient themselves, among other things, to shifting 
cultural traditions.” However, we did not see the attempt, even to a modest level, when the 
need of the decade has been to introduce series of radical changes that implicitly as well as 
explicitly demand a shift from the traditional concept of ‘national identity’ and ‘national 
citizenship’.
The logic that follows now is to see why the new democratic constitution, as the custodian 
of democracy, failed to define the anticipated new inclusive parameters as basis for the 
evolution of equal citizenship. I therefore argue that some of the problem lay in the 
constitution that needs some exploration. I shall deal with the 1990 constitution later in this 
chapter.
10.5. Fusion of history and nationalism
“The system was well crafted. We, as school students were educated to love our king and 
country. King was portrayed to have been full of wisdom; he was the liberator, a guardian 
and benevolent patriarch” said Prem Nepali, a schoolteacher in an interview in Bijouri 
village. The system of monarchy and state worked via the repressive panchayat politics. 
The education system had been exceptionally successful in imparting the monarch-state- 
panchayat values impregnated with the message of monarchical nationalism, sovereignty, 
and Nepaliness.
The daily-cited examples of the panchayat era were drawn from the chapters of history. 
“The national history was regarded to be the personal property of the state,” said Prem 
Nepali in the same interview. Since the unification, the institution of monarchy and the 
history were gradually interwoven into a grand political epic of modem Nepal that
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premised the institution at its centre. The nationalist interpretation often sought historical 
evidences, and the information was used in legitimising the politics of monarchy. The 
monarch spoke for the state and the system of government, while the latter two armoured 
the position and power of the former. The unity of these institutions and processes basically 
upheld the assimilatory nationalist vision while repudiating “to accord any recognition or 
support to minority languages and cultures” (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000:14). The 
assimilatory forms of citizenship for the most part was insisted on by the ruling class and 
the elites for creating common national culture and national citizenship where “all public 
schools, government institutions, streets signs, and public holidays reflect the dominant 
language and culture” (ibid). For Bharat Satyal, a lecturer at the Sanskrit College, the 
monarchical panchayat nationalism made perfect sense. “We are the sons and daughters of 
brave martyrs and for love of our motherland and our inherent attachment to it, we should 
always be ready to sacrifice ourselves in need”. The argument here is not to refute the idea 
of patriotism or progressive nationalism or the ‘sense’ of the ownership of history and 
common experiences, which are essentially the binding factors. Rather it is to cast a critical 
view over the success of the ruling elites in tailoring the national history to their political 
benefit via the messages of external threats and the notions of self-praise.
This approach in shaping the Nepali nationalism produced two adverse effects: first, it 
reproduced the sense of vulnerability and second, it helped to externalise the failures. 
While I put forth my research findings, I would like to stress here that the Indian 
interference in the Nepalese affairs must be critically analysed to appreciate how Nepal is 
seen as a colony within its security umbrella. As a result, the ‘big brother’ colonial attitude 
of independent India has indeed been significantly prominent in escalating the anti-Indian 
sentiments in Nepal. This sentiment was politicised by the king’s regime in creating its own 
model of nationalism. It is within this perspective that the forty-point demand of the 
Maobadi (put forth before the declaration the people’s war) consists of seven, which point 
towards the Nepal-India relationship.
The strategy during the time of the panchayat regime was to confer upon the monarchy the 
ownership of the national history. The history of the state thus was limited to the figure and 
action/inaction of the monarch and chapters spent in its praise and glory. The education 
system and the political discourse converged to meet this end under the presumption that 
allotting rights to the minority would install negative assurance for citizenship traditions.
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The institution of monarchy, being praised as the custodian of the state, was systematically 
legitimised through the political discourses of the system. The institutions and the state- 
governmental processes succeeded in creating a national history that portrayed the 
monarchy as a freedom fighter and a protector from the colonial rule, where each chapter 
drew additional features to its legacy. “The major content of the history was thus,” says 
Nirmala Sharma, a university teacher and a Maoist affiliate “designed to be an expression 
of the heritage of the kings, nobilities and the ruling elites.” The legitimising result 
favoured the cultural and political supremacy of the ruling elites, chiefly the Brahmins and 
the Chhetris. The extra constitutional position of the institution reflected the unconquerable 
political power while the religious supremacy was endorsed by the divine right to rule by 
way of Hindu scriptures. While they both drew their legitimacy from societal levels, the 
national history was created to suit the position of the monarch vis-à-vis the state-monarch- 
panchayat bond fusing the three entities into a single political profile. This made their 
coexistence unproblematic as the monarchists achieved a notable level of legitimacy 
through hundreds of slogans such as raja rahe desk rahancha (whilst the king lives, the 
state exists) or hamro raja hamro desh pran bhanda pyaro chha (our king and our country 
is dearer than our lives^^). This notion was quite clear during an interview with a former 
Prime Minister of the royal regime, during my first field visit, where he stressed, “The king 
is a nationalist, a symbol of unity and the source of inspiration for us all.”
The education system and print media along with the national radio service mostly 
succeeded in disseminating this message as their prime political aim. The flow of 
information and the contents of national history were from top to bottom, and the recipients 
passively internalised the cultural hegemony of the ruling elites formalising the institution 
of monarchy as an omnipotent, and a formidable power structure. “The Monarchy, state 
and the panchayat system were never to be discussed in public, except if one had the 
appetite to comment positively, which was never the case for someone with a democratic 
nature,” added Nirmala in the discussions. Of course, this would be true of any dictatorial 
regimes that tend to promote patriotism and strong and emotional forms of nationalism to 
make the people alert of some real or mythical danger that are often presumed to be driven 
from foreign lands.
Please note the use of the verb. The king and the country were moulded into a single unit.
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It was precisely along these interpretations that the message was effectively passed. The 
nexus of the institution of monarchy, the state and the autocratic political regime formed an 
exceptionally repressive political front that survived the different forms of state resistance 
for thirty odd years building up the “citizenship crisis.” The monarchical ideology along 
with its political creation - the panchayat regime, succeeded in creating Nepal into a 
centralised unitary state and accomplished the task of generating the monarch-centric 
nationalism that to this day has influenced the state’s national policies. It was within the 
parameters of this nationalist assimilatory vision that national identity and national 
citizenship were thought to be indispensible, even at the expense of the multiethnic, 
multilingual, multi-religious genesis of the state.
Thus the growth of ideology/ethos or the sentiment of nationalism, national identity and 
national citizenship, in a multination state, was the product of social intercourse derived 
primarily from the amalgam of the modem education and the panchayat discourse during 
the former regime. The discourse was shaped and funnelled through the interventions of the 
successive monarchs. Thus, the political system, state ideology and the institution of 
monarchy were unified into a single political knot that worked in tandem for a centralised 
state, without any regards to the social, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, regional or political 
inconsistencies or diversities native to the land. The overall impacts of these political and 
institutional processes are visible today in various forms working iri reverse to the ethos of 
equal, democratic citizenship. Moreover, the political parties and the elites collaborated 
with this model of nation building process and contributed significantly to the crisis.
10.6. Politics of inclusion: a myth
During the king’s direct mle, some space in politics was allotted for Madhesi and janajati 
elites although the nation building process in Nepal has never been inclusionary. Despite 
the fact that there was a provision for an indirect election from village to national level, the 
process was politically guided from the centre. The king, having the prerogatives of 
nominating quite a large number of candidates of his choice in the Rastrya Panchayat 
(National Parliament), produced a myth of participation. For those elites seeking power and 
prestige, this scheme offered a valuable opportunity. Even for those panchas who had the 
least probability of being elected through the indirect procedure, the alternatives provided 
by the royal nomination was always an attractive option. Please read Chapter 4 for details.
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10.7. Constitution 1990
The Constitution of 1990 could have been engineered to suit the multicultural, multilingual, 
multireligious and multiethnic nature of the state. However, even though it was proclaimed 
to be the best in the world by few of the politicians from CPN(UML) and the Nepali 
Congress, it remained far from being accepted. “For most part, it never gained its 
legitimacy right form the time of its promulgation” asserted Prem Shrestha, a lecturer of 
political science. Despite the limitations, and the overall failure of the 1990 constitution, K. 
Hachhethu (2003:9) argues in his article “The Question of Inclusion and Exclusion in 
Nepal” that:
The new Constitution brought out fundamental changes in the political system of the 
country—from partyless to multiparty system, reduction of king's position from 
absolute to constitutional monarchy, and promotion of people's status from subject to 
citizen^^.
The constitution was in fact a product of the mid-point settlement of the political 
contradictions between the chief forces i.e. the institution of monarchy, state and the 
panchayat regime versus the democratic forces that I have presented in Chapter 2. Ending 
the era of political absoluteness, the settlement thus included the constitutional monarchy 
and parliamentary democracy as the two pillars, characterising the Nepalese political 
system. This change accompanied by the newly founded relationship between the state and 
individuals that Gellner calls ‘promotion of subjects to citizens’ in the above paragraph was 
a significant political achievement and provided the liberal environment necessary for 
social and political engagements. It was in the midst of this congenial milieu that the 
Maobadi andolan founded a political space of its own. Discussing on the issue of the 
Constitution, Joanna Pfaff-Czamecka (1997:419) stresses:
It (the new constitution) declares the kingdom to be a multiethnic, multilingual, which 
is a drastic departure from the governmental measures aimed at the homogenization 
of Nepalese society during the preceding decades.
62„Source:
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/wp874/inclusion%20and%20exclusion%20-% 
Retrieved: 07/09/2008
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"Taking in account of the constructive features of the constitution, the reality was 
unforeseen,” said Bivuti, a student leader in Kathmandu “From what was presumed as 
being the best constitution in Asia, we now has come to realise that it has inherited the 
similar idea of uniformity.” The constitution prevails in identifying ethnicity; nevertheless, 
the document is hollow in terms of rights and falls short of incorporating essential grounds 
for the growth of equal citizenship. Bibhuti’s apprehension has been credited by K. 
Hachhethu’s (2003) when he questions:
Are such changes significant to reset the state's ideology vis-à-vis ethnicity? To what 
extent the new political system is different from past regimes vis-à-vis grievances of 
the excluded groups (ibid).
In this respect, Mahendra Lawoti (2005:135) stresses, “The positive articles of the 
constitution have not been able to lessen the discrimination and exclusion because other 
articles of the constitution negate them with respect to the marginalised groups.” It is 
indeed a matter of concern that the discrimination persists in the heart of the constitution 
rendering some more equal than others. “We are not treated as human beings; they (the 
upper caste) don’t even drink water from our hands and call us acchut ja t (untouchables)” 
said Prem Lohar in an interaction in Bijouri. The caste system, no doubt, offers the 
strongest barrier to equal citizenship. The ‘tradition’ that the constitution cherishes in 
substance is in itself an undesirable and unjust prelude to protect the status quo. To fight 
the unbalanced power relations in real life, the offended must posses the rights to organise 
and claim for their rights though constitutional means in a democracy. However, “when the 
constitution prohibits organisations based on cultural grounds, there is absolutely no means 
to express ones frustration or grievance as a collective identity. In other words this is a 
denial of justice” said Prem Shrestha, a university teacher. The prohibition of ethnic 
organisations has been explained based on the belief that such organisations tend to 
exacerbate social violence by promoting communal disharmony as has been widely 
observed in many parts of the world including the South Asian countries. However, it must 
be emphasised here that constitutions cannot be drafted on assumptions, especially when its 
own clauses become the reasons for discontent and social strife. The constitution, therefore, 
rather than seeking to establish the norms of equal citizenship through balanced power 
relations has tried to take control of natural consequences arising from its own bias by 
disallowing social justice to prevail. When a state desires and delivers equal rights to all, 
including the minorities, it surely succeeds in gaining the allegiances that it needs from the
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polity. Kymlicka and Norman (2000:31) with regards to minority rights stress: “The claim 
that minority rights are inherently in conflict with the very concept of citizenship is 
untenable.”
The factors related to the practice of good governance have been discussed in Chapter 2. In 
this regard, the ominous state of affairs during the last decade of the democratic practice in 
Nepal also added fuel to the looming citizenship crisis. The rampant corruption and the 
abuse of power basically resulted from the centralised structure of the government. The 
centralization of power inevitably gave way into corruption and malpractices, and 
undermined the democratic processes as a whole and at the same time considerably 
weakened the nascent institutions. I would like to recall the idea of state centralisation and 
power concentration that I had raised; the chief means of state control has always been 
based on these principles. “Even before the unification, there were bayese. and choubise 
rajyas (princely states/principalities) with constant squabbles with one another; however, 
because of their limited sizes and faced with constant battles, the central authorities must 
have been reasonably strong and heavily centralised for the purpose of command and 
control over its populace, especially during the wars” commented Bibhuti in an interview. 
It would be a reasonable argument to stress that the idea of power centralisation and the 
situation of state superiority have never departed from the centuries’ long nation building 
process either. The precarious situation of state supremacy has continued to be the 
dominating trait since times prior to the unification, and essentially has subsumed the 
nation building process, thereafter. To this day, by the same argument, the overall ethos of 
governance has been based on centralisation of power and its abuse - chiefly a game played 
by the ruling elites. Even the Communist Party (UML) was no exception to this foul game. 
“We undermined the general voters and misunderstood their silence as support,” said a 
UML central leader who wanted to remain anonymous in Kathmandu. The fact of the 
matter was that there still is no participation as the rural people are alienated form the 
process of democracy, where as at the centre it is a vigorous game played over the idea of 
‘governing’ and ‘more power concentration’. The engagement of the elite circle in the 
power game at the centre rarely seeks for constructive agendas necessary for mobilisation; 
rather, the rhetoric of the former regime underlying the heavy package of nationalism is 
repeatedly emphasised. This notion of state nationalism and national identity has been 
given continuity besides providing legitimacy to the previously embedded baggage of 
nationalism of the panchayat era even during the present period of democratic polity as
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well. Although the king no longer was the fountain of power (at least by the constitution 
after the restoration of democracy in 1990) and the political regime had changed, the 
redefining of the term “nationalism” should have been the normal means of identity 
creation during this phase of nation building. Thus, by default, the state until today has 
continued with its previous political and philosophical standing holding fast to the ideals of 
cultural assimilation, lingual hegemony and religious supremacy. Even the democratic 
constitution has been streamlined to achieve this end envisaging the necessity of creating a 
national identity and national citizenship irrespective of the natural social diversity of the 
state.
The constitution of 1990 defined the role of monarchy as being constitutional. However, in 
practice it ultimately rose to form the other power centre, often as powerful as the 
democratic process itself. The idea of the two-pillar system advocated by India and 
consequently championed by the political leaders in Nepal propelled the institution from 
the state of being constitutional to becoming ‘constructive’ that manifested in Gyanandra’s 
wishful undertakings of 2001. This move was again akin to his father’s during the 1960s. 
Thus, the political processes in Nepal have demonstrated complex relationships that have 
tended to undermine the necessity of democracy and equal citizenship. Otherwise, until 
king Gynendra had not taken over the state authority, it was only the Maoists that had 
spoken of the feudal structure. After the callous move of the monarch, he became the chief 
of the feudal forces for even the democratic forces including the communists. In the 
Nepalese context, political agenda ferried by the elites has mainly been focussed on 
securing its own position in the power regime. Issues related to democracy, participation, 
equality and social justice have rarely formed the thematic package of the political 
processes. And the constitution of 1990 was a similar venture, albeit with a mixed tone.
The bitter fact underlining state and nationalism has been as Hoffman (2004:3) explicitly 
argues. “Nationalism, conversely, privileges one nationality above others, and is tied to the 
fact that the state cannot seek to claim a monopoly of legitimacy in the abstract: it must 
provide cultural symbols that make its claims plausible and relevant.” In similar vein, the 
Nepali state, in itself, has been a problem exacerbating citizenship crisis, paving the ground 
for the escalation of the politics of identity and recognition. The ongoing conflicts in Nepal, 
in their real essence, have converged into an anti-state process pressuring it on moral, legal, 
and normative accounts for the celebration of diversity and difference that the state of
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Nepal historically possesses. These processes have been replenished and strengthened by 
the powerful message of the people’s war. Please read Chapter 5.
10.8. Nepali national identity: narratives, idioms, symbols and loyalty
The notions of national identity and national citizenship, which were founded at the earlier 
phases of the nation building process, have been premised on assimilatory ideology.
National unity is a necessary provision and states try their best to promote allegiances of 
the public thorough various means. Symbols that represent the states are to a certain extent 
meant to harness the sense loyalty from its citizens. In an interview in Bijouri village, 
Amrit Paswan opined:
Most of Madhesis like us live in the Terai, and everyone knows that it is a plain land. 
The national symbols such as that of rhododendron or lophophorous adapted to high 
altitude do not make any sense to us. They do not make part of our lives. In addition, 
among us very few travel to Kathmandu or to similar places of high altitude where 
these trees or birds are found.
Nepal, during its nation building process, was indeed, deaf to these voices. Symbols play 
immensely strong roles in bringing people together where they feel the sense of inclusion 
and honour at being identified and represented. The representation through symbols, 
although may appear insignificant to the majority culture, it often communicates a strong 
sense of belonging or alienation. This scenario is applicable to the hill ethnic groups as well 
as to the people of the Terai. The Nepali state, in the act of creating its national symbols, 
has excluded many groups, as most of the state symbols are based on the hill-Hindu 
culture, its beliefs and way of life.
Being a resident of Bijouri village, I have noticed the sense of separation that persists 
between the Tharu community and the dominant culture with respect to state symbols. 
Although the state had been keen on imparting the sense of national identity through a 
variety of symbols in school curricula, print media and the state-owned radio, it hardly 
succeeded. While I was interviewing people during my first field trip, I talked to a woman 
from the Tharu community. I had the pictures of national symbols that I showed with the 
request to identify as many as she could. She said:
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This looks like a bird ... this one is flower ... a cow ... a mountain (pahar) ... 
Khukuri... temple ... and these two men ...
When I asked her if they meant anything to her, she replied, “ ...the bird may be food, cow 
gives milk, temple is the home for god ... khukuri is for cutting firewood.”
Then I asked if she took pride in any one of them, she said, “I would be happy if I owned 
some cows.”
For this lady, these symbols represented some pictures for household business. She indeed 
expressed that she would be happy to own a cow. This made me wonder on what possibly 
could be the symbol or a bundle of symbols that would bind her and the people like her to 
the state, make her feel represented and recognised. However, I never found the answer.
The significance of national symbols was not comprehended at the grass roots primarily not 
because the education did not trickle down, but more so because the symbols did not 
represent the multitudes of communities within the mosaic of diversity that characterises 
the Nepali state. Unless the state symbols represent some form of attachment or meaning 
for those within the territorial boundaries, the idea of unity and the sense of cohesion will 
always be in the deficit.
For Amrit Pashwan these symbols signified prejudice:
See even the flag of the state is biased. It consists to two triangles and the symbols of 
moon and the sun in each triangle. I do not think the problem lies with those, but 
analyse the interpretation of these triangles. They say it represents the hills and the 
mountains. It appears as though the Terai does not exist.
The idiom with respect to the Terai as ‘not existing’ obviously would mean that the people 
with their territorial roots in the Terai would feel excluded as Amrit does. The narrative 
signals a message of frustration. The invisible position of the Terai -  as read by Madhesis, 
is a powerful tool for the generation of sub-nationalism that has appeared within the 
Maobadi andolan.
The reorganisation of the coat of arms (that include symbols) following the Maobadi 
andolan has “helped to include the Nepalese people in symbolic form” asserts Prem 
Shrestha, a university teacher. “The state symbols in this case have been inclusive and the
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contradictory ones have been removed owing to the civil war and the prevailing anti-state 
demonstrations,” he added.
For instances the footprints of Gorakhnath (a sage and a deity, who is said to have blessed 
Prithivi Narayan Shah during his conquest), the symbol of khukuri or the picture of a bow 
and gun, in totality signify the Gorkha Empire that expanded annihilating numerous 
principalities in the Himalayan foothills. The expansionist forms of symbols are 
unsatisfying to those who were conquered or unified, even two and a half centuries later. It 
is natural that during the present uprisings or during the moments of ethnic or territorial 
consciousness, the history tends to be reinvented in their most idealistic forms. The 
founding myths have greater significance in identity politics and it is in this direction that 
the history is interpreted. Even the state in this regard had been glued to the myth of 
altruistic mission and thus a good reason for claiming superiority over its conquered 
territories.
The centuries of oppression, subjugation and exclusion was fiercely met by the rising levels 
of consciousness that built up to its new heights along the course of the Maobadi andolan. 
During this upheaval, the state-engineered national symbols were challenged by the politics 
of recognition or identity. For Sushma a Maoist leader in Bijouri, “The social and political 
processes that are in operation have therefore been influenced by the rising level of 
consciousness from both the domestic as well as global trends.” The pressure arising from 
the citizenship crisis, which later was expressed in similar forms of identity politics was 
tactically located in Maobadi andolan while external reasoning were derived from the 
global, regional or multinational networks. The message of exclusion and the needs for 
inclusion was highlighted by the agency of the people’s war. The message was strong 
enough to compel the state to redefine its national symbols. And as a result, the coat of 
arms has been designed to represent the general populace. However, whether the people 
like the woman in the interview above will identify themselves with the state’s new 
symbols will be seen in the days to come.
10.9. History
I have discussed above, the idea of history lies in the heart of identity politics and this 
parameter is important in defining the citizenship status. The national history is the 
interpretation of the dominant elites and therefore, it is also the reflection of the past. As
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part of the politics of recognition, Madhesi cultural groups as well as many of the 
indigenous and ethnic groups have begun to search for their historic roots and ancestral 
roles to draw the line of difference with the state and the culture it represents. In this 
regards, it is not only that the national history has been questioned; rather, these groups 
have been engrossed in redefining their own identity and ancestral roles, which 
substantially depart of the official accounts. The Madhesis have been engaged in 
redefining their own history and the sense of belonging. The national policy on language, 
culture and politics has been labelled by the activists as the means of state hegemony and 
subjugation. In defining his position with respect to the pahadis (hill people) Amit said:
We are treated as second-class citizens. We are inferior to the pahadis. The state is 
biased and it treats us as though we do not belong to this country. However, we are as 
Nepali as the hill people. We are the people from Mithila, and we have a history as 
old as Kathmandu.
The reorganisation of history has been a common phenomenon with the politics of 
recognition. The elites from janajatis and Madheshi groups at the helm are engrossed in 
finding any historic evidence that may help in redefining their category as a different entity 
from the rest. As stories are retold and historical experiences unfolded, the imagined 
differences surface as new waves articulating an additional vigour for identity politics and 
the politics of difference. This is an opinion expressed by Deepak Gurung in a casual talk 
in the UK:
The Kirats ruled the longest in the history of Nepal -  over one century, and we were 
settled in the Kathmandu valley before the arrival of the Khas; thus, they are in true 
sense latecomers while we the kirats are the indigenous peoples. In the same way the 
national festivals such as Dahain, Tihar are not ours. It is normal for us to reject these 
festivals.
The nation building process needs to be examined further. The assimilatory policies were 
thought to have the general approval of the public, as it was the only way for promoting the 
sense of patriotism or nationalism during the anti-colonial movements. This was quite 
sensible and a necessary measure to draft in the largest possible segment of the population. 
And correspondingly, the situation compelled the people to put aside their differences of all 
sorts (cultural, lingual, religious, territorial etc, in favour of greater unity against the 
colonial rulers. Thus, this began the passion for national identity, embedded in the concept 
of monoculture, assimilation and state centiism in Nepal, although it never was a colony.
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The project was to create a national identity. Later, national dress was designed to expose 
what the Nepalese looked like and how they were different from the regional populations. 
“The image of a person wearing daura suruwal, and topi with khururi tucked into his 
patuki was indeed the symbol of a Nepali,” said Amrit.
The present scenario presents a different challenge; this is particularly so because the 
official king-centric nationalism based on national identity is in contradiction with the 
aspirations of the Dalits, janajatis, and the Madhesis. The development of ethnic and 
cultural nationalisms has tended to shape the emerging forms of citizenship in Nepal. 
Although the claims over recognition have grown stronger, the very process has the 
tendency of offsetting the politics of redistribution, something that the involved elites will 
need to comprehend. In this regard, the Maobadi leadership is no exception.
10.10. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have pointed out that the Nepali state has been the strongest and most 
effective barrier to the formation of equal citizenship and thus the positive source to the 
growth of identity politics. The omnipotent and omnipresent state has continued to argue 
for the exclusivist king-centric nationalism that is unreasonable besides being harmful to 
the ideals of equal citizenship. At this moment, it is absolutely necessary to recognise that 
multiculturalism promotes national unity rather than weakening it in practice. Although, in 
the historical context, the fervour of nationalism, national identity and national citizenship 
were accepted as being the representative political architecture of the nation state, the 
pressures arising from the domestic as well as the global discourses have continued to 
challenge this post-war consciousness. At the same time, the surge of Maobadi andolan and 
the heightened levels of social and ethnic consciousness need to be explored through a 
multicultural framework premised on the principles of equal citizenship. Rather than 
digging into the neo-liberal jargon for the solution or depending on the essentialist version 
of king’s nationalism, it is more than urgent that the Nepali state streamlines the principles 
of redistribution and recognition for generating the model of citizenship.
Of course, the sense of patriotism, collective endeavours or national unity is demanded of 
or expected from all the citizens, especially during times of difficulty. Nationalism, in this 
sense, is highly cherished and an ethos to be recognised, without which, liberation from 
colonial regimes or freedom from state atrocities would never have prevailed. It is thus a
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double-edged dagger as seen in the Asian contexts, which clearly defies the principles of 
democracy, equality and freedoms as well. In the absence of political culture and civic 
qualities that cherish democracy, equality, justice and freedoms, realizing equal citizenship 
is not only difficult, it rather is impossible.
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Globalisation in the Nepalese context
Since my discussion has been involved with the issues concerned with the bundles of 
rights, recognition, mutual respect and human dignity that the vast majority of citizens in 
the Nepali state need to be entitled to, I have argued in this chapter that the process of 
globalisation has produced both the impetus as well as barriers to the processes enhancing 
equal citizenship.
I have maintained that the national economy, culture, education, multiparty politics, and 
social movements have been directly influenced by the globalisation processes 
essentialising some elements of modernity and aspects of egalitarianism. However, the 
same process has also led to the rise of identity politics as a consequential development, 
where the effects and outcomes are neither straightforward nor simple. I have argued that 
the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution in the Nepalese context have 
thus been partly the effects of the global processes. In addition, the claims for citizenship 
rights have been simultaneously shaped from the global discourses and experiences rather 
than being drawn exclusively from the local settings alone. In this perspective, the 
traditional aspects of the communitarianism and the ideals of liberal citizenships are the 
two distinct packages that form the core of debate in Nepal. I have contended that the 
educated and modem youths’ inclination towards liberal citizenship contradicts the 
communitarian versions of citizenship claims.
I have further argued that the global knowledge system has been offsetting the traditional 
values, including the social and the political, and replacing them with modem versions and 
modifications, if not destroying them all together. The global interaction with the local and 
the adaptation of the global into the local have been in their simplistic forms, the 
meaningful terms of trade that concem history, culture, art and science or economy besides 
others. The globalisation process has tended to reinforce barriers between social classes and 
at the same time has disempowered the lower strata. I have insisted that the contradictions 
developing between the indigenous thought processes and the principles of modemism and
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liberalism have appeared sharply and as a result, the nature and form of identity politics 
have constantly been influenced and reorganised in complex ways.
11.1. Introduction
Unlike in the past, the process of globalisation has brought together the economic, political, 
social and cultural aspects into a single complexity as never before. In economic terms, 
Stevenson (2001:5) suggests, “huge conglomerates specializing in the production of a 
range of cultural goods now dominate world markets.” For Beck (2000:10), it is not only 
the sense of the integrating markets on global scales that has characterised the globality. He 
goes beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation state and claims that there can be no 
space where global flows and interactive processes have been absent. ''Globality means 
that we have been living for a long time in a world society, in the sense that the notion of 
closed spaces has become illusionary. No country or groups can shut itself off from others” 
(in italics is original).
The results of this powerful process have been considerably significant and often have 
compelled nation states to redefine their philosophical and political basis. Susan Robertson 
(2007:2)^^ presents her views with similar arguments and asserts:
Jayasuryia, Sassen and Fraser, among others, argue that the forces of globalisation have 
altered the nature of national sovereignty as well as the articulations between the national 
state and citizenship, and citizen’s claims-making and social justice. This is particularly 
important in thinking about questions of globalisation and citizenship [...].
It is all too frequently debated that the capitalistic globalisation has rendered the developing 
countries with the overwhelming incidence of growing poverty, want and disease. And 
notwithstanding, has also been the fact that, the division between the haves and have-not 
has grown deep and wide as never experienced in human history. Since my discussion has 
been involved with the issues concerned with the bundles of rights, recognition, mutual 
respect and human dignity that the vast majority of citizens in the Nepali state need to be 
entitled to, I have argued that the process of globalisation has produced both the impetus as 
well as barriers to the processes enhancing equal citizenship.
Susan L. Robertson (2007), Globalisation, Rescaling National Education System and Citizenship 
Regimes, in K. Roth and N. Burbules (eds) “Changing Notions of Citizenship Education in 
Contemporary Nation-states, University of Bristol
http://www.bris.ac.uk/education/peoDle/acadeinicStaff/edslr/publications/06s1r/
Retrieved: 19/02/2008
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Beck (2000:93) raises a fundamental question where he asserts:
A paradox rises here, which is still today an obstacle to any debate. A guarantee of 
basic rights, it would seem, presupposes the national state. So how is it possible to 
establish and secure a cosmopolitan legal relationship between the states and citizens, 
which reduces the importance of national state as guarantor, without at the same time 
becoming lost in the false alternative of either [...]?
Citizenship is indeed a global buzzword, which comes as bundles of rights, duties and 
obligations. As the promoter and protector of these rights, the state has been argued to 
possess special legitimate prerogatives without rivalry. However, the global forces in 
operation have tended to compromise the state’s legitimacy, inspiring the institutions and 
processes to transcend the boundaries of the state. Global networks, civic society groups, 
professional bodies, non-governmental organisations including the UNO have functioned 
considerably beyond the nation-state boundaries. “Globalization has a pluralising impact on 
identities, producing a variety of possibilities. Identities are less fixed and unified. They 
become ‘here and now’, situational (Hall, 192:309). The free flow of information in the 
form of abstract or concrete ideas relating to ethnic rights, cultural prerogatives, political 
choices or issues related to participation, equality and social justice have been subjected to 
global discourses. Since these debates are concerned with identity, they possess profound 
importance related to negotiations and transformations. Global advocacy is marked by 
initiatives against formal nation-states, as has been the case in Nepal, where local forces 
with local needs and global forces with notions of globlity have shaped the emerging forms 
of a democratic state. Although these forces fluctuate countering or titivating one another, 
agencies, processes or institutions involved in the transnational or global exchange have 
indeed been experiencing more freedoms with respect to the limiting boundaries of the 
territorial state that once were regulated through sovereign and indivisible rights of the state 
and thus represented a non-porous model of independency.
The very notion of citizenship in its egalitarian form is a transnational phenomenon for 
Nepal that grew from the territories of ancient city-states. As part of its historic evolution, it 
has outgrown to embrace the global society on accounts of Human Rights, modem values 
or human adaptations, appealing practices or even the traditional rituals or ideas perceived 
as being civilised, rational or open. The global discourses, embracing the elements of 
normative reasoning, have helped to shape the state legislation processes, aiding to 
centralise the peripheral, global ideals into local contexts as well. These discourses have
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been premised on the notions of equality and social justice. As Beck (2000:10) maintains, 
the “various economic, cultural and political forms therefore collide with one another, and 
things that used to be taken for granted (including in the Western model) will have to be 
justified anew.” In a similar vein, the Nepali state, has come a long way through the state- 
centric unitary political processes and it would be unacceptable to argue for the ousted or 
similar state ideology after its actual demise. In this respect, the ideas and ideologies that 
formed the anti-state regimes must be approached from the global context as well. In this 
respect, it would only be an illusion if we were to think of major incidents such as the rise 
of the Maobadi or the downfall of the monarchy in Nepal, to have been limited to the local 
confinements or local political processes alone. As importantly, to argue that the looming 
citizenship crisis in Nepal or the nature and forms of identities being created through the 
massive movements are outside the scope of relevancy, vis-à-vis the global systems, would 
certainly be a pitfall. Thus, both the global and local forces in tandem have shaped the 
ingredients of the crisis as well as shaping the politics of identity. I have highlighted the 
actuality of this nexus or connectivity in my other chapters as well.
The global processes are not linear, simple or straightforward; rather, they represent 
complex sets of transformations through fragmentations, renegotiations, emergences or and 
liquidations of cultures, languages or gross identities creating what Salman Rushdie calls 
mongrelised or hybridised identities. For Stevenson (2001:5), “however, new levels of 
cultural intermixing partially breaking down older more homogeneous cultures have also 
coupled this development.” The ideals of global flattening have encountered the social 
motions confirming particularism and fragmentations during the late century globalisation 
processes. All of these have provided us with opportunities as well as challenges where 
nation states have been ripped between the ideals of sovereignty, nationalism, national 
identity or national citizenship and the ideals of globality induced by the forces of 
globalism. The nature of these social dynamics has substantially weakened the state 
sovereignty, challenged the ethos of nationalism, and rendered national citizenship obsolete 
as some commentators argue. All of these transcendences, on the one hand, occur while 
seeking their own momentum from the unfettered process of multifaceted globalisation, 
while on the other, the localisation, adaptation or internalisation, derived from the global 
exchange, bring about the structural or behavioural changes in individuals, groups or 
institutions contributing as multiplying factors in favour of modernity or post-modemity.
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In the urban centres and cities in Nepal, closed spaces have been connected by 
communication, goods, ideas and networks that link the individuals to the markets. Civil 
societies or junctions of webs having national, transnational or global in characteristics are 
in collusion or in union with forces that transform, renegotiate or liquidate the existing 
cultures, languages, traditions and practices. The political, social, religious or ethnic realms 
are in constant interactions. Motivated by the imagined aspects of reinvented purity or the 
ideals of perfection with constants shifts towards essentialism, ethnocentrism and monism 
or through the salient features of global flatness, similar messages of uncertainty, risk and 
anxiety are apparent. These traits characterise the Nepalese societies today. Nonetheless, 
the world that we live in is interdependent and more interrelated at different levels, and 
nation states are no exceptions.
Thus, Beck (2000:11-12) in trying to grapple with this complex and illusive idea of 
globalisation^"^ presents his explanations as following:
Globalisation, on the other hand, denotes the process through which sovereign 
national states are criss-crossed and undermined by translational actors with varying 
prospects of power, orientation, identities and networks [...] Globalisation process 
lies in the empirically ascertainable scale, density and stability o f regional-global 
relationship networks and their self-definition through the mass media, as well as o f 
social space and o f image flows at a cultural, political, economic and military level. [ 
...]. A globally disorganised capitalism is continually spreading out” (in italics is 
original).
64 Intuitively, globalization is a process fueled by, and resulting in, increasing crossborder flows of 
goods, services, money, people, information, and culture (Held et al 1999, p. 16). Sociologist Anthony 
Giddens (1990, p. 64, 1991, p. 21) proposes to regard globalization as a decoupling or “distanciation” 
between space and time, while geographer David Harvey (1989) and political scientist James 
Mittelman (1996) observe that globalization entails a “compression” of space and time, a shrinking o f  
the world. Sociologist Manuel Castells (1996, p. 92) emphasizes the informational aspects o f the global 
economy when he defines it as “an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a 
planetary scale.” In a similar vein, sociologist Gary Gereffi (1994) writes about global “commodity 
chains,” whereby production is coordinated on a global scale. Management scholar Stephen Kobrin 
(1997, pp. 147-148) describes globalization as driven not by foreign trade and investment but by 
increasing technological scale and information flows. Political scientist Robert Gilpin (1987, p. 389) 
defines globalization as the “increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and 
macroeconomic policy.” Sociologist Roland Robertson (1992, p. 8) argues that globalization “refers 
both to the compression of theworld and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.” 
Also sociologist Martin Albrow (1997, p. 88) defines globalization as the “diffusion of practices, 
values and technology that have an influence on people’s lives worldwide.” I propose to combine the 
perspectives of Robertson and Albrow, and so define globalization as a process leading to greater 
interdependence and mutual awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the 
world, and among actors in general (Guill'en 2001, Held et al 1999, 
pp. 429-31, Petrella 1996, pp. 63-66, Waters 1995, p. 63).
Source: Guillen, M (2001) “Is Globalisation Civilising, Destructive Or Feeble? A critique of five Key 
Debates In the Social Science Literature”, Annual Review, University of Pennsylvania
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11.2. Globalisation of economy: participation and citizenship
Globalisation, in terms of social equality and justice in the economic, social or political 
relationships so far, has been counterproductive for Nepal; and moreover, as the incidence 
of poverty has been additionally pronounced and aggravated since Nepal became a member 
of WTO a decade ago; there is no room to argue that the trickling down effect has reached 
the bottom, into the lower rungs of socio-economic hierarchy. For equal citizenship, 
members of the political community must be free to participate in socio-political affairs and 
that happens only when the basic economic needs are met. Thus, it is equally logical to 
argue that poverty and vulnerability do not produce a free man, and political citizenship 
cannot exist in absence of these freedoms. In addition to the nature of these freedoms, 
aspects of culture, religion, language or territoriality form most of the salient features of 
identity that its members find it worth fighting and dying for.
Nepal became a member of WTO in 1995 although economic reforms related with 
government expenditure, privatisation and deregulation had been on their way since 1985. 
The mantra of economic growth was tied to the structural changes. Instead of the projected 
economic growth advocated by the International Monitory Fund and the World Bank 
through the structural adjustment programmes (SAP), Nepal has been metaphorically a 
sinking boat with billions of dollars as outstanding loans. The debt service and inflation in 
milieu of the slow growth for Nepal means that half its population is crushed beneath the 
unbearable consequences of poverty. The cost of the capitalist globalisation is the poor 
man’s share while the benefits funnel into the coffers of a few national and global actors.
As I have stated before, the response of Nepali state to the globalising trend is positive in a 
sense that it possesses no alternatives. The market forces and trade policies have reduced its 
traditional aspects of influence while the free flow of capital, goods and services; cultures 
and art, music and food etc. have influenced the liberal versions of sovereignty and 
identity. Nepal’s economic position in the global market and as influencer of policies is low 
and thus the tendency to comply is compelling than to debate, reform or repel.
Political participation occurs between and among equals or at least in an environment of 
equal deliberations, which means that if the distribution of power between participants is 
skewed, the engagement in true sense is not founded. In this respect, the discourse of 
globality and the globalisation process in general has intensified the skewed features of
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resource distribution and induced social fragmentation even further. Moreover, the 
processes have structured these features in extensive as well as intensive hierarchies as 
reapers of benefit of the ‘profit maximisation game’ and the all-out losers. This is a 
consequence starkly visible in cities as in Kathmandu and gradually building into the rural 
environments as well. With the donor agencies active in development activities, some 
aspects of development are visible in Bijouri. The main highway leading to the district 
headquarters has been black topped, drinking water project has been completed and the 
Ayurvedic hospital is still functional. However, for a poor person, with no linkage of his 
productive potentials to the road, or for those with stronger belief on witch doctors than the 
hospital science, this sense of vikas (development) hardly bears any substantial meaning. 
With respect to the members of large neighbourhoods that share a ‘single tap’ of drinking 
water, similar projects appear as subjects of ridicule. “If a single ‘common tap’ is our 
entitlement,” says Krishna KC, a sixteen-year youth, “we do not want it, we believe in 
honesty and a fair deal.” For example, the settlement next to the junction area has about 
two hundred individuals living in more than 50 households, among whom Krishna’s 
extended family of four adults and six children have been one. This neighbourhood has 
been entitled to a single common tap as the source of drinking water. However, the 
concepts of inequality embedded in similar development projects, have contributed 
enhancing social fragmentation, as their initiatives legitimise the poverty factor. As in the 
case of drinking water project in Bijouri village, the space for effective system of rights is 
disregarded, the poor cannot gain entry into citizenship. In such a situation, there is no 
common ground for participation.
Binod went on to tell a story that I think is worth highlighting. One day, a thirteen-year 
child belonging to his neighbour, stole money from home and wandered off. He was later 
found to have purchased a bottle of Coke and a tube of scented oil -  both global products. 
The matter was serious because these cost him more than fifty rupees, which, on the 
positive side, could have been used to feed the whole family for two days. However, this is 
not an isolated phenomenon in rural Nepal. The youth and even the adults have been 
attracted towards new and fashionable products and often pay more than their true value at 
the local markets. The market entrenchment into rural lives has created the sense of 
insecurity besides buttressing individualism and consumerism; by doing so, the social 
density is constantly on the plunge. Communitarian sense of livelihoods is gradually giving
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way into an individual-centric liberalism while the division between the have-gots and 
have-nots is starkly visible and open.
As such, the economic hierarchy is quite visible in Bijouri, although significantly different 
from that observed in Kathmandu metropolis. The rich class in Bijouri, is usually tied to 
one of the many political parties on individual basis. The stronger the party, the better off 
will one’s position ensuring participation and availability of scarce resources including 
opportunities. This class forms a component of the elite circle. The gap between this class 
and the rest (as the majority is simply poor) can be measured, as a general routine, by use 
of many common indicators such as the type of alcohol consumed, food eaten, or through 
the nature of clothes worn. The belief of attaining social ascendancy through material gains 
has raised ethical questions as well. The story that Binod told should be linked to this 
phenomenon. The advertising agencies and satellite TV channels have contributed to 
reform the vision of the public as they have successfully entrenched the urban livelihoods, 
and are constantly making their headway into the rural setup as well.
The local shops that sell foreign goods are doing better just for the reasons cited above. The 
basic desire or want for more material gains has begun to cultivate an environment of 
mistrust, anxiety and fear. My friend in Bijouri, who now runs a foreign good shop in the 
district headquarters, told me "‘Jasko paisa chha, usko jundagi chha ” (one who has money, 
has a meaningful life). I noticed this significant change within these two decades. When I 
was a college student, I was radically charged for losing my identity for the reasons of 
being educated at a Christian school. Those moral and ethical issues, which occupied 
debates during those days, do not bear strict relevance to the present settings. As a result, 
moral values and ethical standings have transformed significantly from being the magic 
potions of the once cherished motivational factors.
While I was in Nepal during June 2008, the state was preparing for the upcoming 
constituent assembly elections. I had a chance to meet Prem Chaudhary again in Bijouri. 
He revealed that on the eve of the day before the polls in 1995, raksi and masu (drinks and 
food) were served to the community members by the contesting candidates and the rival 
parties. He said:
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Tharu community is largely illiterate and lives below the subsistence level. Delicious 
food and feasting is of course something that everyone likes. The low levels of 
literacy and education deprives them of free judgement. When the politicians during 
their campaigns call on them to join the feast they readily participate. We also had a 
case where some money was spent by a former Minister a few days before the polls. 
These were the direct method used in buying votes.
The low levels of literacy or the education status as a whole, needless to say, is linked with 
the economic standing of a particular person or a collective entity such as a Dalits or the 
Tharu ethnic community. Thus, asking people, subsumed in poverty, for active civic or 
political participation or on issues, involving the social affairs is to neglect their condition 
of existence in the first place. This practice has two-fold implications: one, it ensures the 
continuity of an elitist rule, as the majority is incapable of meaningful participation because 
of their economic and social powerlessness and second, it legitimises the existing social 
classes with state’s recognition favouring the upper and the middle class, contrary to the 
state’s rhetoric, especially when it advocates the essence of welfarism. In the past during 
the king’s panchayat autocracy, these factors played in tandem to reproduce economically 
fragmented classes in absence of industrialisation. During this time, the political 
participation was a myth (see Chapter 4). However, even at present the state policies have 
not produced significant gains on the grounds that participation being a social process 
requires power equity as the key factor underlying the environment of engagement. The 
globalisation process has tended to reinforce barriers between social classes and at the same 
time has disempowered the lower strata. The fall out of the vast majority of the people of 
the lower economic standing from participation, has increased the risk legitimising social 
disparity, alienation and further fragmenting the fragile social structure of Nepal. Despite 
this research attempt, the issue of poverty and its linkage to citizenship being very complex 
deserves a further academic engagement. This issue should be made the heart of citizenship 
discussions in Nepal, and more precisely the academic focus should seek to unravel the link 
between equal citizenship, poverty and democracy.
Goirand (2003:227), giving account of the Latin American perspectives on citizenship and 
poverty in Brazil asserts:
[...] poverty is related to an incomplete integration into the social and political 
mainstream and therefore raises the question of the relation between the poor and the 
political system. Obviously, the reality behind the words may be quite different from 
the one described by those interviewed.
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My research findings on the whole resemble this assertion. I also maintain that the process 
of integration is associated with inclusion in an environment of mutual respect. The fallout 
of Dalits, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities or the Madhesis from the socio­
economic process had continued abated on exclusionary policies and practices in the 
Nepalese polity until the limited affirmative policies were introduced. Although a little has 
been achieved in this regards, the state has undermined the rationale of an effective system 
of rights. Exclusionary state politics coupled by the absence of effective system of rights 
have inflamed the crisis in citizenship that has gradually evolved into a systemic disorder 
generating the essential environment sustaining the politics of identity and culture. The 
sudden eruption of problems has exceeded the bearing capacity of the state.
It starkly visible that globalisation process has not spared Nepal; and on the same account, 
the emerging forms of complex identities generated though this process cannot be ignored 
either. Besides the subjective issues that underline the claims to citizenship, the new 
dimension of global interaction has continued to generate tension between the local and the 
global. The global discourse on universal rights and democracy transcend the normal sense 
of state-centric citizenship model premised on the narrow legal framework where the issues 
are tied to the ideals of nationalism and sovereignty. Likewise, the collapse of the 
institution of monarchy and the introduction of democracy or the rise of the Maobadi are 
also tied to the global processes as well.
11.3. Education and globalisation
Education and politics in Nepal have tended to converge the society into the global on 
various accounts despite the complex set of contradictions within the local contexts that 
eventually have been subsumed into the discourses of globality. For Nepal, education of the 
past has been the central locus of the project enhancing ideals of nationalism, 
monoculturalism and essentialsm as I have explained in my former chapters.
Kathmandu and urban centres have experienced more of the global presence than Bijouri 
village or the rest of the rural sectors. However, it would be grave mistake to analyse the 
globalisation process as being limited to certain localities alone. Even the remotest 
settlements in Nepal have had the experience either through the modem education or 
through the rhetoric of developmental policies, Stmctural Adjustment Programmes or 
through media and communication sources. In this regard, the New Education Plan of the
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1970s must be analysed as the product of globality that was designed in the US and 
exported to Nepal. Although it ended up shortly in a disaster, it left behind a devastating 
impact on the system as a whole. After its abrogation, the state had to cope with its 
negativity that took years to mitigate. Despite the negative experience of this kind, the 
education system, which was designed later, still fell short of meeting the needs of a 
diverse society along with finding relevance in connection with the global demand. Until 
the 1990s, the strong inward looking policies, derived from the firm belief on nationalism 
and national identity, withheld the education system from being interconnected to the 
global networks and the global education regime.
As I have stated before, globalisation is a complex phenomenon that particularly 
accelerated after the economic crisis of the 1970s replacing the Keynesian interventionist 
model in favour of neo-liberalism. More strangely, the education system introduced in 
Nepal during the same decade was a counterfeit project, right from the start, in the sense 
that it was based exclusively on the inward-looking nationalist propositions -  which in fact 
was a reversal and withdrawal from the global discourse. Counter-fit-projects that have 
tended to alienate themselves from the process of interconnectivity have had short life 
spans in Nepal. Since the state’s economic existence is tied to its dependency, this reality 
cannot be ignored. Thus, Nepal as a state has not been isolated; rather, it has been 
experiencing quite a significant tug and push from global process and being a small 
economy, the pressure is significantly high. As a reaction to these pressures, the state has 
often resorted to its nationalist rhetoric.
Among the eighteen youths interviewed, two in every three said that he was interested to 
work abroad after completing studies, while all of the interviewees said that they would be 
happy to study abroad if given the opportunity. This situation clearly indicates the growing 
erosion in the perception related to the cross-national differences among the Nepali youths. 
Different approaches favoured by the interviewees to express their beliefs portrayed the 
concept of the ‘global standard of education’, or the ‘international standard’ that were 
based on psyche that ‘west is best’. In addition to these traits, the mind for knowledge 
dependency and what I have coined, - the desire for ‘global rafting’ appears to be the main 
feature that have made the youths more western-centric and active global rafters. In the 
process of being attracted towards the global centres, the desire for equal citizenship has 
considerably grown. As an intertwined process, the western-centric ideals have also
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enhanced the concept of diversity where claims for positive discrimination, ethnic 
assertions and aspects of culturism mark the political landscape of the state.
As Nepal in general and its urban centres in particular were beginning to be interconnected 
into the global processes during the 1980s, the demand for English language escalated at an 
unprecedented rate, taking the national education planners by surprise. The demand, 
besides providing social space for English schools was also an important indicator 
demonstrating a shift in social preference from traditionalism to global values. The initial 
identity of this modem education package for a layman in the street were in the cliché of 
flashy school uniforms, back packs, water bottles and school gears of all shapes, sizes, hues 
and colours, which grossly lacked in the traditional schools. In this transformation process, 
the sense of modernity and appeal for western values that gained social spaces were in 
themselves the product of interaction between the local and global systems, compromise 
between values and the result of dialogic environment.
Under the stmctural adjustment programmes, during the 1990s the issue of privatisation 
was feverously advocated and pursued by the govemment. The mushrooming of private 
schools was considered a major breakthrough in advancing the private investment. The 
private education system, however, demanded standardisation that underpinned the 
economic standing of individuals alongside their social status. The process therefore, 
exacerbated the divide between the private and the govemment institutions. Further to this, 
those unable to afford private schooling were educationally disadvantaged and saw 
themselves as being the victims of denial, which often is expressed in emotional terms. 
Thus, the privatisation and commodification of the education system, on the whole, has 
benefitted the managers, schools and the rich, whereas a vast population either has no 
excess to any form of education. The endorsed school curriculums, reading text materials 
and school facilities vary considerably between the private and the govemment-mn 
schools.
Criticising the private schools and the govemment’s failure to nationalise the education 
system Prakash Pun, a local Maobadi supporter in Dang emphasised:
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The government’s failure in nationalising the education system has been one of the 
major causes underlying the current social discontent. The poor are neglected as 
clearly seen, whereas the rich are educating their children in English schools. The 
education system should reach out to the poor and the same provision should be 
accessible to both the poor and the rich alike without discrimination. This is unfair 
and must be challenged.
The commodification of education has legitimised the divides between social classes and 
has penetrated into the other forms of social closures as well. The effect has been to 
reinforce those previously existing social closures to some extent. National statistics show 
positive correlations between poverty and excluded minorities such as the Dalits, Madhesis 
and indigenous peoples. In this regard, the programmes associated with the privatisation of 
the education system have enforced the ethnic, cultural, lingual or the regional divides, 
legitimising them in the education sector as well. However, although Chhetris are in 
majority in the mid-western region of Nepal, education base is exceptionally low and this 
region has the highest poverty level as compared to the rest of the country. In effect, owing 
to the differences arising from regional/territorial imbalances and the poverty factor 
associated with the ethnic divides, a two-tier citizenship model has appeared based on 
education opportunities. In a situation where poverty bears a positive correlation with 
ethnicity and geographic locations, the economic divide correspondingly has continued to 
fortify the elements concerned with the politics of recognition. As Sanjaya Tharu, a teacher 
in Bijouri said:
It is sad; in a country as ours where the levels of literacy and education are very low, 
the govemment has failed in its capacity to deliver to all on equal footings. Every 
citizen has the right to quality education. On the contrary, because the graduates from 
English schools have better opportunities in life, it is an unfair project that has been 
legitimising injustice.
The education sector is plagued with multifaceted problems as Guru-Gharana and Ananda 
Shrestha (1999:159-166) comment. They attribute the failure of the system to the lack of 
clearly defined goals and an extremely narrow curriculum. Their analysis implies to the 
government-run institutions as well as the private sector. The latter being driven with the 
motive of profit maximisation has left no trade undone to meet this end. The exceptionally 
high cost of education in private schools has disqualified the majority from entry. If 
‘education for all’ would be made the genuine goal of the system, this would scale down 
discrimination and exclusion to a certain degree, promoting the sense of a common.
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informed citizenry. At the same time, the provisions for qualifications and skills, which are 
necessary for the act of participation, could be ensured. Despite an unplanned and 
misguided nature of the education system, it nevertheless has promoted attraction towards 
the global job market. However, at the domestic level, this tendency has also encouraged 
the feeling of ‘we’ versus ‘they’ that continue to reflect the boundaries of class and 
conflict. These processes besides underpinning the divides along the traditional Nepalese 
society, also point towards the global-local structures of conflict.
In addition to the problems emanating from the privatisation of education, the essence of 
globality and interconnectivity has grown significantly over the last two decades. The years 
following the 1990s have observed an abrupt rise in the accommodation of global needs for 
serving global markets rather than seeing to the local needs. Contrary to the idea of 
globality, the globalised knowledge base clearly runs counter to the traditions and practices 
at the national or the local level. However, the effect of the globalisation process in this 
regard is apparent in the erosion of cultural, lingual or religious purities in both forms and 
practices. Having said this, the same process has led to the rise of identity politics as a 
consequential development. Politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution in the 
Nepalese context have thus been partly the effects of the global processes. In addition, the 
claims for citizenship rights have been simultaneously shaped from the global discourses 
and experiences rather than being drawn exclusively from the local settings. In this 
perspective, the communitarian form of citizenship at the local level and the ideals of 
liberal citizenships are the two distinct packages that form the core of debate in Nepal. The 
youths in urban centres invariably seek liberal forms citizenship while the traditional 
society is often reserved over the ideals of communitarianism. The contradictions 
developing between the indigenous thought processes and the principles of modernism and 
liberalism have appeared sharply, and the Maobadi andolan has been caught in the crossfire 
between essentialism and anti-essentialism with a limited space for its rhetoric of 
egalitarianism.
11.4. Social context and globalisation
Education, health or the general economic growth affect the substantiality of citizenship in 
any state. The social aspect of citizenship, therefore, embodies these ideals to offer new 
dimensions. In similar vein, when discussing the project of citizenship in Nepal, it must 
entail both the legal arrangements with an organised system of rights in addition to the
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normative elements of substantial equality in social terms that illuminate citizenship as an 
open-ended process. Different ideas, communication, cultures, languages and even politics 
are being interlinked within broader transnational regimes and subsequently been part of 
the international and global processes as well.
To continue my debate, I would like to borrow Professor Dahal’s (1999:1-2) summation of 
Nepalese economy that provides a vivid picture of its actual account offering an insight 
into the local problems vis-à-vis the economy as well. He explains:
In an economy like Nepal where a majority with 73 percent illiteracy live in 
subsistence agriculture and a vast segment of the economy is yet to be monetized, 
where people live in an extremely wretched economic condition with barter trade, and 
where poverty is attributed to the punishment for the bad deeds of their previous 
lives, the curtain of development drama is engulfed in the flames of political 
absurdity that have caused economic backwardness in the country.
In the situation that Dahal has just described, it is almost impossible not to realise the 
importance of the Nepali state in the daily lives of its citizens -  an issue that I have already 
highlighted earlier. For essential services as education and health among others, the role of 
the state is absolutely indispensable. However, the demand for rights and the power of 
nation-states to deliver those services are under the scrutiny of the global powers. The 
vicious state of indebtedness clearly speaks of the barriers that Nepal faces with respect to 
its domestic service scarcity. Trade deficits, macroeconomic instability, inflation, 
devaluations etc. all refer to global consequence although seeming to appear at a local/state 
level. As another example, the incident of trade embargo that India clamped down on 
Kathmandu during 1990 served as the triggering factor of the democratic movement. In this 
case, the demand for democracy was local; on the contrary, it was shaped and reconstructed 
through the flow of global ideas on the notions of ‘what was the best for Nepal’ as its 
political framework.
For Binod Chaudhari, a local teacher, the state still possess the supreme duty for service 
provisions when he says:
The state should look after the needs of the population in an unbiased fashion. Many 
of the people are poor and the richer are getting richer day by day. It is the state’s 
duty to see that the poor also gain the benefit of social mobility from the politics of 
democracy, the fruits of which need to be realised at individual levels.
263
With the exception of an extremely narrow percent of the better offs in the economic 
hierarchy, the globalisation and privatisation has had some positive impacts although not 
without loads of criticisms for inflicting more harm than delivering positive outcomes. A 
local Maobadi cadre spoke vehemently against the privatisation of the education system, 
especially in milieu of the sprouting private boarding schools. This has to be read in 
connection with the party’s policy of nationalising the total education system, with no room 
for the private sphere:
It is the government’s prime duty to see that the education service is well planned and 
executed for all. Privatisation of essential services such as the education has produced 
a two-tier citizenship standard that needs to be opposed. The rich are educated in 
English schools while the poor have no alternative with the exception of enrolling 
themselves in mismanaged govemment schools. Privatisation in education must be 
brought to a stop.
The drive at abolishing the rampant privatisation in the economy has been one of the main 
components of the Maobadi andolan. The impetus of denationalisation commenced since 
the 1990s are in direct contradiction with the Maobadi principles of nationalisation. Despite 
the animosity between the market economy and the centrally planned economy, the 
growing popularity of the Maobadis needs a separate research. The wide support in favour 
of the movement provides us with some logic to review the Maobadi andolan in the context 
of globality and the overall processes of globalisation.
The subsequent governments formed after the 1990s have laid stress on economic 
liberalisation, financial deregulations, trade liberalisation and fiscal reforms as per the 
prescription of the World Band and the International Monetary Fund. However, these 
initiatives have not only failed to produce substantive positive results impacting the 
national economy, rather they have marginalised the lower strata even further. The 
‘trickling benefits’ have indeed remained much short of reaching the subsistence level; 
rather, on the contrary, the risk of the capitalist globalisation has been principally bom by 
the poor. The growth of institutional and social inequalities has surfaced even more, and as 
a result, it has the tendency of decreasing social mobility. The Nepali state partly being tied 
up by the economic and financial regulations (agreements) monitored by the global trade 
organisations, has failed to protect the weak and the vulnerable section of the population. 
To be more precise, without the social safety net in place, and in addition, in absence of
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welfare programmes, social citizenship in Nepal has been just a hollow slogan. Besides the 
central govemment, even the local bodies, the private sector or the public institutions 
including the donor agencies and global financial institutions have grossly failed to 
progress towards enhancing economic opportunity of those that require them the most.
The Regional President of the Intemational Council on Social Welfare in Europe, Hans van 
Ewijk, while speaking at a conference on Social Inclusion in 2004 stressed:
To believe that social commitment and social justice are mere results of self-interests 
and should be organised by competing market principles is a dramatic misunderstand 
- maybe even more dramatic as promoting individualism as collecting private goods 
to buy in the market. A dramatic direct consequence of privatization is the worsening 
of the living conditions of the very poor^^.
As I have mentioned earlier, the dominant religion, culture and language have mounted 
enormous pressures on subcultures, sub-faiths, or languages as part of the local processes. 
Since the growth of globalisation, after the 1970s, the above-mentioned sub-cultures, faiths 
including the scores of languages are under additional direct threats. The global knowledge 
system has been offsetting the traditional values, including the social and the political, and 
replacing them with modem versions and modifications, if not destroying them all together. 
The global interaction with the local and the adaptation of the global into the local have 
been in their simplistic forms, the meaningful terms of trade that concern the economy, 
finance or other areas including the subjective issues as well.
A local farmer, Brigay Ahir, in Bijouri village said:
My son passed his tenth grade exams two years ago. I was very happy at the news of 
his success. However, after his school education he no longer wants to work with me 
in the fields. He tried to get an office job; but when he did not get one, he went to 
Kathmandu after a year and a half. I hear that he is staying with his friends trying to 
get a role in a film.
The exposure to global trends and the values attached to modernisation has extracted 
youths out of their traditional professions. The detachment has had strong impacts on 
shaping the new generation where to oppose the traditional ways of thinking and to do
Source: http://www.icsvv.org/doc/Hans%20van%20Ewijk%20Citizenshir)%20eradication%20of%20Dov 
Retrieved: 15/01/2009
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things differently is considered modem and perhaps even pristine. I had met a youth whose 
traditional work had been to sell milk in a market close to Bijouri village. After gaining a 
few years of education, he became a conductor of a night coach. He eamed a few hundred 
mpees per month, much less than his family income when he was self employed. The 
father being old could only look after the cattle while his mother used to milk them. It had 
been his responsibility to transport milk (using a bicycle) and sell it in a nearby village 
market. I had a chance to speak to this youth. He said:
After studying so much (for eight years) I think it is not proper for me sell milk in the 
market as a layman. I am grown up and have been introduced to modem ideas. I have 
also seen and read about different people and places. I want to try something new that 
will benefit me more. Night-bus conductor is just the beginning and my parents don’t 
care about what I think.
The concept of modemity means different things to different people, and consequently they 
express different opinions. However, what the Nepalese society is undergoing today is the 
period of transition. During this phase, as I have argued, the ideas, principles and way of 
doing things are being debated in different forms and contexts. The globalised modemity 
and local traditionalism have thus clashed in many ways. These contradictions and lines of 
conflict are continuously shaping the emerging society. Traditionalism may be disputed as 
the thought of a bygone era; however, modemity has failed to create equal citizenship as 
well. The emerging picture thus remains far from being clear on whether either of these 
contending processes will benefit the society on their own. It is rather in the comprehensive 
amalgam of traditionalism and modemism that Nepal could expect inclusive forms of 
identity. In this process, the role that the forces of globalisation have been playing, are 
extremely significant.
Just as the number of alcohol-drinking Brahmins, has grown in leaps and bounds, so has 
the number of the lactovegetarian janajatis. Alcohol in this sense cannot be a 
distinguishing factor to analyse Brahmins or non-Brahmins. Consuming alcohol is no 
longer regarded a taboo; rather it has gained the status of modemity and civility among the 
former non-drinking castes, especially where the younger generation is concerned. The 
transition of values is attributed to the global trends that have influenced the local thought 
processes bringing about change in behaviours as well. In Kathmandu, temple visits in the 
momings are no longer considered important and usually it has been the women’s role to
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see that the religious feasts and rituals are periodically performed. The processes of 
globalisation have placed immense pressures on the dominant cultures; while at the same 
time, the sub-cultures have been exposed to the unaccountable pressure from the domestic 
as well as the global forces. The global forces are stronger in the urban centres while in the 
rural settings, they remain relatively weaker although still powerful enough to shape the 
emerging identities and their thought processes.
The rapid shifts in the cultural boundaries, change in social norms or the sense of 
indifference in ritualistic performances among youth have been extremely prominent 
characteristics in urban centres. This trend is very common among the youths in Bijouri 
village as well.
Many interviews that I conducted in the course of this research in Kathmandu as well as in 
Dang, revealed that the sense of looking down and demonising one’s own cultural, 
religious or ethnic practices are not limited to the lower social hierarchies alone. Rather the 
idea that ‘we are inferior with respect to the west’ or that ‘they know what is best’ is a 
common expression among the youths of even the higher castes. The logic of global culture 
is at work, and expressed quite explicitly as well. However, at the same time, strong local 
and global forces are also at play on simultaneous accounts that underpin the causes for the 
rise of ethnocentrism (including Brahminism) imparting a strong message of detachment 
from the global processes. Individualism, as we saw through the interviews above, has 
become a strong motivational factor among youths in contrary to communitarianism that 
three decades ago was the cherished ideology, which governed the essential aspects of 
citizenship. With the declining sense of community and one’s obligation towards its 
members, the youth truly forms a transition phase from the local-national to the global. 
Pop, hip-hop, western music and dances, the general life styles or the way of thinking and 
doing things, once considered alien, have been adopted by the Nepalese youths as being 
their additional identity. This tendency is stronger in the urban centres as compared to the 
rural settings.
The sense of modemity and the idea of traditionalism have reinforced the boundaries 
between the younger and the older generations. While the older generation calls for identity 
assertion and recognition, the youths, on the contrary, have begun to dance to the global 
tunes. The indigenousness related to the cultural, religious, political or lingual practices are
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not the focus of everyday lives, as many youths do not speak their mother tongues any 
longer. Among the 14 youths from ethnic background interviewed, only three said that they 
could speak and write in their own ethnic languages.
Just as the Nepali language has considerably replaced the local dialects over the centuries, 
the onslaught of globalisation has prioritised the global English language. What this means 
is that the claims for ethnic languages is more pronounced among the adult population and 
tends to decrease with the modem private school-goers. The culture consciousness and 
lingual assertiveness were found to be remarkably low within these youths who favour 
English language as compared to their mother tongues or the Nepali language. As it is tme 
that globalisation does not produce a linear consequence, the outcomes therefore, are also 
multifaceted, complex and at the same time interdependent and interlinked. The processes 
and the ubiquitous consequences have both the discemible and implicit impacts on all the 
aspects of human relationships.
Beck (2000:42-43) continues his argument in a similar tone. He maintains:
The globalisation of economic activity is accompanied by waves of cultural 
transformation, by a process that is called ‘cultural globalisation. [...] As the last 
niches are integrated into the world market, what emerges is indeed one world: not a 
recognition of a multiplicity or mutual openness, where images both of oneself and of 
foreigners are pluralist and cosmopolitan, but on the contrary as a single commodity- 
world where local cultures and identities are uprooted and replaced with symbols 
from the publicity and image departments of multinational corporations (in italics is 
original).
11.5. Politics: acting local thinking global
As I have highlighted in Chapter 2, the global pressures have played a significant role in 
the establishment of democracy in Nepal. The buzzword for global politics has been 
‘democracy’. Democracy can signify different tastes and appeals to different actors 
depending on the conditionality offered. For instance, for the Nepali king and the panchas, 
panchayat was a democratic system just as for Praveez of Pakistan his dictatorship was 
perhaps an actual democratic system. More strangely, the rulers of apartheid Africa, more 
often than never, tried to define their rule as being democratic. Pinochet’s Chile, Marcos’s 
Philippines or Suharto’s Indonesia were democratic in the eyes of the US rulers during the 
cold war era. What these examples suggest is that the definition of democracy has always 
been controversial. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term ‘democracy’ has
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prevailed and is, by and large, accepted as being the better system of them all unless we 
have a superior alternative.
In the whirlpool of globalisation, Nepal has undergone many structural changes, some of 
which I have discussed above. Among the few of the more explicit and far-reaching 
changes, the shift from monarchical dictatorship to multiparty democracy and the abolition 
of the institution of monarchy are by far the foremost ones. To explain the phenomenon we 
have to understand the social dynamics and the forces at play. Besides the complex set of 
contradictions in the domestic levels, the global pressures have played their essential roles 
that I have been highlighting.
The democratic movement of the 1990s as well as the the Maobadi andolan are local 
initiatives, drawing experiences from the global ideology and transnational experiences. If 
an individual (although interconnected), or the range of political movements since the 
1980s is analysed as a single long-drawn event, I believe that one of the major 
contradiction that cannot be undermined has been the global versus the local. The king’s 
direct rule relied on the traditional knowledge and did its best to separate and isolate it from 
the possible contamination of global knowledge, viewpoints, opinions or experiences. It 
was in this light that the last Prime Minister of the panchayat era in an interview said, 
“panchayat system was a political system that was grounded on the realities of Nepal and 
therefore represented an indigenous system meant for all.” Contextually, it rejected the 
notion that democracy was a viable alternative for the state. Later during 2006, ironically in 
a situation where the pubic at large were settled with the two-pillar political structure, the 
king through the act of hostility towards the democratic system opposed the global 
discourses and reverted to his off-colour dictatorship. Thus, what Nepal has gained today 
on political grounds, bears direct connection with the global discourses, globalisation and 
the thrust for globality.
“We are now in the twenty-first century” declared a UML leader, “and the history tells us 
that the institution of monarchy can no longer be the representative political structure.” The 
statement is powerful; however, it fails from answering why the century makes the 
difference and how the tern ‘century’ is connected with the institution. Nepal follows the 
traditional lunar calendar and the year is 2065. We have been in the twenty-first century
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since many decades. If then, why the alarm and the panic in arguing why the monarchy 
lacks political legitimacy at this particular period?
Of course, the idea here is that both the global political discourses and the local trend in 
politics are dominated by the principles of democracy and human rights. Either as 
commodity to be transported, transplanted or exported, or as a system to be nurtured by its 
citizens, the message is that it must be in favour of the west. Democracy and human rights 
in this sense have been the mantra of the democratic movements. “Nepalese are 
nationalists and democratic. They love their country and want to get rid of the feudal icon. 
The institution of monarchy must be abolished” (ibid). While discussing the monarch, 
leaders appear global democrats; on the contrary, while asserting their position vis-à-vis the 
monarchical nationalism they sound contradictory. This is because the global discourse 
cannot be digested completely in the local context. While democracy underpins the present 
political trend on the global scale, the fervour of nationalism and the passion for national 
identity indicate the departure from the global. Thus, as is apparent, the process of 
globalisation has set in a reaction mechanism that produces positive as well as negative 
offshoots often opposing, entangled, interdependent and incoherent products.
Just as the fragmentation, exclusion or isolation of communities at particular locations or 
space (as in Kathmandu or Dang) have often been accompanied by the elements of 
interdependency, inclusion or participation, these complex mechanisms are found to be in 
operation in most of the social settings as well. The local shops selling foreign goods, 
which I had mentioned in Chapter 10, could be sighted as examples here. The 
interdependency and participation is often encountered with exclusion and further 
fragmentation that reinforce social and economic boundaries. Citizenship claims in this 
situation becomes extremely political and complex. The global reasons behind citizenship 
claims are merits at one occasion; while on the other, the same reasons pave way towards 
liberal model of citizenship, where the group rights are unprotected. The rights of ethnic, 
faith or language groups, in which case, could be subjected to banal neglect. Kymlicka and 
Norman (2000) argue that even if the concerns for human rights are praiseworthy for a 
decent life and therefore desirable, it may not offer a breakthrough in a conflict situation 
where central issues such as self-determination, federalism or nature of political 
engagement become the major agendas, as has been the case in Nepal. The margin of 
inconsistency and incoherence persisting in similar theoretical debates is often exploited by
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the ruling elites to preserve the political-philosophical basis of the state as a way of 
maintaining the status quo.
The fall of monarchy was the outcome of both the global discourses and local realities. The 
anti-monarchy campaign stood on a tripod network. The political parties, civil society 
organisations and the commoners constituted of the local networks popularising the values 
of a republican constituency. “How many countries have kings? It is the time and the 
global situation that are most important. If Nepalese do not want the monarchy, they should 
be given the right to decide,” said Prakash Gautam, a local leader and a NGO activist in 
Bijouri. The global antidote is apparently the ready-made answer, even when the local 
reasons may appear faulty. The king being the ‘leader of the feudalism’ may not have 
convinced the global forces; however, the cause of democracy and the reasons behind the 
human rights certainly did.
The multinational agencies, transnational corporations, or global cultural and religious 
forums etc. have also influenced the Nepalese political regimes. In this regards, the role and 
influence of the WB or the IMF have already been discussed. The most prominent 
transnational organisation of global influencer has been the United Nations. Although it 
was a creation of modem nation-states in a situation of the post-war consciousness, its 
influence has been to undermine the sovereignty of Nepal taking into account of its earlier 
nationalistic missions and its definition of nationhood.
The declaration of human rights and its implication in recent times have clearly established 
the idea that nation-states are not independent without the consent of the global social 
order. “In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. The 
delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United 
States in August-October 1944.”^^  It must have been beyond their imagination on how the 
system of nation states was to be affected by the rationale of the Charter in the years to 
come. However, the fact that was clear right from the beginning was that the regime of the
66 Source: ‘The story of the United Nations’ http://www.buzzie.com/editoriais/9-5-20Q4-58939.asp
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United Nations, in the capacity of a transnational organisation, had pervaded the sovereign 
sphere of the member states while the rights and obligations of these vary states were being 
set out.
Nepal became a member of the UN in December 1955, and even lobbied at the forefront 
for aspiring new members. It has since been a party to many declarations, covenants, 
bilateral agreements and understandings in association with various themes and in the 
capacity as pledges, binding treaties or nonbinding agreements. However, in doing so, the 
political implications have been to undermine its capacity as a nation-state. Theoretically, it 
appears legitimate for any state to consider who its citizens are and work out the citizenship 
model defining rights and duties, equality and justice and so and so forth. However, as has 
been the case in Nepal when the anti-monarch movement escalated, the human rights issue 
gained currency. Similarly, human rights issue has also provided grounds for arguing over 
the rights of national minorities and Madhesis. In these situations, the state policies or 
traditional knowledge systems were overridden by the global definitions of what 
citizenship should mean. These forms of transformed understandings and value 
negotiations were antagonistic to the nationalistic visions and sovereign ideals imbued in 
the philosophy of the state. As the movement for recognition gathered momentum, the 
ideals of federalism and republicanism were reviewed and considered as the way forward 
for legitimatising the new order of power distribution. The examples to defend this notion 
were all global as national sovereignty in its formal sense was antithetical to these new 
circumstances.
While I was in Nepal, before my departure to the UK in 2006, anti-Monarch 
demonstrations were rapidly gaining grounds. The civil society organisations, educated 
youths and students, political leadership and people from different professions were out 
into the streets for the cause of democracy and human rights. Although different sections of 
the society had differing agendas, all were united against the common adversary -  the royal 
palace. I spoke to a student participating in the demonstration where he said:
We are fighting for democracy, nationalism and human rights. The monarch has 
undermined nationalism and ended democracy. Even the basic human rights have 
been curtailed by the dictatorial regime. I think the problem is multi-layered. Once we 
do away with the king, we can work together to solve the problems of Dalits, 
janajatis and Madhesis and construct an inclusive environment.
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Another demonstrator (a supporter of the Nepali Congress party), presented a deeper 
picture while I talked to him. Analysing the multi-layered problems he added:
Unless the cultural, lingual, religious and political issues of different groups are 
solved, the movement will not subside. Even the United Nations has declared the 
rights of indigenous peoples and Nepal is a party to the covenant. The state should 
solve the problem accordingly.
Here again was an opinion seeking global reasoning. Although he later conceded that he 
had not read the covenant, he however, emphasised that it must be good and that Nepal 
should put it into practice. The tendency of sorting out local problems through global 
standards has been a common phenomenon. It is a general practice in Nepal that when 
leaders speak they view the local problems through the global lenses. The practice of 
externalising problems is extremely harmful in situations when the same leadership seeks 
solace in ‘local cultures’ and ‘traditions’ or in the ‘level of awareness’ when in fact it is to 
blame.
Judging from this angle, where states and governments have undergone substantial 
changes from the process of globalisation, Kim Rubenstein^^ asserts:
Citizenship, therefore, involves the ahility to influence, and be part of, that governance; 
to influence the political outcomes of the state. But the process of ‘governance’ has 
changed substantially in light of globalization.
However, I would like to extend Rubenstein’s assertion a bit further. For Nepal, 
globalisation process has not only influenced the process of ‘governance’, rather, it has 
assisted in transforming local knowledge binding it to the global context. As a result of 
which, historical transformation has occurred - from monarchical regime to parliamentary 
politics. In view of the transformation process, transnational knowledge has added the 
notions of global standards in real terms where ideas governing the political, social, civic, 
religious and lingual depart substantially from the linear notions of legal category or simply 
as the membership in a political community. Although the global discourse is not premised 
on an uniform standard or model of citizenship, the debate in Nepal is rather on loose 
grounds that is generally expressed as - ‘west is the best’. Those holding this view include
Rubenstein, K. (2004) “Globalisation and Citizenship and Nationality,” Faculty of Law, University 
of Melbourne, Research Paper 69 http://ssrn.com/abstract=530382
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scholars, educated elites, party leadership and the business class just to mention a few. 
Many exposed to similar discussions accept intemational discourse or global examples as 
something that one needs to accept at face value. In this respect, the process of governance 
in Nepal has been on the constant change since decades through transnational treaties, 
understandings or through global and local discourses. However, in the latter years the 
influence of globalisation has transcended the state’s legitimate regime. As a result, the 
global-local knowledge and circulating thought process have succeeded in transforming the 
state’s national political characteristics to some degree. The absolute monarchical regime 
of the 1960s has now transformed into a democratic republic polity following the 1990 and 
2006 movements. This, of course, is the simplest way to explain and visualise the changes 
that have occurred at the national level, with profound influence derived from the global 
processes.
The subjects of intemational law, humanitarian actions, economic development or matters 
of intemal peace and security, are under the preview of the transnational organisations, 
global forums or global communities including the UN. Methods employed during 
intervention have ranged from diplomatic pressures, trade embargos or military actions 
including massive scale invasions as in the case of Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq. Thus, 
what these facts point out is that the nation-states today are no longer isolated and neither 
do they enjoy absolute sovereignty as they did earlier. In the same manner, local/national 
citizenship has been overlapped by global versions of rights and obligations that usually 
transcend the nationality or the nation state’s territorial sovereignty.
It was no surprise that during the people’s movement of 2006 the Nepalese civil society 
organisations were communicating with the global networks and transnational institutions 
to make their voices heard. If it were not so, there would have been no reasons for the 
ousted king’s regime to disrupt the communication as well as the intemet facilities 
throughout the state as the movement picked momentum. Although it is true that this 
strategy prevented the nation-wide communication, and thus contributed to the chaos and 
disorientation of the rebelling political force, more pragmatically it served as a double- 
edged sword that effectively disconnected Nepal with the rest of the world as well. This 
was essentially vital for the rulers, as they had sensed the growing global pressures 
mounting on the regime. The communication networks and the growing density of local- 
global flows have steadily continued, particularly, in the last to decades as irreversible
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processes. It was in this regards that the monarch underestimated the reality of 
interconnectivity, interdependency and the local-global marriage. Isolation was impossible 
as it is now, and the nationalistic rhetoric did not promise him any protection or longevity 
either. This clearly shows the global processes in communication with the local. Although 
these processes counter one another on various fronts and in differing nature and forms as I 
have discussed, they however bear strong capacity in influencing the geopolitics of Nepal 
on either directions -  i.e. Promoting positive outcomes or derailing the political processes 
and contributing to gear the state towards the negative pitch of globalisation.
11.6. Maobadi andolan and fall of the monarchical regime
The rise of Maobadi andolan has been coterminous to the fall of the monarchy in Nepal. 
Since the ascendency of the monarchy to political absoluteness, there had been a 
continuous effort to promote anti-monarchy activities in the state by different political 
forces in different times in history. This has been the trend of the political process. At its 
core, the effort contained the spirit of democracy and claimed for a comprehensive political 
framework that would ensure social justice and equal citizenship.
The ideals of the monarchical state and the spirit of the Maobadi andolan have often 
formed common confluences on many occasions with respect to the nation-state ideology. 
State-centric zeal, nationalist sentiments and the fervour of patriotism often resembled one 
another; although the issues derived from the chapters of historical materialism countered 
the ‘feudal institution’ and called for its abolition. However, the commensuration of 
debates on either side of the ideological divide were prompted by the global discourses and 
in general, the globalisation processes. Although the monarchy relied on local and 
traditional knowledge systems and beliefs, it nevertheless drew examples from the global 
canvas when they served its arguments.
For a relatively small country like Nepal, in terms of its territory, economic sphere or 
influence in the global systems, the anxiety offered by the prospects of foreign 
interventions is real. The incidents related to the growth of Maobadi andolan can be traced 
back to its membership in the Revolutionary International Movement^^ (RIM) during 1990s
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) The declaration of the Revolutionary 
Internationalist Movement was adopted in March 1984 by the delegates and observers at the Second
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and, later, the inception of CCOMPOSA^^ with the objectives of unifying the Marxist 
movements in the region. In an interview with Onesto in 2002 the General Secretary of 
Maobadi Party Prachanda acknowledging this fact emphasised, “[...] right from the time of 
preparation, up to the time of initiation, and after the initiation, there was intemational 
involvement. Help, debate and discussion was there” (in Gautam, 2004:10). Besides the use 
of global intellectual debates in local contexts, the Maobadi have, at occasions reverted 
their intemal policy at the dictates of RIM. For example, the boycott of the 1991 general 
elections was the result of a strong objection from RIM that compelled it to reconsider its 
election policy in favour of a nation-wide boycott. Of course, the matter to consider, in the 
broad sense, is that the Marxist ideology is in itself a global product just as democracy has 
been. In similar vein, it was in 1993 that Maoism was adopted as the guiding principle of 
the party’s revolutionary thesis. In this regards I insist that communists are 
intemationalists, and being so are more active in drawing examples and experiences from 
abroad just as the Maobadis drew theirs from Pern or the Naxlite movement of India.
More than the theoretical aspects or the organisational expressions, the important fact to 
consider is the narratives involved in the process of mobilisation. As discussed above, 
human rights claims by the people’s war or the anti-cormption campaigns launched by the 
party, the movement has resorted to global discourses and regional examples. Even during 
the debates on social reforms, the egalitarian concepts and the issues of rights and duties 
have been forwarded as motivational factors that dig deeper into the ideals of equal 
citizenship. “Good examples should be accepted,” explained Sushma, a Maobadi leader 
during an interview in 2008, “without regards to where they may be performed.” However, 
when the perception over what truly should be regarded as being ‘good’ differs 
philosophically, the universal value becomes an unfounded myth surpassing the zone of 
rational debate.
International Conference of the Marxist-Leninist (now Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) Parties and 
organisations which formed the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. See appendix 3 for details. 
Source: http.V/cnnm.org/new/RIM/rim index.htm , Retrieved: 7/4/2009
^  Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOS A), is a 
body coordinating the Maoist Parties and Organizations and their struggle and action in South Asia. 
See appendix 4 for details.
Source: http://cpnm.org/new/ccomposa/cco/cco dclr.htm. Retrieved: 7/4/2009
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11.7. Conclusion
The global processes have tended to offer complex, interdependent and intertwined results. 
The liberal form of citizenship (although very thin) linked with the democratic processes 
clashed in rivalry with the communitarian model of citizenship groomed during the king’s 
direct rule following the 1980s. In this protracted conflict, the Nepali state and its 
philosophical political grounding has been exposed and debated. The movement of April 
2008 has paved way to a republican process. Political transcendence from the monarchical 
model to a republican setup demands fundamental changes that have been referred to by 
the Nepalese politicians as state restructuring. Essence in the Dalit, indigenous peoples, 
Madhesi or the janajati movements, lie in the principles of equal power distribution, 
without which ‘citizenship’ is hollow providing further fertile provisions for identity 
politics.
The local debates have drawn in from globalisation. Just as liberal citizenship makes the 
global discourse, the sense of communitarianism with a strong role of the state, in its 
capacity for interventions, still attracts the majority. The poverty factor demands for a 
relatively a strong welfare-oriented state. Likewise, for the culturalists, globalisation is a 
threat. The global intercourses on issues of human rights or positive rights, however, have 
contributed and influenced the Nepalese society and replenished the contemporary 
movements. A new chapter has been added in the ethnic movement since 2003 when the 
UN declared the year of indigenous peoples. However, together with identity assertions and 
claims over ethnic and indigenous rights, the general feeling that communal harmony may 
deteriorate is not an invalid anxiety, unless harnessed with a clear vision. On the other 
front, notions of individual freedom and liberty are often discussed as being counterfeit to 
group rights and ethnic claims.
Summing up the arguments it is quite clear that the process of globalisation being very 
complex and multidirectional, has offered mixed results in the socio-political and economic 
regimes. The induced results are indeed very difficult to be classified along a linier scale. 
The entailing aspects of hybridity, segregation, transformation, dislocation, 
dependency/interdependency, as intertwined processes, are shaping the future of the 
Nepalese societies - towards unknown destiny in the long run. It is in this respect that 
newer forms of citizenships are immerging. “As national cultures become more exposed to 
outside influences, it is difficult to preserve cultural identities intact, or to prevent them
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from becoming weakened through cultural bombardment and infiltration" (Hall 1992:302). 
Being that cultures are neither immutable nor are they frozen in time and space, hybridised, 
mixed and transformed products with distant characteristics will surface quite unlike the 
original forms.
For example, Stuart Hall (2000:118) states:
As a tentative conclusion, it would appear then that globalisation does have the effect 
of contesting and dislocating the centred and “closed” identities of national culture. It 
does have a pluralising impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and 
new positions of identification, and making identities more positional, more political, 
more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical.
However, along with this trend, the euphoria for cultural or religious purity appears as 
strong. It is visible that seeking ones culture and heritage in its purest form from the ancient 
worlds of imaginations possess the tendency to reinforce ethnocentrism. Cherishing 
differences is not an end; rather it is just a means to gaining as well as granting recognition 
and respect. As these differences are mostly rooted to cultures, they are not transfixed, 
frozen or immutable either.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion: the prospects for change: modernity and momentum 
12.1. Introduction
Although the Nepalese societies have been embedded in the caste structures, and many are 
still influenced by the notion of pollution and purity, I have argued that, a. values of 
modernity and liberalism, b. the contemporary social and political processes, c. individual 
achievement through education, income and profession along with d. the global discourses, 
have been diluting the astringent social norms and the mandatory discipline upheld in the 
past. In this regard, it is important to appreciate that these processes are invigorating the 
claims to equal citizenship. I have insisted that despite the inconsistency between 
traditionalism and modernity, the Nepalese societies have also been experiencing 
overlapping, transformed and hybridised identities with growing levels of porosity and 
diffusion at boundaries that once were rigid and considered impervious. The ongoing social 
transformations are immensely complicated, slow and problematical. The permeated 
processes, nevertheless, have continued to open avenues and enhance claims to equality, 
social justice and human dignity.
12.2. Caste system and changing identities
In the contemporary Nepalese societies, the caste system has been playing an important 
role in sustaining exclusionary social hierarchies. The stratification is premised on the 
prerogatives of exclusion and inequality in different spheres of the social, political and 
religious lives of people. I have already highlighted the fact that the caste system, on which 
the traditional order of Hindu society is based, attaches particular importance to the notions 
of purity and pollution. The high caste people such as Brahmins and Chhetries fall within 
the pure caste category while the people chiefly engaged in different occupational works 
are traditionally accepted as being impure, polluted groups and occupy the lowermost 
position.
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Another equally important feature of traditional Hindu society has been its segmentation 
into a larger number of sub-castes groupings, each of which has been characterized by a 
form of social and cultural identity. Within the country, from one location to the next 
distinctive cultures are found. In Bijouri, a village in the mid-west region, Tharus, 
Brahmins, Chhetris, Magars are the dominant distinct ethno-cultural groups. However, they 
also share common cultural and religious practices that transcend their ethnic boundaries. 
Between the two prominent Hindu temples in Bijouri village, the temple of Lord shiva has 
a Brahmin priest while the priest in a Goddess Devi temple is a Magar female. I talked to 
the woman priest and the local visitors to the temple. They confirmed that this has been the 
tradition since centuries. What is striking is that the visitors consist of a wide range of 
people including different ethnic groups in the region. In addition, beside the Tharus, the 
rest of the village people, including women wear similar colourful dresses and speak the 
Nepali language. Fusion between different cultures and traditions is quite apparent within 
the differences.
The uniqueness lies in the fact that the cultures, traditions and languages including rituals 
of the same ethnic community living in different parts of the country are not the same. For 
example, any group such as Magars, Tharus, Gurungs including others would show some 
cultural differences from one region/area to the next. For example, within the Rais eight 
different dialects are spoken and cultures of some have been significantly Hinduized. 
Centuries of sharing the same space, has produced cultural exchanges among all groups. 
“The fusion between different cultural traditions is a powerful creative source,” indicates 
Hall (2000:119). Kathmandu has more in its favour in terms of the emerging forms of 
hybrid identity. Rushdie claims in The Satanic Verses that “[It] produces hybiidity, 
impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combination 
of human being, cultures, ideal, politics, movies [...]” (ibid). On the extreme end of the 
spectrum, cosmopolitan identities have emerged as well. The results have continued to 
bring changes and transformations, where the religious, cultural or the traditional values 
have been continuously replaced by modem beliefs and corresponding value systems. 
With the political, economical, social and global processes at work, the caste barriers are 
gradually being porous and some forms of mobility have emerged although the process has 
been immensely slow. I will discuss the caste system later in this chapter.
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The social norms pertaining to mandatory disciplines were strongly upheld by different 
caste groups and subgroups in the past. One of the most important attributes behind the 
preservation of social and cultural identity among the caste/ non-caste groups has been the 
social norm of endogamy. This rule was strongly applied by all the groups. However, 
societies are not without exceptions. David Gellner expresses:
There likewise have always been not infrequent examples of intercaste marriage or 
concubinage, with the offspring absorbed either into the father’s or the mother’s caste, 
depending on the circumstances of the case. It is precisely because of this that the Chetris 
have become the largest and most widespread caste in Nepal.^°
Besides the occurrence of inherent hybridity in Chetry caste group, I believe that the 
society has been tuned to accept brides and grooms from different cultures or ethnic 
backgrounds, although this form marriage locally known as ‘inter-caste marriage’ is more 
relevant to the urban settlements. Alongside the developing nature of cultural fluidity in 
Kathmandu, the people that I interviewed in Bijouri village read out a long list of inter­
caste marriages that they had attended. Erosion of cultural boundaries with respect to the 
norms of cultural endogamy is celebrated by people who are willing to accept changes or 
by those who believe this to be a natural outcome. However, the idea of hybridity is not 
appealing to all. Ethnocentric and Brahministic discourses tend to abhor the trend and seek 
purity and through cultural reinvention and reproduction in alliance with the notions of 
protectionism and essentialism. The general trend, however, is that inter-caste marriages in 
rural settings such as Bijouri village are no longer the subjects of ridicule. Many local 
leaders from different parties, businesspersons, teachers along with some people that I saw 
and talked to or interviewed have been married to persons of different castes. This trend 
has been breaking the norms of endogamy, encouraging the idea of the socio-religious 
acceptance, tolerance, and sharing on the mutual grounds of recognition and respect.
As I have elaborated in many of the chapters, the Maobadi andolan is much short of being a 
class based movement. Its chemistry of participation in general represents the features of 
the Nepalese society with respect to the occurrence of caste and non-caste groups. In this 
regards, there is considerable presence of the middle class across ethnic and non-ethnic
Soruce: ‘Ethnic rights and politics in Nepal’ University of Oxford 
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divides. The cross sectional representation of people from different cultural backgrounds 
and territorial divides has been the most important factor characterising the success of the 
andolan. Since the people’s war also consists of the upper caste groups to a significant 
degree from the hills as well as from the Terai, the amalgamating nature underlying the 
civil war needs academic attention. Thus, it is a blunder to consider that all dominant castes 
occupy the highest positions in the traditional ladder of have-gots or that the absolute 
control over the resources is the de facto the inherent characteristic of the higher caste 
groups alone. The Maobadi andolan has effectively challenged the caste structure and to a 
notable degree has been a movement representing an egalitarian concept. We are 
communists,” asserted Bikash, a Maobadi cadre in Bijouri village, “and being so, our aim 
is to promote modem ideas replacing the old ones. Religion is no exception.”
The ongoing social movements; democratic polity and the political debates; media, 
communication and global cultural exchanges along with commercialisation have had 
positive impacts on reducing the overarching dominance of caste in socio-economic affairs. 
It is in this respect that the present movements in Nepal are broadly linked with anti- 
Brahminism and caste stmcture. The Maobadi andolan possesses economic objectivism; 
however, its cultural agenda appears to be substantially emphasised as I have already 
explained in Chapter 5. Most importantly, the janajati andolan, being an ethnic movement, 
is devoid of the politics of redistribution and thus possesses the tendency to reinforce 
ethnocentrism making its headway as an anti-Brahmin thesis. In this respect, ethnocentrism 
and the cultural politics of the Maobadi have coincided, offering a strong resistance against 
the dominance of the caste stmcture.
Like the Newar, the janajati activisms have favoured all but the politics of redistribution 
undermining the liberation of peasants from the exploitative relations of production. 
Demand for cultural justice on exclusive grounds does not always address the other 
dimension of injustice, exclusion, vulnerability and social dominance that often are 
embedded in the production-distribution relations. In the whirlpool of identity politics, pan­
consciousness among the Dalits has progressively risen although it remains short of 
affecting changes the caste structure.
For instance, Marwaris and Newars comprised of the most affluent class of people in my 
research area in Kathmandu. While in Bijouri village, it was the Brahmins and the Chhetris
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that represented the power, prestige and position. However, both of these examples need to 
be accepted with a critical approach; because not all, - not most, nor the majority of 
Newars, Brahmins or Chhetries would share the similar position or similar honour and 
social prestige. This has been the reality as reported by the Asian Development Bank^\
The very poor are found across a wide variety of socioeconomic groups irrespective 
of ethnicity, caste, sex, religious beliefs, or geographic region. Nepalese society is 
both vertically (income, education, professional skills) and horizontally (linguistic, 
caste, ethnicity) stratified, such that each ethnic group or caste, while possessing its 
own cultural identity, is ultimately indexed on the basis of class. Not all ‘upper’ 
castes are wealthy, nor are all ‘lower’ castes poor. However, for groups whose first 
language is not Nepali, language constraints pose additional impediments to 
participate in mainstream development.
In addition, the declining positions of the landowning class, rapidly emerging new 
bourgeoisie and the middle class in the light of expanding education and global 
opportunities have begun to induce changes pertaining to the caste perspectives.
12.3. Social consciousness: both sides of the coin
Social consciousness is indeed a progressive and positive phenomenon that guides the 
societies towards modem beliefs. It is considered as being essential and desirable. 
However, social consciousness does not come without demerits or accompanied by more 
diversified complications. Despite the gradual divorce of societies from traditionalism 
owing to local pressures via the ongoing movements and through the regional or global 
pressures, the outcome is complex and diverse.
A local resident of Bijouri village in an interview said:
Some of the changes that are sweeping the country are dangerous. Just as different 
ethnic movements seek rights that cannot be ignored on moral grounds, similarly our 
(Hindu) culture and religion also need to be safeguarded. Brahmins and Chetries also 
possess their own culture, religion and tradition that need safeguarding. As everyone 
is engrossed in his own sense of ethnicity, then I think it is time that we too woke up 
to the ethnic call. If all except communities like Brahmins and Chetries possess 
special reservations in jobs, health, education and other sectors, then why should not a 
poor member of our community possess similar rights? The state of poverty that he is 
in, clearly speaks of his pitiful condition.
Working Paper, Series No. 4, June 2005, Nepal Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank, page 16
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As the ethnic assertiveness has strengthened that mainly challenges Brahmanism, the 
dominant groups have also developed some signs of ethnocentrism. However, this aspect of 
identity formation is a new experience among the chain of events. Nonetheless, it is equally 
justifiable to consider that it demands a separate research.
Present circumstances suggest that as the social consciousness of the Nepalese society 
(owing to the different reasons as explained throughout the research) is rising; included 
within the social consciousness is the pan-ethnic and Madhesi consciousness. Social 
consciousness of the forces of production and the Madhesi or ethnic consciousness are not 
of a harmonious category in terms of their philosophical outlooks, objectives of 
mobilisation, knowledge systems or the narratives used for the purpose. Thus, it is common 
to see one negating the other as I have explained in Chapter 5. However, as the Maobadi 
andolan has incorporated these nationalist sentiments into its political framework and 
continues to ferry it, the fervour has grown even stronger. In addition, the trend of the 
Nepalese Marxism has been fairly non-violent towards religions, cultures or traditions in 
the past. Because my analytical framework draws from the opportunity of marriage 
between the politics of identity and the politics of distribution, one should not be confused 
and accept the Maobadi andolan to represent this theoretical grounding. But rather, it has in 
actuality, exploited this specific contradiction to its favour for attaining the levels of 
mobilisation that it has accomplished. Whereas the ethnic consciousness is anti- 
Brahminism, the political or social consciousness in Marxist terms is associated with the 
realisation of class antagonism and class conflict followed by an elevated degree of 
participation in organised forms by the working class i.e. the peasants and proletariats. In 
the Nepalese context, the peasants, petty farmers, and the national bourgeoisie form the 
bulk of the revolutionary forces drawing from the reasons of an agrarian form of political 
economy.
Besides the rural sectors, the growing sense of ethnocentrism was evident in Kathmandu as 
well, where a member of Sadbhavana Party, choosing anonymity, said:
Every religion has its own set of duties and moral codes, and in this regards, 
Hinduism is no exception. Thus, if we believe in Hinduism, it is our duty to safeguard 
it against any known or unknown harms that may befall. The form of Hinduism 
practiced in the plains possesses stricter codes and is more resistant to changes.” 
However, since we are Hindus, we naturally are committed to the norms.
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We see that, whilst on the one hand the pressure for modernity has been continuously 
building both from domestic as well as from the global discourses, the same notions of 
modemity/egalitarianism have difficulty in adjusting to the notions of ethnocentrism 
regardless of the agencies, such as the Maobadi, delivering the message. The features of 
compatibility/incompatibility are quite clear, and the Nepali state should now make serious 
efforts to premise the agenda of equal citizenship within its overall national debate.
12.4. Transformation
Despite the ethnocentric and egalitarian concepts of citizenship represented by the ethnic 
and Maobadi andolan respectively, the two models in fact are theoretically incompatible. 
Nevertheless, besides the models of citizenship being generated there are other powerful 
forces at play, which constantly have been reforming and creating new identities. The 
process of modernisation, and to a lesser degree the industrialisation, that I have 
highlighted in Chapter 2, have contributed to the decline of social norms related to the strict 
code of adherence of the caste boundaries. This is associated with the rapid urbanisation, 
urban-centric migrations, and the anonymity offered by urban environments to the mobile 
populations and new settlers in growing cities. The fluidity of the caste closures, which 
have been observed to be urban phenomenon also owe to the growth of urban middle class 
occupations, modem education, and the political initiatives since the legal banning of 
‘untouchablity’ during 1960s. In this respect, as I stated before, the leftist movements have 
contributed to advocate against the caste stmctures although falling terribly short of 
achieving anything substantial in this regard. Being that the trend of the Nepalese 
communist movement has been in good harmony with the religious, cultural and traditional 
thought processes to a fairer degree, this applies constraints to pursue the materialist gains. 
This trend also forms a barrier to equality by obstmcting natural justice when the 
emancipation of social groups such as the Dalits is concerned.
In my research area in Kathmandu, there is no ethnic, religious or linguistic group which is 
economically homogenous or where its members posses an equal prestige or privilege in 
terms of their social standing. In this respect, the largest group, the Newars, appear more 
heterogeneous. However, this needs to be analysed on firm grounds with supportive 
evidence. In the research, I have inferred the reason to be based on the fact that, the larger a 
community the more will it depart from the ideal conditions of homogeneity. On the 
reverse, small groups possess more likelihood of occupying homogenous positions with
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respect to income and social prestige. For instance, the Marwaris in my research area in 
Kathmandu possess the top positions in the social hierarchy, because of its small 
population size and the talent/skill of competence of this community for conducting 
business. Similarly the Thakali, a small community in the eastern hill areas of Nepal, have 
done extremely well both in Kathmandu and elsewhere, and are among the best income 
groups in Nepal, that is evident form the national statics as well. Andre Beteille (1969) in 
his research finding in India asserts:
I find it most convenient to view castes as status group, and as status groups they 
have in the past been characterised by an exceptionally high degree of both diacritical 
and syncretic unity. Status group exist in all complex societies, but in countries like 
Britain and America, they tend to be much more fluid and amorphous -  overlapping 
categories rather than groups with clearly defined boundaries. In contemporary India, 
status groups are acquiring some of this fluidity, although they continue in varying 
degree to carry the impress of the traditional order (1969:70).
In the modem political stmcture of Nepal, the sense of modemity is in direct conflict with
the traditional values as I have highlighted before. This is a general expression in the 
present context where the pressures building from the domestic regimes and those from the 
outside, global and regional, have rendered powerful coupling affects on the existing social 
stmctures. A friend of mine who is an electrical engineer has been happily married to a 
women belonging to the Dalit category. He recalled his days when he was excluded from 
his Newar-Shrestha community for crossing the ethnic boundary. In due course of time, 
after eleven years of marriage and with two handsome sons to their additional happiness, 
they were finally called for a family reunion. “This was a blissful moment for us,” he 
recalled.
To be modem is to find ourselves in an environment that promises adventure, power, 
joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world -  and, at the same time, that 
threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are ... 
modemity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of 
discontinuity ... to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts
into air (Marshall Berman in Camilleri and Falk, 1994:46).
The concepts of traditionalism have been in conflict with values imparted by modemity 
where the notions of caste are slowly being eroded. However, as the modemity interacts 
with traditionalism, Nepalese society is constantly experiencing overlapping, complex.
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transformed identities with growing levels of porosity and diffusion at boundaries that once 
were more rigid and considered impervious.
The social processes that value the egalitarian modemity as being the ideal forms of social 
reality have been continuing, although at a slow and silent pace. This trend of social 
consciousness and ethnic conformity are not complementary either. However, it has been 
more common to see people from different ethnic backgrounds working together in line 
with their professions and interests, and at the same time, identity particulars such as 
preferred dress, type of food, or even languages spoken etc. have common denominations 
among educated professionals. This is more visible in urban centres, as in Kathmandu, 
where the process of globalisation has influenced identities. National culture is in the 
decline whereas new and transformed identities have been apparent owing to the exposure 
and openness to the world. Hall (1992:302) explains:
“National cultures become more exposed to outside influences, it is difficult to 
preserve cultural identities intact, or to prevent them from becoming weakened 
through cultural bombardment and infiltration"
Multilayered nature of identity or overlapping sense of belonging is a common course of 
movement from ones exclusive cultural framework through series of negotiations. The 
examples that I have discussed above provide evidence that hybrid and multilayered forms 
of citizenship are common outcomes from these social intercourses. These very processes 
are contributing to weaken the non-porous and rigid boundaries, although at a very slow 
pace.
The sense of modemity along with its development packages introduced transportation and 
communication facilities, which brought the people together as never before. The practice 
of parliamentary democracy that followed since the 1990s inaugurated a new environment 
of interaction and debate with innovative ideals and ideas as part of the social discourses. 
These changes with sufficient strength to reposition oneself in the contemporary social 
structure were viewed as opportunities by more adventurous or the enterprising members of 
different communities, and more so by those that have been driven by the incentives of 
economic benefits or scaling the social ladder for the purpose of gaining social prestige and 
honour.
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Democracy has been a strong tool responsible for the weakening of the boundaries between 
the castes. Politics when played outside the caste structures will be rewarding for a Hindu 
polity like that of Nepal. As politics stands today, the blueprint of democracy does not 
follow the religious lines, and least the caste boundaries. This has been one of the key 
differences in the Nepalese democracy as compared to that of India, where political parties 
have frequently exploited the Dalit-non-Dalite divide and faith cleavages to enhance their 
goals. The Scheduled caste have often been mobilised against other candidates in the name 
of democracy or made to participate in obscure agendas. However, on the other side, the 
vote patterns in Nepal have not indicated a non-secular trend or the mobilisation of Dalits 
in support of political stunts envisaged by ruling elites, based on the caste hierarchy or 
through the exploitation of the Dalit/non-Dalit divide. In this sense, it is positive that 
national parties, albeit utterly failing in delivering good governance, social justice or equal 
citizenship, have led the national political process refraining from exploiting the most 
vulnerable and exploited communities in the name of ‘religion’ or ‘democracy’ along the 
lines of religions or the caste-non-caste divides. It is thus true that democracy and 
democratic process contribute in diluting boundaries between the Dalit/non-Dalit divide; 
however, the process has been alarmingly slow.
Further to this, say for instance, a Brahmin or a Chetri who may have been the headman in 
village cannot by default claim superiority after the political change. Democracy seeks 
popular leadership by its competitive nature, and more so, many parties are at competition 
with one another in the same constituency. Andre Beteille (1969) shares his findings and 
indicates that the direct method of exploitation based on caste superiority has had the 
tendency to decrease or else a rival party would point out the atrocities committed. A 
similar scenario can be visualised here where the process of democracy, emerging 
institutions and the legal frameworks, have, to a certain degree, replaced the high-caste 
dominance that once existed unhindered. The shift of power from caste category or the 
religious supremacy to the process of democracy, the national and international institutions, 
local and global processes etc., have all contributed to the phenomenon of social 
transformation.
During the monarch’s panchayat regime, the differentiation of political organisations such 
as the kisan sangathan, mahila sangathan, vidhyarthy’ mandai, workers organisation, and so 
on, weakened the importance of caste. Although, most of these organisations possessed
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high caste leadership, the idea of decentralising power from one person to a committee can 
be argued to be of a significant shift. At the same time, the government also declared the 
caste system illegal. Since 1990, following the introduction of democracy, the mobility of 
Dalits has taken a new tern, albeit with a slow pace. In the past, individual mobility was out 
of question. The closed systems are undergoing gradual changes based on individual 
achievement through education, income and change of occupation etc. The caste loyalty or 
kinship-based loyalties are gradually fading although this experience is limited mostly 
among relatively high-income families. This is what Govind Nepali the owner of a local 
jewellery shop in Dang said during an interview in June 2007:
During the Dashain festival, we played cards and gambled for the whole week; 
among whom were the mukhiya (local landlord) and Cham-Cham (nick name for a 
local business man), including high ranking government officers. Although we played 
for days, I neither won nor lost even a single paisa. Mukhiya must have lost about 
twenty one thousand rupees.
The changes that are visible in Nepal today are not streamlined in one direction; rather, 
they are multifaceted, complex and ever evolving. They often counter one another. Modem 
education has been a vehicle for blurring boundaries and creating social porosity. However, 
following the 1990s, with the rise of identity politics, caste and ethnic loyalties along with 
their traditional structures appear gradually to be reinforcing. On the contrary, the caste and 
non-caste divides and the exclusionary practices based on purity and pollution are in a 
natural decline. As these processes are active and evolving it is quite clear that these 
developments have also offered the opportunity of generating multilayered loyalties that 
overlap and contribute to the creation of culturally hybrid, religiously mixed, territorially 
mobile identities.
The weakening of prejudices associated with the socio-religious orthodoxies and practices 
among the upper caste groups where the notions of purity and pollution has been the central 
theme in defining the impervious social closures, has still a long way to go. Concerning the 
change in the attitudes and behaviour among those in the higher echelons of the social 
hierarchy, it is established through the research that the episodes of political conflicts, 
protracted civil war, the nature of polity (democracy), identity claims, and global 
discourses along with the globalisation processes have raised the level of social awareness. 
These reasons along with many others as discussed throughout this research have
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supplemented the process of mobility. In this respect, the social structures in Kathmandu or 
in similar urban sectors in contrast to the rural settlings such as that in Bijouri village differ 
in their inertia as well the momentum, besides equally differing in their value-based 
acceptability towards social change. These processes continue to open avenues for the 
development of equal citizenship although the process rather than being simple is 
immensely problematical. Complications arise as the socio-political processes are being 
constantly subjected to historical debates, ethnocentrism, high caste chauvinism, 
irredentism and xenophobia along with the state-centric bias. In this regard, conservative 
culturalism seeing ethnic and national groups as exclusive and dissociated entities, frozen 
in time and space is yet another formidable challenge for the state as well the janajatis and 
indigenous conununities for some time to come. These, in real terms, are the newly 
emerging problems with the potentials of escalating the citizenship crisis. The issue of 
conservative culturalism, I believe, requires a fresh academic initiative and a genuine 
scholarly research.
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ANNEX 
The political history of Nepal: towards the development of a nation state
1.1 State, sovereignty, nationalism and national identity
During the mid-eighteenth century, the territorial expanse of Nepal hosted, among others, 
twenty-two principalities (baisi) in the Kamali region and twenty-four principalities 
(chauhisi) in the Gandaki region. Although each principality was ruled by a separate 
Chhetri king, these political entities possessed two loose political affiliations resembling 
confederations. Thus, these were called baise confederation and chaubisi confederation, 
each consisting of twenty and twenty-four principalities respectively.
After the Holy Roman Empire or the Russian and Ottoman Empire, argues Habermas 
(1995:257), “A different, federal form of state emerged from the belt of Central European 
cities in what was formally Lorraine, the heart of Carolingian Empire.” The formation of 
similar political organisations in Nepal, provide reasonable basis to compare the political 
processes centuries apart. “It was, in particular, Switzerland where a federation sprang up 
strong enough to balance the ethnic tensions within a multicultural association of citizens” 
(ibid). It is arguable that perhaps, the evolving confederation system in Nepal possessed a 
positive role in providing impetus to the unification project, specifically with respect to 
furnishing the psychological background, and more so, the physical basis by way of ethnic 
balance, keeping in view of the massive mobilisation that the project required in a 
multiethnic and multicultural associations of citizens.
The evolving political process during the 17‘^  century together with the idea of 
confederation among the princely states in the Himalayan and sub-Himalayan regions 
possessed political significance associated with the structuring of the political organisation 
that promoted the actions linked with the unification process. The confederation model 
tuned to the means of survival by chiefly decreasing chances of hostility among the 
members as “[...] some of the most intense rivalries were found within rather than beyond 
their confines” (Joshi BL 2004:4). Furthermore, “This helped set the psychological basis 
for integration in a unified nation-state system” (Rose, 1980:15). The relatively new 
emergent elites in the hills possessed the sense of political tradition, mostly being acquired 
from their experience of being victims of the expanding Mogul empire on one hand and
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from the success of being the new subjugators on the other. These developments direct us 
towards a unique political evolution whereby the new elites and the ruling class within the 
territorial expanse of Nepal hill areas were not only of common origin within an exclusive 
citizenship model, but more significantly were the driving political entities to define the 
parameters of the nation building process in the years to follow.
There have been some concerns raison d'être behind the massive project of conquest and 
subjugation. “The creation of the Nepali state through military conquest was not the 
realisation of some inherent national sprit and natural unity” (Mikesell, 1999:89) as the 
principalities possessed traditional state characteristics, often devoid of self-consciousness. 
“These traditional state forms generally lacked conceptions of sovereignty, monopolistic 
authority, nationality, constitutionality and so on” (Pierson, 2002:31). Therefore, the 
protracted project of expansionism must have been “but a part of a longer project of 
extension of the estates and administrative machinery of the conquerors of the region” 
(ibid). And the prime factor behind the mission was “the existence of an exploited and 
desperate population which could be inspired or drafted into the project with promises of 
land and a sense of taking part in a transcendent project”(Mikesell, 1999:89). It was the 
way forward for greater social, political and economic opportunity for the project mangers. 
In those days, without the political definition of citizenship, the term was seen to define 
one’s belonging within one’s community while at the same time the moral obligation made 
mandatory the required allegiance towards kings and princes broadening it slightly towards 
a political entity.
“Following the conquest of the Kathmandu valley and the surrounding territories that were 
under Malla jurisdiction in 1769, the Shah dynasty of Gorkha embarked upon an exercise 
in imperial expansion never before witnessed in the Himalayan region” (Rose 1980:16). 
The expansionist policy incorporated two dimensions: one, to incorporate the hill 
principalities on peaceful grounds, and two, to mount an all-out offensive if principalities 
failed to comply. The emergent political organisation measured its stakes carefully; those 
that conceded to their project of subjugation were peacefully included into the larger entity 
while others that failed to do so were crushed, never to rise again. The elitists and ruling 
class in association with the hill ethnic groups, that predominantly formed the standing 
army, were therefore the creators of modem Nepal. The Terai population, being absent in 
the unifying project has been explicitly rendered second-class citizenship status even to this
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day. Consequently, the right-based issues raised by the Terai population have been 
identified as a politically challenging to the state-centri ideology of the state and as a result 
of which it represents a shimmering hot bed of identity politics. Regressive policies, 
therefore, have generated the congenial environment necessary for identity politics, as the 
citizenship crisis looms as never before.
1.2 The emergence of a sovereign state
The emergent sovereign authority appointed Bada hakim in each of the former 
principalities that had lost its ruling elites, for the general purpose of administration, 
securing law and order and for the vital purpose of revenue collection. These territories 
were compelled into the centralised political order. The territorial boundaries were fixed 
and authority extended to protect the state against possible foreign invasion, chiefly from 
the imperialist British India.
Nepal then consisted of a three-tyre system of polity. Territories exclusively under the 
centralised control, rajays that possessed limited degree of autonomy, and the territories 
inhabited by ethnic communities in the eastern hilly regions under moderate autonomy -  
although for a limited time. Rai, Limbu and Bhotes were the major ethnic groups subsumed 
into the larger entity from the eastern hilly regions. The forms of political organisation of 
these communities were based on ethnic boundaries and communal systems with common 
language, common culture, common history and tradition.
For the majority of the principalities, it was a forced ‘treaty settlement’ while for those who 
opposed the annexation process, it was through the implication of lethal violence that 
acceptance was insured. The special case of the Limbu community and “kipat” the 
community owned land, need some fair treatment. “The kipat system may have been a relic 
of the customary form of land control which communities of Mangoloid or autochthonous 
tribal origin established in areas occupied by them before the immigration of racial groups 
of Indo-Aryan origin” (Regmi, 1999:87). The annexation process gave way into a forced- 
deal between Subbas, the local chieftains of the Limbus and Gorkha Empire in the form of 
treaty agreements and the “[...] treaties also guaranteed the kipat (communal land 
ownership) tenure system[...]” (Ross, 1980:19), and each Subba in the community was 
made the local representative of the central authority. The royal proclamation following the 
annexation of these territories in 1774 stated,” In case we confiscate your land may our
293
ancestral gods destroy our kingdom” (Regmi, 1999:93). Despite the guarantee of their 
rights and privileges over the territory, the state as elsewhere continued to expand its 
organs in greater efforts to create a centralised bureaucracy to achieve its objectives of an 
absolutist state. The Subbas were added to the pool of emerging elites while at the same 
time, the majority negotiated their conununal rights to ensure their own privileges and 
positions as a token of bargain. Culture, religion, language and traditions being bound to 
the ancestral land, the confiscation was an example of hegemony and internal colonisation.
The reconciliatory policy introduced in 1883 “consisted of a series of measures designed to 
reduce the area under kipat landownership and bring kipat lands with the ambit of the 
raiker tenure. The appointment of Limbu headmen and the official confirmation of their 
traditional religious and other customs were made subject to the surrender of kipat lands 
under raikar tenure” (Regmi, 1999:93). Although this strategy officially ended the promise 
made during the unification, much of the community owned land had been encroached 
upon by the migrating hill parbates. With the centralisation of the means of production into 
the hands of the feudal class, the extension of bureaucracy and a powerful army at his 
disposal, the king was truly the sovereign as the sole owner of the state and the subjects as 
well.
The fundamental fact is that the absolute form of monarchy representing a specific time in 
the social relationship of production is in contradiction with the social consciousness of the 
present day where the former supportive structures have substantially changed that no 
longer can sustain the institution of monarchy as an embodiment of the divine and 
charismatic form destined to rule. In support of this view, we can therefore add that the 
sovereign must undergo deconstruction in favour of popular sovereignty in an environment 
where the social consciousness of the productive forces has advanced beyond sustaining 
the political and ideological grounds that sustained the institution of the absolute sovereign. 
It was as a result of these social contradictions, that the mass movements following the 
1970s in Nepal have been oriented against political system of monarchy, in favour of 
democracy and liberalism that in its truest sense is antithetical to rule of the sovereigns.
294
1.3 Rise of the absolutist state
The political developments, following the unification, clearly outline the trend of the state 
formation towards centralisation and uniformity. The ideology behind centralism mainly 
stemmed from the material needs of the ruling class and the new elites. The necessity of 
consolidating control over the territory through bureaucracy and military enforcements for 
revenue collection; menace posed by the colonial apparatus, which had already ventured 
into the Himalayan region in 1767 to resist Gorkha accomplishment over Kathmandu, and 
finally the emotional nationalism and bahadur (state of being a brave Gorkhali ) 
chauvinism which formed the inner core and buttress to the ideology itself, that often has 
accompanied European nationhood and the nation building processes in the past.
Prithvi Narayan Shah ascended the throne of the newly founded state based on principles of 
absolutism. The time-event described by historians is coterminous to the modem period 
implying the emergence of a modem state. However, the political developments during the 
interlude find common grounds with traditional formations rather than confirming to a 
modem period as compared to that of Europe. Mikesell (1999:89) raises a serious concem 
over the unification process and argues over the rise of the abolitionist state emphasising 
that “It represented the extension of already existing relations and forms of organisation 
rather than a radical departure for something new.” He links the political unfolding to be 
restricted within the framework of a traditional state or the estate system where feudalistic 
forms dominated the social relations. However, departing considerably from this viewpoint, 
“Poggi (1990:42) describes the absolutist state unambiguously as the first major 
institutional embodiment of the modem state” (cited in Pierson, 2002:34). Pierson 
favouring the middle a ground concedes “[...] absolutism is perhaps best seen as a 
transitional form, albeit one that spanned several centuries. It began under what were 
clearly late feudal circumstances and was eventually overtaken by forms which are more or 
less universally regarded as ‘modem’” (Pierson, 2002:34.). In view of Pierson’s argument, 
the social relations of production in Asia in general and Nepal in particular have always 
had significant time-lapse vis-à-vis Europe; and have intrinsically embraced and 
contextually differing courses in social, political and economic developments. Nepal, 
during the unification and periods that followed, was incontestably, a feudalistic state and 
many social scientists confirm the social relationship of production to be of similar nature 
even today; although strong views opposing this traditional analysis have surfaced in recent 
times. Pierson’s argument, may be refined while trying to contextualise it within the socio­
295
political process in Nepal and reorganise the statement that although absolutism is perhaps 
best seen as a transitional form in Europe, which began during the late feudal 
circumstances, Nepal has had its own classical experience.
The feudal circumstances and absolutism resisted changes: the changes which are more or 
less universally regarded as ‘modem’, thus, it is debatable to acknowledge ‘absolutism’ as 
being a transitional form of a short span in strict sense, as it continues to resist change 
while remaining strong enough to battle against evolving forms of modemity since the time 
of its advent, i.e. from 17the century. Nevertheless, a very slow movement has been 
observed within the spectmm of Nepalese political evolution; however, one needs to agree 
that in the absence of clear and well-defined boundaries between absolutism and modem 
form of nation-state, it will be difficult to place Nepal in either one of the two categories. 
Rather, the characteristics of the two forms infringe into one another, creating a third 
dimension i.e. a polity firmly rooted to the bedrock of absolutism on one hand and with 
ample forms of modemity on the other. Feudalism and absolutism reinforced one another 
ensuring non-capitalist modes of appropriation as the state represented the feudal lords and 
landed elites. This strategic balance maintained its valor for centuries to follow. Thus, 
when we compare the evolution of political organisations in Europe with those of Nepal, 
we should agree that the trend of political evolution has not been linear and political 
processes in operation have not therefore been similar.
Absolutism signalled the emergence of a form of state based upon: the absorption of 
smaller and weaker political units into larger and stronger political stmctures; a 
strengthened ability to rule over a unified territorial area; a tightened system of law 
and order enforced throughout a territory; the application of a ‘more unitary, 
continuous, calculable and effective’ rale by a single, sovereign head; and the 
development of a relatively small number of states engaged in an open-minded, 
competitive, and risk laden power straggle (Poggi, 1978, cited in Pierson, 2002:35).
The Gorkha expansionism brought an end to the squabbles and warfare among the 
numerous principalities, for dominance and control, it succeeded in raising political 
awareness among the ruling elites not in the sense of creating an environment of fair 
politics, rather it was concemed with the methods of coercion to appropriate surplus from 
the peasantry. The post-unification period represented feudalisation, expansion and 
strengthening of feudalistic structures rather than the general trend in Europe where it “[...] 
constituted an attempt by the established landed nobility to protect their position in a period
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of increased commodification, more particularly in circumstances in which traditional 
labour-rents (and their attendant economy) were giving way to money-rents (and the 
consequent emergence of wedge labour” (Pierson, 2002:35). This was the classical and 
representative nature of the transition process, where a absolutist state evolves into a 
modem state, embracing capitalist mode of production relations. Christopher Pierson 
(2004:8) illuminating the advent of the absolutist state explains:
An important part of the coming of the modem state was the move away from this 
multi-centred and pluralist stmcture of powers towards a single (absolutist) centre of 
power mling over an undivided social order. Fundamental to this process of the 
centralisation of power was the increasing pacification of the society. To some extent 
the monopolisation of violence with the state was matched by pacification of 
relations in society.
To sway control over the expanded territory, Kathmandu was made the capital in 1770. The 
new regime had to reform the traditional forms of political administrative system in 
operation within Kathmandu valley prior to the unification. Furthermore, system of 
taxation had to be strengthened that would be essential in supporting the archaic, 
centralised and expanding bureaucracy along with the mammoth military apparatus. All of 
these initiatives incorporated the ‘physical needs’ of the mling class above national 
priorities. Most importantly, the fresh regime required a new power-adjustment within the 
elite stmcture, which had undergone significant changes.
The expanded regime rather than being more representative and broad based, became 
strictly limited accommodating only four families, including the Shah dynasty as its pivotal 
centre as compared to the former Gorkha kingdom, that had a wider membership in 
decision making processes. Referring to the larger representation in the political process in 
Gorkha and keeping in view the ethnic diversity, Whelpton (1997:43) emphasises, “Magars 
and Gurungs were found among the ruling elites of Gorkha House.” However, during the 
post-unification period, the former courtiers of Gorkha were strongly dominated and many 
discharged as elites from other principalities entered into the central power structure in 
Kathmandu. Or, even if they remained, they redefined their identity seeking membership of 
the new ruling elites -  the process evolving in the manifestations of national elites. The 
national elites and ruling class mainly consisted of parbatya, strictly the five families of the 
Thakuris and Chetries. For the dispersed and divided elites of different principalities, 
Kathmandu formed the common meeting ground, following the completion of the
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protracted expansionist mission. Post-unification period precariously offered a stage for 
blood and violence not only among the members of the royal family but more explicitly 
among the bhardar (nobility).
1.4 Absolutist state and feudalisation
The tributary mode that evolved from the Asiatic mode of production have raised 
concemed debates among social scientists as it follows a differential course of socio­
political evolution that was absent from the western European experience. It is the main 
form of pre-capitalist class society characterized by the exploitation of the peasantry by 
both the landlords and the centralized bureaucratic state. Referring to Weber, while giving 
account of power relations during the feudal era. King (1986:39) explains, “The feudal 
value system could be used by the king to secure himself at the top of its hierarchical 
system of relationship, where loyalty is addressed to him as ‘feudal lord-in-chief and from 
which the personal element is then discarded. Loyalty is then to the nation of which the 
king is the manifestation”.
The appointment of badahakims in different parts of the conquered principalities as agents 
for revenue collection set in motion the collaborative forms of exploitation, as the agents 
were de facto official representatives of the landed elites. The whole idea of property 
ownership, with reference to land in Nepal’s case, has been based on traditional 
presumption that it is the property of the state (or king as the sovereign); although 
cultivated by an individual, it never formed a property that could be alienable. The total 
land, with the exception of limited area under tribal ownership (communalism), was under 
state’s jurisdiction for sale, mortgage or bequest, affirming the case of state-landlordism.
The rewarding of land to the royal family and its members, nobles, courtiers, army chiefs, 
allies etc, at the aftermath of unification resulted in the emergence of the private ownership 
of land. The state-owned land was relinquished in the land-tenure forms of birta, jagir, 
rakam and guthi. “Birta grants were made in appreciation of assistance rendered during 
military campaigns. [...] birta grants were made by Shah rulers to reward those who 
supported their newly established authority” (Regmi, 1999:25). The feudalistic forms 
gained further prominence through extensification of vast lands. However, the mountainous 
topography and limited agricultural land in the hilly terrains were the bottlenecks to full 
scale feudalism in classical sense. Against the backdrop of induced and extensive
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feudalization (apparently at an extremely later phase of history), the incapacity of the state 
to manage its function and rampant blood baths among the ruling class and elites, the state 
rather than evolving into newer form of organization inclined towards a pre-capitalist 
confinement. Agrees Joshi, “In sum the political process under Shah rulers was a deadly 
game of political poker played by the few privileged elite group of the Court” (2004:26). 
Indicating the familial disputes among the national elites opines Rose, “Thus in the 1770- 
1846 period, the politics at the central level was largely determined by intense struggles 
between political factions, most of which were family based” (1980:22).
Following the movement of 1950, the Shahs ruled the country with an iron fist and 
centralized their absolutism in political, social, economical, cultural, religious, lingual and 
other aspects of life and strived at legitimizing the institutions of monarchy. With these 
developments, the state gradually transformed acquiring more characteristics of capitalism 
at the expense of the former structure. The crisis in citizenship and identify politics is, 
indeed, embedded within the social structure, although, the economy and the political 
sphere cannot be excluded while analyzing the interrelated issues.
1.5 The Nepali nationalism
As history denotes, Nepali nationalism and its efforts to gain nationhood had been based on 
an expansionist ambition. It ignored the multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious social 
formations as it embarked onto the project of assimilating new territories. However, this 
segment of Nepalese history does not stand out as being deviant from the histories of other 
countries during their early phases of nation building. The common basis for the projects of 
statehood was conquest, coercion, assimilation, subjugation, and even execution. In the 
following passages, I will discuss the main characteristics that have defined the genesis of 
Nepali nationalism.
The emergence of Nepali national nationalism has been regarded to be coterminous with 
the unification process. Rather than the growth of nationalism in the sense of providing 
space to all that belonged within the territorial boundaries, the ruling elites pursued to 
achieve it through assimilation policies. The conquered population, irrespective of the caste 
characteristics or of ethnic background, was treated to subjugation of the larger kingdom. 
In doing so, the population not confirming to the khas identity were unprotected and 
rendered vulnerable from the dominance of the state culture, that was based on particular
299
identify, rather than representing the multitude of cultures that were in existence as material 
reality. However, hinduization, sanskritisation and tribalisation were active political and 
cultural processes, where the former two being dominant were foreseen by the ruling class 
and elites as being essential and vital in defining the new emerging state with a set-tone of 
nationalism. Although, khas kura, what is now known as Nepali language was groomed to 
be the lingua franca via the state’s coercive processes carving out its national identity, the 
vast pool of individual ethnic identities, cultures, religions and traditions continued to erode 
under the exacerbating conditions of vulnerability offered by what was perceived as the 
‘superior’ khas culture, religion, and way of life in general. Social exchange of 
internalization and acceptance of dominance, to a larger degree by the conquered was 
assured by state agencies representing dominant culture, religion and common sense of 
shared history.
Thus, the framework for nationalism and national identity had emerged based on dominant 
culture, religion and language through centralization of state policies while the sentiment 
for which was built around the defensive psychology arising from the fear of colonial 
powers that coincided with the rise of Gorkha Empire. In the later course during the Rana 
regime, parameters of nationalism were devised on the basis of Hindu religion, mainly 
through the surveillance of national code promulgated by Jung Bahadur as I have 
mentioned in Chapter 2. “Prithivi Narayan Shah, and those after him,” says Sharma 
(2004:211-212), “based the country’s unification on four key ideas: the unquestioning 
power and authority of the Hindu kings of Gorkha; the supremacy of the Hindu ethos in 
national life; social integration though the Hindu social system based on caste division; and 
recognition of Nepali as the language of government, administration and, in more recent 
time, education”. The vertical social hierarchies associated with Hinduism were extended 
to other communities to assimilate them into the dominant religion and social life. The 
trend of migration especially from west to east, north to south and from different parts of 
hinterlands to the capital had inculcated, in many ways, the Gorkhali sentiment among the 
hill people. However, the absolute notion of Nepal as a nation state (rather than just the 
Kathmandu Valley) and all those living within the territory as Nepali was progressively 
founded during the anti-Rana uprising that dug deep into the sentiments of nationalism and 
democracy. The notion of bravery along with its monarch-state-centric matrix embedded in 
the concept of nationalism was in total an emotional tool that particularly worked against 
the empowerment and emancipation of the vulnerable sections of the society.
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Nepali nationalism was also defined on regional fronts as a fight against the British 
imperialism. As stated before, during the anti-Rana uprising, “[...] the nationalism of many 
radical Nepalis, particularly among the Nepali community in India, was tempered by their 
commitment to the wider struggle against British rule in South Asia” (Gellner, 1997:45), 
and being equally so that the communist parties and nationalists throughout the region have 
always streamlined their policies against imperialism, banking chiefly on liberation and 
independence movements, catalyzed by the sentiments of nationalism.
Although the 1950 movement, being highly cherished by the pro-monarchial forces was in 
fact limited to ousting an oligarchy and transforming power to another form of absolutism. 
As the Ranas had established firm relations principally based on familial ties with the Shah 
kings, there appeared to be no demarcation of power in strict sense as the Ranas still 
controlled the security forces and consequently occupied prominent positions as landed 
aristocrats, ruling elites and camaraderie for the Shah rulers, not to mention of the fact that 
the settled agreement following the ‘revolution’ had the same Rana dictator as the first 
prime minister. During, what followed as a period of political reorganization for the 
monarch, the palace lost no time in it efforts to promote the institution of monarchy as “[...] 
the embodiment of national identity, particularly after the accession of Mahendra, who was 
less beholden to India than his father had been ... in a sense 1950-1951 simply saw an 
exchange of junior and senior roles between two wings of the same family” (Gellner, 
1997:46-47).
The political scenario remained extremely fluid over a period of ten years after the changes. 
Tribhuvan kept himself engaged in recreation with the political parties and played pretty 
well along the lines of disputes among the political forces and their leadership, especially 
with that of the Nepali Congress. King Tribhuvan then his son, king Mahendra never 
agreed to hold the constituent assembly promised by Tribhuvan at the time of anti-Rana 
movement. Instead» mounting loads of blame on the ruling Nepali Congress government 
that ranged from promoting nepotism, institutionalizing corruption, to forsaking of 
nationalism and national integrity, staged a coup d'état in 1960, threw the elected 
government behind bars and introduced a one-party authoritarian rule, two years later, 
called the ‘Panchayat Democracy’ and in addition, all those non-supportive of the king’s 
authoritarian regime were labeled ‘anti-national elements’.
301
The Panchayat system was said to be of nationalist nature, ‘suited to the soil of Nepal’ that 
took pride in establishing national culture, national language, national religion, national 
tradition, national economy. Reinforcing on the national symbols, the king embarked on a 
utopian political venture of creating a unified state founded on unitary principles. The 
decision of the monarch has been clearly expressed by Joshi and Rose (2004:395) when 
they state, “far more important was the decision to embark once again on new experiments 
in the structure, functioning and theoretical basis of the entire political system”. It is as 
important to note of an additional motive behind Mahendra’s political undertakings that to 
this day has been interpreted by intellectuals as being the means of demonstrating that 
democracy and monarchy are not only incompatible but antithetical at their best. As the 
answer to the argument, Mahendra denounced the democratic system as, “[...] clumsy 
western imposition incompatible with Nepal’s tradition” they further write, “ What was 
required, he announced, was a new “Nepali” political system that conformed to the spirit of 
Nepal’s traditions and culture” (ibid). Furthermore, the king was quick to analyze, as 
normal, that the consolidation of democracy would mean the erosion of monarchial 
supremacy. Thus, playing on the sentiments of the glory of the lost era, the leadership then 
was partly successful in generating minimal enthusiasm and partial unity among the ruling 
elites, landed aristocracy and ideologues of anti-expansionism.
The time of the royal coup also coincided with the global phenomenon of the rise of 
nationalism. The decolonization of Asia particularly, the Indian subcontinent in particular 
played a decisive role in the king’s risk-decision. The anti-British movements in South- 
Asia were strongly based on nationalism, national unity and national identity. The unity 
among the contrasting ideologies, cultures, religions and languages were anchored to this 
sentiment. Thus, nationalism in this context was also interpreted as an anti-imperialist 
ideology with substantial state-centric euphoria. Further, at domestic level, the king was 
determined to assert an active role to himself, rather than being constitutional and honoring 
the ethics of democracy and upholding the morals of liberty.
The leaders of the Nepali Congress, the leading political party during the 1950 movement 
and during the years that followed, were determined to remove the palace from the political 
process. It was not until the national elections of 1959 that the party was able to implement 
its political agenda. Its land reform programmes being perceived by the landed aristocracy 
as being extremely dangerous to their class interests, aligned with the monarch in the plot
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to terminate the democratic process mainly banking on the sentiments of nationalism. The 
groundwork had been laid down as the subsequent governments formed from 1951-1959, 
prior to the first national elections were “dubbed by the opposition as puppets dancing to 
the tune of the Indian Government in New Delhi” (Joshi and Rose, 2004:365). The 
allegation was not baseless either, given the precarious conditions and king’s meddling into 
internal affairs of political parties, in addition to the fact that all the governments so formed 
were strictly of his choice. The Nepali Congress leaders being groomed by the anit- 
imperialist movement in India were in friendly ties with the leaders there, however, there 
were many occasions where besides for discussing bilateral issues, the Nepali Congress 
leaders rushed to Delhi as internal disputes overwhelmed the party, with the hopes that the 
Indian Prime Minister, Neheru, would have them settled. Similar events were being closely 
monitored by the monarch and when the moment of power capture did prevail, he carefully 
crafted his way banking on the rhetoric of nationalism and patriotic ideology and built a 
political structure founded on traditional feudal forms.
Frederick Gaige (1975:173) discussing on the issue of Politics in the Nepalese Tradition 
refers to the work of Bhuwan Lai and Leo Rose while describing the nature of Panchayat 
system, that feverishly was claimed to be as indigenous as Nepal itself, possessed “certain 
features on the ‘National Guidance’ system in Egypt and Indonesia, the ‘Basic Democracy’ 
system in Pakistan, the ‘Class Organization’ system in Egypt and Yugoslavia, and the 
panchayat system in operation in several Indian states”. The political events during the 
sixties offer us the explanation around the use of the term ‘nationalism’. It was often 
involved with strategic arguments to sell ones agenda, as the term was extremely powerful, 
psychologically charged and sentimental. The panchayat system was terminated in 1990 
with a popular mass movement replacing the strange political setup with a multiparty 
democracy, that I have discussed in chapter one. The direct king’s rule that terminated the 
democratic process asserts Sharma (2004:212), “[...] did everything to retard the political 
process from 1960 to 1980s.”
1.6 Feudal regime
In feudalism, “relationships of loyalty between the lord and vassal could easily break down, 
and nobles might always be tempted to use their independent military resources against the 
prevailing feudal authority. The feudal regime was then characteristically fragile and 
acutely vulnerable to dissent and even to open warfare”(Pierson 1994:32-33). In 1845,
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Janga Bahadur Kunwar, a member of a minor courtier family, emerged as the new dictator 
after a successful massacre of twenty nine leading nobles and his potential rivals, including 
the prime minister. Following the nauseating episode of power capture, Jang Bahadur 
became the new prime minister and commander in chief while the rest of his sixteen 
brothers and family took control of the state apparatus. Within a month, thirteen members 
of Basnet family were eliminated in a similar plot known as the bhandar khal parba that 
virtually terminated the remaining traces of rivalry. He and his family members adopted the 
title “Rana” in 1858.
In the exercise of exclusive power concentration, Jung Bahadur took direct control over the 
judiciary, foreign relations (either declaring war or celebrating peace with neighbours), law 
formulation, besides heading the military apparatus. Thus began the ages of oligarchy and 
absolute dictatorships that grounded the state for one hundred and four years to follow.
During the oligarchy, the politics was based on belligerent practices that usually ended with 
the termination of ones rivals, and the political scenario within the Nepalese tradition was 
no different. In such an environment, the tactics of suppression and elimination of the 
opponents was a better way of realising power than seeking the necessity of 
accommodation. Interfamilial dispute grew within the Ranas primarily owing to the family 
classification of Ranas into AB and C categories putting an end to all but the A class in 
premiership succession. Besides the prevalence of power hunger among the ambitious 
contenders of A class, the antagonism offered by C class cumulated to be one of the notable 
reason for the collapse of the family-dictatorship. The practice of polygamy, which was a 
common social practice among the ruling elites, was another challenge to the Shah Kings. 
The relationships became complex and extremely politicised as queens frequently 
participated in conspiracies mostly involving the issue of heir to the kingdom. The nobles 
easily exploited the inconvenient situation as means to their self-seeking tendencies.
The persistence of the extreme forms of social dominance and exploitation by local and 
regional elites, that the central system had collaborated with to raise rent and taxes, 
confined the bulk of the people into dehumanising circumstances, offering an active 
resistance to the essentially needed social and political integration. However, as long as the 
tendency to resist and oppose the central authority was under control, the local agents were 
free to extort and appropriate the desired amount from the peasants and working class. In
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addition, to gain cooperation of these elites, grants such as land or trade benefits were 
extended by the centre. The Ranas continued to centralise the state resources and authority. 
Giving account of the exploitation practised by authority to enhance personal benefits, 
Regmi (1999:83) outlines, “no distinction was made between the personal treasury of the 
Rana ruler and the treasury of the government; any government revenue in excess of 
administrative expenses was pocketed by the ruler as private income” In the later years, to 
centralise and monopolise the political process further, land grants were restricted within 
the Rana families and to institutionalise the oligarchy and the process of centralisation, the 
total bureaucracy was brought into direct dictate of the nucleus where the central, regional 
along with the local administrators were directly responsible to the prime minister. “Any 
Rana could exact overt subservience from anybody he met in the hinterland as well as 
demand instant obedience to any direct command” (Rose, 1980:30)
The Ranas, insulated the country from external influence. The isolationist policy restrained 
even the slightest forms of information and learning, which prove to be vital for political 
transformation of a state. During the era of Indian independence, the growth of Nepali 
elites studying in India augmented into a new form of opposition based on political 
grounds. “A new form of opposition politics emerged in the 1920s, largely as a 
consequence of the exposure of some young Nepalese from upper -  and middle-level 
families to the Indian nationalist movement” (Rose 1980:32). After the independence, that 
ended the direct colonialism, the Ranas lost their closest allies. Besides these political 
developments, the World War 2 had promoted the fervour of liberation earlier promoting 
the sense of national identify and nationalism that further guided the popular uprising of 
1950.
Concisely, absolutism was concerned with concentration, centralisation and 
monopolisation of knowledge and power. Historically, unlike as in Europe, where the 
political phase of absolutism was in general a transition political order from feudalism to 
capitalism, in the Nepalese context, political absolutism provided, on the contrary, a 
congenial and adaptive environment to the feudal mode of production relationship, where 
the state played the tributary role.
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1.7 Expansionist state and international relations
During the time of its expansion, the Gorkha Empire was constantly at war with its 
neighbours. Expansionist ideology and war diplomacy formed the inner core of the state 
building strategy. “Mounting war (successfully) was essential to state-making,” argues 
Pierson (2004:39), but as state sovereignty were similarly lost, it was essential for a state in 
hostility with another to justify of its act of rampage to its own populace and establish 
legitimacy over its decision. The unification process involving war with neighbours 
continued for about one hundred and fifty years. Discussing on the general issues 
pertaining to wars or even the relative atmosphere of calm, the state’s role in securing the 
welfare of the general populace failed to be the agenda, which otherwise should have been 
made the legitimate basis for war in the first place. Pandey (2000:298) deviating from the 
general experience in the European context reiterates “there is little evidence of any ruler or 
a regime that has conducted foreign policy with primary objective of enhancing national 
security through efforts to increase the material welfare of the people”.
I would like to borrow Tilly’s term, coercion-intensive mechanism to stress the mode of 
extraction of the expenditure necessary for the series of war that Nepal was engaged in. 
This mechanism contributed to nation building, especially in a classical case where the 
bulk of the population consisted of poor peasants within the rugged Himalayan topography. 
The war albeit mobilised resources in its favour, it was the very act of extraction that built 
nationhood unlike that of western Europe where nation building required capital intensive 
and capitalised coercion modes of extortion. However, the wartime sentiments played for 
the regime that succeeded in mustering the required engagement for war-preparation where 
extreme coercive methods were used for extracting the dire recourses. Presenting his 
accounts on emotional commitment of states at war, Camilleri (1993:204) explains:
The ideology of ‘bureaucratic nationalism’ has enjoyed considerable currency, 
especially in times of war and crisis when identification of external threats has been 
used to great effect to uphold the traditions of the state and reinforce the emotional 
commitment to its territorial integrity. State nationalism, despite the vast institutional 
and technological resources at its disposal, has often failed to subdue or neutralise 
the powerful myths of symbols of ethnic identity.
Trade being the main concern of the expansionist vision, Nepal attacked Tibet to secure the 
strategic trade routes in 1788. The Gorkha occupied Tsang and the southern region of
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Tibet. A treaty was signed between Nepal and Tibet following the conquest that allotted 
direct and indirect commercial benefits to Nepal. During the second war with Tibet Nepal 
lost all its gains when it confronted the Chinese imperial army. Thus, the second episode of 
the battle ended the Gorkha’s ambition of expansion far to the north.
Following 1770s, the Gorkha army marched west conquering Kashmir and extending 
further into the Northern region of Panjab (Kangra). What followed next were the 
adventurous, illusionary and risky attempts for a greater empire. Disputes over the 
territorial ownership of Terai plains to the south brought the Gorkha and British India 
under a direct conflict. After many setbacks during 1814, British launched a massive 
attack, which finally ended the two-year Anglo-Nepali war in 1816. Sugauli Treaty was 
signed in March, 1816. Nepal lost all of its territory west of Mahakali River and its claims 
over southern Terai plains as well. With the loss of substantial territory, Nepal was 
confined into the present political expanse. The Treaty of Sugauli, recognising each others’ 
sovereignty, was confirmed in 1823 between Nepal and Great Britain. “Many articles in the 
treaty providing for terms and conditions of commerce with and through India and for the 
procurement of arms and ammunition by Nepal represent some of the foreign policy issues 
that continue to surface periodically up to the present times” (Pandey, 2000:302).
As part of its survival strategy, the Rana regime was keen on securing ‘good relations’ with 
British India; whose continued support and friendship became vital for their fortunes. Thus 
there was a great concern among the Rana oligarchy and in fact, always kept an eye open 
and waited for their chance of ‘offering a good gesture’. For example, Joshi (2004:37) 
outlines a high-level mission where, “Jang Bahadur helped the British during the critical 
days of the 1857 Indian revolt by personally leading a military campaign against the Indian 
rebels.” Bir Shamsher, after ascending the post of premier, granted permission for the 
recruitment of Gorkhas in the British Indian Army. Similarly during both of the World 
Wars, Nepalese fought under the command of the British and “in return British agreed to 
pay an annual subsidy to the Nepali government [...]” (Joshi, 2004:37).
After the end of the colonial era, the regional politics of independent India, and the attitude 
of the rulers vis-à-vis Nepal contributed to the later phases of political developments in 
Nepal. In its effort to win favour, the Rana regime cooperated with the Indian authority by 
deploying ten battalions to crush the rising munity in Hydrabad and Kashmir that had
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erupted due to India’s policy of assimilating these states into the Union of India. Furnishing 
the relevant information on this account Joshi adds, “When the Indian government became 
involved in military campaigns against the princely state of Hydrabad in 1949, for instance, 
Mohan Shamsher quickly supplied ten battalions under the personal command to his son” 
(2004:67). Although the Ranas offered almost everything at their disposal as concessions to 
the south to remain in good faith with the new rulers of independent India, it was the 
security concerns, associated with their own institutional and political interests on both the 
national as well as the international arenas that the ruling elites in India settled the rising 
anti-Rana revolt with an agreement.
Against the background of anti-Rana popular uprising, a treaty was signed between the 
Ranas and independent India, which institutionalised Nepal’s subjugation to India within 
its security umbrella. Illustrates Joshi, “In February 1950, the prime minister paid state visit 
to India and expressed in his speeches to determination of the government to assist India in 
any hour of difficulty, as it has assisted the British Raj”(2004:67). “The only tangible result 
of Mohan Shamsher’s visit was the signing treaties of peace and friendship and of trade and 
commerce between the two governments in July 1950” (ibid). “The Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship structured to reflect the Nepal-British unequal relations has been in fact more 
oppressive than the former treaty with Great Britain,” ilustrates Pandey (2000:308). He 
further stresses, “This treaty remains a bone of contention to this day and is considered by a 
wide section of Nepali community an affront to Nepal’s sovereignty and national 
dignity”(ibid). Referring to the Treaty, David Seddon (1984:44) emphasising on its 
economic aspect reaffirms:
It assured virtual domination of Nepal’s economy and perpetuation of unequal
relationship between the two countries.
The left-leaning theorists and political organisers have held fast to the relationship between 
India and Nepal as being semi-colonial in principle. The dynamics of centre-periphery 
relations expressed a colonial-conjugation with a facade political independence.
The rise of Ranas to power ushered domestic readjustment along with a change in foreign 
policy. China’s limited access to Nepal and its declining role in the regional political 
grounds inspired the rulers to concentrate on the political game towards the south. The
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imperial power was strong and dominant. Thus, with China’s declining influence and rise 
of the colonial power, Ranas made the choice to align with the sole regional power for their 
own security and personal gains. As a token of friendship, during Jung Bahadur’s tenure, 
the Nepalese army was dispatched in 1857, to quell the first nationalist movement in India. 
The tacit friendship demonstrated by both the countries continued unabated until the 
imperial decline. Referring to the role of the British in the affluent friendship, Pandey 
explains:
They had succeeded in making an inroad into Nepal that fulfilled the basic colonial 
objective of exercising monopoly in Nepal’s external economic and political 
transactions (2000:306).
To elaborate the discussion further, the isolationist policy, basically being the product of 
Rana regime, was also in the interest of the British that extended for the whole sub­
continent, in general - primarily for purpose of monopolisation of the resources. As long as 
it received what it sought, the colonial power was content with isolation, which kept the 
Nepalese people well into the dark ages. As the result, the oligarchy sustained unchallenged 
for one hundred and four years.
1.8. Advent of Absolute monarchy
As already stated before, Nepali state nationalism and its efforts to gain nationhood was 
based on expansionist ambition. It ignored the multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious 
social formations including regional uniqueness and territorial differences as it embarked 
upon the project of assimilating new territories. Prithivi Narayan Shah (1723 -  1775), the 
founder of modem Nepal, was the central figure in amalgamating the divided land into a 
single territorial entity. Thus, the newly formed state could also be viewed as the expanded 
form of the former smaller feudal estates, where he ruled. However, in the course of 
providing a new leadership, fresh compromises had to be made with the emerging elites, 
mercantile capitalist class and the feudal lords within the colossal political setup of the 
expanded state.
Following the territorial unification, the monarchy gained its institutional legitimacy 
through the massive exercise of reinforcing the feudal social structures, mode of production 
and appropriation. The rewarding of land to royal family and its members, nobles, 
couturiers, army chiefs, allies etc, at the aftermath of unification resulted in the emergence
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of the private ownership of land. The state-owned land was relinquished in the land-tenure 
forms of birta, jagir, rakam and guthi. “Birta grants were made in appreciation of 
assistance rendered during military campaigns. [...] birta grants were made by Shah rulers 
to reward those who supported their newly established authority” (Regmi, 1999:25). The 
feudalistic forms gained further prominence through extensification of vast lands. This was 
nothing new; rather being historical fact, Engels (1968:518) makes clear in Origin of 
Family, Private Property and State, that:
It was so in the medieval feudal state, in which the alignment of political power was 
in conformity with the amount of land owned.
(http://www.mai~xists.org/archive/marx/vvorks/1884/origin-familv/index.htm')
However, the mountainous topography and limited agricultural land in the hilly terrains 
were the bottlenecks to full scale feudalism in classical sense. The state’s regime depended 
on feudal lords and thus removed direct threat and possible mutiny against the feudal 
political structure. At the same time share in exploitation, appropriation and dominance of 
the vast majority of the people by feudal lords and those occupying the upper echelons of 
the social order represented the overall socio-political and economic structure. Against the 
backdrop of induced and extensive feudalization (apparently at an extremely later phase of 
history), the capacity of the state (the king) to manage/mismanage its function reflected 
Nepal’s rugged territory, diffused boundaries and frontiers and to its colossal size besides 
rampant blood baths among the ruling families and elites.
After the demise of Prithivi in 1775, power struggle among the ruling class and elites 
gained momentum. As a result it, it ended with a bloody climax in 1845 when Janga 
Bahadur Kunwar, a member of a minor courtier family, emerged as the new dictator after a 
successful massacre of twenty-nine leading nobles and his potential rivals, including the 
prime minister. Later he took the title of ‘Rana’.
Following the nauseating episode of power capture, Jang Bahadur became the new prime 
minister and commander in chief while the rest of his sixteen brothers and family took 
control of all key positions. Agrees Joshi, “In sum the political process under Shah rulers 
was a deadly game of political poker played by the few privileged elite group of the Court” 
(2004:26). From this period onwards, (1845-1950) the kings in Nepal resembled
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figureheads or simply titular kings, resulting from their own shortcomings and inefficiency 
for a period over a century.
The institution of monarchy being politically titular should not be read in an absolute sense 
as being equivalent to the state of non-nonexistence. Rather the institution was yet strong 
on social and religious accounts although having lost most of its political and executive 
authority. Ranas after succeeding in establishing intermarriage relationships with the kings’ 
Shah Family, gained social legitimacy; whereas, through the practice of and reinforcing 
religious orthodoxy secured the support of Hindu population, landed aristocracy, and 
zamindars, who were vital for the extraction of surplus and state-agents for law and order.
The movement of 1950 that overthrew the Rana regime, succeeded in transforming the 
century-long titular status of the monarchy, although it never met the aspirations of the 
exploited masses. “Indian devised and Indian sponsored” (Rose, 1990:33) agreement was 
reached between Ranas and the King in Delhi in 1951, where the king regained his 
sovereign power while a Rana prime minister functioned as the head. The political setup 
being antithetical to the movement was an illegitimate exercise of India that shortly 
collapsed in an environment of political volatility. Following the peoples’ movement of 
1950, the institution of monarchy was developed into a coherent and repressive centralised 
force culminating into political absolutism with constant exercise to legitimise its political, 
social, religious, civic and historical accounts through the statures of nationalism, national 
unity, state symbolism, national language and national tradition. This exercise was 
exclusive of the Terai population, ethnic communities and religious entities that did not 
confirm to these. Within this socio-political composition of the nation state, characterised 
by extreme and unequal power relations, the state had been claiming equality of cultures 
and perfect environment of participation for all, despite the fact that these claims were not 
only baseless, but rather promoted the state policy of division exacerbating difference in 
power relations all the more. However, these efforts functioned as a temporary calm 
amidst the oppressive state machinery. The identity politics arising from unequal power 
relations made its forceful appearance in 1990.
1.9 Democratic movements and globalisation
The Nepali state is in the crossroads of redefining its nationalism, after the historic 
movement of April 2006. Its effort has been to shift away from its imperial and
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expansionist version and national identity that were centred on the omnipotent and 
omnipresent monarch. The movements, particularly following the 1960s, have emphasised 
on the necessity of a democratic state with a clear emphasis on bringing an end to the 
prevailing monarch-subject relationship.
As the political, social, historical and religious explanations offered in support of absolute 
monarchical regime have lost not only their political justification, rather the moral and 
religious grounds to their favour have also shrunk without any likelihood of revival. The 
institution of monarchy representing the state during the nation building process is 
irrelevant today. The burgeoning identity politics in Nepal has its intrinsic relationship with 
the institution of monarchy, especially as it represents the dominant political, social, 
religious, cultural, lingual and regional aspects of everyday life. The identity claims 
revolving around these issues, therefore, are closely linked with socio-economic inequality, 
exploitation and alienation of broad masses from state-crafted mainstream. Furthermore, 
the claims to redefine national identity sprouts from lingual perspective as well, where the 
Nepali language has been declared the official national language while the national 
symbols are limited to preserving the culture, geographic meanings, and official history of 
the dominant. 1 have identified the institution of monarchy as the key institution 
exacerbating citizenship crisis in Nepal.
The national movements that Nepal has experienced have been inunensely influenced by 
international forces, especially India. The influence of India on the Nepalese affairs was all 
embracing during the Rana Regime. During the interim period of 1951-1959, Rose and 
Scholz (1980) affirm the relationship to be inconsistent, troublesome and often contentious. 
The political pressures often derived from its security perspectives have had intimidating 
affects on the sovereignty of Nepal as a nation sate. Since conclusion of the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship with independent India, Nepal has been viewed as having lost its sovereign 
status. A strong argument has been forwarded by intellectuals and Maobadi alike that the 
Treaty that was concluded with the collapsing Rana regime, should no longer be binding, 
rather its abrogation is the only solution. “However, if a similar binding agreement is 
required between the two states, a new balanced treaty may be arranged and worked on 
equal footing that is fair to both the parties,” said Bamadev, a leader of CRN (UML) in a 
interview. Similarly, the trade agreements between the two countries have also been the 
bones of contention.
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CP Mainali, Chairman of the CPN (ML) said:
Balanced and amicable agreements mutually beneficial need to be worked out with 
good intentions. In addition, the issue of uncontrolled and open boarder between the 
two countries has been one of the fundamental reasons behind suspicion and feeling 
of mistrust because of its political implications. Nepal-India relationship sometimes 
turns sour on issues such as dams and hydroelectric projects built by India along the 
border without consulting Nepal.
While the projects involving water management, joint-ventures and trade relations with 
India have always been subjected to political debates rooted to inkhng and suspicion, much 
of India’s involvement in Nepali affairs have been viewed by Nepalese as being stemmed 
from its colonial attitude.
In the modem sense of globalisation, Nepal albeit has remained in the periphery, the 
process as a whole has influenced all aspects of urban life. The globalisation of politics has 
been the predominant feature for the last few decades. Globalisation of culture and 
globalisation of market trail behind although contributing and shaping the political process. 
The 1950 movement thus was the first of its nature, while revitalisation of nationalism and 
redefinition of national identify marked the social movement as a pro-democracy 
showdown. The political globalisations of the 1950s with western twists and turns, and 
legacies of enlightenment and renascence have been forming the intellectual package of 
political justification in Nepal until today. Concerning the volumes of political activism 
following the seventies have been of immense importance. The suggested period represents 
the growing contradictions between the Nepalese middle class, working class and 
professional organisations against the feudal monarchical forces and forces of regression. 
The political developments during this tenure represented the growth of the Communist 
party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) and leftist ideology; the resurgence and assertion of 
political consciousness, the sense of equality, social justice and participation; urgency of 
universal suffrage, and necessity of reduction in monarchical powers. These issues 
composing the package of awareness were the product of domestic socio-political 
processes besides being shaped by the global discourses and examples.
In a similar manner, the support for the institution of monarchy gradually decayed with 
significant reduction in the classical and traditional sentiment. While the changing forms of 
transition in and around urban centres were strongly experienced, the vast rural population 
was left unaffected. This built in a second tier contradiction between the urban thought
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processes and rural reality detaching the political leadership and urban elites from rural 
lives.
Against this backdrop, the anti-Panchayat movement of 1990 was no exception in the sense 
that it kicked off with demand for human rights and political freedom as many revolts 
conjure up in post-colonial scenario. Most of the groundwork having been completed by 
forces antagonistic to the monarchical rule needed a triggering agent to set it on fire. India, 
seeking an advantageous political opportunity clamped an embargo by cutting off its 
exports to Nepal over the unsettled disputes between the two countries while working on 
the Trade and Transit Treaty. The shortage of goods and services in Nepal set off the 
movement against the government that overthrew the Panchayat dictatorial regime 
introducing parliamentary democracy for the second time.
Democratic movement of 1950 that followed the anti-imperialist victory in India, was 
virtually an inevitable political achievement based on new level of social consciousness 
and resurgence of nationalism. On the global scale. South Asian and African liberations 
also had their impacts on the Nepalese political processes and the leadership. In this 
respect, the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy was the result of global inspiration and the 
product of the pan-awakening reality of the populations during the colonial regimes. The 
movement of 1990 was part of the third wave of democracy, internally being built on issues 
of human rights, democracy, social justice and equality, and promised progress and 
development.
Since the anti-Rana movement of 1950, Nepal has experienced episodes of democratic 
environments followed by coup d'états orchestrated by the monarchy. In the global scale, 
the first and the second waves of democracy have rendered powerful impacts on political 
structures that were otherwise adamant to social changes. The pressure towards attaining a 
democratic polity from authoritarian milieu chiefly arose from the need for social justice, 
equality and equal opportunity - the principles that underline the idea of citizenship. This 
also affirmed social and political participation among the people besides assuring economic 
prosperity. The local conditions and global processes have been shaping the political, social 
and economical milieus.
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At the same time, the growth of identity politics has also contributed to the weakening of 
official nationalism as a political tool. The local trend of identity assertiveness or ethnic 
awakening, and global trend of globalisation have been acting in opposite directions 
stretching the state and weakening it substantially. In this respect, citizenship constitutes an 
outstanding socio-political issue and through its distributive nature, identity politics 
become articulated, as has been apparent in Nepal.
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Appendix 1
A Forty-point demand of the Maobadi
40-point demand of the Maoists presented to the Prime Minister of Nepal on 4* Feb.
1996, before the party went underground.
Concerning nationalism
1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be 
abrogated.
2. The so-called Mahakali Integrated Treaty conclude on 29^  ^ Jan. 1996 should be 
repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty 
and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal’s water resources.
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and 
systematised. All vehicles with Indian licence plates should be banned from Nepal.
4. The Gurkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be 
provided dignified employment in the country.
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A ‘work permit’ 
system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the 
country.
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should 
be stopped.
7. An appropriate custom policy should be devised and implemented so that economic 
development helps the nation become self-reliant.
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi 
films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs 
should be stopped.
Concerning people's democracy
10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the 
establishment of a people’s democratic system.
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.
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12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under the people’s 
control.
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act should be repealed.
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons for revenge in Rukum, 
Rolpa, Jajarcot, Gorkha, Kabhre, Sindhupalchok, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, 
and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately 
withdrawn.
15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror should be 
immediately stopped
16. The whereabouts of citizens, who disappeared in police custody at different times, 
namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subadi and others, 
should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of 
victims should be duly compensated.
17. All those killed during the people’s movement should be declared martyrs. The 
families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly 
compensated, and the murders brought to justice.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. 
Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic 
communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own 
autonomous governments.
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The 
system of untouchablity should be eliminated.
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right 
to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. 
The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists, and cultural 
workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the Terai should be eliminated. 
Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should 
be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.
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Concerning livelihood
27. Land should belong to ‘tenants’. Land under the control of the feudal system should 
be confiscated and distributed to the landless and homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and 
nationalised. Unproductive capital should be invested to promote industrialisation.
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be 
arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed 
and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until alternative 
infrastructure is guaranteed.
32. Poor farmers should be exempt form loan payments. Loans taken by small farmers 
from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate 
provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.
33. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should 
be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.
34. People in flood and drought- effected areas should be provided with appropriate 
relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The 
commercialisation of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. 
Essential goods should be cheaply and easily made available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads, and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery and the practices of middlemen 
and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and the children should be duly honoured and 
protected.
Source: Understanding the Maoist Movement o f Nepal (2003:392-395) edited by Deepak 
Thapa
The government of Nepali Congress Party rejected these demands and adopted 
repressive measures to suppress the Maoist activities. As part of their revolutionary
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plan, the Maoists increased their guerrilla activities underestimating political 
activity dialogue among friendly forces. Reports highlight the fact that since 1996 
about 1800 people have died, whereas unofficial reports claim about 4,000 deaths, 
mostly of Maoists, security forces and common villagers. Following 2003, the 
Maobadis had strong presence in over seventy districts. Rolpa, Rukum, Jararkot, 
Salyam and Kalikot districts were hardest hit according to government reports 
whereas the Maobadi claimed Rukum and Rolpa to be their base areas of 
revolution.
Appendix 2 
The origin of the Maohadi (Maoist party)
With the loss of more than 13,000 lives and billions of dollars worth in property, the Nepali 
state has been virtually ripped apart and brought to a stand still. During these years, the 
state has been consumed in it its effort to reclaim its declining legitimacy from the parallel 
pseudo-state. The Maobadi andolan is a powerful movement based on ideology, myths, 
beliefs and behaviour, the different aspects of which I will discuss throughout this chapter. 
The first communist party was named the Communist Party of Nepal after its formation in 
April 22, 1949 in Calcutta.
“The background to the foundation of the party dates further 20 years or more back” 
(Gautam, 2004:3) in conjugation with the anti-colonial movement in India. As many 
Nepalese youths began uniting with the Indian cause of independence, the forthcoming 
messages along with the values of freedom, democracy and liberation became the 
supporting pillars for the inception of Gorkha League in 1920. The message of freedom and 
democracy swiftly called for a domestic scrutiny as well where the Rana oligarchy held 
sway over Nepal. This organisation became the first of its kind to denounce the autocratic 
feudal political system in Nepal, which I have elaborated in Chapter 2. Sensing the urgency 
to organise, “the Gorkha League was formed in the Indian district of Deharadun that later 
commenced with the publication of Gorkha Sansar and Tarun Gorkha” (Rawal, 1991:16). 
In the following decades, and especially after the end of the colonial rule in India, the 
growing political awareness and sense of human dignity, paved a way for a strong people’s 
opposition that overthrew the Rana regime.
331
The politics, then, was centred on the agenda of democracy while the slogan of 
revolutionary land reform attracted peasants that help to amalgamate the working class, 
chiefly peasants, into the elitist agenda. It was amidst the growing social turbulence that 
Nepal Communist Party was formed (see Annex).
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Genealogy of the communist parties of Nepal
Source: Thapa, D., (2003) “Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal,” Kathmandu: Martin 
Chautari Center for Social Research and Development 
*Modified through interviews
Adhikari group
CPN (ML) 1978
CPN (ML) 1998
Rayamajhi 
group 1962
Amatya 
group 1962
CPN (UML) 1998
CPN (Mashal) 1985 CPN (Masai) 1985
CPN (Marxist) 
1987
CPN (UML) 
1991
Central Nucleus 
1969
P. L. Shrestha 
group 1968
Jhapali uprising 
1971
CPN (Mashal) 
1983
CPN (Janamukti)
Fourth Convention 
1983
Fourth Convention 
1974
CPN (Maoist) 1994CPN (UML) 2002
Proletarian
Workers’
Organisation
CPN (Unity centre) 
(United People’s 
Front Nepal (1994)
CPN (Unity Centre) Masai (1995)
Breakaway faction of 
Dr. Bhattarai, Kunwar, 
Rayamajhi, and others 
form Rehel Masai group
CPN (Unity Centre) 
with 
United People’s 
Front Nepal 1991
Communist Party of Nepal 1949 
Puspalal, General Secretary
Genealogy of the communist parties
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Appendix 3
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM)
The declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement was adopted in March 1984 by the 
delegates and observers at the Second International Conference of the Marxist-Leninist (now 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) Parties and organisations, which formed the Revolutionary 
Internationalist Movement.
In 2004 the following were the participating members of the RIM according to its declaration the 
same year:
Cevlon Communist Fartv (Maoistl 
Communist Partv of Afghanistan
Communist Partv of Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist) [BSD (ML)]
Communist Partv of India Marxist-Leninist) (Naxalbari)
Communist Partv of Iran (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist)
Communist Partv of Nepal (Maoistl 
Communist Paitv of Peru
Maoist Communist Partv (Turkev-North Kurdistan)
Maoist Communist Centre of India *
Maoist Communist Partv [Italvl
Maixist-Leninist Communist Organisation of Tunisia
Proletarian Partv of Purba Bangala (PBSP) [ Bangladesh ]
Revolutionary Communist Group of Colombia 
Revolutionary'’ Communist Partv. USA 
(From A World To Win 2004/30, P. 31)
* Maoist Communist Centre of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (People's 
War ) united in 2004 and became Communist Party of India (Maoist).
In 1984
Central Reorganisation Committee 
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
Ceylon Communist Party 
Communist Party of Agit/Prop (Italy)
Communist Party of Trento (Italy)
Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist)
334
Mao Tseing Regional Committee 
Communist Party of Peru 
Conununist Party of Turkey /Marxist-Leninist 
Haitian International Revolutionary Group 
Nepal Communist Party (Mashal)
New Zealand Red Flag Group
Nottingham and Stockport Communist Group ( Britain ) 
Proletarian Conununist Organisation, Marxist-Leninist ( Italy ) 
Proletarian Party of Purba Bangala ( Bangladesh ) 
Revolutionary Conununist Group of Colombia 
Revolutionary Communist Party, India 
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA 
Revolutionary Conununist Union (Dominican Republic ) 
Union of Iranian Communist (Sarbedaran)
Source: http://cpnm.org/new/RIM/rim index.htm 
Retrieved: 9/4/2008
Appendix 4
Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), is a 
body of coordinating the Maoist Parties and Organizations and their struggle and action in South 
Asia. Each Party or Organization is independent to make its own decision and implement into 
revolutionary practice. All the participating member organizations are equal. Therefore, any 
organizational methods as being applied in a particular party or organization cannot be applicable 
here. The Organisation will function on the basis of consensus. The participating Parties and 
Organizations are those which are either waging and leading the People's War or are making serious 
preparations in their own countries and most of them are known by the enemies. Therefore it will 
work on an underground basis and secrecy should be essential part of its functioning. It is always 
necessary to remember the Maoist understanding that organizational principles and rules can never 
be substitute for ideological and political struggle and never be rehed upon as the principal means 
of resolving problems.
Source: http://cpnm.org/new/ccomDosa/cco/cco dclr.htm 
Retrieved: 9/4/2008
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Appendix 5
KATHMANDU, Nov 22 -
The seven-party alhance and Conununist Party of Nepal (Maoist), on Tuesday, made public their 
12-point ground breaking agreement that can redefine the Nepali political landscape in the days to 
come. The Maoists have agreed to shun violence in due course of time and join the political 
mainstream. Both the parties and the Maoists have also agreed to go for constituent assembly 
election, during which the UN or accepted international organization will supervise the weapons of 
both the rebels and the Royal Nepalese Army. The agreement was made public separately by 
alliance leaders and Maoists. The seven-party leaders released the statement amidst a press 
conference here today, while the rebels' supreme leader, Prachanda, made public the same via 
internet this evening. Read below the full text of the unofficial translation of the agreement.
1. At present all Nepalese desire peace, democracy, prosperity, social progress and independent and 
sovereign Nepal. To achieve this goal, we fully agree that the autocratic monarchy is the main 
obstacle. We are in clear agreement that peace and prosperity of the country is quite impossible 
without ending autocracy and establishing absolute democracy. Hence, all anti-regressive forces 
have come to an agreement to focus their attack against the autocratic monarchy independently, and 
bring it to an end by intensifying the ongoing democratic movement across the country.
2. The seven-party alliance is fully convinced that sovereignty and executive right of the people can 
be reestablished through the reinstatement of parliament (on the basis of people's movement); 
formation of all-party government with full executive power; talks with the Maoists and election to 
the constituent assembly. Whereas CPN-M believes that people's sovereignty can be established 
through formation of an interim goverrunent formed after a national conference of agitating 
democratic forces, which will oversee the election to the constituent assembly [This is the only 
point of divergence, so to speak, between the seven-party alliance and the rebels]. Both of us agree 
to continue negotiation and dialogue to reach common agreement in these procedural issues. 
However, we have agreed that people's movement is the only way to attain our agreed goals.
3. The nation has demanded constructive end of the present armed conflict and establishment of a 
lasting peace. Thus, we are fully committed to end autocratic monarchy and establish lasting peace 
through election to constituent assembly. In this regard, the CPN-M expresses its commitment to 
move into new peaceful political line. After bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end, we have 
agreed that the arms of both the Royal Nepalese Army and the Maoists will be supervised by the 
United Nations or a dependable international body to ensure free and fair election to the constituent
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assembly. Both parties have also agreed to accept the results of the elections. We also expect an 
involvement of a credible international community in the dialogue process.
4. CPN-M has expressed firm commitment to acceptance of competitive multiparty system, 
fundamental rights of the people, human rights, and rule of law and democratic principles and 
values and to act accordingly.
5. CPN-M has agreed to create conducive atmosphere to allow all leaders and cadres affiliated to 
other democratic forces and common people, who were displaced from home during the conflict, to 
return to their respective places with full respect. The Maoists have also agreed to return the houses 
and physical properties of people and party cadres seized unjustifiably. People will be allowed to 
take part in political activities without any hindrance.
6. CPN-M has also agreed to criticize itself for its past mistakes and has expressed commitment not 
to repeat them in future.
7. Parties will introspect on their past mistakes and they have expressed commitment not to repeat 
such mistakes in future.
8. During the peace process human rights principles and freedom of press will be fully respected.
9. The municipal and parliamentary polls which have been pushed forward with the malicious 
intention of deceiving people and the international community, and to legitimize the king's 
autocratic and unconstitutional rule will be boycotted and made unsuccessful.
10. People, representatives of people and pohtical parties are the real bulwark of nationalism. We 
are committed to protecting our independence, national unity and sovereignty, and safeguarding 
geographical integrity. It is our responsibility to maintain cordial relationship with all nations in the 
world—especially with our neighbors, India and China— based on the principle of peaceful co­
existence. We appeal to all patriotic Nepalis to be wary of the Mandate brand of nationalism 
preached by the monarch and his sycophants to protect their rule and interest. We also appeal to the 
Nepali people and international community to provide help to our Loktantrik movement.
11. We also appeal to all people, civil society members, professional communities, various sister 
organizations, journalists and intellectuals to participate actively in the people's peaceful movement 
launched under the common agreement based on democracy, peace, prosperity, social 
transformation, and the nation's sovereignty.
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12. The parties and Maoists have also agreed to probe into past incidents and take action against the 
guilty. In future, if any problem occurs among political parties, the concerned high level leaders 
shall discuss and settle the issues amicably through dialogue.
Source: http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=57919 
Retrieved: 07/01/2009
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